

Le Roy & Monsieur

THE ~~NEW~~ 59
COVNSELLOR
OF
ESTATE.

CONTAYNING THE
Greatest and most Remarkable Conside-
rations serving for the Managing of Pub-
licke Affaires.

Divided into three Parts.

THE FIRST
CONTAYNES THE MEANES
to settle an ESTATE. The second, the
meanes to preserve it. And the third, the
meanes to encrease it.

WRITTEN IN FRENCH BY ONE
of the Ancient Counsellors to the most Chri-
stian Kings, HENRY the Fourth, and
LEVVIS the thirteenth.

Translated by E. G.

OXFORD: BY ROBERT BARRETT, Printer.

LONDON:
Printed by Nicholas Okes. 1634.



ACADEMIAE CANTABRIGIENSI
JOANNES WORTHINGTON
JOANNIS VIRI CELEBERRIMI FILIUS
M. A. COLLEGII S. PETRI OLIM SOCIUS
IN PERPETUUM OFFICII ET BENEVOLENTIAE
TESTIMONIUM
D. D. D.



TO THE RIGHT
HONORABLE RICHARD

Lord WESTON, Lord High Treasurer
of England, Earle of Portland, and one of
his Maiesties most Honorable Priuy
Councell.

Right Honorable:

They were the words of the
wisest King & best know-
ing man, Pro: 11: 14. *That*
where no Counsell is, the peo-
ple fall, and where many
Counsellors are, there is
health: Which words he almost reiterates to
strengthen that position: Chap. 15: 22. *With-*
out Counsell thoughts come to nought, but in the
multitude of Counsellors there is steadfastnesse.
And it was the saying of Cicero, the excellent
Orator, and Statesman of Rome: *Non vi-*

The Epistle Dedicatory.

ribus, aut velocitate, aut celeritate corporum, res magna geruntur, sed consilio auctoritate, & prudentia. Cermenatus lib reg. & rer. &c. cap. 18. telleth vs, that it was obserued by the most skilfull Architects of the ancient times: The broader and higher they proposed their buildings, the more solide and deepe they layd their basses: so (saith he) since none are more eminent amongst men then Princes, or beare more waight vpon their shoulders then Kings, meete it is they should haue the best Counsellors, on whom to leane as vpon a firme and stedfast foundation, to dispose as well of matters which belong vnto State as Religion: And such *Orosius* tells vs, *lib. 7. de Reg. instit:* Ought to be *maximo ingenio praediti, bonis Artibus exculti, longorum vsuperiti: In Historijs diligentissime versati, neque praesentia tantum sagaciter odorantes, sed longe in posterum, quod utile futurum reipub. sit, coniectura prouidentes.* With a gracious King are we blest: with such a Counsellor is he furnisht: who (as *Rabanus* in one of his Epistles informes vs:) in plaine things search what may be mysticall and obscure.

In

The Epistle Dedicatory.

In small (seeming) matters what may be of moment , by what is neare , to coniecture of things remote , and out of parts , to gather a whole , by which mature consideration they know as well readily to vndertake them , as speedily to dispatch them : Now knowing your Lordship to be such an one , namely , a *Counsellor* and *Statesman* , euery way accomplished ; After transferring these *Remarkeable considerations* , for the management of *publique Affaires* , from the naturall *French* into our moderne *English* : And further being most assured , that your *Greatnesse* hath euer bin accompanied with *Goodnesse* , and your *Wisedome* with *Clemency* , it hath bin a great imboldning vnto me , to make a dutifull presentment thereof to your *Gracious perusall and Patronage* , not to the purpose that these can be either your *Direction* or *Instruction* , (as being frequently conuersant in all the passages of this Nature) but rather to expresse such things to your view in our Natiue Dialect , which I know you to bee most expert in , in the Originall . Needlesse it were to teach *Typhis* how to steare a Ship ,

The Epistle Dedicatory.

or instruct *Antomedon* to guide a Chariot, should I apprehend any such ambition, I must necessarily incur the aspersions of impudence, or expresse such palpable Ignorance as might draw me into a iust imputation of folly : But Right Honourable, such is my Modesty, that by studying to be free from either, I may euade the aspersions of both : onely desiring your Lordships best construction of these my weake and vnpolished labours, which present themselves so rudely into your presence, whose more weighty imployments can scarcely allow any retyred *Hour*, to cast a second Eye vpon that, (howsoever Naturaliz'd) which (no doubt) you haue formerly perused in the *Natiue*. Notwithstanding, Honourable Sir, presuming vpon your knowne *Gentlenesse* and *Generous Disposition*, I humbly prostrate my selfe with these my imperfect labours to your most *Judicious Censure*, whose least distaste is able to stifle the hope of the suruiuing thereof euen in the *Infancy*, and whose fauorable approbation hath power to giue it life vnto all posterity :

Your Honours most humbly deuoted

Edward Grimeston.



**A Table of the Chapters, and the
Contents therein containd.**

Chapter. 1.

O*F the establishment and forme of an Estate, and
the diuersity of the Governments thereof.*

Diuers sorts of Principallities, a Royall, Seignou-
riall, and Tyrannicall; of the Commaund of a few,
and of a popular Estate.

Chapter 2.

*Of the aduantages and disadvantages of a Popular
Estate.*

Chapter 3.

*Of the aduantages and disadvantages of a Seignoury
or Commaund of a few.*

Of the Seignoury of Venice, and by what meanes
it preserues and maintaynes it selfe.

Chapter 4.

*Of the aduantages and disadvantages of a Principallity
or Royall Estate.*

That the Subiect hath no cable to desire liberty
in a Principallity.

Chapter 5.

A consideration of the setting of the forme of an estate.

The Table

Chapter 6.

Of the dependancy of Estates one of another.
Wherein the dependancy of Estates one of another doe consist. The Markes of Soueraignty.

Chapter 7.

Of the forme of Estates, according to the right of those which command.

Chapter 8.

Of aduantages and disadvantages of Election in a Royalty.

Inconueniences of an Election in a Royalty. Aduantages of the said Election. A consideration of the Election.

Chapter 9.

Of Succession diuersly practised in Successions.
Succession of Women. Reason why they exclude Women from Government in some Estates. Diuersity in the Succession of Males.

Chapter 10.

Of Vsurpation, or an unlawfull Command.
Of the miseries which it doth produce, and the difficulties which are found in it.

Chapter 11.

Of the diuersity which is found among the Subjects of an Estate.

The diuers conditions of Subjects, varies the forme of an Estate. Of Slaues. Of priuiledged and simple Subjects. Of Strangers.

Chapter 12.

Of the diuersity and distinction of Subjects, according to their Vocations and professions.

The

and the Contents.

The Cause of the establishment of Comminalties and Companies in an Estate. That the Prince ought not to crosse them, nor suffer them to attempt any thing about their power.

Chapter 13. *Of Religion.*

Of the efficacy and necessity of Religion in an Estate. Of the abuses in Religion.

Chapter 14.

Of the meanes held in the setting of Religion.

Extraordinary meanes for the establishing of the true Religion.

Chapter 15.

Humane meanes for the establishing of Religion.

The disposition of people to be considered for the establishing of Religion: Barbarous people Ciuillized. Who are properly called Barbarians: Barbarous in Religion. Of the Authors of most part of Religions at this present. Barbarians in their forme of living; In their habits; In their habitation, and in their government. That the manner of proceeding for the establishing of Religion, ought to be diuers. Prophecie dispothly a people to the establishment of a new Religion: Charges and ouer-charges dispose the people to change Religion. Diuersity of Religions. Indifferency of Religion makes way to a change. A Reuolt and Ciuill Warres dispose to a change of Religion; As likewise excessive liberty, and contempt of Religion. The reuision of a Countrey vnder the same Prince, facilitate the setting of Religion.

Chapter

The Table

Chapter 16.

*Of the parties necessary for those which will
bring in a new Religion.*

Parts and quallities necessary for such as seeke to bring in a new Religion. That instruction is a powerfull meanes for the establishing of a Religion. That the zeale of Religion must be accompanied and guided by discretion. Of Spirituall and Temporall powers, and of their iurisdiction. That observing of the Ceremonies of an ancient Religion, facillitates the establishment of a new.

Chapter 17.

*That diuersity of Religion is dangerous in an Estate :
How they ought to carry themselves, to preserve
the ancient Beliefe, in the diuersity of Religi-
ons which are crept into the
Estate.*

Diuersity of Religions in Egypt. There ought to be but one religion in an Estate. Diuersity of religions which is dangerous in an Estate, ought to be auoyded, yea in the lightest matters. How they ought to gouern themselves to preserve the ancient beliefe, in the diuersity of Religions which are crept into the State. Of the extirpation of Heresie, and a new Religion in its breeding, and how they ought to gouerne themselves. That it is not expedient nor fitting to seeke to roote out Heresie by Armes, when it hath taken footing in an Estate. The tolleration of Religions in an Estate, is lesse preiudiciall then a Ciuill Warre. Warre agaynst Heretickes fortifies their party, and giues them great aduantages.

It

and the Contents.

It is dangerous for a Prince to Arme agaynst his Subjects, if hee bee not assured of the event. A good aduise to weaken the party of a new Sect or religion.

Chapter 18.

Of the disorders which happen in Religion: and of the meanes to prevent them.

Chapter 19.

Of the establishing of the Councell of Estate: and of the Qualities and number of

Counsellors.

Of a Councell of Estate. Qualities of Counsellors of Estate. The great difference betwixt an Old Counsellor and a Young, for that which concerns their aduice: A mixture of Old and Young Counsellors of Estate. Obstinacy a wilfull vice in a Counsellor. He ought to be without ambition, and not depending of any other. Irresolution, a dangerous vice, and to be auoided in a Counsellor of Estate. Hee ought not to be too confident. Of the change of Counsellors of Estate. Of the multitude of Counsellors: who are to be otherwise employed.

Chapter 20.

Of the plurality of Councels of State: of the power of a Councell, and of the order in deliberating their opinions.

The power of a Councell. A Consultatiue voice. A Deliberatiue voice. Equality among Counsellors.

Chapter 21.

Considerations for a Prince who is to bee Counsellor.

Sufficiency

The Table

Sufficiency and eapacity necessary for a Prince.
Of the manner how to demand Councell. To receiue
Councell. To examine it. To resolute and execute
it. Of the flattery of Councillors : and how the
Prince ought to auoide it. Of the truth and liberty
which ought to be in a Councillor of Estate. Of the
chiefe Ministers of Estate. A good course for a Mi-
nister of Estate to free himselfe duely of his charge.

Chapter 22.

Of the forme of commanding.

Of the power. Of the Law. Diuersity of Lawes.
The ayme and end of the Law. Qualities conside-
rable in the establishment thereof. Of the breulty of
the Law. Of the Princes absolute command.

Chapter 23.

What we must auoide in the making of Lawes.

Of the multiplicity of Lawes : and the causes
thereof. Of the obseruation of Lawes. Of the se-
uerity. When the Prince may dispence in following
the Lawes. How they ought to gouerne themselves
in the seuerity.

Chapter 24.

Of the particular Commanders of the Prince.

Chapter 25.

Of Magistrates.

A distinction of the Officers and Ministers of an
Estate.

Chapter 26.

Of the difference betwixt Officers and Commissaries.

Considerations to be made vpon a Commission.
Of the person from whom it proceeds. Of the di-
rection

and the Contents.

rection thereof. Of the charge of the Commission.
Of the duty of a Commissary.

Chapter 27.

*Considerations upon the establishing of Officers
and Magistrates.*

Of the number of Officers: That it is more safe to
commit a businesse to many, then to one: That the
plurality of Officers is profitable to an Estate.

Chapter 28.

Of the Creation and Nomination of Magistrates.

The Creation and choice of Officers must be made
by the Soueraigne, and not otherwise. That the char-
ges must be distributed proportionally to the Nature
and capacity of the person. Principall qualities re-
quired in an Officer and Magistrate. The Vices and
Defects are as well to be considered, as the Vertues
and Perfections, in the choice they will make of
Magistrates and Officers.

Chapter 29.

*Of the forme and manner of Creating and making
Magistrates and Officers: and of the time
of their Charges.*

Three kinds of Creating and making Magistrates.
The time of their Charges either for life, then for a
limited time. Reasons and Considerations to make
Officers for a time. Other Considerations to the
contrary. Change of Officers and Magistrates ne-
cessary in a Popular Estate. Meanes to hinder the v-
surpation of the State, by the continuance of Off-
cers in great places. The practice of the Pope, and
the Seignoury of Venice, in the disposition of the
great

The Table

great places of their Estates, to hinder the vsurpation. The praefise of Kings and Princes vpon the same subiect. That the change of Prime Officers and Magistrates, is necessary for the safety of the Prince, and the quiet of the Subiect. Prudence required in this change. That they must not giue great Commaunds to those that are borne in a Province.

Chapter 30.

Of the duty of principall Officers and Magistrates.

In what the duty of Officers and Magistrates do consist. Of their duty towards the Lawes, towards the examination and interpretation thereof. How a Magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the interpretation of the words of the Law. In the intention of the Law. Of the reason of the Law, and of the scope thereof. That he must hold himselfe vnto the Authority of the Law, and not flye subtilties vpon equity. Of the execution of the Lawes or ordinances. Consideration for the sayd execution. From what time and when the Law or ordinance doth bind. What they are whom it binds. Of the force of Lawes and Ordinances. Of Custome. Three things requisite to make a Custome.

Chapter 31:

Of the duty of the Magistrates towards their Soueraigne.

Wherin the duties of the Magistrates towards the Prince doe consist. Of the Princes commaunds: and how the Magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the allowing and verifying thereof. The Magistrate

and the Contents.

strate ought to obey the will of the Prince, although it should be vniust. The Magistrates disobedience vnto the will of the Prince, is of most dangerous consequence. That the Magistrate is not allowed to leaue his place, rather then to verifie and publish the vniust Command of the Prince. Causes and reasons for the which hath bin brought in the manner and Custome to verifie the Edicts, ordinances, and Commandments of the Prince by the Magistrates. How the Magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the execution of Commandments, there hapning a reuocation.

Chapter 32.

Of the duty of Magistrates one toward's another.

Three degrees of Magistrates, and of the power of cyther of them. The duty of the Superiour or prime Magistrates. That it is fitting for the Prince to indure the iudgment of the Magistrates. Of the Kings procter. The power of a Lieutenant is equall to that of the Magistrate. The power of the Magistrate is of no force out of his iurisdiction. Of two Magistrates equall in power; and of the execution of their ordinances or iudgements, vpon one anothers territories. Of the execution of sentence given by the Officer of a Forraigne Prince vpon the iurisdiction of another. Of Magistrates equall in power. Of a body or Colledge, and of their power and Command one ouer another. The difference betwixt opposition and Commandment That they may hinder one another by opposition before the Act, or by appeale after the Act, but not to command.

Chapter

The Table,

Chapter 33.

Of the duty of Magistrates to private persons.

Diuers powers of Magistrates: Of their duty to private men in giving Iudgement. Of the obedience and respect of private men to the Magistrate executing his office. Of the Magistrate wronged. When and how he may be Iudge in his owne cause. Mildnesse and patience required in a Magistrate. Prudence and Gravity without passion. The duty of Magistrates.

Chapter 34.

Of the Iustice of Commandments.

Rules and Considerations in the Iustice of Commandments: A mixture of the Law with the will of the Magistrate: Of the temper which the Magistrate ought to obserue in the Law. Of the distribution of offices and dignities, distribution of rewards and punishments: Harmony in Marriages: Harmony in the diuision of goods.

Chapter 35.

Of the setting of the forces of an Estate.

Prouision of Armes and Shipping: Armes offensive and defensue. The quality of defensue Armes. That they must not be condemned: They augment courage. The quality of offensive Armes: Two sorts of offensive Armes. Of the beauty and ornament of Armes.

Chapter 36

Of Forts; and of their profit for the preservation of an Estate.

The scituation of Forts, necessary and profitable. They

and the Contents.

They must be farre from the heart of the Estate.
They must be strong by scituation and fortification.
Great, and in a place where they may be relieued.
That they must not neglect the Fortification in places which are strong by scituation.

Chapter 37.

Of Warfare.

Of the advantages of Horse and Foote. Of the choice of Souldiers. That they may not vse Strangers as little as may be.

Chapter 38.

Of the number of Souldiers in ordinary Train Bands.

Two sorts of Souldiers. Of Subsidiaries. An order to practise them in the time of peace; and to prevent their Mutinies. Of their numbers. A meanes to draw the Subjects of an Estate, without charge to the Prince, and to hinder the Reuolte and Mutiny.

Chapter 39.

*Of the forme how to make a Leuie of Souldiers :
of the Place : of the Age : of the Stature :
and of their Vocation.*

The particular manner of the Romans. The danger of mutiny vpon the change of Captaines. Of the choice the Captaine ought to make of his Souldiers. Of the place whence he should take his Souldiers. Of their Age, Stature, and Vocation.

Chapter 40.

Of the Forces at Sea.

Chapter 41.

Of the Riches of an Estate.

The Table,

That the power of an Estate depends of its riches.
What is necessary for the Wealth of an Estate.
Wherein the Wealth of an Estate doth consist.

Chapter 42.

*Of the causes of the abundance and wealth of an Estate:
That is to say, in Tillage, handiworkes: and
the commerce with Strangers.*

Whence the abundance of necessary things doth grow. Tillage well husbandred causeth abundance. The cause of the neglect thereof. That it is not vnworthy of a Prince. Manufactures cause abundance in an Estate. An aduice to multiply Workmen. Three considerations for Commerce. Of Merchandize which we may and ought carry to Strangers. Of the transport of Gold and Siluer. Of raw Matterials. Of the bringing in and entry of forraigne Coine into an Estate. That the course of forraigne Coyne ought not to bee allowed. Merchandize whereof they should hinder the entry.

Chapter 43.

Of the facility of Commerce.

Trafficke at Sea profitable and honourable. Advantages which the publique and priuate should receive, if the Nobility gaue themselues to the Commerce at Sea. An order established by the *Hollanders*, for the continuance of the Trade at the *East Indies*. The great reputation which they haue gotten by the meanes of trade. A meanes to establiish the trade at Sea in an Estate.

Chapter 44.

Of parsimony or sparing.

That

and the Contents.

That Parsimony preserves the wealth of an Estate. That it imports much for the safety of an Estate. Wherein excess doth consist. Of the excess in buildings. The orders which they observe in *Flanders* & the lowe Countries for their buildings in Towns. Of the excess in moveables, Followers, Feasts, and Play.

Chapter 45.

*Of the settling of the Treasure, and ordinary
renew of an Estate.*

Of the ordinary Renew of demeanes, and of the establishment thereof. That no alienation ought to be allowed; much lesse ingagements. Entries and issues out of the Estate. Tributes, gifts, and pensions. Traffique in the name of the Publique. To deliver money at interest to Merchants: and the advantages which grow thereby. Of the sale of Offices. The source and spring of their abuses. The inconveniences which grow by the sale of Offices.

Chapter 46.

*Of Taxes; and of extraordinary Levies, Imposts,
and Loanes.*

Diuers formes of Taxes and Levies. Of such as are exempt from Taxes. Of the place where they ought to levie the Taxe. The Introduction of Tolles, tributes, and imposts. Of the valuing of goods practised by the *Romans*: Abolished by Tyrants. Imaginary inconveniences of the sayd valuation of goods, and without reason. Advantages which would grow thereby to the State. Of extraordinary Levies. Of the mildnesse, profits, and Iustice thereof. Of casuall impositions.

The Table,

Of Tolles and impositions vpon Suits. Of Loanes.

Chapter 47.

Of the manning and good husbandry of the Treasure:

That is to say of the regulating of the expence,

and of the abatement thereof.

Of the order of the Expence. Almes. The Charity of the King St. Lewes. That Almes neuer impoverish. The discharge of necessary charges in the Estate. Of the wages of Officers and of Debts. Recompences to the discharge of the Treasure. Gifts and gratifications. Establishment of publique houses and Seminaries for the instruction of Youth, as well in the Liberall Arts, as in Mechannicke. Seminaries of Piety, Seminaries of Honour, for the instruction of the Nobility. The profit of the sayd Seminaries of Honour for the Estate. Expences for the commodity and adorning of Townes and Prouinces. Cutting off the Expences. Of the Iustice and necessity for the abatement of Debts.

Chapter 48.

Of such as ought to be imployed in the manning of the Treasure.

Of the choice they ought to make of such they will imploy to gouerne the Treasure. The commendable custome of the *Romans*. Youth is more fit to manage the Treasure then Age. That experience is not so necessary. The Duty of a Financier or Receiver. The forme to rule Accomptants: and of those which ought to heare and examine their Accompts.

Chapter 49.

Of the Exchequer.

Reason

and the Contents:

Reasons & considerations which make the Exchequer hurtfull to the Publique. Reasons to the contrary. Necessary considerations to lay vp Treasure. Prudence, Wisedome and discretion necessary concerning the Exchequer. A remedy why the Exchequer should not trouble or hinder the Commerce. Difficulties for the guard of Treasure in gold or silver.

Chapter 50.

Of treaties in generall, be it by the enter-view and conference of Princes, or by their Deputies and Embassadors.

Of the care and manning of Forraigne affaires. Estates are like vnto great buildings, which should haue supporters without. Of the care a Prince should haue of the affaires of Strangers, and of his Neighbours. How hee should gouerne himselfe with his Neighbours. Generall Considerations touching the manner of treating. Of the enter-view and conference of Princes. That there is danger then of the breach of Friendship, and of the good intelligence which was formerly betwixt them. That a Prince before hee conferre with another, must haue a care not to breede any Iealousie or enuy against him, nor to fall into any contempt. The consideration of the place of the enter-view must be great in regard of safety. Which of the two Princes vnequall in quality, ought to come first to the place of conference. What Princes ought to doe before their meeting, not to giue cause of Iealousie to their Neighbours. Of Deputies and Embassadors to treat

The Table,

with a Prince, and of the choice he must make. The qualities of a Deputy and Embassadour. Of secret treaties, and of the diuers intentions for the which they are made. That he must watch and stand vpon his guard more then euer, when as they propound any treaty, and especially during the said treaty. That a treaty ought not to be held firme and assured, if it be not ratified by the Prince with whom hee treats. Of the place where treaties of Peace, or a League ought to be made. An Embassadour going to a Prince to treat with him, whether the Prince be bound to treat with him himselfe, or by Deputies. Of the sitting of Embassadours: Of the power of Embassadours of either side, of the clauses of treaties. That they must haue a care the clause bee not ambiguous. That generall clauses are Capitious.

Chapter 51.

Of Treaties of Peace and Truce.

Diuers intentions for the which they make a truce. That they must haue a great care to the Conditions of a truce.

Chapter 52.

Of Treaties of Alliance.

Of Defensue Leagues. Diuers considerations for the treaty of a League. Ordinary Causes of Leagues. Of the time when a League should bee made, and how long it should continue. That the ioynt Allies are bound to recouer the Countrey of their Allie conquered by the Enemy. The contribution of a League. Of the place where the contribution

and the Contents.

contribution in money should bee deposited. Of the head of the League. Which of the Confederates should ratifie and declare himselfe first. That an offensive League and forraigne Enterprize doth seldome succeed according to the hope of the Allies. Of the causes of the breach of Leagues. Of Leagues betwixt meane Estates, and of the Defects which are often found. Of the succours of some against others among the Confederates. Of the Defence of one who is not allied against an Allye. Of the Alliance betwixt Princes and vnequall Estates, that is to say, of protection. The difference betwixt a Pension and a Tribute. Of protection. Of the mutuall Duty of the protector, and him that is protected.

Chapter 53.

Of the differences which grow betwixt Allies and Neighbours: and of the decision thereof.

Of Hostages giuen for the assurance of the passage of a Prince, passing through anothers Estate. The assurance of a treaty. That it is dangerous for one that is in protection to receiue a strong Garrison from his protector, to make him Master of his Forts, and depositor of the Treasure of the Alliance. Appointing of Iudges for the dicision of differences betwixt the Allies. Of a Compromise betwixt Allies vpon differences which may happen. Of a Compromise vpon a possession. When and how a Prince ought to meddle to reconcile a difference betwixt his Neighbours.

The Table,

Chapter 54.

Of the rupture of Treaties ; and of the constancy and assurance of the word of a Prince in his Treaties.

The meanes how to fortifie a Treaty, to the end they fall not to any breach, pretexts of a rupture. Of the obligation a Prince hath to keepe his word. That force nor feare ought not to dispence a Prince of his word and promise. That the constancy and assurance of a Prince in his word is very beneficiall vnto him.

Chapter 55.

Of Treaties of Neutrallities.

Two sorts of Neutrallity. Aduantages and disadvantages of a Neutrallity. That a powerfull Prince ought not to leaue a Neutrallity without great cause. That Neutrallity is more beneficiall vnto a weake Prince, then if hee made himselfe a party. A consideration to depart from a Neutrallity.

Chapter 56.

Considerations for a Prince, which desires to liue in good intelligence with his Neighbours.

How a Prince ought to carry himselfe vpon the demand which is made vnto him by one of his Neighbours of some difficult thing. Hee must not bee too credulous of that which Princes say, he must fauour the Commerce with his Neighbours : He must cunningly nourish distrusts and iealousies betwixt them ; to gayne credite with them ; and to testifie his good affection. Of the feeling hee ought to haue of injuries receiued from his neighbours. To pierce into
the

and the Contents.

the designs of his Neighbour. Of the Introduction of Embassadors.

Chapter 57.

Of the Charge of an Embassadour or Agent.

Of the difference betwixt an Embassadour and an Agent. The qualities and perfections required in an Embassadour. Instructions for an Embassador, how he should governe himselfe with Strangers, and in a Forraigne Country. Of the priuiledges of Embassadors. How Embassadors ought to governe themselves towards their Masters. Of their dispatches.



PART. 2.

Chapter 1.

Of the parts and conditions in generall, necessary for a Prince and Soueraigne.

The preservation of an Estate consists in the Authority of the Prince. The loue of the Subiects is the cause of the Authority of the Soueraigne. Diuers meanes to gayne this loue.

Chapter 2.

Of the parts and conditions necessary for a Prince, to purchase the loue of the people.

Effects of the mildnesse of a Prince. The mildnes of a Prince consists in pardoning of offences. Of the clemency of a Prince. To cherish great men; and to shew himselfe indulgent.

Chapter

The Table

Chapter 3.

Of the liberality of a Prince.

Two sorts of liberallities. The excesse of a Princes liberallity most preiudiciall to an Estate. Necessary considerations in liberallity. An order to be observed in liberallity. Diuers kindes of liberallity. Of liberallity which is given to acknowledge seruice and merite, or of free will. That the Prince ought to shew himselfe liberall, by gifts and benefits vnto those which may do him seruice agaynst his enemy, yea to those of a contrary party. Of the liberallity of a Prince to purchase Reputation. The manner of giuing. Benefits ought to be proportionable to the time and persons. Recompences of honour ought to be well husbandred. The Princes liberallity towards the publicke. The liberallity of a private man towards the publicke, ought not to be allowed. The Princes bounty and liberallity towards the publicke, consists in aduancing vertue.

Chapter 4.

Of the Princes Iustice.

Iustice diuided into two parts: Wherein the Prince should shewe himselfe a louer of Iustice, euen in that which concernes private persons. Diuers kindes of fraud, agaynst the which particularly, the Prince ought to shewe himselfe affectionate for Iustice. Two kindes of violence in an Estate, which the Prince ought to suppress. Of the grace and pardon of Princes towards offenders: and of the misfortune which many times befall. Cases wherein

and the Contents.

in the Prince may giue pardon. That the grace and fauour of a Prince must extend to the violence which is done vnto the Magistrate. Of the choice which the Prince should make of Iudges and Magistrates. Diuers meanes to make choice of those which ought to be established in the administration of Iustice. That the Prince should haue a care to to preserve Integrity of such as are to administer Iustice. Diuers meanes to preserve the Integrity of Iudges. Wages of Officers. Inquiries of their misdemeanors. Of compositions made with Officers, miscarrying themselves in their places, and of the inconueniences which follow. That a Prince hauing pardoned an Officer, ought not to leaue him in his Charge. Of Spies in euery Prouince, to inquire of the Carriage of Officers. Secret informations practised by King Lewes the twelfth, to contayne the Officers in their Duty.

Chapter 5.

Of the administration of Iustice.

Considerations necessary to a Prince, for the administration of Iustice. Of the order and speedy expedition. Of the expence of pleaders: being farre distant from their houses and families. In the vacation of Iudges. In the taxe of Registers, Vshers, and and such like Ministers of Iustice. In the Charges of Soliciters, Proctors, and Aduocates. Of the verification of Edicts by the course of Parliament.

Chapter 6.

Of the Reputation of the Prince.

Of the meanes by the which a Prince doth purchase

The Table

chafe authority. Of the Princes Wisedome and Vallour. That a Prince ought to haue an vniuersall knowledge of all Sciences. The meanes to purchase this generall knowledge. The practice of many great Princes. Of Experience. The knowledge of Histories necessary for a Prince.

Chapter 7.

Rules and necessary instructions for a Prince to be held wise.

Chapter 8.

Of Deceit and Cunning.

That it is lawfull for a Prince to vse Fraud, Cunning and Deceit, and in what manner. Diuers kinds of Cunning. Of Distrust. Of Dissimulation. Diuers practises and intelligences of Princes in one anothers Estates. Of Equiuocations, good words, promises, Letters, Embassies, and Lies, to get some aduantage. Proceedings of Princes, to warrant themselves, and their Estates from their enemies, vniust of themselves, but excusable through necessity.

Chapter 9.

Of the Reputation of a Prince, and of the meanes to get it.

Meanes to get and entertayne courage and vallor
Meanes to entertayne himselfe in health. Meanes for a Prince to purchase reputation.

Chapter 10.

Of the causes of the ruine of an Estate: and of the remedies which may prevent it.

Of the Remedies against that which may cause the

and the Contents.

the ruine of an Estate. The cause of the ruine of an Estate. A Remedy against the violence and force of Strangers.

Chapter 11.
Of the interior causes of the ruine of an Estate.

Of the nearest causes of the ruine of Estates: More remote causes of the ruine of Estates. Of the Defects of Soueraignes which purchase the hatred of Subiects. Remedies against the cruelty of a Prince. Remedies against Auarice of the Prince. Of the Defects of a Prince which breeds contempt; more dangerous then those which cause hatred. Defects in a Prince most preiudiciall.

Chapter 12.
Of the defects of Magistrates, Officers and Ministers to a Prince.

Corruption. Abuse and bad vsage. That change in an Estate is dangerous. A Remedy against abuse and bad vsage. Reformations. Necessary considerations for a reformation.

Chapter 13.
Of the defects in generall: Causes of the ruine of an Estate.

Defects and peccant humours in generall of the people. Remedies to preserve the Estate from these defects and bad humours.

Chapter 14.
Of diuers sorts of humours among the Subiects according to the diuersity of their conditions.

Three

The Table

Three sorts of persons in all Estates. Meanes to contayne great men in their Duties. Of great persons which are allied to the Prince. Of great men in Wealth and Reuenues. Of great men which haue force and credit among the people, by reason of their imployment in great affaires, and in gouernments. Considerations to aduance some one in Authority. Inconueniences which proceed by the continuation of one person in great Offices. Of the poore and needy. A meanes to contayne the common people in their Duties. Excesse and Vsury the principall causes of want and povertie.

Chapter 15.

Meanes to contayne Subiects conquered in their Duty.

To giue vnto Subiects conquered, a share in the gouernment of the Conquerour. Considerations to plant Collonies.

Chapter 16.

Of the nearest causes of the ruine of an Estate.

Of conspiracy against the Princes person. Of the disconery and punishment thereof. Of the causes, and of the meanes to prevent it.

Chapter 17.

Of Treason in places, Townes, and Armies, and other forces of an Estate: and of the Remedies to hinder the effects.

and the Contents.

Chapter 18.

Of Rebellions, and of the meanes to suppress them.

Chapter 19.

Of factions, and how to stop the effects.



PART. 3.

Chapter 1.

Of the increase of an Estate, and the enlarging of Townes.

To increase ours by our owne. Diuers meanes to enlarge and increas Townes. Profit drawes men to liue in Townes. The principall cause of profits in a Towne.

Chapter 2.

Of the increase of an Estate by the procreation of Children.

Of Poligamy, or many Wiues. Of Celibate, or a single life.

Chapter 3.

Of the amplifying of an Estate by the union of anothers to ours.

Diuers meanes to vnite another to ours. Protection of the weaker. Gifts and benefits. Purchases. In-gagements. Alliances by Marriage. Adoption, and Election. Necessary considerations for a Prince who desires to make himselfe great by way of Election.

Chapter 4.

The Table

Chapter 4.

*Of the increase of an Estate by
Conquest.*

Of the Enterprize of a Warre. Iust causes of a Warre. The vndertaking of a Warre must be done with Discretion, and not rashly. Important and necessary Considerations before we vndertake a War. Considerations for the making of Warre.

FINIS.

THE



THE
COUNSELLOR
OF ESTATE.
CONTAINING THE
greatest and most Remarkable
Considerations serving for the Man-
aging of Publicke Affaires.

PART I.
OF THE NECESSARY MEANES
to Establish an ESTATE.

CHAPTER I.

*Of the Establishing and forme of an Estate; and of
the diversity of the governments thereof.*



He Considerations which may serve for
the manning of publique affaires, are
of two sorts. Some are drawne from
generall Rules and Maximes, the which
are vsually followed and obserued in the
government of Estates; and the others
from Circumstances, which fall out in
particular occurrents. For as we may not so relye vpon

the first that we not examine and exactly weigh the particularities of a busines which may be obserued, be it in the Person which must assist; or in the causes, motives, means, place, time, and other circumstances: So we must not tie our selues so confidently to these last, as wee desist from the first. If necessity doth force vs sometimes to dispece, it must be in such sort, as we reserue a way to retorne againe, and to repaire the businesse.

Wee cannot prescribe any thing certaine for these last circumstances, all in particulars which are infinite, and depending principally vpon the sufficiency and particular experience of him which examines such affaires. Many haue written others, some of which suffering themselues to be transported with curiosity, haue mingled Doubts and Queres more fitting for a Schoole, then profitable to make vse of. But my designe in this Discourse is, to gather from the Ancients and Moderns, (who haue treated vpon this Subiect) that which I haue found most fitting for vse and the present Estate.

An Estate
what it is.

That which they truly call an Estate, is no other thing but an order, by the meanes whereof many Families and Comminalties are gouerned, hauing for their end the good of all in generall. But we may also call an Estate, these Families and Comminalties drawne together vnder one gouernment, and be it in the one or the other sense, we may say that all the generall considerations, which may serue for the manning of publique affaires, tend either to the establishing, or to the preservation, or to the encrease of an Estate.

Of the esta-
blishment of an
Estate.

For an establishment many things are necessary, whereof some must be settled among our selues, and others with strangers; as alliances, intelligences, and correspondencies, wherein consists the care of affaires abroad. Among our selues there must be established and regulated the forme of the Estate, Religion, Councell, the manner of commanding the force, and the Treasure, or Reuenues sufficient

sufficient to satisfie the Charges, and supply the defence, of the Estate.

The forme of Estates is diuers, according to the number; Of the forme the dependants and the right of those which Command, of an Estate. & according to the diuers qualities & distinctions of those which obey. According to the nūber of those which command, Estates are distinguished principally into three sorts.

The first is that, in the which one commands alone without Companion, the which wee call Principality. The second is that where the most eminent and apparent Men (which make the least part of the Estate) haue the Soueraignty, the which we call Seignoury. The third is that, whereas the people, or the greatest part of them vnder the Name of people command; and this may be called a popular Estate, or a Common-weale.

But euery forme of Estate is gouerned diuersly: so as of Principalities one is called Royall, when as some one commands according to the lawes of Nature, and the lawes of the Country, leauing the naturall liberty, and the property of goods to euery one in particular, hauing for their principall end the publique vtility: and in this manner most of the Western people of *Europe* are gouerned.

The other is Seignouriall, in the which the Prince is made Lord of their goods and persons, by the right of Armes and a iust Warre, or by the Custome of the Country, gouerning his Subiects as the Master doth his slaues; yet not straying from the lawes of Nature: And this gouernment (although it be rough and tedious) is held lawfull, if the conquest be iust. For where there is a subiect to make Warre, they hold that the force is iust betwixt two Soueraignes, which haue no superiour to decide their conrourerie; and that he may prescribe what Lawe hee please to the weaker. In this manner are ruled and gouerned all the people of the East and West Indies, of *Affrick*, and a good part of the *Leuant*; and euen in *Europe* the the *Muscovites* and the *Turkes* gouerne in this manner.

Tyrannicall.

The third is vnlawfull and Tyrannicall, in the which he that commands, hath no other ayme but his owne priuate profit, and hath no care of that of his Subiects; and for his greatnesse, reuenge, or auarice violates all Diuine and Humane lawes: so as he liues in continuall distrust of his Subiects, and intreates them with all rigour and seuerity against Iustice. I say against Iustice, for that we may not censure a Prince to be a Tyrant by his seuerity, the which a good Prince is sometimes forced to practise against the custome of his Subiects; Neyther by his guard of strangers, which they entertaine not only for safety, but for the obedience, ornament, and attendance of his Majesty: Neyther by his absolute commands, the which are more to be wisht for of a iust Prince, then the flattering intreaties of Tyrants, who draw after them a feare of an ineuitable reuenge.


Of a seignoury

A Seignoury which is gouerned according to the lawes, is called lawfull; as that of *Venice*, and of many Townes in *Germany*. But being gouerned by few men, we call it Factions; as that of *Athens*, vnder the Thirty Tyrants whom *Lixander* established: That of *Rome* vnder the Ten men, and afterwards vnder *Cesar*, *Pompey* and *Crassus*, and lastly vnder the *Triumvirat*.

Of a popular Estate.

A popular Estate is also gouerned diuersly. For either the affaires are in the hands of the common people; and then it is rather a tumult and an Anarchy, then an Estate; as *Athens* was gouerned, after that *Pericles* had taken from the *Areopagites* the power of iudging: Or else the people referre the gouernment to the aduice of some men whom they haue chosen amongst them; whose power and charge is limited to a certaine time, to the end that euery man should haue meanes to command in his turne; or else their Offices continue during life, to the end that by this continuation, they may make themselues the more capable of affaires. In certaine places, and in certaine affaires of importance, or of alliances, peace, or warre, euery one of

of the people giues his voyce, being assembled altogether in Common; as in some Cantons of the Suisses; or diuided by Parishes, Trades, Families, Companies, or Cominalties, as in old time at *Athens* and *Rome*.



CHAP. 2.

Of the aduantages and disaduantages of a Popular Estate.

EXperience hath taught vs, that wee may subsist in all these formes of Estate. But as there is nothing permanent in this World, through idlenesse and negligence the order is many times corrupted, and the State ruined, the which proceeds from the imperfections and defects which are found in all these Estates. Wherefore he that will settle an Estate, must consider carefully of the aduantages and disaduantages which are found in either forme.

The aduantages which they giue to a popular Estate, is Iustice and Equallity, or without fauour or respect of persons; reducing the ciuill constitution to the Lawes of Nature, which makes vs all Equall. Thus incutting off the auarice of some, and the arrogancy of others, loue and friendship is entertained amongst them, euery man enioyes the publicke good; and all being employed in affaires, this kind of Estate is commonly most fertile in great personages: The handy-crafts man by his employment in offices makes himselfe a great Orator and a great Captaine. Yet many haue held a popular Estate to be the worst, and most imperfect of all the formes of Government. For this equallity which they so much esteeme, is against nature, the which giues more graces to some and lesse to others: And if it be well obserued, there should be neither Magistrate nor officer that should

Aduantages of
a popular estate

Disaduantages
of a popular estate.

haue supriority about the rest : and this inequality ruins friendship in stead of maintayning it. As for the publicke, there is no Estate worse gouerned then a popular, there all things are sold as in a Faire (as *Plato* sayth) being gouerned by men bred vp and gluen to gaine. Men most commonly furious, if they be not terrified, and in their feare irresolute in all their actions, nothing secret, and difficult to be drawne together at need; and whom in many Estates, they haue bin forced to inuite them to assemble for the distribution of the publicke mony amongst them.

Their assemblies are alwaies full of disorders, varieties and inconstancy : the ordinary defects of a multitude. Wise men dare not speake, fearing the fury of the people, who alwayes lay their faults vpon their Gouvernors; and Fooles crying out loudest carry it. If you do not hold the people in some feare of strangers, stirring vp some Warre against them, they will forge a Ciuill; there being neuer any quarrell or enuy so great, as amongst those which are equall; be it to supplant one another; or for that the one cannot liue without the other. The need which they haue one of another, being the principall bond of ordinary friendship : and they are inconstant, being of an humour which cannot continue long in quiet; vnlesse there be some number of Citizens, who hauing credit and agreeing together, stay the violence wherewith the people suffer themselues commonly to be transported. The Swisses, which are gouerned in this forme of Estate, are assisted by the Country, to the which no man hath any great desire, and which of it selfe is strong by the nature of the people, who are very grosse and nothing ambitious; being diuerted from dreaming of innovations by their drunkenesse, wherein they spend more of their time, then they haue remayning, and would be necessary to thinke of, for the most quarrellsome and busie : Besides going to the seruice of Princes, and by the

the vnion made among the Cantons, who being separated from the Soueraignty, one cannot attempt against all the rest, for want of intelligence; and one attempting against the Cantons hee should haue to deale with them all.



CHAP. 3.

*Of the aduantages and disaduantages of a
Seignoury.*

THe Estate of many Lords, seemes to hold a meane betwixt a Principallity and a popular Estate, being neither subiect to the tyranny of one alone, nor to the confusion of a multitude: And the Soueraignty being giuen to the wisest, many see more then one, and few resoluing better then a multitude; it seemes that this kind of Gouvernement should be most desired. And if rich men haue the Gouvernement, there is no doubt, but the Estate wilbe better preserued: Hauing alwaies bin held profitable, that such as receiued most losse by the ruine of the Estate, should likewise haue the greatest share in the gouernment, as hauing the same interest with them of the Estate.

Aduantages of
a Seignoury.

Yet experience hath taught vs, that this forme is not more assured then a popular Estate, for where there shall be many gouernours, there will alwayes be diuersity of opinions; And euery one abounding in his owne Iudgement, (especially such as haue greatest authority) will finde out occasions of Disputes in their deliberations, and breed factions in the Estate. Their resolutions will be many times discouered, and being profitable to giue the gouernment to one more worthy, if in a Principality they are many times troubled to find one that is capeable, with more difficulty shall they picke out many, which

Disaduantages
and inconueni-
ences of a Seig-
noury.

may be capeable and worthy of this Command.

And if they will say that one may supply the defect of another, this would be difficult among equals; The voyces being numbred and not weighed: And admit this might be done, yet it were not good for the Councell, which must consist of a greater number then ordinarily the Lords are. But for the command which depends vpon a resolution of diuers opinions, of men equal in power and credit, it cannot well be but in one head.

Likewise in a combustion and trouble, they haue found that the Command of one alone was necessary, and that it was very vn safe in a time full of lealoufies, Difficulties, and Distrusts to impart the gouernment of affaires to many. The *Lacedemonians* vpon this occasion created their *Armoste*; The *Theſſalians* him whom they called *Arshoes*; The *Mitileniens* their great *Achimnete*; At *Rome* they created the *Dictator*; At *Venice* their great *Prouidator*.

Besides all these inconueniencies, a Seignoury as well as other formes of Estates, is not onely exposed to strangers, but more to the Enterprises of a multitude, whom they must content or keepe them in awe by force. To content them without yeelding vnto them part of the Estate, were very difficult, and it were impossible to admit them to offices, without danger to change the Seignoury into a popular Estate, as it happened at *Rome*. To retaine them by force, were no safe thing: and admit it might be done, yet the distrust they should haue of them, would be a cause that in the least warre attempted against strangers, they would make vse of this occasion, to take Armes and to shake off the yoake.

In this feare the Lords durst not traine vp their Souldiers to Armes; and entertaining strangers to mannage the the warre, it is to be feared they will get credit among the people. If they giue the charge of this conduct to one of their Lords, vpon the first discontentment he shal haue
against

against the rest, or vpon the least ambition that shall creepe into his braine, he will dis-vnite himselfe from them, and make himselfe the head of a party. So as this kind of gouernment cannot safely vndertake a War, without danger of ruine. So whether for the diuision which may grow among them, or for the weakenesse of power diuided among many; or be it for the difficulty to agree and resolue; Or be it that the Subiects many times know not whom to obey; Or for that affaires which ought to be kept secret, are most commonly divulg'd: This kind of gouernment is none of the safest.

And that which hath caused the Seignotry of *Venice* to continue so long, and to preserve itselfe against the Enterprises of the people, hath not bin this order so much, as the policy which the Magistrate hath vsed; imparting some petty offices to the people, yea, and some of the greatest, as that of the Chancellor; contracting alliances with them contrary to the ancient opinion of the *Roman* Aristocracy, which forbad such marriages; borrowing from them to oblige them to maintaine the Estate; disarming them wholly; giuing them liberty in all sorts of pleasure, to make them pliable; giuing vnto the rich the right of Burgoisie, and choosung some among the Cittizens to be made Gentlemen, to the end they might liue in hope one day to haue an interest in the Estate. And thus satisfying the Nobility with honours, the People with rest and commodities, inuring their Subiects to warre as little as may be, especially by Land; suppressing speedily all warre with strangers, and factions among themselves, entertaining a neutrality with Princes, not wedding any quarrels; and changing party as their interest change, thus they maintaine themselves.

Of the Seignoury of *Venice*, and by what meanes it maintaines it selfe,

XX

CHAP. 4.

*Of the aduantages and disadvantages of
a Principality.*

Aduantages &
disaduantages
in a Principa-
lity.

A Principality hath its Defects as well as a Seignoury or popular Estate. The first is the change of Princes, which bring with them new Designes, new Lawes, new Ministers, new Friends, new Enemies, a new manner of liuing, and new Alliances.

The second is the danger of falling into Ciuill warres by the diuision of such as aspire to the Crowne, especially if there be a right of election: and in the succession, if the Prince be an Infant, there will be a diuision for the gouernment betwixt the Mother and the Princes, or betwixt the Princes themselues. So as they haue beene often forced to auoid this inconuenience, to giue the breeding of the Child to the Mother, and the gouernment of the Estate to the nearest Kinsman. And if there be a Tutor, there is danger lest he make himselfe Maister of the Estate, as hath beene often seene among the *Macedonians*: If there bee many, they are reduced to the inconueniences of many Lords.

If the Prince be young, and freed from a Gouvernour, young men cause him to commit a thousand disorders, and to reiect all sorts of good Councell: And if he be warlike, he will hazard his Subiects, his Estate, and Person: If hee be subtil and wicked, hee will settle a Tyranny: If he be cruell, he will make a Butchery of his Subiects: If he be luxurious, hee will trouble the holiest Marriages of his Estate, which is a thing which doth most passionate the people: If he be co-

uctous

uetous or prodigall, he will be an exacter; and if he be simple and ignorant, it will be much worse, suffering himselfe to be gouerned by men of no merit, who for their owne priuate interest and greatnesse, will attempt all manner of villanies vnder his authority. Yet notwithstanding these inconueniences, it is most certaine, (as hath beene sayd) that a soueraigne commaund cannot subsist, (to speake properly) but in one person alone; as they say that many see better then one alone: But to resolue, to conclude, and to commaund, one will doe it better then many. As for Alliances of Princes, they doe not alwayes dye with the Princes, there being treaties which are made from one Estate into another. And in regard of the Princes minority, when it happens, the affaires are not alwayes found disposed to Innouation; and according to the occasions they may preuent the mischiefes which happen by this defect.

The other inconueniences are rather particular vices of the Prince, then defects of the Gouvernement, and vices dye with the Princes person, but not the vices and abuses of Lords in a Seignoury, nor of a multitude in a popular Estate, for that Comminalties neuer dye: But contrariwise as they are perpetuated by subrogation, so by contagion the abuses which enter into these companies, passe from one to another.

And in regard of liberty, which is the foundation of other Estates, being onely desired to hinder great men from oppressing their inferiours, this may be provided for by iustice, the which being duly executed in a Principality, the people hath no Subiect to desire liberty: for that this desire would onely tend to an Anarchicall licentiousnesse, which would make them more miserable then a iust and lawfull subiection. But that which makes the people vnable to iudge of the liberty which is in a iust Principality, is that true liberty consisting in not to be wrong'd,

That the people haue no cause to desire liberty in a principality.

no

no man doth acknowledge himsefse bound to him that doth not wrong him.



CHAP. 5.

*A consideration of the setting of the forme
of an Estate.*

BY their defects and aduantages which are found in these three kinds of governments, we may afterwards iudge (adding thereunto the consideration of the inclination of the people) of the particular manner of liuing, and of the condition of the people and affaires, the which ought to be settled rather in one place then in another. Among men that are equall and impatient of Rule, as your Sea-faring men be, and such as dwell in Mountaines and Forrest, by reason of the austerity and roughnesse of their manners and liuing, a popular Estate would be more proper then any other. *Themistocles* desiring to settle a popular Estate in *Athens*, aduanced Sea-faring men, and gaue authority to Marriners. *Cato* sayd that the *Macedonians* deserued to be free, for that they could not be restrained vnder the rule of him that would command them.

If there be an inequality, one part being richer then the other, and that wealth hath bred some dependance and respect of the meaner sort towards the great ones, a Seignoury and gouernment of few may be well established amongst such men.

If in this inequality there be a Diuision or Discord, some being vnwilling to yeeld to others; and that there be found some one that hath more power and credit, they must of necessity settle a principality.

After a Battaille lost, or some other disgrace happened, a people being amazed, finding no Councell in themselues, they

they willingly referre the disposition of their affaires to him or them which promise to preserve them. So as in such an encounter it is easie in steed of a popular Estate to settle a Seignoury or a principallity. As contrariwise, a multitude hauing had some good successe, and growing insolent, it falls out that making no accompt of their Lords, they change the command of few into a popular Estate, or into a Principallity, if he by whose meanes, this good Fortune hath befallne them, hath credit, conduct, and courage sufficient to make vse of his good Fortune.

I will adde, that a fearefull and timorous people giuen to their pleasures, little carefull and incapable of affaires, are better gouerned and more happily by a Prince, then by any other kind of gouernment. Whereas contrarywise, a people that is rough, auaritious, presumptuous, and hardy, downwillingly yeild themselves vnder a principallity, if it be not very moderate, or altogether warlicke, in the which absolute commaunds are supported by force.

It may likewise be sayd, that a Principallity is maintayned better in a great Estate, consisting of persons of diuers qualities; and a small Estate is more fitting for a Seignoury or popular Gouernment: for that in a great Estate, being necessary to trayne vp the Subjects to Armes to defend it, it falls out vsually, that he which is master of the Forces, makes himselfe likewise master of the Estate; as it hath hapned at *Rome*, and in many other Common-weales.

Contrariwise, a Prince in a small Estate is many times forced to become a Tyrant; and so much the greater and feuerer Tyrant, as the extent of his Tyranny, that is to say of his Country, is the lesse, hauing no meanes to draw from his Subjects (without great oppression) so much mony as he shall haue need of for his defence, to the whichall his Subjects would contribute willingly
their

their persons and means, if they were reduced to a republic or popular Estate.

СНАР. 6.

*Of the dependance of Estates one
of another.*

THe forme of Estates is diuers, according to the dependance of those which commaund. For although we treat onely of Estates that haue all soeuerainty ouer their Subiects; yet there are which depend in some sort of another, and others which doe not hold, as they say, but of God and their Swords, hauing no dependance of any man.

Wherein consists the dependance of estates one to another.

Estates depend of another by tribute, duty, honour, protection, or pension. By tribute, when as besides the tribute which they owe to some other Soueraignes, the other markes of Soueraignty remaine. By duty, when according to some obligation they owe succours to some one, be it in money or men. By honour, when as some Soueraigne owes fealty and homage to another, yet without preiudizing the other rights of Soueraignty. By protection, when as some one hath put himselfe into the protection of another to defend him; whereby he is sayd to depend on his protector.

As for a Pensioner, he seemes to depend no more of him that giues the pension, nor to be inferiour to him, then the other is to him. For although he seemes inferiour receiuing the pension, yet the other in giuing it, makes shew that he hath neede of his succours : And when as *Honorius* treated with the *Gots*, and made them his pensioners. *Lampadius* opposing himselfe, sayd, that it was a passion of Seruitude, by the which they made the Emperour tributary to the *Gots*. Yet I hold that this ought to

to be iudged by the quality and power of the Estates, and by the particular conventions. For the succours may be so great in regard of the pension, as we might easily discern who had the aduantage in this treaty, and in like manner if there were any necessity in the one, to doe that which they had stipulated from him; and that what they desired of another, were left to his free will: wherevpon knowledge of the cause the first shall be inferiour to the last.

The markes of Soueraignty which remaine, not withstanding these dependances are, to giue a law to all in generall, and to all in particular, without the consent of any that are greater, equall or inferiour: To institute the principall Officers: to make leuies of money and men: to dispose of the principall affaires, not yeelding an accompt to any man: to giue pardon to condemned persons about the rigour of the Law: To iudge definitiuelly and without appeale, to hold this power of himselfe, and from no superiour: To declare Warre and treat of Peace; to dispose of the Treasure: to coyne Money, to cast Attillery, to build Fortresses and such like.

The markes of Soueraignty.



CHAP. 7.

Of the forme of Estates according to the right of those which commaund them.

THe forme of Estates is likewise diuers, in regard of the right of such as commaund: and accordingly their commaund is called lawfull or vnlawfull, as well is a Principality, Seignoury, as a popular Government. The lawfull is that which belongs vnto vs, be it by the bounty of him which hath power to giue it, or by a iust conquest, or else that which is deferred by the Lawes, the which hath eyther followed succession,

Succession, Election, or Lots. The Lot is more proper for a popular Government, for that all things are equal; and they seldome make use of it in the Government of a Principallity or a Seignoury. Yet *Saul* was made King by Lot: And *Alexanders* Successours after his death divided his Empire by Lot. At *Venice* they draw them by Lots which are to choose the principall Magistrates. But such establishments are not ordinary.

Succession and Election are the most ordinary meanes to attayne vnto a Principallity and Seignoury, whereof it is necessary to know the advantages and inconueniences, which we may hope for, or feare.



CHAP. 8.

Advantages and disadvantages of an Election in a Principallity.

Inconueniences
of election in
a principality.

THE Election in a Monarchy or Principallity is dangerous, for the miseries which the interim or vacancy doth vsually breed, whilest they are about to choose a King, the Estate remayning in an Anarchy, without Lord or Gouverneur: Like vnto a Ship without a Pylot, which owes his shipwracke to the first Wind. For in the meantime Theeves and Robbers, vpon hope to obtayne their pardon from the new King, commit a thousand Villanies: as is often seene the See being voyd at *Rome*, or, as in *Poland*, so as the punishment ought to be doubled, for the excesse which is committed during that time.

Besides this, in the pursuit of the Election, you see many factions, whereof the least is sufficient to ruine the Estate: the which not able to be reconciled, they frame parties, which delay the Election, and continue the interregne, with the disorders which accompany it.

But

But if eyther party choose whom they thinke good, then growes a Ciuill Warre, which continues long after. This hath bin seene in the Election of Popes and Emperours : and the Empire hath bin voyd eightene years, after that *William Earle of Holland* had bin slaine. For although that *Alphonso* the tenth King of *Spaine* were chosen, yet he refused this quality, for the apparent danger, to take the charge of an Estate, exposed to the will of Subiects, to the enuy of Princes, and to the violence of the stranger : And in the meane time the wicked exceeded in all villany. Moreouer in the Election, an ouerture being made of many, if they fall to force, the most cunning and rash would carry it, and the most vertuous would not hazard themselves. If they make themselves Competitors, and will containe themselves within the ordinary bounds, he shall neuer be chosen against the hot pursuit of others, who at need know well how to free themselves. And be the Election made of one of the Country, or of a stranger ; yet there are great inconueniences of either side.

Among those of the same Country, there wilbe alwaies ieaiousie, and the one will neuer obay the other : And although they be not all equal in Wealth and Vertue : yet they will still presume themselves to be such. If they make choyse of a Forraigne Prince, his manners being different will not be pleasing : he will aduance those of his Country, in whom he hath greatest confidence. If there fall vnto him another Kingdome by Succession where he may commaund more absolutely, he will leaue the Electife to some Lieutenant : Or if the two Estates be neighbours, with the one he will make the other subiect. They will alwayes be in distrust, that he will aduance his Country-men, and deprive them of the right of Election ; and he on the other side. will grow iea'ous of his Subiects, if he hath that designe : and to purchase their good wills, and reduce them to what he desires, he will
C
giue


giue and ingage vnto them the demeanes and Reuenues of the Estate, as some Emperours and Popes haue done. Behold the inconueniences of an Election.

Aduantages of
an election.

The aduantages consist more in imagination then in Effect: for to say, that they choose the better, it is a thing which indeed ought to be, but cannot be effected, by reason of practises, Factions, and Iealousies: and withall I will adde, that the peoples ayme, which hath followed this meanes of Election, hath not bin alwayes to choose the most vertuous and wise: But some haue had respected to Nobility only; others to age, as the *Arabians*: others to the greatnesse of the body, as in *Ethiopia*: and the *Scythians* (if we may beleue *Aristotle*) made choyse of him that dranke best.

A consideratiō
in the election.

Notwithstanding what defects soeuer may be in an Election, yet if it be receiued into an Estate, it must be maintayned: and they to whom the charge is giuen to make the Election must among other considerations aduise to make choyse of a Successour, that is vnlike in nature and disposition to his Predecessour, to the end that of two diuers dispositions, there may be a well tempered order in the Estate, there being no humor, how well composed soeuer it be, which bends not towards some vicious Extremitie, from the which by this meanes they retyre the gouernment of the Estate: and withall they grow weary to see continually one manner of proceeding, the which is neuer so Exact, as all the Subjects can rest satisfied: So as by the society of one humor some grow distasted, and others are discontented, whereby a disorder may grow. It is therefore Expedient by this variety to retyre the Estate. Yet it is a thing wherof they think least: and we vsually see, that although the Election be free; yet they make choyse of him who naturally should succeed, if he be of age capable to Command: And this they do to preuent the Enuies and partialities which the choyse of one of another house may breed.



CHAP. 9.

Of Succession, diuersly practised in Successions.

THe other meanes to come vnto the Gouvernement of an Estate receiued by the Lawes, is Succession the which is diuersly practized: For the Command is referred to men and women indifferently: or to men, to the exclusion of women.

The Command which is referred inclusiuely to men and Women, hath for its Foundation the Law of Successions, and the Equality which is betwixt man and Woman; yet this is also diuersly practized: For eyther the Command is deferr'd to Women, according to the order and degrees of Proximity, obserued in ordinary Successions: Or only in defect of Males, aswell in the direct as the Colaterall Line, vnto the fourth degree inclusiuely: As it was resolu'd by the Cardinals for the Realme of *Naples*, as it appeares in the Inuestiture of *Alphonso of Aragon*, in the Yeare 1345. and of *Ferdinand* in the Yeare 1458:

And although that this Succession of women to the gouernment of Estates be receiued in a manner by all the Estates of *Christendome*: Yet some haue reiected it; there being no question of the possession of an inheritance, but to command a Nation: the which seemes to be against the stayednes and modesty which ought to be in that Sex; agaynst the Lawes of nature, which hath giuen force and prudence to men; and against the Law of GOD, which hath made the Woman subiect to man. They adde hereunto Inconstancy, Fragillity, and loosnesse, vices much to be feared in this Sex, and of great consequence in an Estate, their weaknes exposed to the force of Strangers, and to the contempt of Subiects, who will not fayle to calumniat the

Reasons for the which they exclude women frō the gouernment in some estates.

Princesse if she doth not marry : And if she marries (the which is necessary to haue an assured Successor) it must be eyther to one of the Country or to a Stranger. She will vnwillingly marry to one of her Subjects, as well for that she will thinke she hath dishonoured her selfe; as for feare least her other Subjects, eyther Equall or greater then he with whom she hath married, would grow into some ieaiousie; the which would breed contempt, and afterwards disorder.


If she marries a Stranger, he shalbe enuied of his neighbours and suspected by his Subjects, neither can he hold his life assured to commaund in a strange Country, vnlesse he hath Forces & Forts whereof he is the master. He will likewise commaund the Estate; and the better to assure himselfe, he will aduance his owne, and keep backe those of the Country : An insupportable thing to all Nations of the World. These are partly the Reasons for the which they Exclude Women from the Gouvernement in some Estates.

Diuersity in the
succession of
Males.

There are also some diuersities in Estates, where as the succession of men to the gouernment is only receiued, as well for the diuision, as for the order of succeeding. For the diuision some haue allowed it : and in the first and second Race of the Kings of *France*, it was practized : But the diuision which grew thereby, taught the *French*, that the Commaund ought to be in one alone, and that it could not be diuided without ruine of the Estate. The same is at this day obserued in *England*, *Scotland*, *Spaine*, and *Hungary*.

For the order of Succession, some haue receiued none but those that were Legitimate; others for want of lawfull issue, haue admitted Bastards in the direct line, to the exclusion of Colaterals. And for the order of Succession amongst the Legitimate, they haue also found diuers opinions; as well in the direct Line, to know if the sonne of the Eldest should succeed his Grand-father to the

the Exclusion of his Vncle ; as in a Colaterall Line , that is to say whether in the Succession of a Colaterall , very remote , he which is descended from the Eldest branch, ought to be preferred to others which are much neerer in degree. The which *Baldus* decided long since , for the Succession of this Realme , in fauour of the *Bourbons*, who represented the Eldest branch, that of *Vallois* failing : God hath confirmed it, in blessing the Armes of K. *Henry* the 4. with a miraculous prosperity, to attaine to this estate.



CHAP. 10.

Of usurpation, or an unlawfull Command.

AN vnlawfull Commaund is called Vsurpation, the which is eyther made by one alone, or by few men, or by the Faction of a multitude. That which is done by one alone, is eyther practized vpon a Prince, or vpon a Seignoury, or against a Popular Estate : And he which attempts is a Stranger or a Subiect. I will not lay open the manner of their proceedings, nor the meanes which an Vsurper should hold. It is too common a Science, and too much practized in these dayes, the which deserues rather to be forgotten then taught, for the miseries which it doth procure, not only to the preiudice of those, whom they may ouermaster; but likewise to those which are thrust on to such interprizes. For if there be difficulty to prepare the affaires, and bring them to an end, there is no lesse to maintaine himselfe. And it is most certain, that there is more difficulty for a Prince which hath vsurped the liberty of another, to preferue himselfe in his vsurpation, then it is for a multitude which haue recovered their liberty, to maintayn themselves. For if in a people custom to be guided makes most commonly the liberty where into they haue bin set vnprofitable, not knowing

Of the miseries it doeth procure, and the difficulties they encounter.

what government meanes, nor hauing any vnderstanding of the Estate; like vnto a savage Beast, which had bin fed in a Serraille or Cage, being once escaped knowes not whither to goe, hauing not bene accustomed to feede like others, and not knowing whither to retire, is made a prey to the first that will captivate him or inchaine him: Yet it is more difficult to settle a Principality, for this new greatnesse is subiect to the enuy of Neighbours, and the hatred of Subiects; who ioyning together, chase the Vsurper more easily away, then he entred into this new Estate. Whereas a multitude which hath recovered their liberty, hath no cause to feare the hatred of Subiects, seeing that all receiue benefit by this Enterprize: And the enuy of Neighbours is sometimes pacified by the hatred they beare to him whom the people haue expelled in regard of his bad carriage.

Moreover in a new Common-weale euery man contributes freely, and thinkes that what he payes is for his owne particular profit: Yea the greatest contribute willingly, for the desire they haue to attaine vnto some honour by their contribution. Contrariwise an Vsurper hath difficulty to finde money to maintaine himselfe, and entertaine his Estate, vnlesse he vse violence, which doubles the hatred of his Subiects against him. There are an infinite number of other difficulties proceeding from the new Command of a new Lord, with whom the people cannot so easily accommodate themselves. So as for the settling of this new Principality, it is necessary that he reside himselfe vpon the place, to the end he may the better see the disorders, and preuent them speedily. For by this meanes the Subiects shall haue more occasion to loue him, or to feare him if they doe ill; and he that would assaile the Estate, will resolute with more difficulty.

The vsurpations which are made by many, or by the people vpon their naturall Prince, are no lesse vniust; for that they happen not most commonly, but after the bad
gouernment

gouernment of the Prince. They are in some sort iustified by the iniustice of his actions. That is likewise as vniust, which is attempted against a Seignoury by the people, the which most commonly growes from the Inury of the Lords against their Subiects: who being assisted by some one of the Lords, who separates himselfe from the rest to ioyne with them, preuayling in their Enterprizes, they commonly change the Seignoury into a tyrannous Principality.

And it is necessary that in all these changes there should be Iniustice, and likewise violence: valesse the change were made as at *Venice*, the which in the beginning was gouerned by the people; and afterwards the gate being shut to those which had retired out of the City, and neglected the Offices of the Estate, vnto those which had them, afterwards they made an Estate of many Lords, without any ieaousie or violence. The same happens vsually in all popular Estates, which insensibly change into a Seignoury, whenas they receiue Strangers, and impart no Offices vnto them. For these by suceession of time encrease and multiply: and contrariwise the Families of the ancient Inhabitants being onely imployed in the charges of the Warre and State, diminish; so as the gouernment is found in the hands of the smaller number.

It hath happned sometimes, that the greatest part of the Lords hauing beene defeated in Battaille, the people haue changed the Seignoury into a popular Estate: as the *Tarrentins* did, after the Battaille which was giuen against the *Iapiges*, in the which in a manner all the Nobility of *Tarrnetum* dyed. Finally it is in him that will giue a new forme to an Estate, to accommodate himselfe according to the occurrents of affaires, and therein to follow that whereof the people may be most capeable.



CHAP. II.

*Of the diuersity which is found among Subjects
in an Estate.*

The diuers con-
ditions of Sub-
jects diuersifies
the force of
the estate.

BVt this will not be sufficient to giue forme to an E-
state, to regulate and prescribe the number, with
the right and dependance of those which ought to
command: You must likewise haue a care to the
diuersity which is found vsually among those which must
obey, according to the which they must many times car-
ry themselves diuersly. But for that it would be too long
a search to examine particularly the diuers qualities of
Subjects, it shall suffice to make mention of those chiefly
which serue in the gouernment.

Of Bond men.

The first distinction of Subjects is, that they are all free
or Bond-men. The Bond-man is he whom the right of
Warre hath made subiect, or that is borne of a Father
that is a Bond-man. In old time the Masters had power of
life and death ouer them: but the cruelty they vsed, cau-
sed this power to be cut off. In the end Christianity hath
abolished it amongst vs, for the charity which ought to
be among men, and by this meanes hath preserved Estates
from an infinite number of dangers, wherunto they were
subiect; for that Bond-men being ill iatreated, might for-
tifie an alteration, or attempt themselves, as *Spartacus* did.
Wherefore some of the *Roman* Senate desiring to diuersi-
fie the habite of Bond-men from such as were free, one
of the wisest Senators let them know the danger, if the
Bond-men came to number themselves: For they will
soone free themselves of their Masters, for the facility they
should haue to conspire by the signe of their habits:

Yet some vnder colour of making priuate men to be
better serued, and to cut off the infinite number of Vaga-
bonds,

bonds, Idle persons, and Bankrupts, who after they haue consumed their estates, pay the world with nothing; haue held it fit to bring Bond-men into an Estate. But this is so farre from hindring and cutting off the number, as it would augment that of Theeues. For a Bond-man hauiug once escaped, will be alwayes forced, (not daring to shew himselfe) to retire among Theeues: and he is no wise Politician that chaseth Theeues out of an Estate, but he that keepes them from entring.

In regard of free Subiects, some are priuiledged, simple Subiects and bound to all the Lawes: others are priuiledged and exempt from some one: some for their Age, others for their sex; some by particular faueur, or by the prerogative of their charge and vocation; and others are bound to some duties of honour or assistance more then the rest; as feudataries and vassals.

Of priuiledged Subiects.

Of simple Subiects, some are Originaries, the rest are Strangers. The Originaries are those which are borne in the Estate, enioying all the Lawes. As for Strangers, they are intreated diuersly in the world. For they draw some eyther to people the Country, or Townes newly built; or to weaken their neighbours, or to gaine good wits, who may serue eyther for Traffique, or in the War, or for the instruction of Youth, and in this case they are most commonly priuiledged. Others come of themselves, eyther for that they are chased out of their Countrey, or with an intent to benefit their Estates. In this case they are so farre from being priuiledged, as all liberty to dispose is taken from them; and dying, that which they haue accrews to the Prince and State, if they haue no Heir remaining there.

Of simple Subiects,

Of strangers,

Behold the diuersity of their conditions which obey, diuersifying the gouernment. But the forme of the Estate may be also considered by the diuision they make of Subiects, according to the diuersity of their vocation or profession.

CHAP. 12.

Of the diuersity and distinction of Subiects, according to their vocations and professions.

Diuers orders
of Subiects,

IN many Estates the Subiects are distinguished into three orders: As in *France*, into that of the Clergy, the Nobility, and the third estate which is the people. This distinction is followed in a manner throughout all *Europe*, and taken from that of the ancient *Gaules*, who were distinguished into Drindes, Horsemen, and the common people. In *Egypt* there were Labourers, Priests, Shepheards, men at Armes, and Artizans. The *Arabians* were diuided into Priests, men at Armes, and Labourers; who made three distinct bodies. In some Common-weales they haue beene distinguished otherwise, as at *Venice*, into Gentlemen, Cittizens, and common people: and the Gentlemen into ancients, new and last, or more new: Yet this last distinction makes but one body. At *Florence* they had the great, the popular, and the populace.

But among all distinctions those are very considerable, which are reduced vnder certaine bodies, Colledges, and Comminalties, whereof some are religious, as Conuents, Abbies, and Chapters: Others are politicall and ciuill, ordayned eyther for Commerce, or for the safety of a Towne or Countrey, or for Councell and Iustice. Other Comminalties are composed of Trades and Artizans, diuided by Brotherhoods or Companies; the which *Numa* brought first into *Rome*, to quench the faction of the *Sabins* and *Romans*, and to re-vnite these two people into one, taking away the first diuision by this second Distinction; which being reduced into many parts, mingled one with another, was much lesse dangerous. And
afterwards

afterwards *Tarquin* the proud, to take away all signes of this ancient Diuision, mingled their Ensignes.

The like course hath bin followed to re-vnite the E-
state of *Genoa*, afflicted at one time by many Diuisions:
That is to say, by the *Guelphes* and *Gibelins*; the Nobi-
lity and the people; and that of the *Adornes* and *Fregoses*.
For to vnite the people diuided into so many factions, they
made a mixture of the one with the other, in making a
department of Twenty eight families, vnder the which
they reduced the rest; although they carryed not the
name of the family, neyther were formerly of the same
party. In other Estates they haue diuided the people by
Parishes or quarters: and in other by Families.

The Subject for settling of such and the like Diuisions
of the people, must be eyther to let them vnderstand
more easily the Soueraignes command, or to retire from
them their approbation or aduice, vpon some proposi-
tion that is made vnto them: Or for that factions haue al-
ready brought in such distinctions, as they are forced to
countenance and allow them: Or else as *Numa* did, to
take away the name of a distinction more preiudiciall to
the Estate: Or to ease the Prince of some part of his care:
or to giue assurance to the people of good vsage, in ma-
king choise of a good number among them, for the man-
aging of affaires which concerne them in particular: And
these diuisions are very considerable, as also their power
and authority with the people, and their dependance of
the Prince their Soueraigne, as making a part of the forme
of the Estate.

For in some Estates the Soueraigne cannot resolue a-
ny thing of importance, without these Comminalties, or
some of them: as the King of *Poland* without the Se-
nate. In others he resolues; but his resolution must be
allowed by them, to the end it may be imbraced by the
people. In others he resolues in certaine things in the
which the Comminalties haue but one voyce: as likewise
in

The subject of
the establishing
of Comminal-
ties and com-
panies in an e-
state.

That the Prince ought not to crosse the Comminalties, nor suffer them to attempt any thing about their power.

in certaine things the Comminality resolute without the Soueraigne. But as the Soueraigne ought to establish this temper in the Soueraignty, according to the disposition of affaires and persons: so being once settled, he must haue a care not to crosse it vnseasonably; lest that in shewing himselfe a concurrent in some things, he make himselfe by the same meanes equall to his Subiects, whereof this Comminality is composed, which will be alwayes supported by others. As in like manner he must haue a care that they attempt not any thing that is about their power, hindring them vpon the least occasion; and in the beginning: for it is the ordinary of such Companies, to vsurpe as much authority as they can, and to grow bold by sufferance.

XX

CHAP. 13.

Of Religion.

Of the efficacy & necessity of Religion in an Estate.

After the establishing of the forme of the Estate, the most considerable is that of Religion: For it is the cause of good order and good Fortune; And Fortune the Mother of good successe: And so she is not onely the foundation, but the cause of the preservation and greatnesse of the Estate.


Although a people vnable many times to be restrayned but by feare, yet there is not any thing more naturall, nor more iust, nor of greater efficacy in the minds of men, then that which proceeds from the Reuerence which we owe vnto God. And whereas the feare of God is wanting, of necessity the Estate must run to ruine; or it must be supported by the feare of a Prince, who supplies this defect: who although he were such a one, (the which is difficult) yet this Prince fayling, the feare would likewise be wanting, and by consequence the obedience; for that

for that the Successor can seldome inherite this Authority which dyes with the person.

Moreover many things presenting themselves in an Estate, which he must doe, or hinder, and which cannot be perswaded by any reasons which may be alledged, men by their insufficiency not able to satisfie themselves; and force on the other side being a dangerous instrument handle, which doth harme as soone as good, the authority of man being not powerfull enough, we must of necessity haue recourse to the authority of Religion, which amongst people fearing God hath no reply. Wherefore most men which haue desired to effect some great and extraordinary matter, haue made vse of this meanes, as the most powerfull, were it for the setting of Estates, or for the reformation. Which is the reason that in most part of Religions they obserue infinite acts of policy, the which the people would easily flight ouer, were they not restrayned by the respect of Religion. This care then for the setting of Religion, is one of the chiefe in the Estate, for that it ought to be established with all purity, and without abuses: and where we shall finde any brought in already, we ought to cut them off; whereof the principall are diuersity of opinions; blasphemy, carelesnesse, and superstition.

Of abuses in Religion.

We will first treat of the chiefe meanes which haue bin obserued in the setting of Religions.



CHAP. 14.

Of the meanes held in the establishing of Religions.

THe establishment of Religion is eyther made by extraordinary meanes, exceeding the discourse of man, or by humane courses. The first haue not bin employed but to settle the true Religion; and the

the latter haue serued as well to settle superstition and impiety as the truth.

Extraordinary
meanes for the
establishing of
true Religion,

The extraordinary meanes are miracles and Martir-
dome; euery man perswading himselfe that the Constancy they see in one that suffers, cannot proceed but from the particular assistance of God. For although that in Paganisme, they haue seene many Murtherers of Tyrants, and others of all conditions, which haue endured vnspeakable torments with great patience: Yet one age of Christianity would furnish many more examples, then all the time that Paganisme continued. This constancy then which cannot be attributed but to a Diuine assistance, euery man thinkes he hath reason to belecue, that what they say that suffer so constantly, proceeds from God, and is true.

As for Miracles, some are reputed such, for that they are contrary to the common order of Nature; and others for that they are against the common opinion, who iudging one thing impossible or difficult, makes him to seeke by prayers, vowes, and promises, succours from aboue, the which succeeding according to our desire, we take the euent for a testimony of his power, whom as God we haue innocated to our succours, and begin to acknowledge him for such.

Adad King of the *Arimites*, a people beyond *Egypt*, hauing promised to make himselfe a Christian, if he wone the victory against the King of the *Homerites*, who for the most part were *Iewes*; hauing obtained it, he sent to demand Bishops and Doctors from the Emperour *Iustinian*, to instruct him and his people, who sent him *Marcionarius* from *Alexandria*. *Clouis* after the Battaile wone against the *Germans* neare vnto *Cullen*, made himselfe a Christian, with the remainders of the *French*, who had not yet imbraced the Christian Faith; according to a vow which he had made before the Combat, the which he held very dangerous for him; and thus he established

blished the Christian Religion among the *French*, disposed thereunto by this victory, the which being unexpected by them, considering the great number of their Enemies, they could not attribute it but to his power, to whom their King had made a vow.



CHAPTER 15.

Humane meanes for the settling of Religion.

AS for humane meanes they depend partly vpon the disposition of the people, amongst whom they mean to settle Religion, and partly of the quality of such as desire to establish it.

For the disposition of the people, the first consideration we must make, is of their disposition. For some are barbarous; others ciuillized. We call them commonly barbarous which gouerne not themselves as we doe, and according to our opinion. So the *Grecians*, and afterwards the *Romans*, called all other Nations barbarous, although that *Asia* had ciuillized the *Grecians*, and the *Grecians* had taught the Lawes and Sciences to the *Romans*. By the like folly there are some *Italian Writers*, who speaking of the *Germans*, *French*, and *Spaniards*, call them by this name; although there be not any of these Nations that yeelds inciuility or policy to *Italy*.

The disposition of people considerable for the settling of Religion.

Our meaning is not to extend Barbarisme so farre, but to call those Barbarians, in whom is obserued a Brutishnesse, Ignorance, Stupidity, and an insupportable rudenes of manners, be it in Religion, or in their manner of liuing, and apparrell, or in their habitation, or in the form of their gouernment.

who are properly called barbarians.

Of Barbarians in Religion, some acknowledge not any Diuinity, and yet they are giuen to Enchantments and

Sorceries:

Sorceries : As some Historians write, that anciently the *Huns* were, when they came forth of their Country ; and that many of those *Northerne* people are yet. And in *America* the *Brasiliens* and *Cyimegues*. Others haue some kind of Religion or rather Superstition, but so farre from Reason, as it is no difficult thing to confute it. Others worship a plurality of Gods, yet not acknowledging any one for the soueraigne Creator. Others acknowledge a Creator, but they worship the Sunne for a Creator, or some other Creature, as in *Cusco* and *Mexico*, and these two last kinds of Barbarians haue their Ceremonies, Feasts, and Solemnities, better Regulated then the two first. There are others which adore Idols, whose sacrifices in like manner are ordred. Besides these we may hold for Barbarians, such as haue another foundation of Religion then we haue.

Of the Authors
of most part of
Religion at this
day.

There is a Rabby, which writes that there hath bin foure Law-giuers, which haue diuided the V World by their opinions, from which most part of Regions at this day proceed. The first is *Moses*, the second *Iesus Christ*, the third *Mahomet*, and the fourth *Manes*. And this man supposing two principles or beginnings, the one good and the other bad, and attributing the superior part of the V World to the good, who can do no Euill, and therefore ought not to be prayed vnto ; and the lower part to the bad, to whom they must adresse themselves to preserue them from Euill, is held to be the Author of that abominable adoration of the Diuell, receiued in a manner throughout all the Indies, where he hath sowed his poyson. Of these foure beliefs, the Christian Faith being the only true, we may call the rest Barbarous.

Barbarous in
the manner of
their living.

Barbarous in
their cloathing

Barbarisme in the forme of living, is limited by vs in those which liue like bruit Beasts, without any manuring of the Land ; and either feed vpon wild Beasts or of Mans flesh : As the *Popians* in *America*. Barbarisme in the manner of their apparel, consists in the nakednesse of the whole

whole Body, or the greatest part thereof as is seene in the East and West *Indies*, and in part of *Affrica*.

We hold the habitation barbarous, not onely of those which haue no certayne place of dwelling, creeping into hollow Trees, or on the top of them, or into Caves, as they find commodity; whether they liue separated or in Company: but also of such who like vnto the *Tartarians*, dwell in the fields vnder Tents, or in their Wagons, changing place according to their pleasure. As for Barbarisme in gouernment, it is obserued by the want of Heads, Order, and Policy, where they chooseno Commanders but in time of war, like some people of *America*.

Barbarousnes
in their habi-
tation.

Barbarous in
gouernment.

By this diuersity of Barbarisme, it is easie to iudge that the manner of proceeding for the setting of Religion, ought to be diuers. For it is certayne, that they which by their manner of liuing are more like to Beasts then Men, ought to be made capeable of Humanity; and that to such as by their nakednesse, shew that they know not what belongs to honesty and shame, they must first teach them to know it, before they seeke to make them comprehend what Religion is. In like manner they which wander, scattered and dispersed one from another, must be drawne together into Comminalties and Policy, so farre as their Nature will beare it: And they which wander sometimes in one place, and sometimes in another, must be stayed and settled in a certayne abode, to haue commodity to instruct them.

That the man-
ner of proceed-
ing for the
setting of Reli-
gion ought to
be diuers.

Then comming to their superstitions, where they may confute the absurdities by serious Reasons, if they be capeable; or by iests and scoffes they shall make them grow into contempt of their opinions, falling first vpon those whose foundation is weakest. If there be any thing good in some point of their opinions, or that hath any conformity with the Religion they meane to establish, or is indifferent; they need not feare to allow of it: contrariwise this may serue for the setting of true Religion. *S. Paul*

D

at

at *Athens* tooke occasion to speak of Iesus Christ vpon the Altar, which was dedicated to the vnknowne God. The Apostles to gayne credit among the Pharises (who made the greatest part of the *Jewes*) spake dayly of the dead: the which the Pharises heard the more willingly, for that in the beleefe of this Article the *Sadnaes* were opposite vnto them. It hath much auayled for the setting of the Catholique Religion in *America*, to finde amongst those Idolaters certaine Ceremonies, which in the outward shew doe much resemble those of the Catholique.

The Nurnes of the Sunne at *Cusco*, a Towne of *Peru*, made certayne Cakes of the flower of *Mahis*, mingled with the blood of white Sheepe, which they offered in Sacrifice, and of this Cake they gaue a peece to euery Stranger that was present, who eate it in signe of Alliance, Confederation and Denotion to the Inga; and promised neuer to doe or say any thing against the Sunne or the Inga: And this solemnity was performed twiee in the yeare, in *September* and *December*. Processions at *Mexico* were in vse: and in *Peru* there were Priests, destinated to heare confessions after the manner of penitentiaries. They counterfeited the Mystery of the Trinity, worshipping three Statues of the Sunne, the one they call, *the Father Sunne*, the second *the Sonne Sunne*, and the third *the Brother Sunne*.

In like manner they had three Images of *Cucque Bigia*, which is the God of Thunder, the which they distinguished in like manner by Father, Sonne, and Brother. They likewise made vse at *Nicaragua* of a Crosse, which was there worshipped to obtaine Raine. Finally, these exterior conformities, although applyed to a bad vse, haue beene great preparatiues to imp'oy them to better vse.

So must part of those which haue sought to settle some new Religion, haue desired rather to borrow
the

the name of the establishment from the ancient, or from the reformation, then to terme themselves Authors of a new opinion; which in a poynt importing the Salvation of Man, vnder this Name of Nouilty had beene suspected. And *Mahomet* himselfe, although farre from the beleefe of Christians, yet not to discontent them, except the principall poynt which is the Diuinity of IESVS CHRIST hath spoken of him with great Reuerence: And in regard of him, he sayth, that he was come to reforme that which his Disciples had innouated in the Law of IESVS CHRIST.

Prophecies and predictions which may haue some reference to the setting of Religion, doth likewise dispose the minds of those that are to receiue it. The promise of sending of the *Messias*, stirr'd vp the minds of the *Iewes* to acknowledge *Jesus Christ* to be he which had beene promised. And the Oracles of the *Sibylles* was a great meanes to make the *Grecians* and other Gentles acknowledge that he was the Sonne of God. *Mahomet* falsifying the passage by the which *Jesus Christ* promised, to send the *Paraclet* or Comforter, sayth, that it was of himselfe; that IESVS CHRIST meant to speake. In many parts of *America* they had many predictions and prodigies, which fore-ran the comming of the *Spaniard*, and prepared them to change Religion.

Prophecies dispose a people to the setting of a new Religion.

Heauy burthens and rigours, be it that they proceed from the gouernment, or from Religion, may dispose a people to a milder Religion, if they thinke to be releued by this meanes. *Boniface*, Arch-bishop of *Monte*, laboured much in preaching to them of *Turnigia*, to make them Christians; and in the end not able to win them by the hope of Eternall life; but hauing demaunded of him if making themselves Christians, they should be freed from the tenths they payd the King of *Hungary*; he promised

Heauy charges and burthens dispose a people to change Religion.

and vnder his leading hauing vanquished the *Hungarians*, they became Christians. The yoke of the Kings of *Peru* and *Mexico*, insupportable to their Subiects, made the conquest of those Countreyes more easie to the *Spaniards*, and likewise the advancement of Christian Religion much more mild then the superstition, to the which the Diuill had subiected those Nations.

The *Hebrewes* which were in *Egypt*, being miserably intreated, yeelded easily to the Religion which *Moses* taught them, vpon the promise he made to lead them into a Land abounding in all things: although that afterwards forgetting their misery, they return'd somtimes to idolatry.

The diuersity of opinions in the Religion receiued, may open a Gate to another which they would establish; for that from this diuersity growes incertainty in the mindes of men; whereby if another be presented, better accompanied with shew, it is more easily receiued. Nothing did so much fauour the opinion of *Mahomet* in *Asia* and *Affricke*, as the diuers heresies which were then crept into all the *Leuant*: especially those which concerned the Trinity, and the nature of Iesus Christ; as that of the *Mahometites*, *Nestorians*, and *Arians*, and the doubts which grew of eyther side vpon this Subiect: But *Mahomet* to free himselfe from these, found no shorter courte, then to deny the Deity of Iesus Christ, and by this meanes to overthrow the beleefe of the Trinity: But that which helpt most to the advancement of this opinion, was, that he did accommodate the Rule he made for manners to sensuality, ouer-ruling whatsoeuer concerned Christian or Iewish authority, and forbidding nothing but that which the *Arabians* and Southerne people, among whom he liued, might well forbear; as Wine.

Indifferency of
Religion pre-
pares to a
change.

Likewise to receiue all sorts of opinions indifferently, as they doe in *China*, may greatly helpe to the bringing in of a new Religion, for the liberty there is to treat openly without feare of blame; the which is likewise fa-
uoured

noured by the incertainty of mens minds, which is ordinary in this multiplicity of opinions.

Reuolts and Ciuill warre doe likewise dispose a people to receiue a new Religion, as well for that force helps the establishment, as for that the head of a party may countenance his Armes with this pretext, and by an opinion diuers to that of others, hold those of his party more firme vnto him, and better vnited among themselves: which is a consideration which *Tacitus* (speaking like a Pagan) sayth that *Moses* had in the settling of his Religion among the *Hebrewes*.

Reuolts and Ciuill Warre dispose to the change of Religion.

An vnrestrayned liberty among a people somewhat Ciuill, and to open a contempt of Religion, dispose them no lesse to receiue a new, then too great rigour and austerity. For besides that man hath in him some certaine seeds of piety, the which he cannot long suffer to lye vnfruitfull, so as he degenerates sometime rather into superstition then Religion: The contempt of God brings with it so many other inconueniences in a society and ciuill conuersation, to the which the Magistrate cannot prescribe a Remedy; as the first which presents it selfe with a shew of Sanctity, and a desire of reformation, is well enter-tayned and heard by all men: and his opinion is the better receiued, for that the contempt of the ancient giues him place in the minds of men. So the opinion of *Homer* in the Law of *Mahomet*, being growne into contempt among the *Persians*. *Ismael Sophy* settled that of *Hally*, fill'd with many austerities and Ceremonies. And in the Christian Religion, God hath frō time to time raised vp great personages, to restore it by the holinesse of their liues, and their good examples, when as it seemed most contemned and reiected.

As also excessive liberty and contempt of Religion.

It is likewise no small aduantage for the aduancement of a Religion in a great extent of Country, to finde it revnited vnder one Prince, as the Christians did the Romane Empire: For the Example of the

The re-vnion of a Countrey vnder one Prince, makes the establishment of Religion easie.

Prince and the chiefe about him, which they may gaine, drawes all the rest suddainly after him : Whereas if the Country were deuided into many Estates, there would be as much trouble in the one as in a great Empire. Moreover great Courts are more Ciuill, and more diuersified with men of diuers sorts of Condition, of which they may draw a good number, fit to receiue a new opinion. The facility they haue had to conuert the *Mexicans*, and *Peruans*, reduced vnder great Kings ; and the difficulty there is yet to conuert the *Brasilians* and *Cicimeques*, which haue not any, witnesse it sufficiently.

These are the principal Encounters which may dispose a people to receiue a new establishment. But with this disposition the quality of those which seeke to bring it in, and the course they meane to obserue, must be proportionable.

██

CHAP. 16.

*Of Parts necessary in those that will bring
in a new Religion.*

Parts and qualities necessary to the bringers in of a new Religion.

MAny parts are necessary in such men : but the principall are authority and credit, courage, knowledge, or sufficiency of wisdom. The authority or credit, growes either from Dignity, Sanctity or force ; for the dignity it is certaine that the example of Princes and Great men, strikes a great stroake in such establishments ; and the more if they themselves become Ministers and labourers in such actions by publique exhortations. *Isaphat*, sonne to *Asa* King of *Iuda*, sent Priests with some of the chiefe of his Court, throughout all the Prouinces of his Estate, to make them receiue the Law of God. *Oswala* King of *Northumberland*, desiring to bring the Christian faith into his Estate, demanded

ded a Preacher from *Douvald* King of *Scotland*, who sent him *Aydan*: who being ignorant of the Saxon Tongue, this King serued him for an Interpreter to his people. The like in the time of our Fathers did the King of *Congo* in *Affricke*, seruing as an Interpreter to certaine Religious men, whom *Emanuel* King of *Portugal* had sent vnto him to preach the Gospell. *Godscald*, Prince of the *Vandales*, who depended of *Aldemburg*, deliuered vnto his people in the Country Language, that which the Priests and Bishops had preached in *Latine*. *Iagellon*, great Duke of *Lituania*, hauing made himselfe a Chriitian to be King of *Poland*, in the yeare 1386. took such a liking to this Religion, as he himselfe preached to the *Lituanians* to conuert them. Some haue written, that *Sicebueles* King of the *Visigots*, conuerted by exhortations fourescore and ten thousand *Jewes*, for the which in the decretales he is called most religious.

We must not doubt but the authority of *Moses*, who was a great Captaine, and had made War long against the *Ethiopians* for the Kings of *Egypt*, did assist him much to free the *Hebrewes* from Seruitude, and to make them receiue the true Religion.

Holinesse of life is so corrupt and licious an age, Holinesse of life. giues credit to him that makes profession. This meanes is particular to Iesus Christ and to his Apostles, who being borne of an abiect condition according to the World, haue aduanced themselves by their holy and miraculous actions, aboue the greatest powers of that time. *Ismael Sophy* was desirous in the establishing of his opinion, to make vse of this voyce: But force and other humane meanes, haue contributed more then his exterior Deuotion.

They which could not imitate his Sanctity, haue bin forced to purchase to themselves authority, to suppose Miracles and Dreames, and after the manner of *Mingus*, *Sertorius*, and other Law-giuers of times past,

make the World beleue that they had a particuler communication with God, as *Adahomet* did, who had tamed a Pygeon, the which came picking in his Eare before the people, to the end he might perswade them by this shew, that the Holy Ghost changed into a Dove, did suggest vnto him the foolerics of his Alcoron. But among the demonstrations of a holy life, nothing doth so much draw the people as austerity, to the which the Commons will hardly beleue, that any man will submit himselfe, for ambition, vanity, or lying. And yet there haue bin Phylosophers in times past, which without any deuotion haue affected it, to giue credit to their opinions; and many times the ambition of such men is greater, then of such which openly contend for Crowns and Kingdomes: The first doing like men that Row, which turne their backes to the Ports where they desire to arriue.

As for force, it is of all the meanes by the which a man may purchase authority, the most powerfull; the rest without its assistance succeeding seldome. Yet we haue found by Experience, that it hath bin of small vse in the setting of Religion, if the force hath not bin such as it can receiue no tollerable opposition, and that the minds of men haue not bin formerly disposed to change: and yet withall this, we find not any example, vnlesse it be in some petty Estates.

Charlemaine, who sought to imploy it agaynst the *Saxon*, without this preparation aduanced little, although he ioyned Prudence with Instruction to force, for the setting of the Christian Religion among those people: And after he had attempted all meanes, for his last remedy, he was forced to transference a great number of them, into *Flanders* and *Brabant*, and to draw from thence Christians to mingle amongst the Idolators, which remained in the Country, and continued there long after.

The Turke hath done the like, hauing drawne many of his

his Religion which were in *Asia*, to plant them in *Europe*, and transported a great number of Christians which were in *Europe* into *Asia*. And yet we see that hitherto the Turke hath wholly expeld the Christian Religion out of his Estate, although he hath employed many other meanes.

Hence we may conclude, that if with Force, which receiued no opposition, he could not preuaile; it is a meere madnesse for certaine men ignorant of the Affaires of the World, to propound to make vse of Force against those, who fortified with intelligence among themselves, and good Conduct, may not only defend their opinion by Force; but also indanger the ruine of the Estate. But reseruing to treat more particularly of this Question hereafter, I will come to another kind of Force or constraint, which depends vpon the Authority of the Magistrate, and concernes the punishments and burthens, and the exclusion of Hereticks and Infidels from honors.

As for punishments, it workes no greater effect then armed Force, which is vsually ioyned vnto it; and sometimes these punishments borne with Constancy, produce a contrary effect to that which was expected; as we will relate more particularly hereafter the Reasons. As for heauy burthens, although they seeme more mild, yet we may well feare the incomuenience.

From the example of Martyrdome, which is in punishments, if they conuert not speedily, heauy burthens ruines them by little and little. St. Gregory writing to Bishop Ianvyer, for the Conuersion of the Pessants of *Sardinia*, aduiseeth him to charge them with Taxes and Labour. In *Spaine* they haue done the like with the Moores, who not withstanding haue multiplied. The Turke, besides the exclusion from honours, which is a meanes ioyned to that of heauy burthens, practizeth the like with the Christians, taking Tribute of their owne children.

Charle-

Charlemaine vled it against the *Hungarians*, after that he vanquished them, leaving the Idolators nothing but their Liues, and giuing their goods to such as would become Christians. Sometimes the exclusion from honours, without any heany burthen, hath preuailed much for the conuerſion of great men, and of a meane condition, among a people ambitious of honour. *Ingo* Prince of the *Vnides*, receiued none to his Table but such as made profession of the Christian Religion, preferring the meanest before the greatest of another Religion.

Sufficiency.

Instruction.

Sufficiency consists in the Knowledge and ability to instruct and dispute. Instruction is made eyther by word or writing: And that which is done by word, is eyther publicke or priuate, in such places where they feare that the beliefe, which they seek to establish be not allowed in the beginning; or when as they desire to winne some great man, whose example may serue for the conuerſion of others. They vse priuate Instructions, as a preparatiue to publicke, the which is done by Preaching, or by publicke Lectures of Bookes concerning the Diuine Seruice: As the Law of God was anciently taught by the Reading thereof before the people. And as among the Christians they Read the Epistle and the Gospell, with the Simball of the Creed; simple meanes and without affectation; and of no lesse edification (if in this simplicity they cause them to be vnderstood by the people) then the Preaching of some, who deliuer many times their owne Fancies more then the Gospell.

In times past they found it not strange to Translate the Holy Scripture into the vulgar Tongue. *Nergher*, a Religious man of Saint *Gal*, vnder the Abbot *Bernard*, Translated the Psalter in the French tongue, which was then but rude. *Alfred* King of *England* did the like into his Language: *Hestad*, also King of *England*, caused the Holy and Sacred Scriptures to be conuerted and turned into English: And *Beda*, (called the Venerable.)

Tran.

Translated the Gospell of Saint *John* into English. Preaching:
 In Preaching two things are necessary: the one to vnderstand the vulgar tongue in the place where they Preach perfectly: the other is to bring some exteriour ornament to perswade. The first Iesuits that went into *Iappon*, for that they rashly vndertooke this Enterprize, before they did well vnderstand the Language, in steed of instructing they were laughed at, by reason of the many incongruities and errors they committed in this Language. Disputation requires an aduise Spirit, to satisfie all difficulties that may be encountred in such matters. But order is very necessary, wherein two poynts are especially to be considered. The one is, that it is more ease to oppose a Religion, whatsoeuer it be then to maintayne and defend it, for all Religions hauing in them something which is aboue the capacity of mans vnderstanding, it is no difficult thing to contradict such a beliefe by humane reason. VVherefore they must first shake the opinion receiued, before they come to plant a new. The other poynt is, in such disputations to begin with things knowne, and confesse of euerie side, to come vnto those which are contradicted and not yet receiued.

This meanes of Instruction is the mildest, and most proper to attaine to the setting of Religion, how much soeuer it differs from the opinion receiued, and amongst what people soeuer: Especially if they beginne to teach young children, before they haue bin instructed in the old beliefe. The Iesuits, seeing they could not preuaile in the conversion of the *Brasilians*, a nation altogether brutish and inhumane, they could find no other remedy, then to draw their children vnto them by gifts, and kind vsage, and this people suffered them to go the more willingly, for that they alwayes brought backe some thing, besides instruction which they receiued. In *Peru*, in the beginning they made vse of poore blind men,

Instruction a powerful meanes for the bringing in of a Religion.

men, who being receiued by them and well vsed, went afterwards vp and downe repeating that which they had learned: and seeing nothing they deliuered it to all sorts of people indifferently, with more assurance then if they had bin cleare sighted.

The opinion of *Aly* in the Law of *Mahomet*, which hath beene embraced by the *Persians*, was divulged, (as the Histories of that Country relate) by thirty thousand slaues, which *Tamberlaine* had giuen to *Tegel*, predecessor to *Ismael Sophy*, to cause them to be instructed in that belief. *Charlemaine* erected many Colledges and Seminaries of piety among the Idollaters whom he had Conquered, and retained twelue children of the Saxon Princes, as Hostages, to cause them to be instructed in the Christian Religion. The Turke takes the fifth of all the Christian children, and causeth them to be bred vp in the Law of *Mahomet*. The *Xerif* seized vpon *Morocco* and *Fez*, hauing by Pilgrimage, and the shew of a holy life, gotten some credit among the Moores: He bought a thousand slaues, which he bred vp in his opinion, grounded (as he pretended) vpon a more pure interpretation of the *Alcoran*: and hauing instructed many with such Disciples; and his sonnes hauing some aduantages agaynst the Christians, turned their Armes agaynst the Kings of *Fez* and *Morocco*, and settled themselves in their places with their Religion.

Prudence.

That the zeale
of Religion
must be accom-
panied with
conduct and
Prudence.

Prudence, is next to Piety; the principall part which they should haue, which vndertake such an enterprize, and so much the more necessary, for that many times an indiscreet zeale hinders his function, and ruines that which he would Establish. And although that the counsels of these zealous persons succeed sometimes; which notwithstanding is but seldome, God hauing giuen prudence to men, to serue them for a guide; all hauing not deserued that God should daily imploy his power to worke miracles.

Ana-

Ananias hauing perswaded *Isates* King of the *Adiabones*, and his mother to receiue the Iewish Religion, held it fit that he should forbear to cause himselfe to be circumcised, vntill he had disposed his people. But *Eliazar* the *Gallilean* prest him to do it, and not to preferre the feare of men to the grace of God. Which was the aduice of a Diuine more zealous then discrete; the which although it succeeded well at that time, their spirits being better prepared then the Prince expected; yet it were dangerous to follow it in all Encounters. For the Apostles commaunds that zeale should be guided by Knowledge. We know in our time, that this rash zeale hath done more harme to the Catholicke Religion then good.

I doubt, whether to this inconsiderate zeale we should not attribute that opinion, which some haue of the greatnes of the spirituall power, by the which and their Rules, they minister cause of Iealousie to all temporall powers, the which they submit vnto it, agaynst the ancient beliefe and the custome of former ages. A proceeding quite contrary to that of Iesus Christ; whom the Iewes desiring to surprize by this meanes in the crime of high treason, and to bandy the Magistrate agaynst him, declared openly, that his Kingdome was not of this world; and commaunded to yeild vnto *Cesar*, that which was *Cesars*, although he were a Tyrant, and an Vsurper of another mans liberty.

Of Spirituall and temporall powers, and their iurisdiction.

After him his Apostles haue spoken of the ciuill Magistrate with honour and respect, commaunding to obey him; and it cannot be found, that by vertue of the Spirituall power, they haue aduised to attempt any thing agaynst the Magistrate. It is true, that among Christians, the Spirituall power hath beene alwayes much respected; but only when it hath beene practized in matters which are meere Spirituall, the which looseth the dignity and grace, which is due vnto it, when it deales in matters which are temporall terren.

These

These be the bounds which haue alwayes beene set in *France*, betwixt the Ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction and a Regall power: and with this distinction the Christian Religion, hath beene preserued aboue a thousand yeares in *France*, without any blemish. But inconsideration or ambition, which is vsually blind, hath proceeded further, to breed a Iealousie among all Christian Princes. For by a consequence altogether absurd and foolish, they would make the VVorld beleue, that the obedience of the Subiect towards his Prince, the which being a temporall thing, cannot be reputed but temporall, may be prohibited by the Spirituall power, the which notwithstanding hath no power nor Iurisdiction ouer temporall things. The which is a meanes not only to hinder, that such Princes as are distracted from the ancient beleife; do not re-vnite themselves, seeing they cannot do it without diminition of their authority and power: but also makes others, which are not yet separated (to free themselves from this subiection) leaue it, or fauour all which oppose themselves to this Doctrin, neuer insisting vpon the errors, which they may adde thereunto.

The obseruation of ceremonies of an ancient Religion, facilitates the setting of a new.

There is as little wisdom to crosse the Rules of a receiued pollicy, if they were not altogether impious: neyther must they presse to change the Religion of the conscience, if without impiety this apparence may be preserued. The ancient Christians, made no difficulty to apply vnto the Diuine Service, many of the Iewish and Pagan ceremonies. In diuers changes of Religion hapned in our time, *Luther* in *Germany*, and *Peter Martyre* in *England*, haue carried themselves more discreetly, hauing retayned the greatest part of the ceremonies of the Catholicke Religion, approoued therein; then they which haue made their Religion bald, and destitute of all ornament; and to make it the more sauage, and to seeme more different from the common beleife, they haue changed the names and termes, by an indiscreet vanity.

Behold

Behold part of the principall considerations which they must obserue in the setting of a Religion. Let vs now see how we are to carry our selues to preserve the ancient beleife; amidst the diuersitie of other Religions which are crept into the Estate.

XX

CHAP. 17.

That the diuersity of Religion is dangerous in an Estate: how they ought to carry themselves to preserve the ancient Beleife, in the diuersity of Religions crept into the Estate.

IN old time the Kings of *Egypt*, entertayned this diuersity in Religion among their Subiects: Some worshipping a Dogge, others a Bird, and some a Crocodile with other things according vnto their fancies: which was a tyrannicall practize; to the end their Subiects might not agree to controule and reforme their Actions.

But it is certayne that if in the Concord of an Estate, consists the good and quiet of the Subiects, it is more expedient to re-vnite themselves all in one Religion when they may. For Religion is the cymment which binds the Quick-siluer, that drawes together all the members of the Estate into one perfect vnion: And contrariwise there is nothing that doth more dis-unite a people, then the diuersity of opinions, or the vse of diuers ceremonies in matter of Religion. Hence haue proceeded the most violent and furious passions, that euer troubled an Estate, and the life of men: And in this poynt all other interests are so implied, as it hath drawne with it all that, which makes a part of the honours, goods, and fortunes of men. For Religion the children haue left the Fathers cause; seruants haue denied their masters seruice, and

there ought to be but one Religion in an Estate.

Diuersity of Religion dangerous in an Estate.

and subjects their fidelitty to Princes. Finally all naturall rights and offices of humanity haue ceased, whereas Religion hath resisted: Euery man esteeming that which he followes to be the most pure, and the true manner of worship, and condemning all that which is not conformable to his beliefe.

It must bee a-
uoyded euen in
light things.

VVherefore we must flye this diuersity, euen in light things: for that a multitude being vncapable to iudge of things by themselves, nor by reason or motion in Religion, suffering themselves to be carried away by chance and apparent shewes, contrary to that which Faith should perswade them, aboue the perception of their vnderstanding: when they haue once shaken some opinion which he had in Reuerence, he presently falls into the like vncertaynty of the other peeces of his beliefe; which haue no more authority nor ground with him, then those which they haue already shaken.

How they must
gouerne them-
selves to pre-
serue the anci-
ent beliefe, in
a diuersity of
Religions.

Finding then this diuersity in an Estate we must consider whether it be little or great. If it be small, and the parties of the new opinion weaker then that of the ancient Religion, be it in number of men, or in retreats of intelligences, it wilbe no difficult thing to suppress them: No more then if in a great Estate, this opinion had not taken footing but in one corner, or in one or two Prouinces; as that of the *Albygeois* had done in *France*. For the rest of the Estate being secure, it is easie for the greater party to suppress the lesse, by the conquest of these Prouinces. But if this opinion hath crept into all the parts of the Estate, although they that follow it make the lesser number, yet we must consider if we are in the beginning, or in the strongest fit of the disease.

Of the rooting
out of Heresie
and new Reli-
gion in the
breeding, and
how they ought
to carry them-
selves.

In the beginning such weeds are to be pulled vp as soon as they grow, the which must be done by secret Executions, and not as they haue vsually practized by publicke punishments; if it be not of some opinion that is very difficult to perswade: For that the Example of Martyr-
dome

some mooues many to pittie, makes others obstinate, and drawes some to be more curious to examine the reasons, for the which a new Preacher, who hath nothing in shew but what is holy, suffers so constantly: and few will perswade themselves, that any man will for so small a matter loose his life with so much dishonour; and so by this gate many enter into that Comminalty: so as in stead of retyring the people by the example of punishments, they inuite them: as being certayne that the terrour thereof, workes a contrary effect in a new opinion, which hath a shew of sanctity, and of the truth and falshood whereof they may doubt, then in other crimes, the which are generally condemned in all men. For to search the bottome of euery mans conscience, were to kindle a fire in the Estate, add to discouer a mischiefe, which were more expedient to hide, and whereof the scandall were dangerous. We haue seen many Realmes and Principallities preserve themselves in peace, with the exercise of two different Religions; but there was neuer any but hath bin ruined by the course and continuance of Ciuill wars: and the conditions by the which they may make two Religions agree together, would not only be lesse hurtfull to an Estate, but more supportable to priuate persons, then the lest ciuill war, which shalbe attempted vpon this subiect. For although there may be some found amongst Hereticks, who, eyther for want of Instruction in their new opiuiou, or for want of courage, thinke to be perswaded by Force, that they do meritoriously suffer the paynes which they endure, and therefore were easie to reduce: yet I will say that in such affayres, for that a firme perswasion must prectede the resolution which such men haue taken to change their first manner of liuing, in a poynt which doth wholly import their saluation; it is dangerous to imploy Armes. For some striking sayle, and continuing amongst vs, serue vnderhand to those of their party by many meanes; if it were but only in giuing aduice or dispersing

The tolleratio
of two Religi-
ons in an estate
are lesse hurt-
ful then a ciuil
Warre.

of bruits, which may assist their affaires. Others which haue more generosity, perswaded of the iniustice of the harme which they cause them to suffer, continue resolute and obstinate: being the ordinary of the spirite of Man, to grow more resolute the more it is resisted, and giues way when there is least opposition. For the more that that man loues his liberty, and yet abuses it, the more he hates seruitude and constraynt, in the which notwithstanding he carryes himselfe better then in the enioying of his freedome.

Warre against
Hereticks fortifies their party, and giues them aduantages.

All men tend naturally to the contrary of that which is desired of them, and affect more willingly that which is forbidden. Feare and necessity maintayne men best in their Duties. They force them to know themselves, to resume courage, to allie themselves together, and in the end to frame a party within the Estate; which vpon the least good successe which shall befall it, (Fortune not alwayes assisting the greater number) it fortifies it selfe, as it proceeded from the Iustice of their cause, and that GOD fought for them, so as by this good successe many being perswaded to follow it, they encrease the number of their partizans; and it falls out most commonly, that the discontented, and such as desire to worke their owne ends, ioyne with them. Moreouer, this Sect, as I haue sayd, being dispersed ouer all the Prouinces of an Estate, and the Prince not able to haue Armies in them all, whilest that he assailes them on the one side, they attempt vpon another, surprizing some place of importance; or standing vpon their defence, they cause an Army to ruine it selfe most commonly before some paltry place.

I will adde hereunto, that if they be the weaker in number, they will be found in effect the stronger by their vigilancy and intelligences which they haue one of another: For that Vnion is most commonly stronger in a meane number, then in a greater; and in an opinion received

ceined by their owne choice and election, then in that which is receined by custome, in the which man shews himselfe vsually more negligent. Besides this, the intelligence is better obserued amongst men that are assayled, or that feare to be so, by reason of the necessity of the defence, then among the assailians. For to assayle proceeding from a free will, they are sooner wearied then the defendants.

Moreouer, there is nothing more dangerous for a Prince, then to make tryall of his forces against his Subiects, if he be not well assured of the successe. This were to arme and shew the Lyon his pawes to fight against his Master, to make himselfe the Head of a party, making the head of the contrary faction equall to his power. And it hath bin alwayes held a Rule of State, that the most powerful should neuer make an Enterprize vpon the weaker, without assurance of the event, For the weaker is alwayes in feare, that the stronger can doe any thing, vntill he hath made tryall of the contrary; and when they finde how far the forces of the stronger may extend, he falls in his reputation. Wherefore in this case the best aduised Princes haue done like wise Pylots, who slip their tacklings in a storme, knowing that the resistance they should make, would be the cause of a generall shipwracke. But if he forced of necessity to goe to Field vpon this quarrell, and that their courages puffed vp too much, cannot be humbled but by Armes; he must before they haue gotten any advantage, graunt them tolleration of their Religion, in places where they may giue the least scandall, to such as are opposite vnto them, and in all other things make them inferiour: The which they will yeeld the more easily vnto, for that in this first beginning, there is nothing but the conscience that doth threaten them; and hauing found their owne weaknesse, they will be content to haue gotten this point, neuer refusing places out of the way for their exercise: for that by this

It is dangerous for a Prince to arme against his Subiects, if he be not assured of the event.

A good aduice to weaken the party of a new Sect or Religion.

meanes they shall bee more assured, lesse exposed to the view of their Enemies, and by consequence lesse subject, to their surprizes.

To draw vnto him the heads of a new Religion,

As for the ambition of Commanders, it will bee easie to preuent, for that they will bee vsually few in number, in entertaining them by promises, presents, and hopes; hauing a watchfull eye ouer them, and imploying them abroad in honourable charges and affaires, yet where they may neither get credit, nor doe much harme; and therest which desire to bee aduanced to honours, and yet haue small power of themselues, they may feede them with hope, that in changing their opinions, they may attaine to that which they desire. This being done, the rest will bee easily maintained, in hauing a care that they which follow the Princes Religion, and are fauoured by the Prince, may not doe them any wrong or iniury in hatred of their opinion.

Institution of Commanders.

They may by the same meanes, erect Seminaries, to breed and instruct a good number of persons in the true Religion; Out of which they shall choose such as are most sufficient and capable, and whose liues may serue for an example of well liuing, to place them in Ecclesiasticall dignities.

Orders of Knights to defend and maintaine the ancient Religion.

In certaine Realmes they haue vsed to make orders of Knight-hood, whose chiefe profession was (when it was necessary to vse force) to maintaine their Religion by Armes, and they had for their recompence many benefices, which wee affected vnto them; which institution is not to bee neglected, for that there are two sorts of those which strae from the true Religion. The one agree vpon the foundations, but they contend vpon the interpretation; and these may bee instructed: The others doe absolutely denie the grounds, whereby the Doctrine of Religion is supported. These not able to bee drawne by the instruction of the true Religion, there remaineth nothing but miracles, and

and a Divine Interpretation, which are Supernaturall meanes, whereof God doth not make vse to all persons: and force amongst humane meanes. Wherefore these Military orders of Knights, may profit much in an Estate, and may also inuite those of a new opinion to submit themselves vnto the old, to the end they may be partakers, or their children, of these honours and Recompences.

Moreouer, it will not be inconuenient, that a Prince which raignes in an Estate deuided in Religion, should labour by presents and promises, to draw vnto him the most learned and capable of such as are contrary vnto his Religion: And in case they will returne, to aduance some of them to great dignities, to the end he may bind them the more by the preservation of their dignity to mayntayne the Religion, and to giue experience to others, who wilbe inuited by this Example. For what ambition soeuer they shall discouer in him that shalbe aduanced, having gotten Authority, the Example of his advancement, will make others thinke of it. And if the Prince can, deuide them in opinions, or otherwise he shall do well; for that the weaker the body of this Sect shalbe, the lesse cause the Estate shall haue to feare; and there growing some diuersity of opinions amongst them, he shall fauour that which approacheth neere to his Religion; or by this deuision he shall endeauour to make them weaker, and more resolute what they should follow.

To draw vnto them the most learned & capable of a new Religion,

But when he shall see a Sect grow old, and that the abuses should begin to distaste most part of them which follow it: He may do like vnto *Theodosius*, who seeing the Temples of the Pagans in a manner all abandoned, he caused some to be beaten downe, and the rest to be applied vnto the deuotion and seruice of the Christian Religion.

To beat downe and ruine the temples least frequented.

Mahomet had found a remedy to preserve his Religion from

Not to dispute of Religion.

from these innovations, forbidding them to Preach or dispute: the which if it had beene well obserued, there had beene such a diuersity of Sects, in the Interpretation of his Alcoron.

But a Duke of *Musconie*, to keep his Religion intire and vnfoyled, the which is grounded like to ours in the Administration of the Sacraments, and in the Preaching of the Gospell, caused all the Homilies and Sermons of the Holy Greeke Fathers, to be turned into his Language, to be repeated publicly in the place of Preaching, and read particularly by the Subjects: freeing himselfe by this meanes from the ignorance of the multitude, and from the nouelties which Preachers might haue brought in, in publishing their inuentions and dreames; and by this meanes confirming his Subjects in the beleife of those holy Fathers. Wherefore the principall end must be, to keep the ancient Religion, to haue but one, if it may be, to hinder a new one from taking footing in an Estate, and in case we cannot effect it without troubling the vniuersall peace of the Subject, we must gouerne our selues as I haue formerly spoken.

Let vs come to other disorders which commonly happen in Religion, the which wee must fore-see in its establishments, to preuent them when they shall happen.



CHAP. 18.

Of disorders which happen in Religion: and of the meanes to preuent them.

Blasphemy.

Blasphemy consists in periury, and in scandall, or detraction. Periury is when we call God to witnesse of a lye, Scandall is when wee mocke at Religion.

Care-

Carelesnesse regards chiefly the seruice of Religion, and is the more to be feared, for that by this degree they mount to impiety. For Religion consistiing more in affection and zeale, then in discourse; when as the heat of zeale is growne cold, Religion is lost by little and little.

The third abuse is Superstition; withdrawing the beleife made to the seruice of God, and bringing in scandalous things of no moment.

As for the first, which is Blasphemy, they must establish rigorous punishments: and to hinder the second, which concernes Diuine seruice, it must be enioyned very strictly. But the remedy of the last, must come from the care of Prelates, who for this effect ought to be chosen vigilant and Religious; and they must be prohibited from bringing in of any new thing, vpon pretext of Deuotion and Piety, neyther in the beleife nor in the Ceremonies of Religion, without exact knowledge of the cause. As for that which concernes the ground of priuate Mens consciences, we must leaue it to the duty of Ministers, who being chosen good men, there is no doubt but they whose consciences they gouerne, would be so in like manner.



CHAP. 19.

Of the setting of a Councell of Estate, and of the quallities and number of Councillors.

THe forme of the Estate, and Religion being established, there followes the setting of a Councell; wherein two sorts of persons are to be considered, that is to say, they which Counsell, and they which are Counsellled. In those which Counsell, we must know the qualities which are necessary

Of a counsell of estate.

for them; in what number they ought to be; the power which is giuen them; and the order they are to obserue in giuing their opinions: For to examine affaires, it is done according to the ability and capacity of euery one of them.

Qualities of
Councillors of
estate.

Age and expe-
rience.

The first quality of a Counsellor of Estate, is to be old, and to haue experience. I ioyne these two together, for that experience cannot be but in a man that is already ancient, and age without experience would be here vnprofitable: for that in such affaires the knowledge of the particular humours of Princes, of people, and of great men is most necessary: the which cannot be obtayned but by a long experience: the which although it be not repugnant vnto reason, yet it hath a different meanes of vnderstanding the affaires, whereof they cannot haue a certaine light, to make a coniecture of that, which with reason would be fitting to doe vpon the point which they will put in execution, if they haue not first seene the tryall in some other place.

Authority.

Moreouer, age will adde much more authority and credit to the resolutions of a Councell, consisting of ancient men, then if it were composed of young, how sufficient and capable soeuer they were, who cannot haue the reputation of good Councillours: For such as shall be as young as they, will thinke they are as well aduised; and such as are more ancient, will hold themselves to be wiser. And in matter of Estate, opinion hauing no lesse force, but many times more effect then truth; there is nothing more dangerous, then that the Subjects should haue an opinion, to be wiser then their Governours. So as the presumption being alwayes, that the older are wiser then the young, there is no doubt, but they are more proper for Councell, and more resolute for a long exercise, to heare, weigh, and resolute of great affaires.

A great difference
betwixt
an old Coun-

There is another difference betwixt ancient and young Councillors. These last hauing their bloud hot,
and

and hauing neuer beene deceiued by Fortune, insist commonly vpon Councils, which haue more magnificence and shew then safety. Whereas on the other side, old men as well by reason of their naturall coldnesse, as of their experience, the which by the course of their life they haue gotten, to haue executed many things in vaine the which they could not bring to a good effect, they, more willingly imbrace the safest party, misfortune causing them to bandy their spirits, and to open their eyes to discouer the danger. The which young men cannot, doe so well, who haue not had experience of the variety of Fortune, nor haue obserued the circumstances of such particular accidents. A most necessary thing in a man that will giue Councell; a small circumstance of more or lesse, doth many times cause a great variation in affaires. This experience being onely found in ancient men, their aduice ought to be esteemed the better. Yet I meane not to speake of such as are come to a decrepit age. Age fit for Councell, must be strong and vigorous, to the end that the resolutions of a Councell of such men may not be too dull and timorous.

Wherefore with these ancient men that are cold and slow, it will be very fit to mingle some of a middle age, approaching to 50. yeares; and that both the one and the other past their time in many imployments, in the which they haue seene diuers sorts of affaires treated and negotiated, and haue therein made knowne their discretion, fidelity, and industry; and by this meanes giue assurance, that they are worthy and capable to hold this ranke, without staggering or falling. For a Counsellor of Estate must be an honest man, faithfull to the Estate, and firme in his resolutions; yet without wilfulnesse and obstinacy: a most dangerous plague in a Councell, where it is necessary sometimes to obey the storme, to strike sayle, to leaue the ordinary course, and retire sometimes into the Hauen, to the which in the end they will sayle when they see

cellor of estate and young, for that which concerns Councell.

A mixture of old and young Counsellors of estate.

Discretion, fidelity, and resolution in a Counsellor.

Wilfulnesse a dangerous vice in a Councell of estate.

see the Wind prosperous. And although there be some one thing resolved, yet if it discover some apparent danger, it is not against custome to change opinions. For Prudence doth not consist in an obstinate will, to doe a thing resolutely; but amongst many different parties which Fortune presents vnto vs, to choose the best and the most commodious, to attayne vnto our end. Wherefore some haue bin of opinion that they should propound that a little before, which was to be resolved vpon; least that doing otherwise, and some one hauing bin of a bad aduice, without due consideration, he should not grow obstinate vnseasonably, and strue to maintayne his opinion, rather then to leaue it. Yet in affaires whereas they that haue credit, are interess'd, it is not fit to make the proposition, if they be not assured to be able to resolve it speedily: otherwise it would giue them meanes to make parties and factions, and to prepare hinderances and lets.

Hee must be without ambition and not depending of any.

A Councillor of Estate must likewise be without fauour to some, or hatred to others, or ambition for himselfe; hauing no other ayme but the publique good, and that he depends not of any other Prince, be it by fealty or homage, or by obligation or by pension: but rather that he runne the same fortune with the Prince whom he serues; to the end he may know, that it concernes him to suffer the euill, and enioy the good, proceeding from the Councell which he hath giuen. *Marc. Anthony* the Philosopher and Emperour, ordayned that the Senators of *Rome*, which were not *Italians*, should at the least haue the fourth part of their Estates in *Italy*, to make them more carefull, to thinke of the preservation of the Province, where the seate of the Empire remayned. And *Pliny* writes that *Traian* the Emperour had formerly decreed, that such as sued for any Benefices, should haue the third part of their Lands in *Italy*; not holding it reasonable, that such men should make

make vse of *Rome* and *Italy*, as of a retreat, and not as of their Countrey.

Yet I would not herein set a generall Rule, there hauing bin many found, who although they had their retreat else-where then in the Estate of the Prince whom they serued, haue notwithstanding carryed themselves faithfully, vpon hope that if they should lose the goods which they enioyed in the Estate of their Master, yet they should alwayes haue meanes to liue else-where.

And contrariwise we haue seene some which had not any retreat but in the Estate of their Prince, whom the good fortune of the Enemy hath made carefull to enter into treaty to saue their Estates; the which happily they would not haue done, if they had meanes to liue else-where. It is likewise certayne, that in affaires where we haue no interest, we iudge much better, then when as we put our interest in Ballance with our opinions in Councell.

He that looks ouer Gamesters, and is not posselt neyther with the hope of gayne, nor the feare of losse, will giue a better iudgment of the carriage of the game then he that playes: And he that in a Councell hath not any feare to lose his Estate, and who brings neyther affection nor passion, will alwayes take the most honourable party: And he which hath any interest preuented by his owne opinion and feare, will willingly incline to that side by the which he thinks to saue himselfe.

A Councillor of Estate must not be too suddaine and rash, for that precipitation of its nature, is blind and indiscreet; a good deliberation hauing need of time, to make a good resolution, being impossible in a short time to consider & weigh the inconueniences duly: and withall precipitation cannot come but with indiscretion, or little iudgment; & both the one & the other hurtful in council.

Irresolution is another vice, into the which he must be very careful not to fall; for he must resolute vpon the party,

A Councillor must not be rash and precipitate.

Irresolution a dangerous vice in a Councillor and to be auoided.

and forget all the rest; lest that by remembering them, he doth not breake and dull the vigour of the minde, necessary for the due execution of great Enterprizes, and with all the constancy which he must bring in matters that are doubtfull and difficult: neyther must he thinke that there is lesse difficulty in the party which he hath left, then in that which he hath chosen.

The causes thereof.

In some one ignorance to be able to examine affaires causeth irresolution; and these ought to be reiected from Councell. Others are Enemies to inconueniences: So as although that with reason they ought to imbrace the thing which is propounded vnto them; yet being amazed with the paynes and difficulty, which doe alwayes accompany great affaires, they remayne in suspence and doubt, whether they should endeaueur to attempt it.

Subtily.

Other haue such subtyll spirits, that to all things that are propounded, they finde contrary reasons; and being (as often it happens) of small courage, they neuer (vnlesse it be vpon necessity) resolute; And they neuer want reasons to couer their fearefulnesse, the which will euer haue more power over them then reason, and experience to haue many times trembled in vaine. For resolution proceeds not from the spirit, but from the courage: And these men are so much the more dangerous, as they are more subtyll and cunning, and haue more dexterity to couer their difficulties. But as he may not be resolute, so must he not be so confident of himselfe, as he stop his eares to the aduice of others; or that relying vpon our owne forces, we doe not draw into consideration those of our Enemies, yea sometimes hazard and fortune, which hath a good share in the greatest actions, to the end we may fore-see that which may happen. For distrust is the Mother of fore-sight, and fore-sight the Mother of safety.

He must not be too confident.

Other qualities necessary for a Counsellor of Estate. Patience.

Patience is another quality, very necessary in a Counsellor of Estate, not onely to endure opinions contrary to his owne, but also to haue his reasons weighed, blamed, and

and contradicted, and to heare many follies which grow amidst their discourtes, euen from great Personages. He must heare I say with patience, or without Jealousie or desire to be followed in his opinions, and not to doe as many which please themselues, to be the Authors of a new ouerture, who with a spirit of contradiction, full of bitterness, trouble themselues to reprehend the reasons of such of the Councell as are their Enemies, be they neuer so good. A vice altogether insupportable. Yet notwithstanding it is not forbidden, to draw into agitation the reasons of another: but it must be done with respect; and thereby he shews that he doth not seeke to diuide or surprize the resolution, but it sufficeth him to haue his reasons vnderstood, and the inconueniences of a contrary opinion. Besides these qualities which concerne the iudgment of integrity, a Counsellor of Estate must know how to explicate himselfe, and to make his reasons be vnderstood: and they which of purpose obscure their reasons and intention, for the vncertaynty of the euent, are bad Counsellors, which vnderstand not what belongs to Councell: for that good Councell is measured by the reasons, and not by the euent, no man being answerable for that which happens against all discourse and reason.

Eloquence.

But aboue all things it is required to be secret: for a Councell divulged, profits no more then a Mine blowne vp. Wherefore it is necessary that the number of Counsellors of Estate, should not be great: for in a great number this inconuenience is ordinary.

Secrecy.

Of the number of Counsellors of Estate.

It is likewise good to change Counsellors often: for that being necessary they should be instructed in affaires, it would fall out that their charge would end before they should be able to see those which were begun, finished, and before they should vnderstand the course and proceedings; the which is necessary to settle a iudgement: This course notable to be so well represented by the report which others might make, but they might faile in some particulars

Of the change of Counsellors of Estate.

particulars, whereon they might ground their opinions. But if for the quality of the Estate it be necessary to change them; at the least they must provide in such sort, as the Councell be not changed all at an instant: but having ordained a certayne time for every Councellor to assist, their charges must expire at severall times, and the greatest part of the ancient must remayne to instruct the new in affaires, who growing ancient in their turnes, shall instruct others that shall enter.

Of the great
number of coun-
cellors of estate
to be employde
else-where.

And if through the ambition of some, the Councell of Estate (which ought to consist of a small number) be too full: the which doth usually happen in sicke and corrupted Estates, it shall not be unfitting to employ them else-where, attributing to the greatest part of these Councellors, some Iurisdiction which may approach in some sort the affaires of Estate; as *Philip the faire King of France* did of his Parliament: *Charles the Eight* with his great Councell, and as they doe at this present with the Priuy Councell. This meanes is not new, but hath bin anciently practized by *Tiberius*, *Nero*, and some other Emperours towards the Senate of *Rome*, making them to forget by little and little the knowledge of State affaires, by the attribution of a contentious Iurisdiction, which was in the end established by *Adrian* in this Senate, in forme of an ordinary Iurisdiction.

XX

CHAP. 20.

Of the plurality of Councels of Estate. Of the power of Councell, and of the order of giving their Opinions.

Of many Coun-
cels of estate,

IN *Spaine* there are many Councells of Estate, distinguished according to the diuersity of Realmes and Prouinces, which are vnted to that Crowne. They may

may likewise in erecting many Councils to facilitate the expedition of affaires in a great Reame, imploy the more honest men profitably, and preuent surprizes; distinguishing them according to the diuers parts of the Estate, which are, Religion, Iustice, Warre, Policy, the Treasure, the care of Government, and the intelligences as well without as within the Estate: This last ought to be annexed to the Soueraignes person, accompanied with few, least that a great number should breed confusion, and discouer the secret.

As for that of Religion, it should haue care to maintayne Religion in Reuerence: and if there were many which they were forced to tollerate, it should serue to caule them to liue in peace one with another, and to decide their differences. That of Iustice should not be imployed but to order the differences of Iurisdicktions, and to iudge those, whereof Iustice should be forbidden to take knowledge.

That of Warre should serue to regulate the Souldiers both Horse and Foot, prouiding for the Munitions, places of strength, Ships of War, Garrisons, and generally of all that which may depend of a Military order and care. That of Policy should order the Commerce and Trade with the manufactures, and should make all establishments necessary, for aboundance, the safety, the beautifying of Townes, the assurance of wayes, and the commodity of Riuer: That of the Treasure should regulate the leuies of money, the assignations, and all that which concernes the dispensations of the Reuenues of the Estate.

Yet there being many affaires so vnited, as they seeme to belong as well to one Councell as another; to auoyde the contrarieties of Ordinances, if many Councils should take notice of one businesse, the most expedient would be, that these Councils should haue no other charge, but to examine that which should be propounded vnto them, and

The meanes to auoyd the contrariety of Ordinances.

and to cause the diuersity of their opinions to be reduced to writing, with the reasons of eyther side; the which should be read in a Councell composed of the heads of all these Councils, and of two other Counsellors of eyther of them, chosen by the Councell it selfe, according to the quality of the businesse; All which being assembled for the reading of the sayd opinions, they should haue no more to doe, but to resolute the businesse thus digested and examined.

I know that in an Estate, whereas all things are ouer-ruled by the head of one or two, who desire to gouerne the Prince, he that should attempt any thing for the good of his Estate, they would presently perswade him, that these Councils would be so many comptrollers which he should giue vnto himselfe: That he was sufficient to provide for all, and that all must depend vpon his will, and not oblige nor subiect himselfe to another mans Reason. But vnder pretext of maintayning the Princes Authority, these people seeke to continue their owne to worke their ends, neuer representing the Princes affaires but by a crosse meanes, which may serue their owne designs: they ingage him many times in Councils, which proue very preiudiciall to his honour, reputation, and Estate.

The power of
a Councell.

In regard of the Councils power, it ought onely to consist in giuing Councell, and not to command, Commandment being inseparable with the Soueraignty: And in Estates, whereas Counsellors commaund that which they Councell, they may not onely be termed Counsellors but Soueraignes, and if the decree or sentence seemes to haue any command in it; yet it is certayne that without the Soueraignes commission, no more then the sentence of the Iudge it cannot be executed.

A consultatiue
voyce.

In some Councils they haue receiued two kind of Lawes: and they haue giuen power to some to make an ouerture of some affaires, the which hauing bin propounded by them, they retired, and left others to deliberate; the
which

which they call a consultative voice. Others had power only to deliberate, and to resolve, but not to propound. A deliberative
voyce.

Wherefore to take away this superioritie in a Councell, and to entertaine an equallitie among Councillors, the which is of great force to maintaine the libertie of opinions; it is fit that the Councillors should haue a consultative and deliberative voyce. Yet forasmuch as it is necessary to propound, and to bring some order in all sorts of Companies; it is fitting that hee which hath something to propound, should impart it to him that holds the first place in the Councell, provided alwayes that hee hath no interest. Equallity a-
mong Coun-
cellors.

There is another diuersitie for the order of opening, either beginning by the greatest, and of most authoritie in Councell, to the end that the younger and least capable, might more easily choose the best party, and the soundest reasons: Or in beginning to take the voyces of the youngest and inferiours, and causing them of most authority to giue their opinions last; least that the libertie of aduice might not bee cut off by the authority of great men, who are factious and ambitious, and admit no contradiction. Order in gi-
uing their opi-
nions.

Which two kindes of deliuering their opinions may bee practized according to the equallity, that is among the Councillors. For if they bee equall in power, it seemes most fitting that the most sufficient should deliuer their opinions first: Whereas contrarywise if the Councell be mingled with great Lords, and men of a meanes condition; they which haue least power, must deliuer their opinions first; yet causing them which haue only a consultative voice, to deliuer their censures first, who prepare the way to such as haue a deliberative voice, representing vnto the Councell all the reasons of either side, and propounding their owne aduice: In doing whereof if they erre, they shall bee reformed by the others without Icalousie; for that an ambition to speake,
F
drawes

drawes after it many times the enuy of some, and the ieaiousse of others. *Augustus* demanded their opinions without obseruing Ranke, or Age, to the end that euery man should be attentiu to the propositions that were made; and without staying for the aduice of next neighbour, he might be alwayes ready to deliuer his owne.

I will adde one thing, whereof we must haue a speciall care in Councell, which is to call into the deliberation of some businesse of hazard, they to whom we are to giue the Execution. For it seemes that calling them, it will make them more cunning and aduised to auoyd the dangers which may fall out in the Enterprize the which they meane to recommend vnto them. Yet it may be of such a nature, as the difficulties which they shall heare, will present themselves in the Execution, may discourage them and make them grow cold, in danger to giue ouer the Enterprize. Behold that which ought to be principally considered in those which giue counsell.



CHAP. 21.

Considerations for the Prince which is to be Counsell'd.

AS for him that is to be Counsell'd, we must consider his sufficiency, the manner of demanding Counsell, to receyue it, examine it, to resoluue and Execute it.

Sufficiency and Capacity necessary for a Prince,

In regard of Sufficiency, they haue alwayes held that there are three sorts of persons. Some haue such a vigour of Spirit, as they alone can better resoluue their affayres, then a whole company would do; in the which besides the feare that the secret would be diuulged, the number of good men would be so much the more rare, as they
of

of whom it is composed are great. Others haue not this vigour or Spirit; but a naturall docillity to heare the aduice of others; and a iudgment to discern good from Euill: And these, as they are inferiour to the first, so are they Superiour to the last; who not able to take aduice in their owne heads; and contemning the aduice of others, know not how to make choyse of the sounder party.

And although it seemes that the first haue not any need to seeke the counsell of another; yet aswell to free himselfe from presumption, as to giue the more authority and credit vnto their Enterprizes, they must communicate them; and confesse that Sufficiency is neuer so great in any one person, but that many may adde something vnto it. And although that this Sufficiency be very commendable, yet it is dangerous in a Prince, who easily falls into presumption; and it seemes that the docillity which is found in others, yeilding an Eare to Counsell, is the more safe. Yet if these bring not Iudgment to discern good from euill, this meane Sufficiency would be as dangerous, as if he referd himselfe wholly to the Counsell of others: which is an Instrument, whereof they haue somtimes made vse to ruine many Estates; for that where the Councell shall consist of incapable men, aswell as the Prince; a thing which vsually falls out, when as the Counsellors are chosen by him, for that euery man seekes his like; and we much acknowledge some Sufficiency to iudge of that of another man, to make the Election: and in this case the Estate is the sooner drawne to its ruine, when as the number of Counsellors is greatest. But if they whom the Prince hath called to his Councell, be worthy and fit to support the burthen of the Estate; & that the Prince be not capable to make choise of good parties and occasions, and to adde the conduct which shalbe necessary in the executions; this council wilbe fruitles to him. Besides, the Counsellors of Princes are accompanied

with ieaiousie one against another ; and tending all to one end , they finde out many times publique Councils , and make them serue to their owne priuate interests , striving by many cunning practises , to frustrate the Designs , and to hinder the increase of reputation one of another . Whereby it happens , that the Prince hauing not (for the little sufficiency that is in him) that authority among his Counsellors which were necessary to keepe them in awe , and to hinder the course of these Diuisions ; nor yet Iudgement to discouer the particular Designs of euery one ; he remaynes among so many Counsellors , rather confounded and irresolute , then counselled . Besides that in such a Councell of Wise men , and full of valor , which serue a Prince of little vnderstanding , there is neuer so much Friendship and Affection as were to be desired in Counsellors . For that seeing their Prince more inwardly then other men , and knowing his imperfections and weaknesse better , the order of Nature beares it , that in the end they fall to contemne him , the which afterwards doth easily turne to hatred ; for that the Minister which hath some meritt in himselfe , scornes to obey a man incapable of his Greatnesse , and vnworthy of his Fortune , long . After hatred and contempt followes the infidelity of Counsellors ; so as the Prince must eyther be sold , or turned vp and downe according to the occasions of the will of those which shall be about him , who in their Councell will haue more regard to their particular aduancement , then to the greatnesse of their Master .

A Prince then that desireth to raigne in his Estate , must make himselfe capable to gouerne , and mannage affaires : not that I would aduise a Prince who hath sufficiency in himselfe , to haue no man about him to giue him Counsel ; but rather I beleue that one of the greatest foundations of his reputation is , when they shall haue an opinion that his owne iudgement and proper intelligence
of

of affaires, is assisted by a wise and faithfull Councell ; which is the thing for the which he must most labour.

But this Councell how wise and aduised soeuer, must alwayes be surmounted by the iudgement and capacity of the Prince, so as they must rather serue for an accessory ; then a principall in the government of the Estate : that in commandments they acknowledge themselves inferiour to the Prince, and not carry themselves as equals : that in occasions and affaires of importance, they may rather haue power to alter, and to make knowne the difficulties and inconueniences, but not to resolve : And in a word, the Prince hath neede of so much spirit, as his Councell may assist him to gouerne, but not teach him to raigne.

We will therefore conclude, that as a Prince hath neede of himselfe, to maintayne himselfe in life, so hath he neede of a good Councell, to maintayne the affaires of his Estate : and as without it he cannot be termed a man, so without Councell he cannot be held a Prince.

Wherefore hauing made choyce of those which may Counsell him, he must carefully take occasion to demand their Councell : that is to say, neyther too long before the Enterprize, least it should be discovered ; nor too late, for feare that the Councell should proue vnprofitable. And if he doubts that the businesse will not be held secret, being propounded in a full Councell, or that some of his Councillors for the interest of some great man, dare not deliuer their opinions freely ; and he may receiue their aduice separately and in secret, and reject the reasons contrary to the Councell which they haue giuen him, to the end he may the better iudge what party he shall embrace ; without tying himselfe to number the voices, but rather to weigh him ; for affaires of Estate ought not to be gouerned according to the plurality of voices, if the reasons of eyther part be then so strong, as they are vncertaine what party they should follow.

Of the manner
to demand
Councell.

But above all things a Prince must haue a care in affaires of greatest importance, nor to discouer euenvnto his Councillors of what opinion he is : Least that they which counsell him should rather seeke to furnish him with reasons to confirme his opinion and to please him. For Councillors ought to declare freely what they hold in their consciences honorable for him, and safe for his Estate.

Some one would oblige the Prince to assist himselfe at all manner of Councils, aswell to take knowledge of all the affaires of his Estate, as to discouer the capacity of his Councillors, to hinder factions which grow in Council, to moderate the passions and iealousies of his Ministers, to giue more Authority to his Resolutions, and by his presence to cause the affaires to be treated of with the respect and grauity that is requisite and necessary.

Yet there being many things which are treated of in the like Councils, depending of Iustice, policy, or the Treasure; besides that this would over-burthen the Prince, in making him to imploy the greatest part of his time in these affaires; he cannot do it without abasing his Authority and Maiesty too much, by this too frequent communication; and it will suffice, that he assist at most important affaires, or at those whose resolution may increase his Reputation, contenting himselfe to provide for that which concernes Peace or Warre, with the safety and quiet of his Estate.

And to prevent the inconueniences which happen daily in Councils, wherethe Prince doth not assist, and to draw the same aduantages without assisting, which he should haue by his presence being there, the course observed by the Grand Seignour is somewhat considerable. For in the place where they hold the Diuan or Counsell, there is a window, by the which (without being scene) he may heare all that is spoken and past in his
Coun-

Councell: So as his Councillors vncertayne whether their master heare them or not, obserue the same respect, the same modesty, and the same manner of proceeding, which they will do in his presence: and after they haue held the counsell, they go and make report vnto him of what hath past; the which they dare not deliuer falsly, not knowing whether the Prince haue heard them. And thus he is informed of all that hath beene propounded in his Councell. and heares himselfe if he will, or by some other, the reasons of all sides; and then after the reports which is truly and certaynely made vnto him, he presently resolues without any demunition of his Majesty.

The Prince hauing demaunded the aduice of his Councillors, he must receiue it from them all with an equall countenance; without hating him, which hath giuen him bad counsell: vnlesse he discouer some malice. For Councels hauing no force if they be not allowed by the Prince, he hauing found them good, it is a signe that he hath iudged, and hath beene mooued by the same reasons, like to him that gaue them: So as the errour of iudgment hauing bin common to both, the blame and the fault ought not to be imputed vnto the Counsellor alone: And for that they haue neuer in any Estate established recompences or punishments for good or bad counsels; which are held such commonly not by the reasons, but by the euents, whereof no man can be any way answerable.

To receiue counsell.

We must therefore diligently Examine, an aduice or counsell; consider the thing in its selfe, with all the circumstances and dependances; preferre the safety of the Estate to all other considerations; and then to seeke the profit by honest courses, which consist in all the parts which we represent in this treaty, very necessary for the establishment, preservation, and increase of the Estate.

To examine.

Afterwards the Prince must duly consider of the Execution of that which they counsell him; for the Counsell being of doubtfull things, he must aduise whether Fortune may haue a greater share, in that which he meanes to vndertake, then wisdome: and if he finds that he hath more need of Fortune, he must beware how he imbarque himselfe, especially if the contrary succeed to that which he desires, he incurres more losse, then he can hope for profit, succeeding after his desire.

But if necessity reduceth him to this poynt, that he must eyther loose or hazard; it were better to tempt Fortune, the which although it did not succeed, yet at the least he should haue this contentment, to haue done what lay in him. Otherwise, he may not lightly imbarque himselfe in a dangerous Enterprize, although that at the first sight the perill be not so neere. For besides the danger that euery bad resolution carries with it, it drawes after it likewise to maintayne it, an infinite number of such like, for that things cannot remayne alone, but are bound one vnto another, and in chayned together.

Wherefore we may not haue so much respect vnto the present, as we forget the future. For although that the accidents of Fortune are in such variety, and so frequent, as they may hinder vs from a certayne fore-sight of the future: and that to haue regard to an imaginariy feare of a thing which may be or not be, it seemes that this were to imbrace the shaddow, and to leaue the body or substance.

Yet the greatest part of Errors which are committed in deliberations proceeds from this, that men suffer themselves too much to be carried away with the affect of the present; the which how little soeuer it be assisted by Fortune, it seemes that it hath alwayes greater force and vigour, then the strongest respect we can imagine of

of the future. Wherefore he must shew himselfe very stayed in such affections, and as for the affection of the present, he may not forget the consideration of the future: but he must accustom himselfe to see that which is to come before his Eyes, with such a resentment and apprehension, as if he saw it or toucht it. So he may not for a feare a farre off, forbear to remedy a present mischiefe.

He may not likewise suffer himselfe to be carried away by any Example that is alledged, if all the particularities do not concur. For although that these comparisons may ioyne at some corner, and that all things hold by some similitude or likenesse: yet there are very few Examples which do not haile: And the relation which is drawne from Experience, is many times defective and imperfect, if it be not assisted by discourse and Reason.

Then hee must examine the quality of the person which giues the aduice, especially his interest, and aboue all things he must refuse to counsell a flatterer, and inuite him that counsels, to speake freely and with courage.

It for the respect of the greatnesse of the Prince who is counselled, it be necessary to flatter him; the Prince shall consider, if the flattery of him that counsels him, (who must sometimes vse, as they say, words of like,) proceeds from cunning and subtilty, which the Counsellor doth vse to perswade him to that which is for his good; or with a designe to get credit by his pleasing, he enters into this flattery: For in this last case, the Prince must stoppe his Eares, and open them to him that speakes freely, there being no condition of men, that haue so great need of true and free aduertisements then Princes, who vndergo a publicke life, and are to satisfie and content the opinion of so many people, which as they are accustomed to do any thing that

Of the flattery
of Counsellors
and how the
Prince should
auoyd them.

that may diuert them from their course, they finde themselves insensibly ingaged in the hatred and detestation of their Subjects, for occasions many times which they might well auoyd, without any interest of their pleasure, if they had beene aduised and directed in time.

But the manner whereby most Princes liue at this day, few men are found that will practise this Trade, being the office of true Friendship towards the Soueraigne, in a rough and dangerous tryall; So as they must not onely haue much affection and freedome, but also courage. Flattery is far more safe; for that by pleasing, it seemes they draw nearer vnto Friendship: and for that it is more agreeable to him whom they flatter, it is also more easie for him to practise that meanes to flatter.

Of the truth & liberty which ought to be in Councellors.

Contrariwise Truth and Liberty, as if they approached neare to contempt, cannot be so safely practised with a Prince. They haue their circumscriptions and limits: and many times it falls out, that (as the World is) they leaue truth in the eares of Princes, not onely without fruite, but with preiudice to him that speakes it.

Of the prime Ministers of an estate.

If then the Prince will assure himselfe on that side, he must encourage one or two of those which approach nearest vnto him, and whom he knowes to be best affected, and freest from contempt of him, to deliuer freely vnto him in what manner they receiue his actions; and he must choose such men of a meane fortune, and are notwithstanding satisfied and content, to the end that on the one side they may haue no feare to touch their Masters heart to the quicke; least they should thereby lose the course of their aduancement; and on the other side being of a meane condition, they may haue the more communication with all sorts of people. A Prince is not to be credited, when he brags of his courage, to attend the encounter of his Enemy, for the seruice of his glory; if for his profit & aduancement he cannot endure the liberty of a friends words; hauing no other effect nor aime but to pinch

pinch him by the Eare, the rest of the operation being in his owne hands.

Wee read in the Turkes Historie, that a Bassa called by his Master to the gouernment of the Estate, and made Vezir, which is the first charge of the Empire next to the Grand Siegnour, holding himselfe not very capable of this charge, hee drew certaine Persons secretly vnto him, who had charge to collect whatsoener they heard spoken in the Citie of *Constantinople* touching the gouernment of the Estate, to relate it vnto him: And by this meanes being aduertized of all that was found good or bad, and of that which they desired to bee done or not done, hee gouerned himselfe in such sort, and without the helpe of any other Councell, all things succeeded to his desire, and accomodating his actions to the will of the people, hee was admired by them, who before held him to bee vncapable of this charge.

A Wise act of the first Minister of an estate to discharge his duty.

This may be practized by the Prince; but yet hee may not forbear to make choise of a good Councell, to examine the propositions of that which by this meanes they haue discovered, to bee desired of the people. In this manner it shall bee easie for a Prince to resolve, bee it that hee take the aduice of euery one secretly and apart; or being assembled, hee cause them to deliuer their opinions openly, to the end that by the communication of their aduises, the resolution may bee more easie to take, either in following the greatest number of voyces, or in making choice of his opinion that seemes the best; and the resolution taken, the execution must follow with all possible speede; Celeritie making all things easie, as well for that of it selfe, it is active and full of vigour, as for that it gives no leisure to crosse a businesse in the execution, before they can oppose it.



CHAP. 22.

Of the forme of Commanding.

THe fourth establishment to bee made in an Estate, is the forme of Commanding, in the which wee must consider two things; the power of the Commander, and the iustice of the commandement.

Of the power. The power of him which commands is either soueraigne or inferiour. The commandement of the soueraigne is, either generall, or particular: The generall consists in the lawes which the soueraigne establisheth, vnder which wee comprehend the ordinary orders, customes and statutes.

Of the law. The law is as it were a pledge and a generall safetie, which Princes giue vnto their subiects, for the enter-
tainment of contracts, and their course of liuing, which ought to be maintained and obserued, especially amongst them for the generall good of the Estate. For reason alone which God hath put into man, being vnable to re-
taine him within the bonds of his dutie, and custome to liue ill, hauing made so great an impression in him, as neither prayers nor admonitions are able to retire him; it hath bene needfull to employ the authority of lawes, and the force of the Prince, to reduce every man to rea-
son, for feare of punishment, and by the Establishment of certaine rules, to a sure order in the Estate, and to con-
firme iudgments in iustice. In effect it were dangerous, to leaue all to the iudgment of men, in the multitude whereof will grow a confusion of opinions, if they had not some rule which they ought to follow, and they might more easily bee carried away by hatred or fauour: the which cannot happen to Law-giuers, who making
lawes

Lawes for the future, are not transported with any private passion but for the publique. For although that the Iudges were wise and without passion, yet it is more easie to finde a small number of wise men which establish the Lawes, and the forme of iudging, then to finde such a number as is necessary to be Iudges. Moreover, the Lawes are made with mature deliberation, and Iudgements are giuen suddainly according to the occurrents of affaires: so as the rule is more safe taken from the Law, then if the Prince gaue it himselfe.

The Lawes are of diuers sorts, according to the diuersity of Subiects, for the gouernment whereof they are made. For some rule the power of Offices and Magistrates, as well Ecclesiasticall as Ciuill; and distinguish the function of their Charges, their Iurisdiction, honour, and preheminance one vpon another. Others rule the Treasure; others the military Discipline; others the generall Policy; others Iustice, as well in regard of the quality of persons, of contracts, treaties, and commerce among men; as for the punishment of Crimes, the order and forme of proceeding in Iudgements by the parties and Iudges. Some are made to contayne the Subiect in his duty towards the Prince and Magistrate, and to maintayne Concord and Peace. Finally, the Law must haue for his principall end the good of the Estate, and to prouide for all the parts thereof, and for the inconueniences that may annoy it, and not for any particular profit for him that hath made it: Otherwise the Reuerence which hath caused it to be receiued, would part and be separated from such commandments, and there would remaine nothing but the sole authority and power. For although they say, that the will of the Prince is a Law, yet this must not be vnderstood of all that comes into his fancy and will to doe; but onely of that which he may iustly desire: for that the Lawes ought to be made and published, to amend and correct the nature of things, for the which they meane to establish.

Diuerſity of lawes.

The ayme and end of the law.

Qualities con-
siderable in the
establishing of
lawes.

stablish them; and not to second the appetite of him that makes them: We must therefore consider in making of Lawes, the qualities which must concur in a Law. The first is, that it be according to publique honesty; observing the dignity of persons and things: that it be iust as well for the end whereunto it ought to tend, which is the publique good onely, as for the authority of him that makes it, who in establishing it, ought not to exceed the power that is giuen him. There is another quality which concernes the forme, to the end that Equality and proportion may be kept, as in the imposition of Iudges: for otherwise it were not a Law, but a violence, to the which in conscience we are not bound to obey, but onely to auoyd scandall and sedition. It must likewise be peaceable and quiet according vnto Nature, and the condition of such as ought to obey, and are Subiects, grounded vpon naturall reason, and accommodated to the quality of affaires, and the customes of the Countrey. For there are lawes which are good in one Countrey, but would not be so in another. The Lawes in like manner must be fitting for the time, being necessary to gouerne the Estate, as a pilot doth his ship, according to the wind that blowes, and not lightly established. Moreouer, the Law must be profitable to all, or to the greatest part; plaine, least its obscurity breeds some error; brieve, and according vnto some without preface, with the commandment onely.

Of the short-
nesse of the
law.

Yet others are of a contrary opinion. For although that the principall intention of the Law ought not to be to teach the reason for the which it is made, no more then the Physitian, who is not called by the sick Patient, to giue him a reason of his prescriptions, but to cure him, hauing more need of health then Doctrine: yet for that they make Lawes for men capable to vnderstand that which is necessary for the publique good, the Prince ought (as a common Father) not onely to make knowne vnto his people the end of the Law, but also the reason, that he may know that

that the Ordinances of his Prince are no lesse full of reason then command. It is true, that when as by such mildnesse and humanity the Prince preuayles nothing with his Subjects; then he may with a sufficient excuse vie his absolute command: For his duty binds him to practise all meanes to moue and induce his Subjects to well doing, yea, to imploy force, the which in it selfe is not bad, if it be well vsed. For although that the Lawes ought not to be against men, yet they are made to commaund men; and for that pleasure doth many times deceiue men, delighting in things which are pernicious and hurtfull; the Prince in making a Law, must not haue any regard to the pleasure or displeasure which his Subjects may take: but it shall suffice him, that those things which he ordaynes or commaunds, may be good and profitable to the publique. Yet this is not to say, that he should not proceede in those courses which may breed a popular contentment; but contrariwise he must haue this principal obiect after the good of the Estate. Behold what we are to follow in the establishment of a Law, let vs now see what we are to fly.

Of the absolute
command of
the Prince.

XX

CHAP. 23.

What we are to auoide in the establishing of Lawes.

AMong other things we must haue a speciall care not to establish any Lawes but such as are very necessary. The multiplicity of Lawes is rather a testimony of confusion then good orders: For few Lawes suffice to entertayne good men in their Duties, and to punish the wicked if they be well obserued. The number of Lawes proceeds commonly from two causes, the one is the ambition and vanity of those which command, who to gaine the reputation of wel ruling,

Of the great
number of
lawes, and the
causes thereof.

will

will provide for all, yea for matters of small moment. The which is a cause that being of this quality, they are not observed, and the people accustoming themselves not to obey Lawes of small importance, they afterward do easily dispence with themselves from doing that which Lawes of greater importance commaunds. Wherefore it is better to leave the care of such great and weighty things to the Magistrate, who may provide according to occurrents.

The other cause, from whence the multitude of Lawes do usually proceed, is the bad inclination of the Prince, who having an intent to domineere over the Magistrates & publick, in his particular appetites and affayres, makes what Lawes he can to offend in particular, eyther those whom he feares or such as he hates: or of that, from whence he thinks he may draw some profit for his owne particular.

Of the observa-
tion of lawes.

I come vnto the obseruation of Lawes, without the which, the establishment were fruitlesse. To this obseruation two things are necessary: the example of great men, and of those which commaund; and Seuerity. For as the Lawes prescribe vnto Subiects the rule of well liuing, so the Prince ought to giue an Example for the obseruation and entertaynement of the Lawes: And the Prince is called the liuing Law of the Estate, not only for his intelligence and power to make a Law; but also for the obseruation of that, which they teach by way of commaundment, the Prince by his Example commaunds it. When I say the Example of the Prince, I speak not of his person alone, but of those of his trayne, of his nearest Favourite, and of the greatest personages: For it would little auayle him to obserue the Lawes, if he suffer the great men of his Court to break them. Wherefore he must haue an Eye, for that the Subiects of a meane condition cannot receiue a greater contentment then to see the actions of great persons conformable to the common

common rule, conceiving an opinion thereby to have some equality and participation with them, in acknowledging them equall in this obedience.

As the example of the Prince serues to inuite men to doe well, so seuerity retires and hinders those (whom impunity might abandon) from doing euill. This seuerity notwithstanding doth not extend to search out and punish the most secret offences; but those which may be the cause of bad example. Likewise it is certayne that the punishments ordayned by the Lawes, are more in regard of the scandall then for the Crime, whereof God is the principall reuenger, and not so much to punish the offence past, as to strike terrour into the wicked for the future, by the rigour of punishment, not to commit the like fault. And although the intention of the Law be not to hinder any man, yet for that men sometimes commit errors, which deserue (eyther in regard of the person which commits them, or for some other good respect) compassion and mercy: in this case the Prince may moderate the rigour of the Law by a fauourable temper, or giue him an absolute pardon, if the Subiect deserues it; and that herein he cannot bring impunity in other things, or in equality which breeds scandall to good men to the preiudice of the Estate.

Of seuerity.

When the Prince may dispence with the lawes,

For this effect pardons must not be too frequent, but for a Subiect that is full of merit, and they must be pleasing to the most part. But when he shall be forced to shew himselfe seuer, as it is necessary sometimes, that in the disobedience of the Subiects the Prince should be rigorous: if punishment may be called rigour: this rigour ingendring vially feare, the which seldome accompanied with loue, he must amidst his actions of seuerity, extend his bounty to good men: and then the feare which was full of hatred, will bee conuerted into Reuerence. This shall suffice for that which concerns the generall commaunds of the Soueraigne, which

How he ought to gouerne himselfe in seuerity.

are made by Lawes, Ordinances, and other such kinde of commands.

XX

CHAP. 24.

*Of the Princes particular Com-
mands.*

AS for the particular Commaunds which are made vpon occasions which happen dayly, the forme is in a manner equall: for that it ought to be constant in that which they haue first vndertaken to establish, and not to change vpon euery difficulty which may happen, but contrariwise they should strue to surmount all the crosses which may present themselves. This forme of Commaund shalbe like vnto the other accompanied with seuerity, being needfull to preuent disobedience in small matters: for that this vice like vnto others, growes by degrees. But aboue all, hee which commaunds, must deale in such sort, as the Soueraigne commaund may depend wholly on him, and betyed to his Person: not that the Prince should therefore draw vnto himsef all the gouernment, and the whole managing of the Estate: for besides that he should find himsef ouer-burthened, and that in the multitude of affaires there will be many ill cared for, and worse executed, he should charge his Principality with enuy; and his subiects seeing themselves deprived of the administration of Offices, would grow cold in the affections which they ought to beare him. But the Soueraigne authority ought not to be imparted to any one, nor the distribution of Recompences and Offices, nor the absolute comãd of forces; least that he to whom the Prince hath giuen this power changing his affection and will, shou'd take occasion to attempt against the Estate, hauing the commodity
of

of such an aduantage : whereof there are but too many examples Histories.

We haue treated of the Commandments of a Soueraigne power : Let vs now obserue the forme of their Command, whose power is inferiour, and to whom the charges of the Estate are distributed, to haue care and to watch ouer that part of the Estate which is committed vnto them.



CHAP. 25.
Of Magistrates.

IT being necessary that of all the parts of an Estate, there should not any remayne without gouernment; one alone being vnable to imbrace all; being likewise vnfit, that the Soueraigne should be troubled in matters which may be done better by those which are inferiour vnto him : it hath beene held necessary to giue order, that this supreme authority, yet without suffering any demuntion, should be dispersed into many parts; and that power should be giuen to a certayne number of men, to heare, or dayne, or prouide particularly, for affaires of least importance, and the which are all so many branches of the Soueraignty, out of which they grow, and are supported as by their stemme, and by the which reciprocally the Soueraignty brings forth flowers, leaues, and fruits.

The distinction of these inferiour powers is diuers, according to the diuersity of the parts of the Estate. For some are ordayned to free the Prince from the care and particular safety of the Prouinces, and to watch ouer them; as that of Gouvernours : Others haue the care of Religion; Others of War; Others of the Treasure; Others of Policy; others of Iustice; Others of Iudgements, which must be giuen vpon the controuersies of priuate persons,

*Distinction of
Officers & Mi-
nisters of an
Estate.*

persons, or for the punishments of crimes; Others must haue an eye to the affaires abroad; as Embassadeurs or Agents; Others are destinated to assist the greatnesse of the Prince, to dispose of his house and traine, and to serue him in his Court.

And as euery one of their parts is subdiuided into many others; so according to these subdiuisions, the charges are in themselues distinguished into functions: and in this diuersity there are some which haue power to command, proceeding from the sole authority of the Prince, or from that of the Lawes, the which haue attributed this power to the Office. Others are erected for the seruice of the Estate; Others for the execution of commandments.

Some hauing distinguished publique Offices, according vnto honour, iurisdiction, and command. For some are without honour, iurisdiction, or command; and in this ranke they place all those which are destinated for the seruice or execution of the superiours commandments, as Registers, Notaries, Cryers, Sergeants, Trumpets, and such like. Others are with honour, yet without power to command or to iudge; as Embassadeurs, Councells, and Secretaries of Estate, Receiuers of the Treasure, and most part of the Officers of the Princes trayne. Others haue honour and iurisdiction, but no power to command, as Prelates. Others haue honour and power to command, but no iurisdiction, as the Consuls in old time at Rome, and at this present the gouernours of Prouinces, and the Kings Procurators. Others haue honour, iurisdiction, and power to command, and these are properly called Magistrates.



CHAP. 26.

Of the differences betwixt Officers and Commissioners.

IT were a fruitlesse thing to busie my selfe here, to Discourse particularly of the duties and power attributed to euery publique office : For that it is diuersly practized, not only in seuerall estates, but also in the same Estate, as it is held most expedient for the publique good, to increase the power of the one, and to diminish that of another. And relating only that which is most generally obserued, I will content my selfe to adde vnto these former distinctions one other, which is drawn from the forme in the which a power is giuen to those which are imployed in publique charges.

For charges are giuen eyther by Office or by the way of Commission : If in an Office, he that hath the charge is called an Officer : If by Commission he is tearmed a Commissioner. The charge of an Officer is regulated by the Law, or by the Edict of the erection of the office : and by the letters of Commission the charge of a Commissioner is limited. This difference is betwixt an Officer and a Commissioner, that the charge of an Officer is ordinary, and hath a perpetuall course, although that in regard of the person the Exercise be limited to a certayne time : and the charge of a Commissioner is extraordinary, and reuokable at the good pleasure of him that hath giuen the Commission.

Of officers & Commissioners and of their difference.

There are foure things to be considered in a Commission : The person from whence it proceeds ; the Direction ; the Charge ; and the time when it is to expire. In regard of the first, Commissions proceed either from the Soueraigne, or from his Officers, or from other Commissioners

Consideratio to be made vpon a Commission

Of the person
from whence
it proceeds.

Of the directi-
on of a Com-
mission.

Of the charge
of a Commis-
sion.

deputed by the Soueraigne, who may commit, there happening some lawfull let, vnlesse it bee forbidden, or there be a question of State, or of the life and honour of some persons: For in this case they cannot sub-delegate.

For the direction, a commission is directed either to an Officer, or to a priuate person: If to an Officer, it is either a thing depending of his Office; and in this case, the letters are neither Executorie of his dutie, then letters of commission, if the time or place be not changed; and differs from that which is mentioned in the Edict of the Execution of the Office. In this concurrence, the ordinary knowledge is to bee preferred before the commission; euen as the qualitie of the Officer is preferrable to that of a Commissioner, and the actes of the Officers more assured then those of Commissioners. But if it be a matter which belongs not vnto them, in regard of their Office, and that there bee a difference in some circumstance; then he cannot get it as an Officer, but onely in qualitie of a Commissioner.

In the charge we must consider the end, for the which it is giuen vs; and the power wee haue by it. The end concernes either the instruction, or the knowledge of some businesse: And the power regards the decision, iudgment or resolution; and the commandement for the execution of that which we haue resolved. I call instruction all that which is to bee done, to bring a businesse to an Estate ready to be resolved and determined. The knowledge giuen vnto a Commissioner, is either of fact or of right; or of both together, wherein hee shall carry himselfe, as wee will shew by and by, treating of the duty of the Magistrate towards the commandement of the Prince: the power to iudge is giuen either definitiue, & without an appeale, or without execution if there be an appeale; or els with power to put in executiō that which we haue resolved, notwithstanding any opposition or appellation, and


and without prejudice thereof. For the power of Command, either it is given the Commissioner for the execution of that which hee had ordained; or the Commissioner is commanded to execute that himselfe, which another had decreed, having no power to command a third: And this last kind of Commission, is directed to inferior Officers, who are simple executioners of the commandements of their superiors.

From the consideration of that which I have said wee may gather, that the duty of a Commissioner is to regulate himselfe, according to the termes of his Commission, the which he may in no sort exceede. For although that this generall clause bee inserted to carry himselfe according to the quality of persons, and as hee shall see matters disposed, hee may adde or diminish to the instructions that are given him in writing, according to his wisdom and discretion; Yet this must be vnderstood of the necessary of his charge, and of the smallest matters, for of those which are important hee may not dispose without speciall command. For although they referre it to his wisdom and discretion; yet the ignorance of a Commissioner were not excuseable, this clause being to be vnderstood according to the examination of an honest and sufficient man, especially when it concernes the publike good of the Estate.

The duty of a Commissioner.

It remaines now to know when the Commission expires. It ceaseth, if he which granted it comes to die: if the thing or person for the which the charge is given, bee no more in being: If hee which hath given the Commission reuokes it; if the Commissioner during the Commission, obtaines an Office or Magistracie, equall to him who granted the Commission, so as the businesse bee entire; or that being begunne it may bee left, without prejudice to the publike or to priuate persons.

Of the time when a Commission should expire.



CHAP. 27.

*Considerations upon the Establishment of Officers
and Magistrates.*

THese distinctions knowne, many other poynts are to be considered in the Establishment of those, to whom this power of Command vnder the Soueraigne, or to mannage other affaires concerning the Estate is attributed, be it by Office or Commission; but principally we must consider the number of those that are to be employed: The authority of him which hath established and employed them; the qualities of those whom they put into offices; the forme of proceeding in these Establishments; the time they ought to remayne in Authority; and finally the duty of principall Magistrates, aswell towards the Soueraigne and the Lawes, as to other Magistrates that are equall or inferiour, and towards particular persons.

Of the number
of officers.

That it is more
safe to commit
a businesse to ma-
ny then to one
alone.

The number of Officers or Ministers in one charge is blamed by many; and yet it is more safe to commit a businesse to many then to one. First, for that they watch one another, and as it were through ielousie, every man stirres vp his companion to Execute his charge the better: And moreouer it many times happens, that after they haue made Election of some, they do not answere the opinion that was conceined of them; in which case there being many, one helpes and releiues another. The more they are, the more difficulty they wilbe corrupted; and if any be, their corruption shall haue the lesse force to commit a bad act; one alone, or few hauing no power to deceiue many, and it is a difficult thing that all should agree together to deceiue.

Moreouer the ordinary inconueniences, as sicknesse
or

or other naturall hinderances, befalling a Minister, if he be alone, his charge (which it may be is necessary for the publique) will remayne in suspence and without exercise, and the publique affayres by this meanes delayed, not without preiudice to the Estate.

As for the plurality of Officers, which growes from the plurality of Charges, the charges being distinguished one from another, so as they cannot be confounded; so as this plurality is so farre from being hurtfull or preiudiciall vnto the Estate, as it is profitable. By this meanes no part of the Estate is neglected: you content and pacifie the ambition of many, who living priuately in idlenesse, would seeke to imploy themselves in some innouation: and you bind them to the preservation of the Estate, for that they would feare that an alteration would change the order, and by consequence impayre their authority.

But as in this diuersity of charges, we must provide that confusion may not trouble, neyther the Officers in their charges, nor priuate men in their businesse: We must auoyd irresolution which is ordinary in a multitude, and the tediousnesse of affayres, which happens when as many take knowledge of one thing one after another. Irresolution wilbe aduoyded, not in reducing the affayres to the Knowledge of one alone, or of two, but to a competent number, according to the quality of businesse, and those must be vnequall, to the end that the plurality of voyces may decide the businesse, and that they may not be subiect to be diuided in opinion. The tediousnes would be auoyded in cutting off the degrees of those which are to take Knowledge one aboue another; and it seemes that two degrees would suffice. But they must auoyd in the one and the other, a plurality in the charge of the treasure of the Estate, where the people is oppressed, by the fees or rights attributed to Officers: the which may be done by two meanes. The first in giuing more honour vnto Offices, and lesse wages and fees: And the other

Inconueniences growing from the plurality of officers; and the meanes to auoyd them.

other in giuing them hope to ascend by degrees vnto greater dignities.

This meanes likewise will serue to make the greatest affect and seeke the meanest Offices, making them know that they cannot come to the greatest before they passe through the others ; and there will alwayes remayne a place for the Princes fauour , making choyse of one among many which are in the same charge , to rayse him vnto a greater dignity , and this order may also serue to cause the affayres to be mannaged with more Integrity. For they which desire to aduance themselues , will feare that doing otherwise they shalbe reiected when they desire to rise. In like manner the Capacity wilbe greater in such , as shalbe aduanced to more eminent charges. For that hauing past through many degrees , they will haue more knowledge , both of the affayres and of the manner how to mannage them.



CHAP. 28.

*Of the creation and nomination of Magistrates,
and Officers.*

The creation
and choyse of
officers, must be
made by the So
ueraigne only.

THE Magistrate or Officers, euen the principall ought to be made by the Soueraigne, being one of the greatest markes of Soueraignty. The which I meane not only for the creation and erection of offices , but for the choyse of persons : there being no greater error (although ordinary in Princes) then to relye vpon some other , for the choyse of a man to aduance him to some Office.

And we must not wonder if they be ill serued, although their intent be good ; nor if the Lawes be so ill executed : For that hauing no will to take the paynes

Paines, to search out and examine the merite of their principall subiects; they cannot dispose of Offices proportionably to their Natures and capacities. For besides that there is a difference, in regard of the vnderstanding betwixt affaires of importance, and those of lesse moment in the Execution: there must be more courage in the greater, and lesse subtilty in the lesse: which are two principall parts which seldome ioyne together: no more then in Iron tooles; where we see that a knife for that it hath the edge finer will doe an effect that a Hatchet cannot doe; and he that will imploy a Hatchet like vnto that of a knife, he shall make it vnprofitable to cut any hard substance, wherein they imploy it vsually: so as they must imploy euery toole to the vse for which it is made.

That the charges must be distributed proportionably, according to the nature and capacity of them.

For although that affaires ought to be mannaged by discretion, and not by inclination: yet it behoues the wisdom of the Prince, to know that most part of the affaires of this world are gouerned more by inclination then otherwise. Wherefore he must cunningly make vse of this defect. For Nature hath giuen to euery mans condition some good thing in exchange of some defect which is found in him: if it hath giuen to some one a slownesse to begin, it hath likewise imparted an obstinacy to continue and finish the worke, ballancing his negligence with perseuerance. To those which by Nature shalbe suddaine and hasty, and who in regard of their impatiency, strue to doe things out of season; she hath giuen hardinesse, by the meanes whereof they haue effected great matters.

These Defects being common among men, the Prince shall accommodate himselfe, and distribute the charges according to euery mans humour and inclination; and to treat a businesse, it shall suffice to informe him whom he meanes to imploy, of the grounds and substance of the businesse, and to leaue the rest to him to mannage according to his naturall inclination, be it graue, modest, seuer, or otherwise;

otherwise: for that they may vse diuers meanes tending to the same end; and if it be forced, the businesse wil not succeed. But in making choyce, he must consider, that the humour and sufficiency may be proportionable to the businesse, and to the humour of those with whom he is to treat. The same must be obserued for all those whom they imploy in charges and publique affaires.

Principall qualities required in an officer & Magistrate.

And although it were to be desired that in the managing of affaires, they might haue men that were discreet, and of great sufficiency: yet for that these two qualities doe seldome meete together in so high a degree as were to be desired; it were better to choose them of a meane vnderstanding, so as they be honest men: for that his sharp subtilty proceedes from choller, to the which such men are subiect to suffer themselves to be transported for a smal matter: And moreouer hauing a good conceipt of themselves, and a bad of others, they can hardly agree with any man. Besides they are vsually of small fore-sight, for the little leasure their promptnesse giues them; and for the passion which blinds them, they are many times desirous of nouelties. For neuer allowing those orders which are made with a mature deliberation and their quicknesse of spirit, furnishing them with others, which in their opinions seeme better; they strue to purchase beleefe, and in this attempt they sometimes cause trouble.


They which are of a meane vnderstanding, support the accidents which happen more easily; and when as they finde themselves in an Estate well ordred, and gouerned by good Lawes, they maintaine themselves long. Such men most commonly are inclined to Fleagme. And if by a breeding contrary to their nature, they haue not beene stirred vp to ambition, they obey more willingly then the rest; for that their humour being grosse, the impression which nature hath bred, is more firme, and the desires and appetites stronger.

The vices and But in choosing Magistrates and Officers, they must not onely

onely consider the vertues of Men, but also the vices and defects are as well to be considered as the vertues, in the election of Magistrates and Officers. naturall defects, which they may haue; and to obserue if these defects be so powerfull, as they may hinder him in the exercise wherein they meane to imploy him. As for example, in a Iudge, there is no doubt but a iust Man for his Iustice ought to be chosen; but if hee be fearfull, assure your selfe, if hee be to giue sentence against some great man, he will leaue Iustice to adhere to safety. Moreover a Magistrate must loue and vnderstand the Lawes: For louing them hee will obserue them; and louing and vnderstanding them, hee will make others capable to obserue them.

But to make the choyce of Officers easily, the meanes would bee (as wee haue formerly said) to make many degrees, and to choose out of the last degree, him whom they meane to aduance to the next, and so from degree to degree: For they should know by their actions what they would bee before they make choice of them. An easy means to make a good choice.

This shall suffice for the principall qualities of Magistrates and Officers. Let vs now come to the forme of making them.



CHAP. 29.

Of the forme and manner to Create and make Magistrates and Officers: And of the time of their Charges.

They are made either by election or by lot, or by both together. The election or choice is referred to one alone who names and chooseth whom hee pleaseth, which is the ordinary manner in all principallities; or else it is referred to many; and is done either by voice, or in lifting vp the hand and voice; or by billets or by beans. The Lot is cast, either vpon certaine Citizens, Three kinds of creating and making Magistrates. By election. By lott.

By lot and election together.

Citizens, out of which they will choose some one to employ in some charge; or vpon all those which are of the same age or the same condition, out of which they will likewise by Lot draw one or two to aduance them to some Office. The Lot and choyce concurre together diuersly. For either they choose a certaine number by voices, out of which afterwards they desire to draw one to bee an Officer; or hauing drawne many by Lot, they giue them power to choose one amongst them, which is held most capable.

In this difference it is to be obserued, that the discontent of those which are not chosen is the lesse, when the Lot proceeds the choyce, then when the choyce goes before the Lot. Wherefore in places whereas hatred is irreconcillable, it were better to make vse of this last kind, then of the first.

The continuance of Officers is either for life or a certaine time.

Let vs now see what time Officers ought to remaine in the exercise of their charges. This is diuersly obserued. In some Estates they continue them during life: In others they are limmited to a certaine time. In some for a yeere; in others for two; and in others, although they were continued in their places during life, yet being many in the same charge, they made them serue alternatiuely one after another.

Reasons and considerations to make Officers for a time.

They which haue beene of opinion to make Officers temporary, and not to continue them during life, had for their principall consideration to abate the insolence and pride which a long command brought with it; as also to haue meanes to call Officers to an Accompt, hauing giuen ouer their charges, fearing they should not bee able to draw them so easily, being still in authority: In like manner to preuent the impunity of those, which had transgressed in their Offices. To make many pertakers of the Estate, not onely to satisfie the ambitious, to cut off discontents, but also to recompence many good men, & to make more capable of affairs, & to stir them vp to the care of the publique.

publique. Some also haue beene of this opinion, to hinder that the gouernment might not bee vsurped by few men, who would make the rest subiect: hauing beene often seene by many examples, that the continuance of command hath made vsurpations easie, not onely vpon popular estates, but also in principalities and seignouries; the Offices and charges for life hauing beene made hereditary and patrimoniall in many estates.

They which would perpetuate them, haue had other consideration: For that making the Magistrates Annall, or for a short time they leaue their Offices before they are informed of their duties; so as the Estate falls alwayes into the hands of vncapable men, and by these suddaine and frequent changes, most part of affaires remaine vndecided, Warrs begonne left vnperfitt, Suits and differences laid by, and punishments and executions delayed. There is another consideration, which is, that the time being short, the Merchants study to doe their businesse speedily: and this change brings nothing, but new starued horse-leeches, which must be filled; whereas they which are already full by their offices, might giue more ease vnto the people.

Reasons and considerations to perpetuate Offices during life.

And as from new seruants growes the enuie of Families, so from new Magistrates proceeds the fall of Estates, which bring new Councells, new designs, new Lawes, new Customes, new Edicts, new kinds of liuing, and new Iudgements. *Tiberius* to withdraw the greate men of *Rome* from the knowledge of publique affaires, and to assure those the more whom he imployed in Offices, hee continued them during life. Wherefore to auoid the greatest part of the inconueniences which are found in either party; you must consider the forme of the Estate, and the humour of the subiects.

Popular Estates are maintained by the continuall change of Magistrates, to the end that every one according to his qualitie may haue his part, as they haue in a soueraigntie, and that equallitie (the nurse of a popular Estate)

The change of Offices and Magistrates necessary in a popular Estate.

Estate) may be the better entertayned by the annual succession of Magistrates ; least that the custome of commaunding long, should cause some one to desire to seaze vpon the Soueraignty : the which is a consideration which they ought to haue in Seignouries, and Estates gouerned by few persons.

Meanes to preuent the vsurpation of the Estate by the continuance of officers in great charges.

In Principallities it is not needfull to teach Subjects to Command, but to obey. And being necessary to retayne them in their duties, they cannot assure themselves but of few to maintayne the rest. Yet to preuent that the continuance of a great charge should not make some one dream of the vsurpation of the Estate, they may in continuing other Officers in their places, ballance the power of great men, in giuing them companions as great as themselves : or after the expiration of some time, to cause them to passe from one charge to another, which hath more honour but lesse power. Wherefore some haue held it fit, to distinguish the charges whereon the force depends, from those to whom they wil giue authority ; and to make others aboue them, who shall haue more honour then authority or power.

The practise of the Pope and Seignoury of Venice, in the disposition of great charges to preuent vsurpation.

This course is obserued by the Pope and the Seignoury of Venice. The governments depending on the Church, the authority is giuen to a Clergy-man for the gouernment, but the force is committed to another, who depends immediatly on the Pope ; yet hauing charge, in that which shal concerne the gouernment, to assist the resolutions of him that hath the authority. In governments depending on the Seignoury of Venice, a Gentleman of the Commonweale commaunds : and for the Forces a Captayne of the Seignoury, who hath charge to assist him. But in neyther of these Estates, the Gouernour and he which commaunds the Forces, are not linckt together, as the one would fauour the vsurpation of his Companion. For as the Gouernour would not allow of his vsurpation that commaunds the Forces, for that it cannot be done but against his authority:

so he cannot expect and assistance from him, fearing that hauing made this ouerture, and the other making shew to yeeld vnto it, being Master of the forces, the authority of the Estate and gouernour being weakned by this enterprize, he would chase him away, and make himselfe Master of the gouernment. And these charges being not the most honourable in an Estate, but there being others more eminent, those which enioy them, aiming at the honour of the others, study not to settle themselves there; but contrariwise some affect to be made Cardinals, and to be drawne from those places, and the others to attaine vnto the chiefe Offices of the Seignoury.

Kings who haue but one sort of people to imploy in gouernments, make vse of other meanes, some make gouernments triennall, and not onely the gouernments of Prouinces, but also of Cittadels and Forts, causing that these depend not on the others; but in certaine things, and accompany the Gouernour with forces; which are not particularly at their deuotion, but onely so farre forth as the Gouernours shall contayne themselves in the Princes seruice. But if the Gouernours cannot be changed, they may change the forces which ought to assist them.

The practise of Kings & Princes vpon the same subiect.

But forasmuch as the Prince ought to be Master, and dispose freely of great places, it seemes that hee might giue them for a certayne time; and the affaires so requiring it, they might continue them to the same persons, if he thought it fit; if not hee might take them into his hands, and deliuer them to others, without any cause of discontentment to those from whom he had taken them. For this expresse limitation of time would worke two effects: The one that they which are aduanced to these places; entring into them, would resolute to leaue them: the other, that being certayne they must goe forth, they will neuer thinke

That the change of principall Officers & Magistrates is necessary for the safety of the Prince & peace of the people.

to become Masters, and settle themselves: whereas the time not being limited, every one will strive to continue in his place, and there to build his designs; but also will desire to bring in after him some one of his Children or Kinsmen. And if the Prince desires to retire him, he must buy his place of him, or cause it to be bought by some other; which is to bring in a venality, more shamefull and dangerous in an Estate, then any other abuse that can bee imagined. We will therefore conclude, that this change in the government of Prouinces, and the command of great Troupes or Companies, be it of Souldiers or others which haue great authority in the Estate, is necessary for the safety of the Soueraigne, and the peace of the Subject.

Prudence required in this change.

But for that in doing this altogether, they which would desire to continue in their charges, might plot together and trouble the Estate, to maintayne themselves; he must change them one after another, causing the time of their charges to expire at diuers termes.


That you may not giue great commands in a Prouince to those that were borne there.

There is another consideration which hath beene discreetly and wisely made in great Estates, not to giue great commands in a Prouince to those which are Natiues, not onely to auoyde the Iniuries which such persons may commit as well in fauour of their Kinsfolkes and Friends, as in hatred of their Enemies; but also to auoyde the contempt of his Authority which giues these charges, which proceeds commonly from the Iealousie of those of the Countrey, who hold themselves equall, and sometimes greater then he that is aduanced. But if he that is made Gouvernour bee so great, as they neede not feare this Iealousie, yet the Prince must make vse of this meanes, to auoyde the swelling authority which hee may get in the Prouince by his owne meanes, or by that
of

of his Kinsfolkes and Friends, to the preiudice of his Master. Our ancient Ordinances conformable therein to those of the *Romans*, had therein very well provided, especially in regard of Bayleifes and Seneshals, who were the ancient Gouvernours: But they haue beene and are yet very illgouerned and obserued.

It auayles not to say, that to facilitate the obedience of Subiects, they haue beene forced to take this course; the Subiect obeying more willingly one of his Prouince, who hee thinkes would haue the same affection like himselfe for that which concernes the good thereof, the which a Stranger and vnknown vnto him would not doe, whom he imagines to be vnlike in humour and will. For this were to make the Prince subiect to his Officer, and to make the obedience of the people depend more on the credit which the Officer hath, then of the Authority which the Prince ought to haue ouer his Subiects, who obey not the Prince, but so farre forth as it shall please the Officer; and the Officer losing his credit, the Prince shall be no more obeyed.

But if in a new Estate to settle himselfe, it is very fitting to make vse of those which haue most credit with his Subiects, the Princes authority hauing not yet taken roote in their minds; but I will not thereby inferre that he must continue it: but contrariwise this authority being acknowledged, to settle it absolutely, the obedience must immediately depend, and they must obey the Officer so farre forth as he hath authority from the Prince, and not for the particular credit he hath among the people.



CHAP. 30.

*Of the duty of the principall Officers
and Magistrates.*

AS for the support of the body, it is not sufficient that the Head be in good Estate, but the other members in like manner must doe their function : So in an Estate, it is not sufficient for the Prince to doe his Duty, but the Officers, and especially the principall Magistrates of the Estate, should likewise doe theirs.

But I should be tedious, if I would relate here all the whole Duty of every Officer : onely I will deliver in generall termes that which concernes the Duty of such as haue Iurisdiction and command together, or the one and the other diuided ; as those which are more considerable and worthy of obseruation in the managing of the Estate. Their Duty is considered in foure diuers Subjects : eyther towards the Lawes, or towards the Soueraignes Commandments ; or towards the other Magistrates ; or towards priuate persons. Vnder the Name of the Lawes we comprehend the Ordinances and Customes, which oblige the generall. For the regard of Ordinances, the Duty of the principall Magistrates is, to examine those which they will make, in that which belongs to Iustice, decency, and publique profit and commodity ; and from the consequence to make their remonstrance vnto the Soueraigne before they declare or publish them, if they finde any thing to bee reformed and amended.

As for those which are already receiued, they must cause them to be strictly obserued, and restore the old

Wherein the
Duty of Offi-
cers and Magi-
strates doe con-
sist.

Of the duty to-
wards the
lawes,

old abolished for want of vse, before they put them in execution: otherwise it would be a very vnjust thing, and resenting tyranny, after they had for a long season contemned an Ordinance, to proceed suddainly against those who hauing not obserued it, had made a breach: The common error being not onely excusable, but also held for a Law, if the Law of Nature doth not resist.

But for that the Lawes are not sufficient to gouerne an Estate, for that they ordayne onely in generall, the Law-giuer, or Prince being vnable to fore-see an infinite number of particularities which happen in affaires: For this cause the Magistrate is established, to examine the particularities, and to accommodate the Law thereunto by a iust and vpright interpretation; the which is taken eyther from the words of the Law, or from the intention of him that made it, or by the induction or conclusion which may bee drawne from it.

In regard of the words of the Law, you must obserue these Rules: First, not to take them nor interpret them contrary to the intention of the Law-giuer: Secondly, you must see if the other clauses of the Law doe correspond and agree with the interpretations which we giue. But if by reason of ambiguity, and the diuers significations of words, there be obscurity, they must seeke the proper signification either from the common manner of speaking, or from that which was peculiar to him that drew the Law; if it did not plainely appeare, that the intention of the Law-giuer had beene wholly contrary to the proper signification of words.

How the Magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the interpretation of the words of the law.

If there bee found a double interpretation, taken from the propriety of words, and the common vse of speaking; they shall follow the mildest; and if the words bee obscure, they must haue recourse

In the interpretation of the intention of the law.

to custome, and to that which is practised in that regard. But if the interpretation be notwithstanding doubtfull, they must follow that which shalbe most proper for the matter, to the which it must be referr'd. And if notwithstanding all this they cannot draw any interpretation suitable to the businesse, or to reason; he must cause it to be interpreted by those who haue made the Law; or cause a declaration to be made by the Soueraigne. Thus the Magistrate must carry himselfe in the interpretation of the words of the Law. But in the interpretation of the intention of the Law, there are other Rules: eyther they restrayne the Ordinances to certayne cases, or they extend them to many others then those which are specified. They restrayne the ordinances commonly, when as the reason which seemes to haue bene the cause of the ordinance, doth not extend but to certayne cases, and ceaseth in all the rest, in regard of certayne circumstances; for the reason of the Law fayling, the disposition can take no place.

But to seeke out the reason of the Law, we must consider, whether it be exprest by the Law it selfe, or gathered by the Interpreters; and to draw from thence the condition of things whereof the Law speakes, or if it be vncertayne. For if it be exprest by the Law, eyther the Law is formall in the case that it is in question, and then without doubt the Law must be followed; Or if it be not altogether formall, you must consider whether there be not some contrary Circumstances which hinder the reason of the Law, that it takes not place in the businesse that is in question: And they shall doe the like, if the reason be not exprest in the Law, of the execution whereof they treat, but in another fact vpon another subiect. But if the reason be gathered from Interpreters, you must see if they can yeeld no better: And then you must follow it, restrayning it, if it be particular, and extending it if it be generall. But if it be doubtfull, and ordaynes generally, you may not in this doubt in any sort restrayne the effect of

of the Law, vnlesse it be in things that are odious and hurtfull: And whereas the Law shall bee limited in certaine cases, they must not easily extend it to others vpon pretext of equitie, vnlesse there were an Identite of reasons, especially in things which concerne the rigour of the Law, whereas the case not exprest is held for omitted. But in such occurrents, they shall gouerne themselves according to the common Law, to the which all the Ordinances, if it may bee, must bee referred; to the end that in all the Lawes of the estate, vniformitie may bee obserued, and naturall equitie followed, whereby all the actions of men should bee gouerned, and regulated.

Wherefore the case not being exprest in the Law, but onely the reason being knowne whereon the Law is grounded: It shall be easie to examine if this reason may take place, in that which presents it selfe, in concluding from the generall to the particular, from the principall to the accessory, and by the other meanes of induction. Thus allowing one of the contraries which haue no meane, wee may induce that the other is forbidden: And in like manner, if the Law forbids one thing to auoid a mischiefe which may follow; wee may induce that it likewise forbids all other things, which may breed the like mischiefe, although they be not exprest. And so many consequences may bee drawne from the Lawes, and referred to diuers examples, whereof the reason would be easie to applie from one to another.

Wherefore to recollect my selfe, and to explaine more at large what I haue said, as long as the Law is certaine, wee must stand firme to its authority, and make no subtle distinctions vpon equitie: For that the Lawes are published to be obserued in their termes and tenor, and not to bee disputed of: I say so farre forth as it is plaine and not obscure. But if it bee obscure, they shall follow the interpretation that is most receiued by vse; so as it bee not altogether contrary to naturall reason. But if vse

Examination
of the reason of
the law.

That wee must
stand to the au-
thority of the
law, and make
no questions
vpon equity.

failes vs, wee must in the diuersitie of opinions, follow that which is supported by example: yet wee must examine the example duly, to see if they agree in the cause, and principall circumstances.

When as vse and examples faile, they shall chooseth the opinion which shall approach neerer to naturall equitie then to rigour; and that which shall bee more conformable to the intention of the Law, then that which shall be drawne from the subtile interpretation of words: And that which shall bee taken from the true Interpretation of words, then from similitudes and coniectures: For that all similitudes halt; and coniectures neuer conclude directly: Or from that which shall bee receiued, or most conformable to that which the ancients haue held, for that we may not slightly leaue the opinion of the ancient. But when wee cannot iudge which opinion is the most iust, wee must consider which is the safest, and that which is approued by most men, and by the wisest, more sortable to the businesse that is in question, and which hath in it lesse inconuenience.

Of the execution of lawes and ordinances.

From what time the law or ordinance doth bind.

Who they are that are bound

Behold how the Magistrate ought to carry himselfe, in the interpretation of the Lawes. The other part of the Maiestrates duty is the execution, for the which he must enter into other considerations: And first from what time the Law or ordinance ought to take place; when they bind the Subiect; and who they are that are bound. For the first, you must vnderstand that the last ordinances, being contrary to the precedent, derogate from them: But the last cannot take place, but for differences to come, and not for those which are decided, or hanging in iudgement by appeale. And the ordinance is in force from the day of the publication, and from that time it binds euery man for the future, which is for the second point.

For the third, the Princes law doth not bind the subiects which are gone to reside in the territory of another Prince. Yet if the ordinance be prohibitive, they must consider if the

the prohibition or defence bee made in regard of something, which is in the territory of him which hath made the ordinance: For then a stranger or the subject of another Prince should be bound. But if it bee in regard of persons, that the prohibition is made and in fauour of the subjects; the Princes subject is bound not to contradict it, although hee remaine in the territory of another Prince. But if it be in hatred of the subject, hee that is out of the territory of the Soueraigne, which hath made the ordinance, is not bound. If the prohibition be made for solemnitie, which they desire to haue obserued in some acte, it doth not oblige the subject out of the territory of his Prince, for that in the obseruation of solemnitie, they regard the place where the act is made.

As for other persons whom the ordinance may bind, they must distinguish whether they bee named in the ordinance by their names, or specified by their qualitie and condition, or if there be no designation. The name or the condition being specified, the ordinance doth not extend to those which are of another name, and another qualitie. But if there be no qualitie specified, the ordinance bindes not only all those which gaue consent to the publication, but also such as remaine in the place where it is obserued, were they strangers: whence this distinction proceeds, that in things that are personall, proceeding from contracts, solemnities, and acts of voluntary Iurisdiction; they must follow that which is obserued in the place of their abiding, but in that which is of the realitie of things; they shalbe bound to that which is receiued in the place where the thing is scituated.

Ordinances are in force, not for that they are written or iust, but in regard they are commanded and made by the Soueraigne. For hee that should obey the Law onely for that it is iust, should not obey it as hee ought, this Iustice being subject to debate. So customs haue the force of law, for that they are receiued and allowed by the Iudgment of the

Of the force
of lawes or
ordinances.

the people: And although there may be some exception, so as it be not against the Law of Nature, the Magistrate is bound to obserue them, and to cause them to be obserued by others.

Of Custome.

But it is lawfull for the Magistrate to extend or restraine the Law with the reason in certayne cases. Yet he hath not the same power with a custome, the which consisteth more in fact then in Law, and in the particular vse then in reason, he must obserue it with the circumstances, with the which it hath beene receiued. To make a custome to haue the force of a Law, three things are required.

Three things
required to
giue force to a
Custome.

The first, that it hath beene brought in from the beginning to be obserued for the future. For you cannot authorize by this name that which some, (ayming at another thing, or by the indulgence or conniency of the Magistrate) haue sometimes done: For that a custome cannot take its beginning from a casuall or rash vse, but from an vse continued by a common obseruation.

The second point necessary to authorize a custome, is the reiteration of many the like acts; not so much to endure a plurality of examples, as a consent of opinion, by the frequency of these acts; and by this consent two Acts suffice to confirme a custome.

The third and last thing required for the approbation of a custome, is the time of tenne yeares at the least; some hold thirty yeares that the consent in this manner of liuing should continue: And that Custome shalbe of the more authority when it is fortified by the longer prescription of time.



CHAP. 31.

Of the duty of the Magistrate towards his Soueraigne.

THe Duty of the Magistrate towards his Soueraigne, consists in the respect and obedience he owes, not onely to the Princes person, in whose presence all the power of Magistrates is held in suspence, as the Stars lose their light in the presence of the Sunne, (the Magistrates being not brought in, what power soeuer they haue, but to supply the presence of the Prince, their Soueraigne) but also to the commandments of the Soueraigne: the which as they are of diuers sorts, so the duty of the Magistrate, is to carry himselfe diuersly for the enrolling or verifing thereof.

Wherein the duty of the Magistrate to the Prince consists.

For eyther the commandment consists in the knowledge of the Cause, and in this case the power of the Magistrate remains entire: Or the commandment giues him knowledge of the right, but not of the fact: and in this case the Officer ought notwithstanding to enquire of the fact, although the Prince had assured him to be well informed of the truth: vnlesse he had expressly forbidden him to take notice: For then the Magistrate may not proceede: Onely he may (the fact being notoriously false) acquaint his Soueraigne with the truth, and yeeld to that which hee should reply vpon his remonstrances. But if the Letters did onely giue him knowledge of the fact, and not of the right and merite of the graunt; the Officer ought to obey, so as it be nothing against the right of Nature: If notwithstanding if it be against the Lawes and generall ordinances, or that it may bring some inconuenience or prejudice to the Estate, or to a part thereof; he may make his remonstrances, not once onely but twice or thrice.

Of the commandments of the Prince, and how the Magistrate must carry himselfe in the verification.

But

The Magistrate ought to obey the will of the Prince, although it were vniust.

The disobedience of the Magistrate to the will of the Prince, is of bad consequence.

The Magistrate is not receivable to giue ouer his charge, rather then to terrifie the vniust commands of his Prince.

But if notwithstanding the Prince will haue the Officer proceede to the verification, hee must doe it, although the matter were vnlawfull. For although it bee certaine, that the Prince may not command any thing that is vniust, nor that is subiect to scandall or reprehension, or which may bee reiected by his Officer: Yet for that by the constraint, which the Soueraigne is forced to vse, the ignorant multitude is moued to disobedience, and to contempt of his Edicts and commaunds, as being published and receiued by force: The duty of the Magistrate is, not to bandy himselfe against his Prince, what errorr soeuer hee commits: For this were a Rebellion in the Estate, and to bandie the Feete against the Head. It were much better to yeild vnder the Soueraigne Maiestie with obedience, then in refusing the commaundement of the Soueraigne, to giue an example of Rebellion to the subiects.

There are some which proceeded farther, and hold, that if the Prince commandes the Magistrate to excuse some wicked acte to his subiects, it were better to obey, and thereby to couer and bury the remembrance of a wickednesse already done; then by refusing to irritate and incense him to doe worse, and to cast, as they say, the helme after the hatchet: As *Papinian* did, who refusing to excuse the Parricide committed by *Caracala*, on the person of *Geta*, caused this Emperour to exceede in all sorts of cruelties; whereof hee felt the first fury: This resistance hauing preuailed nothing, but brought an irreparable losse to the affaires of the Emperour, as well by reason of his death, as of that which followed.

The Magistrate is not allowed to leaue his Office, rather then to publish the vniust will of the Soueraigne, for that it would bee a dangerous ouerture to all the subiects, to refuse and reiect the edicts and will of the Prince, if euery man in his charge might leaue the Estate in danger, and expose it to a storme, like vnto a Ship without a helme,

helme, vnder colour of an opinion of Iustice, which it may bee would bee affected by some fantastique braine, without reason, but to crosse a contrary opinion. Wherefore in all Councils, they hold this rule, to make the Counsellors range themselves to the two greatest opinions. For although it seemes strange, to force the conscience of those, to whose Wisedome and Religion they haue referred a businesse, to be examined, and to giue their aduice: yet for that the varietie of opinions might hinder the conclusion, it hath bin held most reasonable, yea necessary, to vse it in this manner: The rule of wise men which cannot faile, is, that of two vniust things they follow that which is most iust, and of two inconueniences to auoid the greater: Otherwise there would neuer bee an end of humane actions. If the command be so vniust, as without wronging their conscience, they cannot passe it; some Magistrates to auoid the disobedience, and not to charge their consciences in verifying it, haue incerted; by the expresse commaundement of the Prince, many times reiterated.

The manner of verifying the Edicts, ordinances, and commands of Princes by the Magistrates, hath beene brought in, in some estates, to make the people more willing to obey them: Who hauing not capacitie to iudge of things by themselves, and being more inclined to distrust, and to caluminate the will of the Prince then approve it: And the Prince on the other side being inuironed by importune Courtiers, who without any regard of duty, or of iustice, nor to the good of the Estate, seeke by new inuentions to worke their owne ends, and to get them authorized by circumventing the Prince: It hath beene held conuenient for the Prince, to cause his will to passe by such solemnities, to the end they might bee receiued by the people; and that being examined and found contrary, or preiudiciall to the publique good, they might be refused by humble remonstrances; which
wipe

Reasons why
the custome of
verifying the
Princes Edicts
hath beene
brought in by
the Magistrate

wipe away the disgrace of the deniall: and serue the Prince for an excuse, to free himselfe from the importunitie, and iniustice of great men.

How the Magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the execution of a commandement after a Reuocation.

It remaines now to know, how an Officer ought to carry himselfe in executing a command, if there comes vnto him a reuocation, the businesse being begun. Some hold opinion, that if the execution be so much importing the Estate, as not being finished there would happen some inconuenience, that notwithstanding the reuocation hee ought to proceed: If not, hee must leaue the businesse as it is. But for the first, it is necessary that the danger of the Estate be euident and knowne to all Men, and not to the Magistrate alone, who might bee suspected to haue proceeded lightly, or with spleene, passing on after the Reuocation.



CHAP. 32.

Of the duty of Magistrates one towards another.

THe duty of Magistrates, and the manner of proceeding which they ought to hold one towards another, is regulated according to the power which they haue, whereof in most Estates they make three degrees.

Three degrees of Magistrates and the power of either of them.

The highest is of those, who in some part of the Estate, haue power to determine without appeale. The Prince only may command them; the middle sort obeyed these, and commanding those which are of a lower degree, who haue not any command ouer the Officers, but only ouer particular persons. Wee may call the first superiors or principalls; the second middle or subalterne; and the last inferiors. The first haue power to command all Magistrates and Officers, without exception; or only certaine Officers

Officers subiect to their Iurisdiction. They which haue power to command all in generall without execution, ought not to be brought into the Estate, for the change that such a power might vsually cause. For there being but one degree to climbe, and to make themselues Masters, ambition doth teach it speedily; and euery man doth the more easily indure it, for that all men are accustomed to obey them.

The dutie of a Superiour or principall Magistrate is, to containe those that are vnder him in the termes and duties of their charges; of whom he may be Iudge, and not they of him in qualitie of a Magistrate; but as a priuate person. And as for the Soueraigne, although they may iudge in their owne cause, to whom God hath giuen power to dispose without Iudgment, as *Xenophon* saith; yet it is much more fitting for the Soueraigne, to suffer the Iudgment of his Magistrates, then to make himselfe Iudge in his own cause; provided alwayes that the businesse doth not concerne the Soueraignty, or his particular person; but to the end that Maiestie may not suffer diminution of its greatnesse, or that the splendor of a Royall Name may not dazell the eyes of the Iudges: It hath bin wisely aduised in some Estates, that the Soueraigne should not plead but by his procuratour, and would neuer assist in Person.

The dutie of a Superiour or principall Magistrate.

That it is fittig for a Prince to indure the Iudgement of the Magistrate

And as in the power of the Prince, the power of Magistrates is held in suspence; so in the presence of superior Magistrates, the power of Inferiours hath no effect. The which is vnderstood, not only of superiour heads and Magistrates, but also of their Lieutenants who are therein held the same thing, as being but one power distributed to two. Wherefore the Lieutenant cannot determine any thing, his chiefe being present. Yet the Magistrate may take notice of an iniury or wrong done by his Lieutenant.

The power of a Lieutenant equall to that of the Magistrate.

But that which hath bin spoken of the power of Superior Magistrates ouer their inferiours, must be vnderstood in their

The power of the Magistrate is of no effect out of his territorie.

their territorie, their seats, and in the limits of their Iurisdiction, out of which they are but priuate men, without power or command.

Of two Magistrates equall in power and of the execution of their decrees in one anothers territory.

Magistrates which are equall in power, or haue no dependance one of another, cannot bee commanded nor corrected one of another. But if there bee question to execute the decree or Iudgement of one in the territory of another, they must vse honest intreaties and clauses of request. Yet where there shall bee question of the interpretation of a decree made by one Magistrate, another that is his equall may not take knowledge: For euery one ought to bee the interpreter of his owne will.

Of the execution of a sentence giuen by the officer of a forraine Prince vpon anothers territory.

And in regard of the sentence giuen by the Officer of a Forraine Prince, for the execution whereof in the territory of another, there should be a Commission of intreatie: The iudges of this Prince to whom the Commission is directed, may not examine the Iudgement, least the stranger bee induced another time to doe the like, and to dissolue the Iudgements whereof they should demand the execution; the which would bee done more through ieaiousie of the Estate, then for any iniustice in them. Yet if there bee question of honour, or life, they may not execute the Iudgements of forraine Magistrates, if they haue not knowne the merite of the cause, and seene the informations. And Princes owe this respect one vnto another, for the good of Iustice, not onely to punish the wicked, which fle from one Estate into another; but also for the Exemplary punishment, which ought to be made vpon the places, are bound to yeeld the naturall subject to his naturall Prince, vnlesse the Prince to whom the fugitiue is retired, findes that hee is vniustly pursued; for in this case, he ought not to yeeld them: Yea he is forbidden by the Law of God, to restore a Bondman which is fled into another Mans house to auoid the fury of his Master.

But

But although the Magistrate may not command his Equals, yet in a body or colledge consisting of many equall in power, the greatest part may command the lesse. For in this case they that are superior in number, are likewise superior in power. So as the lesser part cannot command the greater, nor yet hinder it. Yet one Tribune at *Rome* opposing, might hinder the acts of all the rest: the *Romans* making a difference betwixt opposition and command; for that hinderance and opposition is lesse then a command, and doth not induce any superiority like vnto a command.

Of Magistrates equal in power in a body or colledge, and of their command one ouer another.

The difference betwixt opposition and command.

But Colledges hauing no superiority one ouer another, they cannot haue any command, but they may well hinder one another; this hinderance growing rather from a contrariety in an equall concurrence, then from any superiority. This may be grounded vpon the generall Rule of all those which haue any thing in Common, amongst which he that hinders, hath more force, and his condition in this case is better then his that seekes to proceede; and among many Lawes, that which forbids, is of greatest force. But if before the Act, a Magistrate may hinder his Equall by opposition; yet after the Act he cannot doe it by any other meanes, but by appeale to the Superior.

That they may hinder one another by opposition before the act, or by appeale after the act, but not by command.



CHAP. 33.

Of the duty of Magistrates to private Persons.

THe duty of Officers or Magistrates, to particular person hath two principall foundations. The one is grounded on the power which is given to the Magistrate by the Edict or Letters of Commission: the other vpon the seemliness which consists in the particular

Foundations of the duty of Magistrates to private persons.

I

carriage

carriage of the Magistrates person, to be able to maintaine himselfe in credit, reputation, and authority, with those ouer whom he is to command.

Diuers powers
of Magistrates.

And although that the power of all Magistrates regards generally the execution of the Law, the which without the Magistrate were idle : Yet the power of some is more strictly limited then that of others. For some are bound by the Lawes and Ordinances to command and vse the power that is giuen them, in that forme and manner that is prescribed them, without adding or diminishing any thing : And in this case they are but simple Executioners of Lawes. To others they giue more liberty, and leaue many things to their discretion and iudgement. Wherein notwithstanding they must so gouerne themselves, as they doe not any thing that is extraordinary without a speciall command, or that may not be easily required, that they are not forced by some strong and powerfull necessity, or an apparent danger. But in these things where the diuersity of circumstances is a hinderance that he cannot specifie, or set downe in particular the power, as in the arbitrement of Princes, the Magistrate may according to his conscience decree without a speciall command. But therein he shall auoyde to affect the reputation of pittifull as well as of cruell: For cruelty although it be blameable, yet it retaynes the Subjects in the obedience of the Lawes : But too much Clemency causeth the Magistrate to be contemned, with the Lawes and the Prince which hath made them. Wherefore the Law of God forbids them to take pitty of the poore in Iudgment: But one of the things most requisite in a Magistrate, is to make the grauity of offence knowne, as well to make offenders vnderstand what they haue deserued, as to induce them to repentance : And in doing so the punishment will haue lesse bitternesse and more profit. Wherefore the principall Rule of the duty of a Magistrate to priuate persons, is to vse the power that is giuen him, well ; and priuate men

Of their duties
to priuate persons
in giuing
sentence.

Of the obedience and respect of priuate

Men, reciprically owe him all obedience, in executing his charge, bee it right or wrong, so as he exceeds not the termes of his power or Iurisdiction: For then they may contradi& his ordinaances by appeale or opposition; and if he proceeds, he must make a distintion, whether the grieuance be irreparable or not. If it may be repaired, they shall not oppose by fact, but by course of law: but if it be irreparable, they may oppose by fact, yea with force; not to offend the Magistrate, but to defend the innocent.

persons to the Magistrate, executing his charge.

As for iniuries which priuate men doe vnto Magistrates, it is certaine that the Magistrate being wronged hee cannot be Iudge in his owne cause; vnlesse it bee for some vnreuerence or iniury done vnto him publicuely, in executing his Office. For in this case it is lawfull for the Magistrate being wronged to punish such Men, for the offence done vnto the particular person of the Magistrate. For this reason if a Body or Colledge of Iudges hath bin wronged, they may censure and condemne those which haue done the offence, not to reuenge the iniury done vnto them, but to the Estate, whose Maiesty is wronged by the contempt they haue made of them.

Of the Magistrate wronged when and how hee may bee Iudge in his owne cause.

As for obedience, it seemes requisite, that the Magistrate should carry himselfe to priuate persons with all mildnesse and patience; yet in such sort, as the dignitie of his place be not vilified; as it would be if he should indure any indiscreete words in his presence, and not take exception: Or a countenance of little respect. But especially, as hee ought not to shew himselfe rough and difficult of excesse: So he must not grow familiar, laugh, or ieast with priuate men; but to speake little, with discretion, without making shew of any passion of choller, Enuie, Iealousie, or such like, which may diminish the opinion which they haue of him.


Mildnesse and patience required in a Magistrate.

Discretion and grauitie without passion.

Wherefore to collect in few words that which concerns the duty of Magistrates, they must learne to obey the Soueraigne, to bend vnder the power of their su-

The dutie of Magistrates.

perious, to honour their equals, to command the Subjects, to defend the poore, to make head against great men, and to doe Iustice to all.



CHAP. 34.

Of the Iustice of Commanding.

Rules and considerations in the Iustice of commandments.

An harmoniacall proportion followed in many things.

An Arithmetical proportion followed in others.

AS the forme of commanding is diuers, so is the Diuersity of power, which according vnto Iustice, obserues diuers Rules to make the commandments iust. For in certayne things according to an Arithmetical proportion, it makes all the Subjects equall: In others it enters into consideration of the quality, and followes a Geometrical proportion: In others according to an Harmoniacall proportion, it neither follows an equality altogether, nor a similitude; but taking a consideration of other differences, it mingles the one with the other by a certayne temper and accord.

And as that which they seeke most in the setting of an Estate, is Concord, which cannot be without some harmony or correspondence of the parties one with another: This last proportion is followed in many things; as in the forme of government, in the distribution of Offices, honours, dignities, and recompences, in the establishment of punishments, and for the peace and greatnesse of families, in Marriages and diuisions of successions.

But in contracts and treaties betwixt man and man, and in that which concernes the performance of promises, which they make one vnto another, or the Iudgement of that which belongs to euery man, whereas Faith and Integrity ought to be equal in all men, of what quality and condition soeuer they be; they must obserue an Arithmetical proportion: and not to imitate *Cyrus*, who condēned a little man that had too long a Robe, to giue it to a tall man, and

and to take the tall mans which was too short, insisting more vpon seemelinese then to Iustice.

But in the imposition of charges which are burthen-
some, and necessary for the support of the Estate, they must obserue a Geometrical proportion, charging the rich, who haue more to lose by the ruine of the Estate, then the poore: the which in a manner is generally obserued. For although that the Nobility seemes therin to haue more priuiledge in some Estates then the Country-man, by reason that he payes no Subsidies, and doth not contribute any thing by way of imposition: yet the personall seruice which he doth many times performe at his owne charge, is much more then that which hee should pay by way of Subsidy, if it were imposed vpon him; besides his person which he doth imploy, the which the Countrey-man doth not. And in this particular, a Geometrical proportion is obserued, in that they leaue vnto the Gentlemen (who haue honour more in recommendation then the Clowne) honourable charges, the which giues them meanes to approach nearer vnto the Prince, and haue some honour in them: which is the reason which makes them more willing to endure the burthen, discomfort, and charge, which is farre greater then that which is imposed vpon the Country-man. But as I haue formerly sayd in other parts of the Estate, they must approach as neare as may be to a harmoniacall proportion, from whence proceeds that mixture which they make in most parts of Estates, of the Law, with the will and opinion of the Magistrate. The Law is made for all in generall, and all are equally bound to the obseruation thereof. but the Law not able to foresee all the circumstances, the will of the Prince or Magistrate in its execution, must adde such a temper, as there may not follow any inconuenience or absurdity; and to bend according to the Circumstances of the businesse, and to regulate it according vnto naturall Equity, which is the soule of

A Geometrical proportion in the imposition of burthen. Some Offices for the support of the Estate.

A mixture of the law with the will of the Prince.

the Law, the which in a Prince extends to declare and correct the Law according vnto reason; and in the Magistrate, to extend or restrayne it as the case shall require. And he that would haue the Law only take place in an Estate, he should fall into an infinite number of inconueniences and absurdities. For eyther he must make a Law vpon euery particular Fact that may happen; the which is vnpossible, and admit it were Feazable, it would breed a confusion of Lawes: or else he must leaue many things vnprouided for, and in others commit many Iniustices, neuer insisting vpon the circumstances, which are sometimes contrary to the reason of the Law.

Of the temper
a magistrate
should adde vn-
to the law.

There will be no lesse inconuenience, if they suffered the will of the Prince or Magistrate to wander vncertainly, without any establishment of the Law, whereon as vpon a Rule they might ground themselves. For besides the variety, diuerity, or contrariety of ordinances, or Iudgments which might grow, the which in the end would make them to be contemned, they should open a Gate to all violences and Iniustice. But as two Simples in extreanity of cold and heate, are so many poysons; and yet composed and tempered one with the other, make a wholesome Medicine: So by the mixture of the Arithmetical and Geometrical proportions, which separated would ruine the Estate, grows a harmoniacall accord and proportion which serues to maintayne it.

Of the distribu-
tion of Offices
and dignities.

In the distribution of Offices and dignities, an equality cannot be obserued, without Iniustice and preiudice to the Estate; all being not of one quality and capacity: And it might so fall out, that the most important and difficult charge, might fall vpon him that is least capable; and an Office of no moment to him that is sufficient. Moreover if you will choose those of one quality only, to giue them the charges, behold the rest that are excluded will be discontented; but all would be well satisfied, if they see that the Gate be not shut against them: and they would

would not take it ill, that as the Capable ought to be preferred before the incapable: so the Gentleman finding himselfe as capable, as the *Plebeian*, should be preferred, and the rich before the poore, in Offices where there is more honour then gayne: and the poore before the rich, in those where there is more profit then honour. And if the Offices be associated or doubled, to make a harmony of the one with the other, they must mingle those that haue where-withall to supply in one sort that which they want in the other, otherwise there wilbe no more harmony then if they should separate the accords that are in time, the which would make no pleasing sound if they were not together.

Yet in this Subiect we haue a regard to merite, which is the bond, which may make the poore and Countryman equall, to the rich and Noble, being without merite. And therefore they must according to euery mans deserts, giue the purse to the most Loyall: Armes to the most Valliant: Iustice to the Honestest: Censure to the most Entire: Toyle to the strongest; the Gouvernment to wisest; and the Prelateship to the most deuout: notwithstanding preferring in the equality of merite, such as are best qualified to them that are lesse.


We may say as much of Rewards and Punishments, weighing not only the merite of the Fact, and the quallities of persons; but also the circumstances of time and place, or such like. In regard of Peace of the marriages of Families, and the preservation of Houses, it is likewise very necessary to supply the defect which is in the one, with the Excesse and abundance of the other. So there is no better Marriage (as the ancient sayd) then of Riches with Pouerty: And among Marchants there is no society more safe, then of a rich idle man, with a poore man that is diligent. And in the inequallity of the conditions of persons, if there be not some quality to supply the defect of the meane, there can be no accord. The marriage

Distribution of
rewards & punishments.

Harmony in
the diuision of
goods.

riage of a rich Country Woman, with a poore Gentleman would hold firme, but of a poore countrey Woman with a poore Gentleman, they will easily disagree.

In like manner in the diuision of successions, it seemes this harmony ought to be kept. For as many inconueniences follow, leauing the disposition of goods to the will of the Man; who most commonly disinherits his Children vpon the first motion of choller, or makes choise of the most incapable to preferre him before the rest: So the Law which requires that the succession should be equally deuided, is vniust; for that the dignitie of families is lost, and a great succession deuided into many parts, comes to nothing. And the Law which hauing too much regard to the dignitie of families, adiudgeth all to one, or little to the rest, without doubt is nothing iust. But that which hath regard to the quality of goods, distinguishing those that are proper and hereditary to the house, and those which are newly purchased, giuing some aduantage to the elder aboue the younger, and to the Males aboue the daughters, regulating this aduantage according to the number of his Children, and leauing something in the free disposition of the Father, seemes to bee more iust, and more approaching to this harmoniacall proportion, which ought to be followed as much as may be, in all sorts of commands and Establishments. And this shall suffice for the forme of Commaunding, as well in that which depends of power, as of Iustice.



CHAP. 35.

Of the Establishing of the forces of an Estate.

THe order which ought to bee entertained in the setting of the forces, being more Military then politique, shall bee treated here succinctly.

The

The forces whereof wee meane to speake, are those by the which wee may repulse the attempts of our enemies; the which if the Estate bee Maritime, would be of two sorts, to the end wee may resist both by Sea and Land.

The prouision of armes and ships, is the first part of the Prouision of force; some hold it the greatest treasure of a Prince; and *Jacobus* writes that *Phillip of Macedony* made himselfe there by fearfull of his enemies. I know that many haue held, that in a great Estate, there might inconueniences happen by this great prouision of Armes; for that hee that hath a will to mutine, to arme those of his faction, and to deprive the Prince of the meanes to make vse of this prouision, will make a designe to seaze vpon the place where it is kept. But by the same reason, wee must not draw together any treasure, to supply vs in an vnexpected necessity; nor to fortifie any places, least that comming to loose our money and our places, our enemy should grow the stronger, and wee the weaker.

But Wisedome prevents these inconueniences, the which wee must imploy to keepe these aduanrages, and to make vse of them before the enemy comes to seaze of them: And if hee doth seaze of them, wee may not therefore conclude, that the prouision ought not to haue beene made; but that it is his fault that hath made it, not to bee able to keepe it. It is certaine, that a Sword or a Knife would cut him that knowes not how to handle it, but wee may not therefore say, that wee must neither make Sword nor Knife. So in all sorts of parties, there are inconueniences: But those which by foresight may be prevented, should not hinder vs from doing that, which may otherwise serue vs.

Vnder the name of Armes wee doe not onely apprehend that which serues a Man to couer him, and to assaile his enemy; but all carriages and necessary munitions for the Warre, bee it Offensue or Defensue; as Engines, Artillary,

Artillery, Powder, Ladders, Bridges, Cordage, and such other things, whereof they haue need in many military Exploits, and which it concernes the wisdom of the Prince or Soueraigne to provide, in such quantity, as when he shalbe assailed, or would inuade another, there may be nothing wanting, for not able to provide such things in a short time, it were to be feared, that before he should recouer that which is necessary, his Enemy would get such an aduantage ouer him, as he shall hardly afterwards recouer it.

Quality of defensive armes.

But laying aside the discourse of the diuersity of Armes and Engines of Warre, I will only propound some general considerations for the Armes fit for men, whereof those which are defensive ought to be light of carriage, (those that be heavy or pondrous commonly hindring more then they serue) difficult to pierce, and proportioned in such sort, as they may not hinder the necessary motions for a Combat.

That they ought not to be contented.

Many relying too much vpon their Vallour, haue contemned this kind of armes, as fit for men that were afraid. Yet the Roman Armies, in the time of Gratian, hauing demanded leaue to abandon their Cuyrasses, and then their Head-pieces; found themselves so weak when they came to fight with the Goths, as they were cut in peeces: wherby it appeared that armes make a part of the force, and I will adde, of courage. For besides, that Iron is more hard to pierce then the flesh, he that finds himselfe couered, takes more courage to ioyne with his Enemy, for that he is not so much exposed to blowes. They reproacht a Captaine; who armed himselfe complearly, that he seemed to be afraid: *No sayth he, but I arme myselfe that I may not feare.*

Quality of offensive armes.

Of the Pike,

As for offensive Armes, they must be light, to the end they may not tyre or weary those that vse them, and likewise easie to mannage; sharpe and well steeled, to pierce the better, and withall to continue the longer.

Som;

Some demaund them long to strike a farre off. *Philopon* caused his men to vse the Pike. And *Iphicrates* made his Souldiers to carry them twice as long then they had formerly done. They attribute the victory of *Gastus* agaynst *Christian King of Denmarke*, to the length of the *Swedish* pikes, which were three foote longer then those of the *Danes*. And *Guichardin* writes, that *Vitelof Vrsino*, with pikes a foote and a halfe longer then those which the Souldiers of *Pope Alexander* the sixt carried, wonne the battaile aginst them betwixt *Sarra* and *Bassan*. Others haue better allowed of short Armes, being of better vse in a strait or a throng; as *Cyrus* and the *Lacedemonians*.

Besides this, there are two sorts of offensive armes: Two sorts of some to shoote, cast, or dart; and others which they offensive armes hold continually in their hands; of both which kinds they must make good prouision, being all necessary in an Army. The *Parthians* haue many times vanquished the *Romans* with their Bowes, fighting a farre off. And the *Romans* as *Vegetius* writes, haue many times gotten great victories, by the meanes of certayne long darts, called *Marciobarbaz*.

There is another quality, which some haue desired in Armes, that they should be faire, gilt, and enricht, so as they may be pleasing vnto the Eye, thinking that this giues courage to the Souldiers; the which *Xenophon* and *Cesar* haue allowed. Others holding that this was of no vse, but to kindle the auarice and courage of the enemy, haue thought it better to haue the armes without any ornament and bare, as those which strike more terrour.

To resolve the most expedient in this quality and contrariety, we must know those whom we meane to arme, and those against whom we are to fight. If the first by this vanity of ornament, are to be the more encouraged, and that the same vanity may breed admiration and

Of the beauty
& ornament of
Armes.

and amazement in the Enemy ; it shall be fit to vse it. But if we haue to deale with men which know what belongs to Warre, we must rather seeke horror then ornament in our Armes. Wherefore a Prince making provision of Armes, he shall doe better to choose those that are good then faire, and simple and plaine, rather then enricht, as well to auoide the charge in so great a provision which it behoues him to make; as for that they are induradurable, and no lesse profitable then the other.

CHAP. 36.

Of Fortresses, and of their profit for the preservation of an Estate.

Fortresses doe also make a part of the force of an Estate: and they which haue bene of Opinion, that they should not build any, haue bene confuted both by reason and vse: so as there haue bene few found, vnlesse they were some petty popular Estate, that will follow their Councell. The *Grecians* and *Romans* who had lesse neede during their Empires, then any other Estate, for that all submitted themselues vnder their yoke, entertayned Cittadels at *Corinth*, *Tarentum*, and *Rhegium*: And if the Capitoll had not bene strong, the Empire of *Rome* had bene smothered in the Cradle by the *Gauls*.

The Estates in which are no strong places, are conquered by one Battaille. *England* hath testified it; and the *Persian*, relying onely in the great number of his Men, hath lost in one battaille a great extent of his Countrey, the which the *Turke* hath since preserued by Forts. For although that Fortresses alone cannot much assist an Estate, yet being seconded by Armes, they make it invincible; and there being no Armies on foote, they giue you leasure

to raise them, and after a Route, to Rally your Men together to renew the Warre. Yet this is not to say, that the estate which hath most forts is the strongest: For it is impossible to guard many well; and some being ill guarded, they prove more prejudiciall to the Estate, then profitable for the defence. It must therefore have few, but well furnished with Men, Victuals, and Munition of Warre.

They must likewise bee in a necessary situation or at least profitable. Necessary situations are those which being unfortified, make the Countrey to lie open, and expose it to the invasion of Enemies. Profitable situations are those, by whose meanes they may guard a rich Towne and well inhabited, and may serve for a retreat unto the people. They must likewise be remote from the heart of the Estate; to keepe the Enemy and danger farre from it, to the end that whiles the Enemy busies himselfe in assailing them, the rest of the Countrey may bee in peace, and wee may have means to prepare our selves to resist him. And if the forts be not only farre off, but at the entrie of the Enemies Countrey, they will bee the more safe: For they will not only give vs meanes to defend our selves, but also to annoy our Enemy in his owne Countrey.

The situation of Fortresses necessary and profitable.

They must bee farre from the heart of the Estate.


Besides this, forts ought to be strong both by situation and by fortification. Forts strong by situation, are those which are built vpon high and sharpe Mountaines, and of hard access, or which are inuironed with Lakes, the Sea, Pooles, Rivers, and Marishes, and haue all commodities necessary for the entertainment and succour of a Garrison. Those are strong by hand, which are flanked to purpose, with a good Wall, a large and sound rampire of Earth, with a broad and deepe ditch; and they must make more account of the rampire then of the Wall, and of the ditch then the rampire. A fort must likewise bee great, to the end it may bee capable of many Men for the defence, and to annoy the Enemy the more, and to be able to intrench themselves within.

Forts strong by situation and Art.

They must bee
situated where
they may bee
relieued.

It must in like manner be situated in such sort, as it may be relieued, for soone or late they take that place by force or obstinacie of a siege which is not relieued. Wherefore they haue held those places strong, which haue a Port of the Sea, hard to stop vp, and is not commanded. For this backe doore makes them as it were impregnable, hauing meanes dayly to receiue refreshing of Victualls, Munition, and Men, and to discharge themselves of their wounded and vnprofitable Mouthes for defence.

And although that the situation of a place be strong for defence; and such in some part as they hold it inaccessible; yet they may not forbear to adde what they can to make it stronger: For wee haue seene that many places haue beene taken, by those parts which they had neglected to fortifie, for that they held them inaccessible. So *Carthage* was taken by *Scipio* towards the Poole. *Antiochus* the great, tooke *Sardis*, by that part which was the strongest, where he found there was not any Sentinel, seing birds to build their nests there without any disturbance.



CHAP. 37.

Of the Warre-like Discipline.

THe third part of the force of an Estate, consists in the warlike discipline, that is to say, in Souldiers of good experience and well disciplined. And herein wee must obserue that the force doth not alwayes consist in the number, but in the resolution of the Souldier, and in the experience or conduct of the Commander. In all the battells which haue bin giuen, it is obserued, that few men haue fought; and those few, according to the resistance that was made, haue won or lost the battell; and as the kinds of armes make the Souldier stronger or more feeble, so they haue demanded what force is most

most beneficiall ; eyther that on Horsebacke or on Foote.

Polybius sayth, that it were better that our foote were a Moietie lesse then that of our Enemye, so as wee bee stronger in Cauallerie, then if wee were equall in all: The which may be true in a Combate; hauing bin often seene, that when as the horse are routed, the foote seeing themselves farre from any retreat, haue bene forced to yeild sometimes in grosse, without striking stroake: But in all the course of the Warre, it is most certaine that the Footmen do the greatest seruice, were it but at sieges and defences of places, and that they may fight in all places, which the horsemen cannot doe.

Of the aduan-
tages of Horse
and Foote.

Those Nations which haue made vse of Horsemen only, haue sometimes gotten great Victories; as the *Parthyans* haue done: But when they were to besiege or defend a place, they aduanced little. Also those people which put all their forces in horsemen, doe it, for that they cannot keepe their rancks and order which is necessary for Footmen. And to recompence this defect, they make vse of the violence of Horse in a Combate, and of their swiftnesse, and readinesse in Enterprizes of War, which are executed more speedily with Horse then Foot, who march heauily.

But the better is, that the Armies of an Estate should consist both of the one and the other, that is to say, of Footmen to serue for the body of an Army; and Horsemen, for armes and leggs. Wherefore the Prince besides the prouision of Armes, and other necessities for War, must be carefull that the Cauallery may be well mounted, & prouide that they may haue horses in his owne Countrey; for he cannot be termed strong and powerfull in horse, if he be constrained to haue recourse in that regard to his neighbour, who in time of war may faile him.

An Army must
consist of horse
and foote.

I haue said formerly that the force did not consist in the number, but in the bounty and courage of the souldiers; yet for

Of the choise
of Souldiers.

for that they are not all borne such, wee must choose as neare as we can, those which promise so much; and by Discipline make them such, and in deauour to instruct and trayne vp others. For the choyce many haue made a question, whether we should draw them out of our Subjects, holding that the Prince, which innures the Subjects to Warre, thrust himselfe into danger to receiue a Law from them, and haue held an opinion, that it was more safe to imploy Strangers. But there haue beene Princes which haue not imployed their Subjects indifferently, but onely the Nobility of the Country, as the Kings of *Polland* and *Persia*: the which haue made them strong in Cauallery, but weake in Foote. Some others hauing a distrust and ieaiousie of the Nobility, would make no vse of their seruice; but to make head against them, haue armed and put forces into the hands of some of the Common people. The *Turke* hath put his forces into the hands of Subjects of the Countreies which hee hath conquered; but this hath bin in making them *Turkes* by Education. For causing the Children of Christians to be taken in their younger yeares, and to be instructed timely in the Law of *Mahomet*, breeding them vp to toyle and labour, vntill that they come to an age fit to beare Armes, they continue as naturall *Turkes*, not knowing other Fathers then the Grand Seignour, who haue caused them to be fed and brought vp; nor other Countrey then that, for the guard whereof they are entertayned.

Wee must im-
ploy Strangers
as little as may
be.

To decide this question, we must vnderstand that euery Estate is weake which cannot subsist of it selfe, and whose force depends of another: And he that supports himselfe wholly vpon forraigne forces of a Soueraigne and independant, he makes himselfe as it were a Subject and dependant of another; and exposeth his Estate, not onely to the inuasion of the Stranger of whom he depends, (being often seene that most part of those which haue called Strangers to their Succours, haue beene a prey to those which

which succoured them :) But also the stranger sayling him either for that he is troubled to defend himselfe, or for some other occasion, he remaines at the mercy of his Enemy.

Besides this, the stranger fights more for gaine and his owne private interest, then for any good will hee beares him. As gaine drawes him, the same gaine may diuert him, and draw him to the Enemy. The *Celiberians* suborned first by the *Romans*, abandoned the *Carthaginians*; and afterwards corrupted by the *Carthaginians*, left the *Romans*. Imploying none but Strangers, the Enemy not able to hinder the leuie, may slacke and stay it in the greatest necessity of the Prince: The which hath fallen out too often in *Suisser-land*, to the preiudice of *France*. And the Enemy inuading the Nation, from whence you draw your Souldiers, many times in your greatest necessity, these Strangers are forced to abandon you, to goe and serue their Country; as the *Grisons* did, who were in the seruice of King *Francis*, when as *lean Iaques de Medices* inuaded their Country. Finally, the treason, the Mutiny, ruine, and as I haue sayd, the vsurpation of an Estate is more to be feared by the succours of Strangers, then we can expect any aduantage.

Adde to all these considerations, that they are in fight, their Companies ill filled, fearefull, rude, and oppressors of the Subiects; to the great charge of the Prince, consuming in the Leuie, and before they can ioyne with vs, much time and much money. But I doe not hereby inferre that we should altogether reiect Strangers: For they may serue with our owne Souldiers; whom by this means we shall spare, and vppon whom we may settle our ehiefe force; and not as some Estates doe, cause them to vndergoe all the toyle, exposethem to assaults, and to all dangerous exploits, and dispence with the Strangers.



CHAP. 38.

Of the number of Souldiers in their ordinary trained Bands.

IT rests to know what number of Souldiersought to be entertained in an Estate. This cannot be truly regulated. For we must haue regard to that which the Estate may beare, and to his forces that may assaile vs. Onely I will say, that in many Estates they haue established two sorts of traine bands. The one ordinary, consisting of men raised and bred vp to the War, hauing no other vocation or profession. The other is subsidiary, composed of Men which haue sometimes followed that profession, or are capable to do it, with the which at need they may fill the Companies, or raise new, and who in time of peace shall imploy themselues in their particular affaires, being sometimes practised in Military exercises, when as the Commanders shall draw them together.

Returning then to the first, they must not be in great numbers; but the number must be such, as they may resist, as well to auoyde the charge of their entertaynement, as the mutinies and reuolts, which happen among such men, when they feele themselues strong and in great numbers. And in a meane Estate sowe haue ruled it to 6000. Foot, and 1200. Horse; in a greater, double the number. But if they must diminish any thing, it were better to doe it in the Foote, which may be easily fill'd againe, then in the Horse, which cannot be so soone raised, being necessary to spend money for their furniture, and time for the exercise both of Man and Horse.

As for Subsidiaries, some haue thought that they ought rather to be retayned vnder some priuiledges, not preiudiciall to the publique, then entertayned with pay whilest they

they doe dot serue. But it would seeme more expedient, to make them serue one after another three Moneths in the yeare, neare vnto the Gouvernour of the Prouince where they shall liue, in giuing them pay for that time: During the which they shalbe practised in all sorts of exercises, seruing to their profession: and going out of seruice after their Quarter is ended, they shall leaue their Armes in the Towne where the Gouvernour remaynes, euery man returning to his owne home, leauing the place to such as are to succeed them. Being thus practised three Moneths yearly, you shall keepe them still in Allarme, and they will be alwayes ready to march: And making them to leaue their Armes after the seruice, you shall haue no cause to feare any Mutiny: The which they may make more feeble in diuiding these Subsidiaries into no greater troupes then of foure and twenty Souldiers, which troupes shall not depend of any Commander but the Gouvernour, or of him whom the Soueraigne shall at times commit: yet euery one hauing his Captaine apart, to trayne the Souldiers; and when as they meane to imploy them, they may reduce them into Companies of hundreds or two hundred men, as they shall thinke good; and may giue them a Captaine to command them, during the expedition. By this meanes for the full pay of a yeare of 6000. men, you may enter-
tayne in your Estate 24000. Subsidiaries, trayned, practised, and ready to march, and assure your Prouinces against all sorts of Mutinies. And if you will traine vp more without any charge, they may giue commandment vnto the Youth of the Towne where they shall practise, and thereabouts, vnto a certaine age, to come at the time, and to the place of the sayd Exercises, where they may giue them Armes to practise with the rest.

Order for their exercise in time of peace: and to hinder their Mutiny.


Of the number of Subsidiaries.

Meanes to traine the subjects of an Estate to Warre without any charge to the Prince.

This were, some one would say, to make too many Souldiers in an Estate, which might fauour a reuolt. But being disarmed and reduced into small troupes, their Captaines hauing taken an Oath to the Soueraigne

And to hinder a reuolt and mutiny,

only, and the Souldiers not depending on them but for the Discipline, and not for the pay: And moreover, being disarmed, but when as they enter into seruice, there being but one fourth part that enters at a time in the Provinces, the other three parts may serue to oppose against such as being armed, would attempt any thing. So as with a little fore-sight which they may vse in this conduct, it will bee easie to diuert the inconueniences which they may conceiue of this order. There remains now the forme which they ought to hold in leuies.



CHAP. 39.

*Of the forme how to make leuies of Souldiers:
Of the Place, Age, Stature, & Vocation.*

The particular
forme of the
Romans.

THe Romans who could not haue their Souldiers depend wholly vpon the Captaines, obserued a particular forme; which was that of a great number which were enrolled, the Captaines did choose one after another in their turnes: And in this manner the Companies were as it were equall both in force and valour of Souldiers. But the Captaines hauing little credit amongst them, they saw many mutinies fall out among the Legions. The which was the cause that they found it expedient that euery Captaine should make choyce of those whom he was to command; being likely that they which present themselves to be enrolled vnder a Captaine, would be more obedient vnto him, then they whom they shall enroll against their will.

Danger of a
mutiny vpon
the change of a
Captaine.

The same inconuenience of a mutiny happens, when to a troupe consisting of old Souldiers, they giue another Captaine, then him vnder whom the Souldiers haue bin accustomed to fight: For this new Captain hauing no meanes to get credit suddenly, the least subiect that presents it selfe

to the Souldiers to mutine, they imbrace it, being not re-
strayned neytherby the respect nor feare of their Cap-
taine. Yet an exact Discipline will easily helpe and re-
medy this.

Wherefore it seemes more safe, that euery Captaine
make choyce of those whom he is to command. I say
choyce, to make a difference from the greatest part of
the leuies which are made at this day, into the which
they receiue all sorts of men. The which ought not to be;
and no man ought to be admitted without an attestation
from the place of his dwelling, of his quality and how
he hath liued; to the end they may exclude all Theeues
and Robbers, which creepe into the Troupes; and that
the Souldier offending, they may punish him in his per-
son, or in his goods, when he returnes into his Coun-
try. And to this effect the choyce being made, the Soul-
diers ought to be presented to the Officer, or Commissary
of the War, to see if they be of the quality required.

Of the choice
which the Cap-
taine ought to
make of his
Souldiers.

A good order
if it were well
observed.

And, although wee may finde good Souldiers euery
where; yet it seemes that not onely the ordinary, but
also the subsidiary ought to be chosen and taken rather out
of the Country then in Townes; for that in the Fields they
finde them stronger and more rough, be it to strike, or
to endure the discommodities of the Warre: And the
Subsidiaries which are not in continuall practice of the
Warre, being dispersed here and there, they cannot so
easily draw together to make a mutiny; as they might doe
if there were many in one Towne.

Of the place
whence they
must take the
Souldiers.

As for the Age, they must chooe them young, a-
boue Seenteene or Eightene yeares, and vnto Thir-
ty or Forty, as well to haue the more agility, force,
and courage, as to be more venturous, pliable, and o-
bedient to the Commandments that shall be giuen them.
For the stature, the greatest and most manlike make the
greatest shew: But if in a little body they finde a strong
complexion and courage, they may not reject him.

Of the Age of
the Souldiers.

Of the stature.

Of his vocatiō. But for that by their manner of living, they may settle a Iudgement of the complexion and force both of body and mind : They must haue a care not to choose Souldiers (but as little as may be) which are accustomed to some sitting Trade , that is soft and effeminate ; but rather to choose them out of Trades, in the which they must be exposed to heate, and cold , to raine , winde , Sun ; Or which are accustomed to bloud , to strike, to march, and to labour. The Leuies of men of Warre thus made, they must be trayned and gouerned. And thus much for the forces at Land.




CHAP. 40.

Of the forces at Sea.

THe like shall be also followed in the forces at Sea ; In the which besides the order they must obserue for the building of ships, they must also haue a care to provide a good number of Pilots and Mariners ; and for the Gallies , to furnish and exercise their Rowers, whether they consist of Galley-slaves or voluntaries. For the which they must provide in good time to accustome the Slaues to doe their duties, and to make the Souldier get firme footing at Sea.

The se forces at Sea are so necessary in an Estate that is Maritime , as without them the Prince cannot be termed strong nor powerfull. For besides that in a short time they may seaze vpon his Ports , before he shall haue any aduice of the Enterprize ; and these being seazed , this Port being hard to stop vp the Enemy will keepe it long : He must make an accompt not to recouer any thing by the Commerce at Sea , but from the hands of his Neighbours, who will prescribe him a Law , and intreate his Merchants ill. Let vs now come to that which is necessary for the setting of the Renewewes of the Estate.

CHAP.



CHAP. 41.

Of the Riches of an Estate.

EVERY one agrees that to make an Estate powerfull, it must be rich; Riches being the principall finews that supports it. For although that many poore Estates haue made themselves to be redoubted: Yet

That the power of an Estate depends of its riches.

this hath rather happened by the diuision of their Neighbours, and the fault of some others, then for any aduantage there is in the pouerty of an Estate.

The *Lacedemonians* in their pouerty, during the diuision of the *Grecians*, haue beene for a time Masters of all *Greece*. But when as this diuision ceased, their greatnesse (which could not long subsist with this defect) decayed presently.

Of the *Lacedemonians*.

The *Venetians* and *Genois*, although poore in the beginning, haue sometimes held a part of *Greece*; euen that which was neare to the *Archipelagus*: But this happened, during the diuision which was in the Leuant for the Empire of *Constantinople*.

Of the *Venetians* and *Genois*.

The *Romans* themselves in their pouerty, had no other aduantage; then the weakenesse and diuision of their Neighbours, whereof they could make better vse then any other, receiuing some into their City, ruining others; sending Colonies to neighbour Prouinces; allying themselves to those whom they could not easily vanquish, and making vse of their Succours and meanes; and finally establishing in conquered Countries, affaires, toles, and tributes, for the pay of their Souldiers, and for to supply the other charges of the Estate. And they haue beene so carefull to enrich their City, as many times this care hath made them shut their eyes to an infinite number of thefts and spoyles, which were practised against their

Of the *Romans*.

Ministers, whom they imployed in the Prouinces. It is then most certaine that an Estate cannot be termed powerfull, vnlesse it be rich. Yet euery Man doth not agree, wherein the wealth of an Estate doth consist. Some haue measured it by the great treasures; others by the reuenues; and others by the fertillitie of the Countrey. But as there is no treasure so great, but a long Warre may exhaust; nor any reuenues so abundant, but in a long and tedious enterprize, they may be forced to ingage them: so the fertillitie alone of an Estate would bee vnprofitable, if the publique had not meanes to make vse of it, and by gentle leuies to draw succours from priuate persons.

What is necessary for the riches of an Estate.

Wherefore besides the abundance of all things fit for the life and seruice of Man; the parcimony or sparing of priuate persons, is necessary to make an Estate rich: As also the facilitie to make vse of their meanes. For as wee doe not call a Prodigall man rich, who spends all he hath: So what abundance soeuer there bee in an Estate, wee will not terme the Subiects rich, who by their riot and excesse consume all this great abundance, taking from the publique the meanes to draw any succours from them.

Wherein the riches of an Estate doth consist.

Wee will therefore conclude, that the riches of an Estate consists in all things necessary for the life and seruice of Man; in the parcimony of Subiects; in the greatnesse of Lands and ordinary reuenues; in the facilitie of ordinary leuies; in the gouernment of the Treasure, and in the Exchequer.

XX

CHAP. 42.

Of the causes of the abundance of the wealth of an Estate: That is to say Tillage: Manufactures and Commerce with Strangers.

A Boundance in an Estate proceeds from three necessary things: From the Earth; from Manufactures, which comprehends all Manuall and Mechanicke Arts; and from the Commerce we haue with Strangers, vnder the name of Earth I comprehend the labour of the Land; the entertainement of Woods, Forrests, and Trees, which may by their fruitfulnessse contribute something to the vse of Man; The digging of Mines for mettall, stones, and minerall druggs.

Whence the abundance of necessary things proceed

As this point is the fountaine of all the riches of the world, so it ought to bee more carefully husbanded by the publike: And yet it is that which is most neglected, hauing left a libertie to euery Man to doe with his owne what he pleaseth, vnder a false proposition, that euery Man being carefull to find out that which will bee profitable vnto him, knowes how to husband his ground, so as nothing well bee vnprofitable: And yet experience teaches vs the contrarie. For most part of Lands being possesst by the Nobilitie, Clergie, or others imployed in publike affaires, few reside vpon the Lands; so as they are occupied by Farmes, who enter like vnto gleaners, which draw what they can, hauing no interest in the future. And of those which reside vpon their Lands, some through ignorance, others by negligence or bad husbandrie content themselves with the reuenues of their predecessors, being loth to take the paines, or complayning to aduance that, that should bee necessary to plant or cleanse a peece of Land that lieth waste
to

Tillage well husbanded causeth abundance.

The cause of the negligence thereof.

to dry vp a Marish, to settle a Race for breeding, or to doe such like things as may better their Demesus.

That it is not
vnworthy of
a Prince.

Some one it may be of little Iudgement will say, that this care is vnworthy of a Prince and of the publike: But to this wee may answere, that all Princes haue not so held it, *Massissa* cleansed the greatest part of *Babary*. And in our time we know the improuements which the *Venetians* haue made in *Polesene* of *Rouigo*: That of the great Duke of *Tuscany* towards *Pysa* and *Areso*, and that of the Duke of *Ferrara*, in the Valley of *Comachyo*, and that which the *Hollanders* doe daily. Wherefore some haue held it fit, that the publike should take vpon them this care to quicken the diligence of some, by the orders which might be made, according to the places; and to punish the negligence of others, by Fines, Amercements, and Seisures of the Lands neglected.

Manufactures
cause aboun-
dance in an
Estate.

As for Manufactures, the number of workmen giues the aboundance; but the good giue credit to the Marchandize. The great number would not be vnprofitable, but also hurtfull, if they were not good. To haue them such, you must seeke for them: And if wee haue them not among our selues, wee may draw strangers by Priuiledges, in giuing vnto some according to their industrie, some honest entertainment. To multiply the workmen, they may erect publike houses of all sorts of Manufactures, as hath beene propounded, in the which they may instruct the poore. And as this Establishment should bee chiefly made in their fauour, so the reuenew of these houses may bee taken vpon that which is affected by the Cannon, and ancient Ordinances for their Entertainment.

Some one, to the end they may banish idlenesse, which is at this present in Monasteries, (many persons vnfit for contemplation and study being therein, and many
against

against their will) haue propounded to restore the ancient Monastique discipline, which was to imploy in certaine workes and mannall Arts, at houers of leasure: those that were not fit for study and preaching. The which did also multiply manufactures. Others haue likewise beene of opinion, to bind the Masters, who serue themselves with young Boyes to cause them to passe a certaine Age in learning of a Trade: And so by these meanes an Estate in lesse then twenty yeares, would bee furnished with more workemen then were needfull.

The Commerce and Trafique which is made with the stranger, is the third point which produceth abundance in an Estate, for the setting whereof there are three considerations to be made. The first is of things which we are to carry, and not to carry to the stranger. The second is of things which wee must receiue from strangers, and their entry into our Estate; or not to receiue them and to banish the Commerce. The third is the facility and ease of Commerce accompanied with safety.

Commerce with the stranger causeth abundance in an Estate. Three considerations for the Commerce.

The Marchandize which we ought to carry to strangers, with whom wee haue Commerce, are those whereof we haue abundance: Of which after the Estate is sufficiently furnished, wee may allow the trade. As contrarywise, those whereof wee haue want may in no sort be transported; nor in like manner those, whereof our Neighbours may make vse to our prejudice; as Armes, Horses, Sayles, and other things destinated to the vse of the Sea or Warre.

Of Marchandize which we may and ought to carry to strangers.

The transport of Gold and Siluer is likewise forbidden in all Estates; but these prohibitions are very ill obserued. And as they are necessary, to hinder the want of these mettalls, which are sought after by all Nations, deprive vs not of the meanes to make vse of them, for that they are hunted after by our Friends and Allies: So wee must haue a care, that it may not trouble

Of the transport of Gold and Siluer.

trouble nor altar the Commerce. And to speake truth, these defences thus generall which they haue made, are impossible in the execution, seeking to maintaine the Commerce with our Neighbour: Vlesse it be, that we forbid to Negotiate otherwise then by exchange, and permutation of Marchandize. The which may be practized, in regard of the Marchandize, which is not very necessary, and not in regard of those which are necessary for vs, and whereof we cannot passe. We are forced to haue recourse to our Neighbours, and to take a law from them, in eyther giuing them other Marchandizes which may bee as necessary for them as theirs for vs, or in paying them ready money.

And in this last case many haue held, that the safety which might be added, was, to allow of the transport of Gold and Siluer, in giuing caution to bring backe within a certaine time the quantity in Marchandizes, for the which the transport hath beene allowed, the publike hauing no interest therein; presupposing the necessity of this Marchandize, and that it cannot bee recouered by exchange from another.

Of raw stufes.

Among those things which ought not to be transported out of an Estate, are rawe stufes; but not manufactures, for that you take the meanes from your workmen, to imploy themselves and to liue; and from your Estate the meanes to enrich it selfe by the meanes of manufactures, the which in certaine workes exceede the price of the substance. And they are so farre from suffering these stufes thus rawe to goe vnto strangers: as the Estate which knowes what belongs to husbandry, not satisfied with those which grow amongst them, draw them from their Neighbours, to put them in worke, and by this meanes to enrich themselves, selling them thus wrought euen to those who many times haue sold them the sayd rawe stufes.

Behold the things which wee ought not to carry to strangers,

strangers, by the which it is easie to iudge of those, which we ought to desire they should bring vnto vs. For if we retaine those things for the liberty which may come vnto vs, by the same reason, if wee want them, wee must seeke the meanes to draw them from our Neighbours.

And in regard of Gold and Siluer, the entire ought to be allowed: ut not the course of Forraigne Coyne among the peop'e, for that there is not any assurance among Princes touching coynes, euery one seeking to deceiue his companion, and to draw the Gold and Siluer out of one anothers Estate, in raising the price of coynes more then they are worth in their Neighbours Estate, or in weakning the allay of their coynes, the stampe, greatnesse, thicknesse, and waight, remaineing still the same. So as giuing them entry, vpon an opinion they haue, that they are still according to the ancient standard, the people find themselves full, before the tryall can be made, and the abuse discovered: The which if you thinke to remedy in decrying them, and causing them to bee carryed to the Mynt, for the price of their bounty, your Subiects shall sustaine a great losse. On the otherside if you suffer this abuse to continue, they will by little and little draw all the good coyne out of your Estate, to reduce it to the weake Allay of your Neighbours, and then returns it vnto you againe thus satisfied. Wherefore to hinder this exchange of coyne, they shall hinder the course of forraigne coynes among the people, to the end that they which haue any, may carry them to the exchangers appoynted for that effect, who shal giue them the value esteemed according to their interiour bounty: And they carrying them to the Mynt, as they shall be charged: They shall also clipp in peeces the forraigne coyne which they shall receiue, in the presence of those that bring them, and they shal be conuerted into curreant coyne. So they neede not to feare the falsifications of strange Coynes,

nor


Of the beginning of strange Gold and Siluer into an Estate.

That the course of forraigne Coyne ought not to be allowed in an Estate.

nor the raising of the Prince: And they shall not be able to draw your currant money out of your Estate, but in bringing Merchandize to the value.

Marchandize
whbreof wee
ought to stop
the entry.

The things whereof wee must stop the Entry, and the Commerce in our Estate, are those which serue for ryot and excesse, the which is the chiefe meanes to impouerish an Estate; as pretious stones, exquisite perfumes, spices, not much necessary, and stufes, the which serue only for Pompe and shew. But if the abuse bee so inueterate, as wee cannot hinder them by a prohibition, wee must charge them with such great customes and imposts, as the stranger may haue no desire to bring them, fearing hee shall not retire his Siluer, and the subiect to buy it, in regard of the dearenesse. For although that some times this consideration doth not restraine the subiect, from buying such Merchandizes; yet by this meanes he growes poore, the publique shall bee the more rich by the great imposts, the which shall supply the place of punishments for excesse in priuate persons.



CHAP. 41.

Of the facillitie of Commerce.

The carriage
of Merchan-
dize.

Monopolis for-
bidden.

AS for the facillitie and ease of Commerce, it depends of many things, for the which it is needfull to prouide: And first for the commoditie of the carriage of Merchandizes by Water, Land, Cart, or otherwise; They must prouide to make the Riuers Nauigable: The Ports safe, to keepe the wayes and passages in good Estate, and due reparation, and free from Pyrats and Theeues. Not to suffer any Monopole which may hinder the libertie of traffique: And if it bee discouered to punish it rigourously; to inuite Strangers to bring vs the Merchandize which wee cannot

cannot want, by the discharge of Customes and imposts, as much as the necessity of the Estate will beare. Of the discharge of customes.

To Establish such Lawes for affaires, as there may bee faith and assurance amongst negotiators; and in case of difference, speedy and summary Iustice, especially in that which concernes strangers, who forbear to traffique in a place, no lesse in regard of the tediousnesse of Suits, as for the treacherie of those of the Countrey. And for that a permutation cannot bee made without a certaine price set downe vpon Merchandizes, and that they cannot Negotiate with all sorts of people by exchange, but it is needfull to make vse of Money: The price and estimation thereof must bee certaine and firme; otherwise they should bring a confusion into the Commerce. But besides this, the interiour bounty and value of this Coine must be easie to iudge of, not only by the waight, but by the eye and sound if it may bee. The which may bee done, if they resolute to make vse of the mixture of mettalls, no farther then it is necessary for a remedy; gold and siluer suffizing to make all sorts of Coine. Faith and assurance in affaires. Speedy Iustice. That Siluer & Gold are sufficient for all sorts of Coine.

For in regard of the Coine, if they will not diuide the marke of Siluer into eight thousand peeces, as they haue sometimes done in *Lorraine*, for the *Angelines*, which *Rene Duke of Anjou and Lorraine* caused to bee coined, whereof the two hundred were worth but sixe pence, and forty a soue of base French Money; they may reduce them to a third part thereof, to make the peeces more solide; which may bee stamp with a bodkin; making no vse of the Copper, whose price is vnequall and variable in all Countries, and moreouer is subiect to rust.

Contrariwise the price of gold & siluer, hath changed little, & they haue inmp'vually in proportion, as one to two, little more or little lesse; & the marke of gold vallewed at twelue marks of siluer. *Herodotus* writes, that in his time a pound of gold was worth thirteene pound of siluer. I do not The prise of Gold & Siluer in proportion one of another

not say, but there hath beene some Ages and some Pro-
uinces, in the which Gold hath beene dearer: But
this hath not beene generall, nor of long continuance.
Wherefore making the coynes of one Mettall, and of a
certaine waight, greatnesse, thicknesse, and well coyned
in the forme of a medaille that is cast: as the *Grecians*,
Latins, *Hebrewes*, *Persians* and *Egyptians*, in old time did:
It would be a hard thing to be deceiued.

To bring Mar-
chants into
credit.

There is another thing, the which doth greatly de-
cay trading, which is, the contempt they make in many
Estates of those which deale in it, holding this vocation
to be sordid and base. So as they which haue gotten a
little wealth, retire themselues speedily, to imbrace an
other vocation, to the which the people carry more re-
spect and honour, then to this.

Trading at Sea
profitable and
honourable.

In truth wee must confesse, that there are certaine af-
fares which should be left to the poore and common
people, to enrich them. But there are others which
they only can execut that are rich; as that at Sea, which
is the most profitable in an Estate, and to the which they
should attribute more honour then they doe here: For
it in all Estates they haue thought it fitting to inuite the
Subiects by honour to the most painfull and dangerous
Actions, the which might be profitable to the publipue;
This being of that quality, they should propound and at-
tribute more honors to those that shall deale in it. And
if Nobility hath taken its foundation from the courage of
Men, and from their valour; there is no vocation in the
which there is so much required as in this. They are
not only to encounter and striue amongst men, but some-
times against the foure Elements together; which is the
strongest proof that can bee of the resolution of a Man.
This hath beene the occasion, that some hath beene of
opinion, that they should open this doore to Marchants to
attaine to Nobility, so as the Father and the Sonne hath
continued in the same trade; and to suffer Noblemen
who

who are commonly the richest in an Estate, to practise themselves (without prejudice to their condition) in this commerce at Sea, which would be more honourable vnto them, then to bee vsurers, or Banckers, as in *Italy*; or to impouerish themselves, in doing nothing but spend, and neuer gather. Hence will grow many aduantages both to the publike and priuate. To the publike, For that they that should deale in the commerce, hauing meanes, courage, and sufficiencie for this conduct, it would bee farre greater, putting more Ships to Sea and better armed, whereof the Estate at need might make vse for its safety, and would carry the reputation of their Nation farre. The which they cannot doe, who beeing poore, and hauing no stocke but from others, haue not the courage to hazard themselves in a great enterprize. And for the particular, this commerce being wisely managed, what hazard soeuer they run, there is more to be gotten then lost: And if the Gentlemen apply themselves, without ruining themselves in expences, or importuning the Prince with demaunds, they shall doe more in one yeere at Sea, then in tenne at Court. It auails not to say, That a Gentleman will sooner turne Pyrate then Merchant. For holding that order which may be prescribed in their Imbarquing, they may so mingle them one with another, as it would bee a difficult thing that all should agree to commit a villany. Finally experience hath taught, and doth daily, that where the richest haue dealt in this Commerce, it hath enrich both them, and the Estate vnder which they liued: And at this day the examples of the *Venetians*, *Portugalls*, *Spaniards*, and *Hollanders* haue made it knowne vnto vs,

These last being lesse rich then the others, but not lesse couragious and hardie, haue setled an order for the continuance of this commerce to the *East Indies*, which deserves to be knowne, which is, that after they haue found by many voyages, which some priuate Men haue made,

Aduantages which the publike and priuate should receiue if the Nobility gaue themselves to the Commerce at Sea.

An order setled by the *Hollanders* for the continuance of the trade to the *East Indies*.

that they ruined one another by this concurrence; they advised in the yeere 1602. to craue leave of the generall Estates, to traffique into those parts before all others, during the space of one and twenty yeeres. The which was granted them, in regard of five and twenty thousand *Florins*, which they promised to pay vnto the Estate during the first tenne yeeres. Thus reduced all into one Company, *Amsterdam* had a Moietie, *Middleburg* in *Zelanda* fourth part; *Delphe*, *Rotterdam*, *Horne*, and *Enchusen* had either of them a sixth part: And the whole stocke of this vnion amounted to fixe Million of *Liuers*, or six hundred thousand pounds sterling.

For the direction of this trade, and the interest of the Associats, they haue established in either of these Townes a certaine number of Administratours: At *Amsterdam* twenty, at *Middleburg* twelue, and in either of the rest seauen. And if any one dies, the Chamber of the place names three, of which either the Estates generall, or the Magistrate of the Towne chooseth one.

These Chambers, choose seuentene among the administrators: that is to say, *Amsterdam* eight, *Middleburg* foure, *Delphe*, and *Rotterdam* two, *Horne* and *Enchusen* two; and the seuenteenth is chosen alternatiuely, sometimes at *Middleburg*, and sometimes at *North Holland*: The which are called together to resoluue ioyntly, of how many Ships, and with what Equipage and furniture, they shall make the flecte which they meane to send, and to what Fort or Coast they should goe. This assembly is held six yeeres together at *Amsterdam*, and afterwards two yeeres at *Middleburg*, and then againe at *Amsterdam*. By the conditions of the accord, the Ships must returne to the same Port from which they parted; and the spices which are left at *Middleburg*, and other Chambers, is distributed amongst them by the waight of *Amsterdam*; and the Chamber which hath sold her spices, may buy from other Chambers.

By

By this order they haue hitherto continued this Commerce with reputation, not as simple Merchants onely; but as if they were Soueraignes, they haue made in the name of the Estates an alliance with many Princes of those parts; As with the King of *Sian*, *Quadaen*, *Patam*, *Iobor*, the Reire of *Malaca*, *Bornean*, *Achin*, *Sinnatra*, *Baretan*, *Iocotra*, and other Kings of *Iatta*. They haue made themselves absolute Maisters of the Iland of *Amboyne*, where they haue settled a president which gouerns in their name. At *Banda* they haue a Fort for a retreat, where they must deliuer them the Spices at a certayne price. In *Ternate* they haue another, a Mile distant from that of the *Portugals*. At *Azagniene* they haue three: At *Motire* one: At *Gilolo* they haue taken that which the *Portugals* had built.

The great reputation which they haue gotten by the means of this Trade.

From this example we will conclude, that the onely means to settle the commerce at Sea in a Nation, in the which the best purses will not hazard themselves in these Enterprizes; is to force the Merchants which trade at Sea in certayne places, to ioyne one with another, and not to make their traffique a part. For although that negotiating a part the gaine would be the greater, when the Enterprize succeeds happily: yet we must consider, that the losse which may happen, would wholly ruine him that attempts alone: And if in making a Company the gaine be the lesse, yet it is more assured; and the losse being borne by many, it is lesse to euery one that is interested.

Means to settle the commerce at Sea in an Estate.

Thus diuiding the Trade according to the Coast and places where it is made, they may make diuers Companies; that is to say, one for the Trade of *Ginnee*; Another for the *Leuant* by the *Mediterranean* Sea; One for the *East Indies*; Another for the *West Indies* beyond the line; Another for that on this side the line; And one for *England*, *Norwage*, *Sweden*, and other Northerne Countreies: forbidding them to attempt one vpon another.

and to all other priuate Subiects which shall not be of the company, to negotiate in those places vpon great penalties:



CHAP. 44.

Of Parsimony or sparing,

That parsimony preserves the riches of an Estate.

Parsimony imports much for the safety of an Estate.

AS abundance is the fource and fountaine of the riches of an Estate, so parsimony is that which preserves it, consisting in the cutting off of superfluous and vnnecessary things, part whereof come from abroad: so as hindering the Entry of those, they shall provide in that regard for sparing. Eor if excesse creepe not in among the Subiects, the Stranger shall not grow fat, to the preiudice of the Estate, but the other Subiects shall taste of the aduantage. Yet this is not to say, that excesse is tollerable, although that nothing goe out of the Estate, to the which the extreame poverty of some, and the great wealth of others may breed much trouble. But if some growing poore by excesse, that which is lost, is diuided into so many purses, as the publique shall not be able to make vse of the increase of their meanes, which receiue the aduantage by this excesse; this would be likewise worse: For the others remayning poore, it would be so much aduantage lost for the Estate. Whereas if he that spends, retayned his expences within the bounds of necessity, and conuenience without excesse, he should be alwayes found to haue meanes to succour the publique at need. But this moderation doth likewise import much for the safety of the Estate. For great men being they which vsually runne into these expences after they haue ruined themselues, they are eyther a charge to the publique to bee maintained and entertayned by it: or receiuing nothing from the publique, they

they abandon themselves most commonly to many innovations and enterprizes preiudiciall to the Estate. And therein some Princes are deceived, who hold it a greatnesse to entertaine this excesse in their Courts. It is onely meere vanity which ruines those which follow it, and deprives them of the meanes to continue the Service, which the Estate might expect from them, if they governed themselves otherwise: For that at the end of ten yeares at the most, a Gentleman growes so poore, as he is forced to retire, and to hide himselfe in his house, and most commonly much indebted, being no more able to shew himselfe in the Equipage of others of his condition. Whereas if Princes restrayned them, so as no man might spend more then his Reuenues will beare, they should be served longer by their Nobility, and should not bee so often importuned with demands, recompences, and reproaches, that they are ruined in their service. Wherefore be it in regard of Strangers, or in consideration of the Estate, they must cut off excesse, but especially that which brings with it the ruine of people and of great families. This Excesse is principally in great and sumptuous buildings; in moueables, apparel, and ornaments of the person; In the traine of seruants and attendants, in shews; in Banquets and Feasts, in Playes of shew and hazard. For the first, it seemes that the greatnesse and sumptuousnesse of buildings, turnes in some sort to the benefit of the publique, and that they ought not to forbid it, but rather inuite euery man to build for the ornament of Cities and Townes. But as a generall prohibition would be something preiudiciall to the publique; so the free and indifferent tolleration of this expence, is hurtfull not onely to the publique but to the particular. It ought to be allowed to a great man, and a rich Subiect, who hath few or no Children, to spare his Crowns, to imploy them in the Ornament of the publique. This cannot be termed Excesse. Neither would I hinder many Treasurers

Against excesse

Wherein excesse doth consist.

Of excesse in buildings.

and partizans, who haue done their businesse with the publique, and profited largely, to make the like expences. But if in stead of building of priuate houses, they will raise some publique Edifices, I would esteeme them the more: But yet I would desire to adde two restrictions; the one, that they should not build with any Materialls, but such as are found in the Estate where they liue: The other to forbid them guilding and enriching with Gold or Siluer, which ought not to be allowed, yea, rather in publique buildings, there being nothing that doth so much decay Gold and Siluer in an Estate, as the like workes.

An order in the
low Countries
for buildings in
Townes.

As for the common and priuate buildings, they may without this great expence prouide in building for the ornament of the publique, after the manner which they obserue in many Townes of *Flanders* and the lowe Countries: where the order is such, that he which meanes to build, takes not onely the plot from those which are deputed to that end by the Magistrate, but also the proiect of the front, or face of the building, the which must answere vpon the streete: The beauty whereof consists more in a certayne proportion, then in any enriching eyther of stuffe or workmanship: And it shalbe most commonly made according to the front of some neare house, of small charge, according to the which they shall rule them selues for the height and fashion of the Doores, and other exterior parts. So as in succession of time all the houses of a Streete (building according to this proiect,) are found alike, and by this resemblance and proportion, they are very pleasing vnto the eye.

From this policy there redounds vnto them another aduantage, which is, that the workemen by the establishing of this order, being aduertised of the forme how they are to make the Doores and other parts which must answere vpon the Streete; they haue them ready long before: So as priuate men that will build, they haue presently

presently raised their houses, which are for the most part of bricke, finding that little stone that shall be necessary ready cut. It is therefore easie to cut off this excesse, and to provide for the ornament of Townes, in restraining euery man in his buildings according to his meanes, that the front may be answerable to the nearest houses, if there be obserued in them any proportion or pleasing prospectiue: Making the publique places spacious, the Streets large, straight, and long; yet in such sort as neither the great heate, nor cold may annoy passengers: for therein chiefly consists the beauty of a Towne.

The excesse of moueables, Apparrell, and other Ornaments of the person, must in like manner be cut off; as pretious Stones, Enamell, Embroideries, Stuffles of Gold and Siluer, and all strange Manufactures of great price. If they will adorne themselues with Gold, they may allow it in chaines without Enamell; in the which the losse cannot bee great: For the which the Ordinances of *France* haue well provided, and the Magistrates very ill.

Of the excesse
of moueables.

That excesse which consists in a great traine of attendants, is excused vpon two considerations: The one which regards the commodity of those that will be attended, the other vpon the feeding and imploying of many men, the which being poore, and hauing no imployment, would be forced to steale or to dye for hunger, if they had not this retreat. In regard of the first consideration, if the number of Seruants were regulated according vnto the commodity, it were no excesse: But to feede many vnprofitable Mouthes, which wee might well spare without any want, it is vanity that makes vs doe it. As for the second, which is to imploy many profitable persons to all other things, this is so farre from doing good to the publique, as by this retreat they inuite many to be idle: which if they wanted, they would fall to learne some trade, or thrust themselves

Excesse in a
great traine.

A good order
made by the
Venetians.

into the Warre and serue the publique The *Ven-
tians*, haue better then any other provided for this
point. For not able to regulate the number, which was
necessary for the commodite of priuate persons, they haue
cut off that which serued only for shew, which is the a-
tendants in publique: Not suffering a Gentleman, how
great and rich soeuer hee be, to be followed with a-
boue two seruants, giuing him libertie to haue as ma-
ny in his house as hee shall thinke good. The which is the
cause, that not able to make vse of this vaine traine in pub-
lique, euery man keepes but what he needs in his house.

But as the ordinance is more easie to execute in a
Towne, then in a Princes Court, where, for that the
discommodities are greater, they haue need to be serued
by a greater number, and must likewise satisfie the vanitie
of the Court: The *Italians* and *Spaniards*, who are in
this regard good husbands, seeing themselves forced
to this traine for a time, make vse of Men whom they
retaine with them, for daily wages; and knowing how
much they are to giue them by the day, they are not
tied to feede them, nor to keepe open house for them,
as they doe in *France* and *Germany*: And going from
Court, this troope is dismiss, there remaining none
but the ordinary traine; and thus they satisfie vanitie
and good husbandrie altogether. I confesse that this
point would bee hard to reforme in *France*, euery
Man desiring to eate his meanes in good Companie.
Yet there might be some course taken that might di-
minish their disorder.

Excesse in
Feasts.

The excesse of Banquets and Feasts, is that which is
most esteemed, especially among the Northerne Nati-
ons: But in effect it is the most superfluous and beastly.
I doe not say but vpon some occasion, as in publique re-
ioycing & marriages, it is fit to make more expences then
we doe in our ordinary course of liuing; but yet we must
fly superfluity, & prouide principally for neatnesse, order,
and

and seemelinese, which must bee regulated according to the number and qualitie of persons whom you treat. Wherefore it imports the Estate and priuate Men much, that this should bee reformed.

In regard of Playes, those of hazard are forbidden in all Estates: But the defences are so ill obserued, as many great families ruine themselves thereby. As for Playes of show, as Tilting, Turneyes, and Masques; those that may quicken the courage to Vertue, as the two first, ought not only to bee allowed, but the Nobility should bee invited vnto it; yet so, as the expence may not seeme greater then the vallour; carrying such a moderation, as it may not ruine any Man; and in regard of those which haue no other ground then vanitie or loue, and being apish followers, whereof most part of those which haue imployed themselves therein, haue beene afterwards ashamed; they deserue not only to bee forbidden, but scorned at as ridiculous. Wherefore these doores being shut, by the which the faculties and meanes of priuate Men flow away incensably, there is no doubt, but those streames which runne from this abundance, whereof wee haue spoken, will so swell, that when the publique will make vse, they may well doe it without drawing priuate Men into necessitie.

These two foundations being laid, of the abundance of all things necessary, and of the parcimony of Subjects, wee must now speake of the setting of the Finances, or ordinary Reuenewes, the which haue beene diuers according to the diuersitie of Estates.



CHAP. 45.

*Of the Establishment of the Finances, or ordinary
Renewes of an Estate.*

Of the ordina-
ry renew of
the Demesus
and of its Est-
ablishment.

MAny haue Established the principall renew of an Estate, or publique demesus, which is the most honest, the most iust, and the most safe, there hauing beene certaine Lands and Demesus reserved, to bee let out to farme, and giuen to particular men for a time or in perpetuity, in paying the Rents and Renewes, wherewith they had beene charged towards the Prince. In some Estates this reservation hath beene of a Moietie, in others of the third part of the territory, and in others of lesse.

That an alie-
nation is not to
be allowed
much lesse an
ingagement.

This Establishment is hard to make, vnlesse it be by the meanes of a full and absolute conquest, by the which it is lawfull for the Victor to prescribe what Law hee pleaseth to the vanquished; but being once made, hee must bee maintained without any alienation; But likewise an ingagement and no alienation, for that the ingagement in the end growes to be an alienation, by meanes of the necessity which the Prince hath alwayes to be releued vpon new affaires which happen. So as he is so farre from being able to redeeme it, as he is prest to make new ingagements, the which being made for a farre lesse value, then the alienation would be, the Prince findes himselfe deprivied of his Renewes for a small releife; and it may be sayd, that it had beene profitable to sell, then to ingage. But to doe better, wee must not allow neither to one nor the other: And if hee cannot find money otherwise, hee must not ingage but the vse of it for a certaine time, the which expired, the Prince may re-enter into his Demesus.

The

The second meanes, which they make vse of to raise a stocke of Treasure, are the entries, and going forth to Marchandize, Hauens and Ports, aswell vpon strangers as the Subiects: An ancient and generall course, in it, lawfull and most profitable, with the conditions which we haue mentioned speaking of Commerce; which are not to suffer the trafique of things which are necessary for life, vntill the subiect bee furnished, nor of raw stufes, to the end the subiect working them, they may draw profit from the manufactures: To suffer the trafique of those which are wrought, and the bringing in of that which is raw by strangers: But they must moderate the imposts, of necessary things, which are brought vnto vs from abroad.

Entries and going forth of the Estate.

Some likewise haue esteemed Tributes, Gifts, and Pensions, which they receiue from strangers, for an ordinary Renew. But this being not sufficient for the entertainment of charges, it cannot bee called a stocke of Treasury; although it may serue to increase the stocke.

Tributes, Gifts, and Pensions.

The fourth meanes is in trafique which they may make in the name of the publique or Prince. As there are many trades vnworthy of a Prince or publique, so there are some which require a great stocke, the which may well bee allowed them. Yet it would seeme more profitable, in regard of the theft which Factors doe commit, to giue the money which they haue in reserue, to those which trafique, vpon good cautions and sufficient assurance, with a meane interest (as they say *Augustus* did) then to trafique. Hence would grow three or foure advantages. The first it would increase the publique money. The second, it would giue meanes to priuate men to profit and gaine: And the third, that they should saue by this meanes the publique money out of the hands of importune beggers, flatterers, and fauorites; and preuent the facility of a prodigall Prince. There is another kind of

Trafique in the name of the publique.

To deliuer money at interest to marchants.

Of the sale of Offices.

tra-

The source
and beginning
of this abuse.

trafique which is vsed in some Estates, the which is the sale of offices and publique charges, which is not onely dishonest, but most pernicious: And yet this abuse is gone so farre, as this trafique is not onely receiued but carefully handled, as an ordinary stocke of the Treasure.

To preuent it, it is necessary to know vpon what pretext this abuse is crept in. As all new inuentions are grounded vpon publique necessities; so this hath beene aduanced vnder this pretext. Seeing that in regard of the multitude, of those which might aspire to charges, Princes referre themselves to courtiers, and to such as were about them, to make choyce of Officers; And Courtiers hauing no other ayme, then to worke their owne ends, propounded vnto Princes, those which promise them most money vnderhand, to bee preferred before their Competitors: So as although the Prince did not sell the Offices, yet they were venall, the profit going to particular men that were about them: They found it more reasonable, seeing the abuse was such, and that growing from the ordinary carelesnesse of the Prince, it would bee difficult to reforme; that the publique should the trafique, by the meanes whereof it might be eased in some other charges, then to suffer it to bee done by priuate persons.


In trueth this mischeife is lesse then it was, seeing the publique profits something thereby; but yet notwithstanding it is euill, and most preiudiciall to the Estate: For the which there is more remedy, but to quicken the vigilancie of the Prince, or of those which haue charge of the publique, to make choyce of those which are to bee aduanced: being more fit (for the Officers) to leaue vnto them the choyce and the Election, to the end that gratifying him whom they hold most fit to serue, hee should be more bound vnto them, and shew himselfe more obedient then he would be, if he had obtained it by his owne merit

merrit, or for money. But for that it is impossible that the choyce could bee made in the confusion of so many Competitors, which might pretend to one Office: the Princes seeming to haue some excuse therein, the meanes aboue propounded might serue for a Remedy, Establishing many degrees in the Offices of euery profession, as well in Armes, Iustice, the Treasure; as Religion; and prescribing a certaiue time, that euery one ought to remaine in euery degree, before hee can pretend to mount higher; For that it would be more easie for the Prince, to choose out of the number of those which had serued *their time*, him whom he pleaseth, to aduance him to the next degree, there being some place voyd; then it is after the manner they now liue. And for all this they should cut off nothing of the Princes fauour. For hee that is thus aduanced, should be only bound to him and not to any other. Whereas hauing no meanes to bee knowne vnto the Prince but by the mediation of other persons, whose knowledge he hath bought for ready money; hee is many times more obliged to the Groome then to the Master, for the fauour hee receiveth; but much more to his purse: And by little and little the affection of Officers, towards the Prince, is lost by these courses, there being none of all those which practise these meanes, but blames them, and esteemes the Prince lesse which suffers them, then if they proceeded another way.

Inconueni-
ces which
grow by the
venality of
Offices.

The Prince should bee better serued, not only with more affection and fidelity; but also with more diligence and sufficiency. For the Officers comming to the highest and supream degrees, they would be much more capable, as hath beene sayd; And euery Man desiring to make himselfe knowne to his Prince, to bee preferred before his Companion, would serue with enuy, and indeavour to make himselfe to bee obserued by some seruice. Whereas the Officer in this venality, hauing no other hope to aduance himselfe then by his purse, seekes what he

he cannot profit, be it by right or wrong, to haue meanes to purchase some greater Office, wherein hee may benefit himselfe better. But wee will leaue this reformation to another time, when they shall be more capable.



CHAP. 46.

*Of Subsidies, of Extraordinary Levies,
Imports, and Loanes.*

THe fift meanes to make a stocke for the Treasure, is taken wholly from the subiects; whom they haue shorne after diuers manners in many Estates, and in some they haue flead them. This meanes cannot bee excused but vpon necessity: But if it bee necessary it is likewise iust; the safetie of the people and the preservation of the Estate being the Supream Law.

Of Subsidies.

*Diuers formes
of Subsidies
and Levies.*

The most ordinary manner to leuy vpon the Subiect, is by way of Subsidy, for the goods which he enioyes; the which also hath beene diuersly practized, according to the diuersity and condition of subiects and goods. Clergie Men and the Nobility in some places, are exempted with their goods, of what condition soeuer they were. In other places they made the Subsidies reall, exempting the Feodall, or noble-lands; the persons aswell of Nobles as Ecclesiastiques, hauing submitted themselves to contribute for their rurall goods which they possesse. In some Estates and other places they haue exempted the Nobles and Ecclesiastiques, & the lands which they held in their owne hands; but they haue not exempted their Farmers.

To dispute which is the most iust of all these formes of Levies, were vnprofitable. For this Establishment hath

hath not beene made according to the rules of Iudgement ; but according to the facility and disposition which they haue found in people , to receiue one forme more then another. Yet if any ought to enioy an exemption, it seemes that Gentlemen, who are bound to a personall seruice , and to contribute for the defence of the Estate , not onely their goods but also their liues , may with Iustice bee exempted from this kind of imposition ; seeing that the burthen which is imposed vpon them, is much more greiuous and heauy then that of the Cannons.

Of those which ought to be exempted from Subsidies.

In regard of Clergie men, the respect and reuerence of Religion hath held them long exempt : But in the end in those places especially , whereas the Subsidies are personall , Iustice hath wrested out of their hands, some succours for the publike , whereof they make a great part ; which succours , although they be not called Subsidy , but a chauntatiue graunt ; Yet vnder a milder name it hath the same effect. As for others, some haue beene exempted, partly to preserue the respect due vnto the Offices which they hold of the Prince; and partly to authorize and maintaine the Leuies , and to punish the disobediences. Others haue beene exempt, for the feare of some sedition and Rebellion , and for the good of peace onely : So as they vse the like pollicy with them , as they doe with the Clergie ; and draw Succours from them vnder the Names of Loanes and borrowing.

As for the place where the Subsidy is to bee leuied, cyther at the Mans dwelling house, or at the place where his Lands and Goods lye : Many hold opinion, that the most iust were, to leuy the Subsidy in euery place, where the man that is subiect to the Subsidy hath goods, by reason of the fraudes which are committed vsually by such as haue goods in many places who seeing themselves charged at the place of their abode with a great Subsidy,

Of the place where they are to make the leuy of the Subsidies.

pro-

proportionable to the estimation of their goods, retire themselves either to a Towne that is freed from Subsidies, or into some place where they pay not so much; whereby their Subsidy is layd vpon others. But if the Subsidy were layd vpon their goods, they should cut off this abuse, which doth much import the poore people.

Introduction
of tolles, tri-
butes, and im-
posts.

These difficulties are found in the laying of the Subsidy, as well in regard of the exemptions pretended by many conditions of men, as for the inequality and disproportion in the laying thereof among such as are subject: and the faculties of euery one vpon whom it should take hold, being vnkknowne, it had ministred occasion to seeke many other courses, and to impose many duties sometime vpon proprieties, sometime vpon Legacies, and testamentary successions, left to strangers; vpon carriages as well by water as land; vpon Wine, Meale, Salt, and other Merchandize; vpon Contract, Seales, Waights, and Measures: Of which tolls euery man insensibly payes his part; the Merchant making the aduance of those which are leuied vpon the Merchandize, the which hee retires afterwards from partiular persons which they buy of him.

Introduction
for the nūbing
of goods.

Yet some which disallow of this diuersity of poling and tributes in an Estate, holding a Subsidy the most iust, if it were well ordred, haue thought to bring in a certayne and settled order, whereby they might regulate themselves in drawing from euery man the number of his goods. This order hath beene practised in many Common-weales; but neuer more happily, nor with more aduantage to the Estate, then in that of *Rome*.

Practised by
the *Romans*.

To say that this expedient is more proper for a Common-weale, then for a principality, there is little colour, seeing that when it was established at *Rome*, the Estate was gouerned by King *Seruius Tullius*; and continued vnder all the Emperours which sought to gouerne iustly. And contrariwise the Tyrants which sought by the

Abolished by
Tyrants.

the meanes of a small number to gouerne, treade vnder foot, and oppresse others, to enrich some, and to impouerish others; Finally, to turne all topsie turuey, for that they would not discouer their Iniustices, violences, and tyrannies; haue neglected this order, laying their exactions with more impunity vpon the weake, then if they were diuided among them all with a iust proportion.

To say likewise, that it were a hard matter to expose the pouerty of some to scorne and contempt, and the wealth of others to enuy; it is a very bad reason to hinder a good establishment: For neuer man of vnderstanding, in that which concernes his good, made any accompt of enuy or scorne. But besides this we may say, that on the other side enuy would cease against such whom they held rich, and haue nothing; and the scorne against such as haue some wealth, who notwithstanding were held poore. It is certayne that the deceitfull Merchant, who hath a designe to steale the goods of another by playing banquerout, will say, that it is not good they should know the course, traffique, and negotiations of Merchants, which consist many times in papers and credit; nor that they should discouer the secrets of Houses and Families. But he that is an honest man, and will be knowne for such, for a good husband, and not a deceiuer, will ground his credit vpon his Discretion, and not vpon the vncertainty of his affaires; and will alwayes take delight, they should know his estate and manner of liuing: And there is no man which doth not more willingly lend an eare to a poore man, who shall be knowne for an honest man, and a good husband, then to a rich, which shall be held for a bad husband, and of little faith.

Imaginary inconueniences of the nūbring of goods.

But in recompence of these imaginary inconueniences, an infinite number of aduantages redound to the Estate, which will by the establishment of this order. For thereby they should know who are prodigall, banquerouts, cozeners,

Aduantages which will come vnto the Estate.

M

and

and Vsurers; how some gaine so much, and others spend: And moreouer, the penalties of Iudgements and condemnations, would be easie to regulate by the Iudges, according to the ability of euery mans estate. The deceipts which are practised in Marriages, Sales, Bargaines, and in all publique and priuate negotiations, would be discovered and knowne: An infinite number of frauds which are vsed touching Successions and portions, would be auerred, without iniquity, or rather charges of Law; and they should preuent falshoods and false Witnesses, which are practised dayly. But besides these aduantages, to retaine where we left, the facility wou'd be great in a necessity to draw succours from the Subjects without iniurice, not oppressing one more then another; as it falls out vsually, some bearing the whole burthen, and others being discharged.

Of extraordinary leuies.

This facility of extraordinary leuies is the fourth point, which may cause an Estate to be held rich. For we shall in vaine bragge of the abundance of an Estate, and of the ordinary stocke of the treasure: the which as wee haue sayd, how great soeuer it be, may be exhausted, and sometime it gaged, if the publique in an vrgent necessity may not be releined by some extraordinary leuy, which may be done without Iniustice, discontentment, or insupportable oppression of any part of the Subjects, which would draw after it reuolts, seditions, and intelligences with the Enemies.

It is numbring of their goods being vnable to be brought in, to equall euery man in such sort of contributions, they must haue a recourse to other meanes, the most iust and plausible that can be deuised, according to the quality of Estates, and the condition of times, the which being vnable to set downe now in particular, it shall suffice to say generall, that the imposition which extends it selfe vniuersally ouer all the Subjects, of what condition soeuer they be, is the most gentle, the most profitable, and the most iust:

For

For that euery man paying, euery man payes the lesse, then if it were leuied of a lesse number; and yet it is farre greater; wherein it is more profitable to the Estate: And it is more iust, for that euery man hauing an interest in the preservation of the Estate, euery one is likewise bound to contribute. But the principall part of Iustice would be, if it be proportioned and layd equally among them that contribute, according to the proportion of euery mans estate; If the leuy be made without rigorous executions, especially against the person. The contrary whereof doth vsually happen vpon leuie of the Subsidies, the which being imposed vpon view of the Countrey, as they say, and without any certaine ground, the goods of euery man being vnkowne to direct them, and leuying it vpon the poorest, they cause them many times to dye in Prison, which is a pœuerty resenting Barbarisme: Or to get some delay of payment, the poore man must satisfie the Auarice of Receiuers, and Sergeants, which ruine him by such concussions, the which many times exceede the principall of the Subsidy.

But if some considerations be iust, to exempt certayne conditions of persons, or that making the imposition generall, some trouble is to be feared; they must haue recourse to those that are casuall. As after the Ciuill Warres at Rome, they setled the twentieth part of Successions and Legacies, which were left to Strangers or Collaterals. And before in the time of Warre likewise, at the request of the Consul *Manlius*, they ordayned the twentieth part of infranchised men.

In Scotland *Malcolana* hauing sold all the Kings Demesnes, the Estates of the Countrey agreed, that the Fees changing hand, should pay vnto the King a certaine right of redemption.

Impositions likewise and customes may bee iustly layd vpon all that which may corrupt the man-

Of casuall impositions.

ners

Of voluntary
borrowing.

ners of the Subjects, eyther to contayne them, or to banish them away. This reason was the cause that in some Estates they haue charged suits with diuers duties; and in others they haue only punished them that fled from them, imposing great amercements vpon them that fayled; and in others they haue punished rash pleaders, which lost their causes; as at *Athens* and *Rome*. Those likewise which may be established without opposition, which come from some Body vnited and of authority, may be receiued for the facility of their establishment, to the which they haue many times more regard in such things, then vnto Iustice. But if the necessity be such, as they must prouide a speedy remedy, and that they cannot attend the time, which would be necessary for the establishment, and the leuy of an imposition: there is no other meanes, then to make vse of voluntary borrowings, vpon those that are best able, whom they shall pay at a prefixed time without fayling, to the end they may maintayne the credit of the publique, and that whensoever the like necessity should happen, they might finde the purses of private men open to succour him. But if he cannot finde money without interest, he must to the end to stay the course, prouide for the payment both of principal and interest by the same assignation, the which shall be deliuered into the hands of such as lend, as well being assured by this meanes of their due, they might lend another time more freely: As for feare, that this assignation remaining in the hands of those which mannage the businesse, it should be otherwise disposed of, whereby the the Prince should not onely loose his credit, but should finde himselfe at the end of the time charged with great interest.

CHAP.



CHAP. 47.

Of the manning and good husbandry of the Treasure : That is to say, of the ordning of the expences, and the cutting it off.

THe ground of the Finances being found, we must order the manning, which consists in two principall points. The one concernes the husbanding of it, the other the quality of the persons which are to be admitted to this manning. The husbanding hath two parts, that is to say, the order and governing of the expences, or if it exceeds the receipt, the cutting off part of the charges.

Touching the order of the expence, if in all things that which concernes God, is to be preferred, the same must likewise be obserued in the Treasure. Wherefore the first Chapter of the expence, must bee of Almes, wherein he may not be sparing. The Kings of *France* haue had goodly examples in St. *Lewis*, who founded and endowed Twenty eight Bodies or Colledges, as the Seignour of *loinnille* sayth; And had dayly in his traine one hundred and twenty poore, and in *Lent* two hundred and forty, feeding them with meate from his Table. So hee liued in great honour, feared of his Enemies, reuerenced by his Friends, adored by his Subiects, and after hee had Reigned Forty foure Yeares, hee left two Sonnes, whose posterity haue Reigned, and doe yet ouer the *French*; and his Realme exceeding rich, and flourishing to his Successor, recommending especially vnto him, that hee should bee deuoute towards Almighty God, and charitable vnto those who are poore and miserable. Almes doe neuer impouerish an Estate, nor a

Of the order of the expences.
Almes.

Charities of the King St. *Lewis*:

Almes doe ne-
uer impouerish
Family,

family, but contrariwise they enrich them with all sorts of blessings.

The freeing of charges necessary for the Estate.

Of the Fees of officers and debts.

Recompences to the discharge of the Treasure.

Those which are made by offices and dignities are to be preferred before that which is done by money.

The second Chapter of the expence must be the freeing of the charges of the Estate, but first of those which are necessary for its safetie; as the pay of Souldiers, Munitions, Artillery, Shippes and Vessells of Warre, Repayrations and Fortifications of Townes and important places, entertainment of Spies, and finally all the Expences, as well ordinary as extraordinary, necessary to warrant the Estate, against the inuasion of strangers, or the reuolt of Subiects. Next must follow the Fees of Officers, especially of those, by whose meanes they hold the rest in their duty and obedience, these making a part of the safety. Then follow the debts, which I place next to the necessary charges for the safety: For that if by the meanes of these charges, the Estate be not secure, the debts cannot be assured.

After these come Recompences; with which they shall not charge the Treasure as little as may be, for the which the King must bestow Offices and Dignities, and accustome all the great Men not to seeke any other kind of Recompence, which is of most share and more durable, then that which is made by money. For a Prince which aduanceth some one to honor that hath done him seruice, he publisheth the meritt of him whom he recompenceth, and his fauour withall, the which remaines continually in the mind of him that receiues it; And it lasts as long in the minds of the people, as they see him, who hath receiued it in this degree: And moreouer the remembrance which they haue, to haue seene a Man gratified for his meritt, many by this meanes are inuited to serue, seeing seruices so honorably rewarded: whereas to recompence in money, few know it, and the grace many times continues no longer then the money lasteth.

The Prince may likewise recompence his seruants, to the

the discharge of his Treasure, in procuring eyther for them or theirs, marriages and alliances of aduantage; Not thereby to force his Subiects, for that were tyranny; But he that sees himselfe debarred of the Princes fauour, is glad sometimes to approach by the meanes of the alliance of one, that is in grace with his Master, though otherwise inferiour in meanes, and family; Especially when the inequallity is not such, as hee may receiue some dishonor by the alliance. Knowing then how to husband these kind of recompences, the greatest part of great seruices will be rewarded; and recompences of small seruices will be of so little moment, as they will not greatly charge the Treasure.

After recompences follow gifts, the which must not be done at pleasure: But as recompences are made for seruices done, gifts must likewise be for seruices, according to the quality and importance thereof, as also to the quallity, sufficiencie, and power of the person, the Prince must moderate his bounty, and giue not to one alone, but to many, little, and often. I say to many, for that in giuing to one alone, the enny is great, the grace little, and the ingratitude of him that receiues, may one day be hurtfull. I say little and often, especially in money, which is soone consumed, for that the great expence in gifts waist the Treasure, and accustome those that receiue them, to moderate demands. Small bounties often reiterated, are as it were insensible; the grace is the more durable in the minds of those which receiue them, and the desire and hope in continuing the seruice to receiue daily, bind Men the more. I except the gifts that are made to Embassadours and Forraigne Princes, the which are done for reputation, and to shew the magnificence of him that giues them, or of his Estate, and may in no sort bee omitted where they haue beene accustomed.

Gifts and gratifications;

A Prince must giue to many little and often.

* Election of publike houses and Seminaries for instruction of youth, as well in the liberall Arts as Mechnick.

* The expence which followes, is that which hath
M 4 beene

Seminaries
of piety.

beene propounded by some, for the breeding vp and instructing of youth, to that whereunto they shall be found fit, (especially the poore) as we haue formerly sayd, by the Erecting of publique houses, for manuell Arts, and all sorts of manufactures : Whereunto may bee added the building of Seminaries for piety, and the study of Diuinity, and other learned vocations ; and some for the exercises of honor and vertue of the Nobility. In many Estates they haue prouided a great number of Seminaries, for piety and the sciences ; but the greatest are so ill gouerned, as they are become vnprofitable, by the disorder which is found in them.

Seminaries of
honour for the
instruction of
Gentlemen.

As for Seminaries of honor and vertue, I meane those places which are destinated for the instruction of the Nobility, which are to be imployed in Armes ; in long and dangerous voyages ; and in the manning of publique affaires : Whereof hitherto they haue made small accompt. And yet the safety and reputation of an Estate, especially of a principallity, consists in those of this condition : Who, if with that greatnesse of courage, which is not naturall vnto them, they ioyne industry and prudence, which may be gotten by exercises and instructions, fit for their profession ; there is no doubt but many would haue beene more capable to serue the publique, then they are.

The profit of
the sayd Semi-
naries of honor
for the Estate.

It were a great Art both of pollicy and wisedome, if the Prince should cause the young Gentlemen of his Estate to be bred vp in those places, whose Fathers haue not the meanes to vndergoe the charge of such an instruction, as is necessary for them of this condition : And there to entertaine thē at the charge of the publique, vnto a certaine Age, to be distributed & do seruice in the troupes and garrisons, affecting certaine places of honor vnto them, with sufficient entertainment, to the which they may bee advanced after they haue serued some time. For besides that these Men, governing all the affaires of the Prince, they

they would be more faithfull vnto him : The Gentlemen who find themselves burthened with many children, and who for feare to leaue them miserable, become house-doues, to husband both their liues and goods, would hazard the one and the other freely for the Princes seruice, and not be diuerted for the care of their Children, whom they knew could not one day faile of preferment, as well by reason of the institution, as for the beginning of employment for the Princes seruice, which should bee assured vnto them. And the charge which should be made in these Seminaries, would be recompenced by the seruice, which the whole Nobility, would bee thereby inuited to do, willingly and freely to the publique: And the troupes, especially thole of Foote, would bee found with more order, discipline, fidelitty, and courage, being filled with young Men of good houses, bred vp with honour and obedience, then they now are, being for the most part Men of no moment, Ryotous, and drawne together from all parts.

After all these expences, come those which may serue eyther for the commodity, or the decoration of Townes and Prouinces; as conduits of Water, structure of Bridges, reparation of wayes, Churches, Royall Pallaces, Pyramides, Tombs, Statues, Collofies, and other publique buildings : But with this restraint, neuer to enter into those expences, vntill the sparing of the some which is necessary, be first made. For to multiply the Subsidies, to make Pallaces, more stately then necessary, were to leaue a remembrance of his tyranny, and a perpetuall testimony to posterity, that they haue built with the blood of the Subiects.

Expences for the commodity and decoration of Townes and Prouinces.


Behold the principall husbandry which consists in the order of the expence. But the stocke of the Treasure being not sufficient, to beare all these charges, most part of which seeme necessary ; they must seeke the meanes to raise the Farmes, and fall to the cutting off of debts, especially

Cutting off Expences.

cially of interests, of Fees, and of excessive gifts, rather then to come (as they haue done in many Estates) to make new impositions. In an Estate where the Prince finds himselfe ill assured of the will of his prime Men, they haue obserued the course which *Eumenes* vsed, to borrow of those that were ill affected, to the end that interressing them in the Estate, and the losse thereof, for feare of loosing their debt they helpe to maintaine it. But if they finde some hinderance to assure themselues elsewhere, this meanes would be but weake. Wherefore a Prince must neuer borrow, vnlesse it bee in an vrgent necessity: For there is nothing that doth so much harme to a bad husband, (as the publique is many times) then credit.

Of the iustice
and necessity
of cutting off
of debts.

I know that many hold, that this cutting off of debts or wages is vniust: as in truth it is, if the Estate hath wherewithall to pay: But if the sparing of the ordinary Reuenue be not sufficient to satisfie, the necessity makes this cutting off necessary and iust. For to satisfie it by a new imposition, were to repaire one iniustice by another more generall, & to draw most commonly from the poore to giue vnto the rich; in which cutting off part of the interest of debts, will not prejudice so much, although it be great, as a Subsidie would do the Poore. I doe not say, that among those to whom the Prince is indebted, there may bee some one found, to whom this cutting off would bee hurtfull: But for one of that quality among the Princes creditors, there would be five hundred of the poore reduced to beggery, if they should by that meanes pay the debts due by the Estate: the which I vnderstand of Estates which are already ouercharged with great impositions, and likewise with great debts.



CHAP. 48.

*Of those which ought to be imployed in the
gouernment of the Treasure.*

AS for the quallity of those to whom the mannag-
ing of the Treasure ought to be committed, if Men
could be knowne, there is not any one, but would
make choice to deliuer it into the hands of the
most loyall : But making this choyce most common-
ly by hazard, I say that although we suppose him to be an
honest Man, to whom wee will giue this charge ; yet
we must not take neither a poore Man nor a needy, nor one
that is too powerfull, nor of too great authority. The
first for feare that through necessity he bee not intited to
rob vs ; and the other least that he steale from vs too
boldly, and hauing robbed vs, we are not able to call him
to an accompt, and to punish his thefts.

There is besides this an ordinary fault which is comitted
in this subiect in many Estates, which is, that they make a
trade of it apart, and profession of the managing of the
Princes purse. So as he that enters into it, instructs him-
selfe as to an Art to doe his owne businesse ; the which
he cannot doe but with the preiudice of the publique :
Thus the elder they grow, the more learned they are, that
is to say preiudiciall to the Estate. I doe much commend
that ancient custome of the *Romans*, to imploy young
Men in the mannaging of the Treasure, before they aduan-
ced them to any other Offices : For this is to giue them
occasion to shew their discretion, and for the hope to
bee one day something more, to incourage them to doe
their duties well, and to mannage the publique Rene-
newes. Besides, this youth is lesse auaritious then another

Age,

Of the choice
they ought to
make of those
which are to
manage the
Treasure.

A commenda-
ble custome of
the *Romans*.

Youth more fit
for the managing
of the
Treasure then
Age.

That experi-
ence is not so
much necessa-
ry.

A forme to re-
gulate Ac-
comptants.

Age, and more innocent, and lesse hardy in deceits, easie to be discovered : So as the *Romans* leauing them but a short time in these charges, to bee aduanced to other honors, they came forth more innocent then they entered.

To say that a long experience is necessary in these places, to manage them well, this were to endear the trade. The greatest pollicy in the Treasure to serue the publique, is to haue no other but discretion ; and to know how to write downe that which hee receiues and paies ; to recouer that which he receiues not, hauing charge to make the recouery, and to follow exactly the commandments and ordinances of those which haue power to ordaine. There is no factor in a shop but vnderstands this. But I will confesse, that to know how to steale from the publique cunningly, and to couer and disguise his thefts, he must haue a long experience of ill doing, be it to defend the falshood of an acquittance, of the omission of a receipt, of a false reprisall, of a disguising of parties, and a secret composition with those that are to receiue ; with other courtes ordinary to those which deale in this trade ; Not meaning to taxe honest Men.

Some to make accomptants more diligent to make their receipts, and to hinder them that they may not maliciously (as it often happens) make reprizes, or to ease some more then others, or to vse it for their owne particular, or for some other designe ; haue held it fit to regulate their Fees proportionably to that which they are to receiue, and to diminish the, according vnto that which they shall leaue in reprizes, to the end that being interested in their owne particular, they would be more exact to make their receipts. Others haue giuen their receipt to make the abatments, with charge to make it good, and not to bring in any not soluable : The which would seeme more iust.

As for those which ought to heare and examine the accompts,

compts, besides the choyce that they are to make, of the honestest men for this effect; it is necessary to bind them, to iudge according to certaine formes and orders, which haue beene held fit to hinder the abuses which accomptants, or themselves might commit: And especially to draw particular Notes of the distribution of the Treasure, which they shall enioyne the accomptant to verifie, vpon those of the receipt and expence, without any meanes of dispensing, for any occasion whatsoever; but afterwards he may addresse himselfe vnto the Prince, if there bee any reason to ease him.

But as the Prince is not alwayes at leasure, nor sometimes of experience to regulate & direct his owne affaires; and that moreouer, hee is importuned by an infinit number of beggers, whom if he should satisfie, his Treasure would be found too short: To free himselfe of the hatred, which the deniall of so many demands might purchase him, and to discharge himselfe of the importunity; the custome is to send such suitors to a Councell consisting of rough and seuerer men, more inclined to refuse then to graunt; and who know how to moderate the denialls which they make, as they doe not deprive those which are refused of all hope, to be satisfied in some other thing: For rough and contumelious denialls, may distast many, from imploying themselves in the Princes seruice, although the Prince make not the deniall: For that as they loue the dogg for the Masters sake, it falls out often, that when the dogg bites too sharply, in the end they take exceptions at the Master.

Of Accompts
and of those
which are to
heare and ex-
amine the Ac-
compts.



CHAP. 49.

*Of the Exchequer or sparing of
Treasure.*

Considerations
which makes
the heaping vp
of Treasure
hurtfull to a
Publique.

There remains to speake of the Exchequer, the which some haue held hurtfull to the publique, euen that which is made to heape vp Treasure, drawing apart great summs of Gold and Siluer, God forbidding it *Deutronomy*. This many times hath caused some to attempt against Estates: As the sonne of *Tygranes*, who besieged *Sopkone*, a Towne in *Armenia*, which *Pompeys* Army, to haue his Fathers Treasure. Moreouer this gathering together ruines the Commerce and traffique of the Subiects; and doth not hinder the ruine of the Estate, when as the affaires are thereunto disposed. *Sardinapalus* left forty Millions of Gold to those which slue him. *Darius* left fourscore to *Alexander* who vāquished him. And many times the Father, who leaues much Gold and Siluer to the Sonne, leaues him withall a speedy meanes to ruine him. For a young Man relying vpon his Treasure, thrusts himselfe into impossible enterprizes, which are aboue his forces; hates peace; contemns the friendship of his Neighbours; Enters into Warre not onely vnnecessary and of little profit, but also hurtfull.

Yet custome is contrary, as also reason, if we had the consideration of heaping vp of Treasure: For that to gather together money when as necessity doth presse, that were too late: For that the bruit of Armes, causing traffique to cease, Tillage, and the gathering in of fruits, the customes and imposts by consequence would decay; and the Subiects (impouerished by the lodging of souldiers, and the holding of the Fields) will be ynable to pay.

But

But there must be two considerations added for the gathering in of Treasure. The one to make it equall to the other forces of the Estate, that is to say, of persons, whom we may imploy, and of Munition of Victualls and War, which are necessary for vs ; whereof wee must make a Magazine or store-house before we gather Treasure. For to hope that without it, the Treasure alone which we gather will preserve vs from ruine, were a vaine thing ; and the examples aboue mentioned shew it sufficiently. The other consideration is, not to draw together so much Gold and Siluer, as it may incommode the commerce and traffique of the Subjects : For this were to dry vp the spring of the Treasure. If the Sea should retaine all the waters of the Riuer which disgorge themselves into it, and not returne them to their fountaines, by conduits vnder ground ; it would dry vp the Riuer, and in the end grow dry it selfe. Wherefore they which will shew any discretion in heaping of Treasure, haue considered in grosse the quantity of money, which goes forth and enters yearly into an Estate : And if there enters more then goes forth, they haue held that a Prince might lawfully, and without any interest of the commerce, lay vp yearly in his Exchequer, as much Gold and Siluer, as the entry exceeded the going forth. But if the entry hath not exceeded the going forth, they haue held and with reason, that the Prince ought not to lay vp any Treasure.

But in this case there is another Remedy, of which we haue formerly made mention; which is, that after necessary charges are payed, the Prince hauing meanes to spare something for his neede, he may distribute it vpon moderate interest to the Marchants of his Estate, taking necessary security, (as we haue sayd *Augustus* did) to yeild it at a certaine time. For in this manner, the assurances being good, this supply would bee as ready as if it were in his Coffers : And the interest being such as the Marchant may gaine thereby, the commerce is no way diminished by

Considerations
necessary for
the gathering
of Treasure.

Prudence and
discretion ne-
cessary for the
gathering of
Treasure.

A Remedy to
the end that
sparring may
not hinder the
Commerce.

Difficulties for
the keeping of
the Treasure
of Gold and
Silver.

by this sparing, but rather augmented, and the Subjects and Prince enricht by this meanes.

But men haue beene much troubled for the guard of Treasures of Gold and Silver. The Kings of *Pern*, kept it in great Massies, of Gold and Silver: The *Romans* in *Lingotis* in the forme of Tyles; The Kings of *Morocco* caused Massie Boules to be made, which set vpon the top of their Mosques or Temples; Some (to be guarded more religiously) haue put them into Churches. As the guard in a Common-wealth is not vneasie, so in a Principality or Monarchie it is most difficult. For they haue not so much cause to guard it from theeues, as from their owne Princes, who for their priuate pleasures, or by the importunity of some flatterers, scatter that in one yeare, which their predecessors haue gathered in many. So *Caligula* spent in one yeare, seauentie and seuen Millions of Gold, which *Tyberius* (as they write) had drawne together: And *Carcalla* consumed in one day, that which *Seuerus* his Father had spared in Ninteene yeares.

Wherefore as it is most fitting, that few men should know what is layd vp in the Treasure, least that being too much, it should prouoke some through Enuy to seeke to get it; or being too little, it should make vs to bee contemned of our Enemies: So many haue held it fit, to ordaine not to touch the Treasure, but in the great necessity of the Prince and State, and by the Councell of the Magistrates, of greatest authority.



CHAP. 50.

*Of treaties in generall, be it for the enter-view
and parley of Princes, or by their Depu-
ties and Embassadors.*

E States are like vnto buildings raised high, the which although they bee built of good materials, and strong Walles, yet to subsist long, they haue neede to be supported and vnderpropt without with Buttresses, Pillars, and Arches; For that being threatned as well without as within, they must bee rampired against all forces. Wherefore the care of the affaires of Strangers, especially of his Neighbours, is most necessary for a Prince, and for any man that shall bee called to the Rule or Gouernment of the Estate.

Of the care & manning of affaires abroad.

This Care consists in three principall points. The first is how hee shall gouerne himselfe with his Neighbours. The second consists in gaining some credit among them, to haue a part in their deliberations. The third and last, being vnable to passe without them, to get meanes to pierce into their Designs. The manner how to gouerne himselfe with his Neighbours, depends of the manner of treating with them, and of the obseruation of treaties, according vnto the which hee must gouerne himselfe. The manner of treating depends chiefly of the condition of persons and of affaires. Yet there are some generall considerations which deserue to be knowne.

How a Prince should gouerne himselfe with his neighbours

The first is in the ouerture, which is made to treat, it many times happening, that of two Princes which are Enemies, the one will not seeke vnto the other for an Accord, so as the ouerture must bee made cyther

Generall considerations touching the manner of treating.

N

by

by some greater Prince, or by some Neighbour that is a Friend to both : and sometimes the Ministers of two Princes meeting accidentally together, if they be employed. *Argenton*, and a Steward to the Duke of *Mantona*, meeting at *Creal Carragio*, to condole in their Masters names for the death of Marquesse of *Montferat*, made an ouerture for the treaty of peace, betwixt *Charles* the eight and *Lewis Sforse*. King *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* hath employed Monkes to that effect, Religion giuing a free accesse to those of this condition, and liberty to speake and propound what they will. The Ouerture to enter into treaty being made, the Princes resolute to parley themselves, to the end the treaty may be more secret; or they depute Embassadours to that effect.

Of the enter-view of Princes, where they may be aupture of the Friendship and good intelligence which they formerly had.

Many haue not allowed of this Enter-view of Princes, although they were Friends: And particularly *Philip de Comines*, obserues many examples of the meeting of Princes, who being formerly good Friends, haue become Enemies after this Enter-view. Yet I hold that in such affaires we cannot prescribe a certaine and generall Rule; Histories teaching vs, that other Princes haue parled; and yet no hatred hath ensued: So this depends rather of the Estate of affaires, and of the conformity and diuersity of humours, and manner of liuing, of the Princes and their people, then of the Enter-view. That of *Lewis* the twelfth of *France*, and of *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* at *Sauanne*, past fairely: As also that of the Emperour *Charles* the fift, with Pope *Clement* the seuenth at *Bolonia*; and that of the same Pope with *Francis* the first.

A Prince before he parles must haue a care not to procure Enuy or ieaiousie against him, not to fall into contempt,

But it shall be discretion in a Prince, before he comes to that, to consider, if at this parley there may not something fall out that may breed ieaiousie or enuie against him, or that may draw him into contempt of him with whom hee treats. The Emperour *Maximilian* the first, hauing

hauing appointed a place and Day to parley with King *Lewis* the twelfth, came to the assignation. But fearing that he should not appeare so well accompanied as *Lewis* the twelfth, whose trayne was in better order then the *Germans*, he auoyded this Enter-view, which might haue bred some contempt of him and his with the French; and sought a pretext before he parted, or the King arriued, excusing himselfe vpon the Warre which the *Venetians* made in *Frinsly*, whether it was necessary for him to transport himselfe speedily. The place of parley is likewise very considerable, as well for the safety, as for the honour which he receiues, whom they goe to finde in his owne Pallace.

The consideration of the safety is commonly the principall. And the distrust which King *Francis* the first had, that vnder pretext of a parley with the Emperour *Charles* and the Pope, whereunto hee was inuited during the hostage of his two Sonnes in *Spaine*) they would retaine him, made him refuse to come. The same consideration hath sometimes beene the cause, that two Princes being Enemies, haue parlyed vpon a Bridge, made to that end vpon a common Riuer, with barres and shuttings betwixt them; least that the Princes which parley, or those which follow them, falling into contestation for something, should not attempt one against the other: As it happened at the parley betwixt *Charles* the seuenth, then *Dolphin*, and the Duke of *Burgundy*, who was slayne by *Tannequin Du Chastel*: which was the cause that this manner of parling was obserued betweene King *Edward* of *England* and *Lewis* the Eleuenth. But *Lewis Sforse* hauing demanded to haue the same forme obserued and kept, being to parley with *Charles* the Eighth in his returne from *Naples*, they refused him, as to one who ought not to treat with the King as an Equall, to whose fidelity hee did wrong, to demand such assurances. Yet this hath no certaine

Of safety.

Rules : But they gouerne themselves in such things according to the confidence which they may take one of another.

The ordinary course is to choose for these Enter-viewes, eyther a neuterall place belonging to some common Friend ; or a place vpon the frontire, or an Island ; to regulate the number of those which shall accompany the Princes : And if the iealousie bee great, they may specifie the Armes, which euery one may carry in these Enter-viewes.

But if of two Princes, the one goes home vnto the other, he is bound to doe him the honour of his House : And if the Prince be inferiour vnto him, hee must send forth the Chiefe of his Court to receiue him : But if he be his equall in quality, as being both Kings, although there be some debate betwixt them for precedence, if he come first to the place where the treaty is to bee made, hee must goe himselfe.

In the Enter-view which was betwixt King *Lewis* the twelfth and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* at *Sanona*, which then belonged vnto the French King, *Lewis* the twelfth at the approach of *Ferdinands* Galley, (before he could land) entred into it, accompanied onely with his Guard ; to testifie his confidence, and thereby to assure King *Ferdinand* of that which hee should finde in him : And at their going to land, King *Lewis* left the right hand to *Ferdinand*, who lodged in the Castle, as the most honourable place ; and himselfe went to the Bishoppricke.

When two Princes vnequall in quality, parley, some hold that it is for the inferiour to come first vnto the place of meeting, there to attend the greater. Yet the contrary hath beene most commonly obserued vpon this reason, that the lesse ought to goe vnto the greater. So as he is to goe first vnto the place where the parley is to bee made : And this was particularly practised

Which of two
Princes vne-
quall in quality
should come
first to the
place of parley.

led, at the enter-view of Pope *Clement* the seventh, and King *Francis* the first, although that *Marseilles* were in the Kings subiection.

It is presumed that two Princes doe not meete for small matters, the which doth many times put their Neighbours in Iealousie of these Enter-views; they must finde out some apparant and important pretext, the which may bee published to free their Neighbours from all Iealousie, vnder which they may treat what else they please. When Pope *Clement* the seventh came to *Adarseilles*, to treat the Marriage of his Necce, with him that was afterward King *Henry* the second; this treaty might haue bene crost, if they had knowne the Designe; hee borrowed the pretext of a generall peace, and an Enterprize against Infidels, the which could not put the Neighbours in Allarme, carrying a faire shew, and hauing in it many particularities, which deserved to be treated by mouth, be it for the taking away of all difficulties the more easily, or for the holding the businesse the more secret.

What Princes ought to, doe before their Enter-views, not to put their Neighbours in Iealousie.

If they hold it fit to treat by Deputies and Embassadors, as it is the ordinary, the more safe will bee to choose a man of a meane condition, experience in Negotiations, and who vnderstands no lesse the Estate, affaires, and dependancies of him with whom hee treats, then the Estate and affaires of his owne Master: Neyther must he be interested in the businesse whereof he treats. This was an Errour, to commit the solioiting of the difference of the Duke of *Ferraria*, to *Alberto Pio*, Embassador for *France* with Pope *Iulio* the second, who in steed of pacifying the sayd Pope against the Duke, he incensed and vrged him the more; fearing that if the sayd Duke were reconciled to the Pope, hee would get the other Moiety of *Carpy*, which the sayd *Alberto Pio* enioyed.

Of Deputies & Embassadors to treat with a Prince, and of the choice they are to make.

Qualities of a Deputy or Emballadour.

Not to be interested in the businesse hee treats of.

I haue sayd of a meane condition, for that Of a meane the condition.

the great Men of an Estate are not fit, as well for the iust feare they may conceiue of them, that vnder colour of treating, they should suffer themselves to bee practised by the other side ; as for that they haue sometimes interests and reasons, which concerne them in their particular, to the which they doe willingly accomodate the affaires of their Master, and to his disaduantage : Besides there is seldome found so much patience and sufficiency in Men of this condition, as is needfull in such Negotiations. Neither may they choose men of a base condition, as *Lewis* the Eleuenth did who imployed his Barber ; least that he with whom we treat, or his Deputies, doe not finde themselves contemned by this choyce. Yet in secret treaties, they stand not much vpon the choyce, and these last are commonly most proper, as those of whom they haue least distrust : Vlesse they hold it more fit to make vse of Embassadors, which reside with the Prince, with who they meane to treat ; of some Prisoner taken in the War, as the treaty of the League, made betwixt King *Lewis* the twelfth and the *Venetians*, by *Andrew Gritty* then Prisoner to the King.

Of secret treaties and of the due intention for which they are made.

These secret Treaties are vsually made when there is question to make a League one with another. They are made for diuers intentions : But most commonly to entertaine and deceiue him with whom they treat, or to surprize his enemy, or to assure himselfe of two enemies which make Warre, treating with one secretly, and the other openly. Pope *Alexander* the sixt, promised King *Ferdinand* by a breife, to assist him for the defence of *Naples*, in case that *Ferdinand* should promise to doe the like for the Estate of the Church. The League which was treated betwixt *Lewis* the twelfth and the *Venetians*, was so secret, as neither *Lewis Sforse*, nor the Pope, did euer know what had beene treated, vntill the Army was ready to march. The treaty of the same French King, which *Ferdinand* King of *Spaine*, was no lesse secret, to breake the

the League betwixt *Spaine* and *England*, the King of *England* hauing sent a Herrald to the King of *Spaine*, to summon him to performe their League, who arriued at the same time when as the peace betwixt *France* and *Spaine* was proclaymed.

Pope *Leo* the tenth. Hauing made a League with the Emperour and the King of *Spaine*, treated with *Lewis* the twelfth, not by a Publique instrument, but by a scedule vnder his owne hand, to the end the businesse might bee carried more secretly, and that hee might assure himselfe of all sides. The same Pope treated afterwards secretly with the King of *Spaine*, for the defence of *Italy*: Yet meaning to entertaine King *Francis* the first, to slacken the preparations continued to treat with him, sometimes demanding one thing and sometimes another, to the end that the one being denied him, hee might haue a Subiect to breake when hee should see his time; and to make the French King belecue, that necessity more then his owne free will, had induced him to treat with the Spaniard, with whom hee had long before made a secret treaty. And distrusting that the King would not yeild to that which hee should demand, hee made diuers ambiguous and irresolute answers. The same Pope made another secret League, with the Emperour *Charles* the fift against King *Francis* the first, and when he was forced to declare himselfe, made shew to treat a new with the Embassadour of *Spaine*.

It is one of the ordinary policies among Princes, and wherewith the best aduised doe sometimes suffer themselves to bee abused, to propound a treaty to betray his commpanion, Pope *Iulio* the second, to winne time to make his preparations against the Duke of *Ferrara*, he entertained King *Lewis* the twelfth, making shewe that hee would agree. The proposition of peace made by *Lewis* the twelfth vpon the difference

that they must stand most vpon their guards when they propound a treaty, and especially during the treaty.

for the Dutchie of *Millan*, was a meanes to chafe the French out of that Dutchy, the generall of *Normandy*, hauing forborne vpon that Subiect to make a leuy of *Grysons*, and thinking to spare the Kings money lost that Estate. The same Pope *Inlio* the second, to the end hee might busie the same King, sent his *Nuncios* to treat a peace, with power to conclude it, but with certaine limitations, which might breed a doubt of his intention. And hauing recouered his health, hee continued the same treaty, and at the same time made another offensiue League with the *Venetians* and the King of *Aragon*, against the sayd King. After these practises, the King of *Aragon*, and the King of *England*, kept the French King in doubt, of the League made by them, to the end they might hinder his preparations. The Emperour *Maximillian* the first, to haue meanes to reuenge himselfe of the French King, by a fraudulent reconcilliation interrupted the treaty which was made betwixt the sayd King and the *Venetians*, and hindred the preparations of Warre which the sayd King might make, making shewe that he would treat a peace with him.

The Spaniards, to interrupt the League which was ready to bee made, betwixt the Princes of *Italy* and Pope *Clement* the seauenth, after the battaile of *Pavia*, propounded vnto the sayd Pope to treat an accord. The which not onely hindred the League, and stayed the preparations of Warre which he might make; but also caused him to discharge the troupes which he had drawne vnto him for his safety. *Hugo de Moncada*, made other prepositions of an accord to the same Pope, to make him the more negligent to thinke of his defence.

Bourbon, leader of the Emperours troupes, entertained the Pope with an accord, whilst the Army marched towards *Rome*. The *Gonfalonier* of *Florence*, to keepe Pope *Clement* from attempting any thing openly

ly against the Citty, entertained him with hope of some secret praesises. The *Spaniard* (who in matter of State make no great difficulty to breake their faith,) doe more vsually practise this pollicie then any other Nation.

Alexander the sixt, (as *Guichardin* saith,) to busie his enemies excused those things that he could not deny; and deuised those were doubtfull, pacifying some with promises and good lookes, and assuring others by diuers meanes, treating with them a part, to the end hee might breed a iealousy among them, and disvnite them.

Gonsalue in the treaty which hee made with the Duke of *Calabria*, sware vpon the holy Host, that hee would send him into *France* to his Father *Fredericke*. But the interest of State preuailed more with him, then the opinion of Men, or the feare of God; so as he sent them into *Spaine*. Hee makes the like reckoning of the faith which hee had giuen to Duke *Valentine* by his safe conduct; Notwithstanding the which hee sent him Prisoner into *Spaine*; But *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* his Master sent him backe. For hauing sent *Phillip* Arch-Duke of *Austria* into *France* to treat an agreement vpon the difference, for the diuision made of the Realme of *Naples*, betwixt him and King *Lewis* the twelfth, in regard of the limits and bounds: Notwithstanding that the sayd treaty had beene sworne by the French King on the one side, and the sayd Arch-Duke on the other, as procurator for the Kings of *Spaine*, And that they themselues had likewise sworne, vpon the holy Euangelist, and the Crucifix to confirme whatsoever he should doe; yet vnder diuers precepts, forbare to ratifie it, to the end that the longer the French King should remaine in this suspense, the longer hee would stay to make his preparations to succour his Men: who for want of releife, hauing bin forced to abandon the countrey, the said Kings of *Spaine*, Notwithstanding their
solemne

solemne Oath, would heare no more speech of ratifying the treaty made by his Sonne in law.

That a treaty ought not to be held firme and assured, if it be not ratified by the Prince with whom they treat;

Of the place where the treaties of a peace or a league is to be made.

From all these examples we may gather, that during a treaty, wee must watch more carefully, and make our selues the stronger, not onely to frustrate our Enemies of all hope to surprize vs, but to the end that the consideration of our forces may make vs obtaine conditions of more aduantage: And wee must not hold a treaty firme and concluded, vnlesse it be ratified by the Prince with whom we treat; especially if the treaty be made with a Prince whom they detayne Prisoner. For the force by the which he hath beene constrayned to promise, will alwayes dispence him to re-aduise himselfe. Pope *Clement* the Seuenth, refused to ratifie the Conditions which the Duke of *Ferrara*, when the sayd Pope was a Prisoner; saying, that it was an vnworthy thing, that a man in life should approue of that which had beene done in his Name, whilest he was dead. And King *Francis* the first excused himselfe to accomplish the treaty of *Madrid*, vpon the inhumanity which *Charles* the fift vsed towards him, to extort from him the Cessions which he made: All which tooke not place, although the King had giuen his Children in hostage. As in the parlies of Princes, the place where the enter-view is to be made, is very considerable; So is it in treaties of peace, which are made by Deputies. If it be to choose a League, there must be a conuenient place, not too farre from the confederates, to the end they may haue a more speedier answere of the difficulties that may happen. When as the Kings of *France* and *England* were to treat a League with the Princes of *Italy*, they resolued to treat in *France*, to be the nearer to *England*. Pope *Iulio* the second, meaning to treat with the Emperour and the French King, desired that the Embassadours should come to *Rome*, to the end hee might gaine the Emperours Minister by kinde vsage, promises, and benefits, to perswade his Maister to dis-vnite himselfe

himselfe from the French King. The which he of *France* refused to doe, being neyther reasonable nor honorable to treat a peace in the house of his Enemy, how great soeuer he were. So as the vsuall course is to choose a neuter place.

But the question is, if an Embassadour hauing agreed to goe vnto the Prince, with whom he is to treat, whether the Prince be bound to treat with the Embassadour himselfe; Or depute some of his Councell for that effect. This last manner of proceeding is the most vsuall, as well to preferue the dignity of the Prince, which cannot be maintayned amidst the contestations which happen in conferences; as for that Princes are vsually little practised in such negotiations. And the example of the Bishop of *Gurgia* is not therein to be followed; who going to Pope *Iulio* the second vpon his request to treat with him; and the sayd Pope hauing deputed three Cardinals to that effect, he deputed three Gentlemen to conferre with them, excusing himselfe vpon other affaires: For therein the sayd Bishop carryed himselfe, not as a simple Embassadour, but as Lieutenant to the Emperour, to the which quality he had beene receiued at *Rome* by the Pope.

An Embassadour going vnto a Prince to treat whether he is bound to treat himselfe with him, or by Deputies.

The Deputies being assembled, their seats are considerable, they hauing no power to quit any thing of the ranke which their Maisters ought to hold. The first place is at the head or end of the Table, if there be one: The second is the first on the right hand; and the third is the first on the left hand of him that is at the end. And if there be many Deputies to one Prince, they vsually sit all on one side, to haue the more facility to conferre together, if it be needfull.

Of the sitting of Embassadors

The seates being resolved, the Deputies are to see the Commissions of eyther side, and to consider of them: For that from thence doth grow the assurance which they may haue of the proceeding of the treaty; there being

Of the power of Embassadors on either side.

Commis-

Commissions so generall, and so ambiguous, as thereby they may easily iudge, that he which hath giuen such to his Deputies, hath no will to conclude any thing: for that vnder these ambiguous and generall termes, he hath a desire afterwards to ground a new breach. Some desiring to deferre the conclusion of a treaty, whereof the motion seemed reasonable on eyther side, they haue concluded in requiring the Prince of the contrary party to consent vnto them before they ratifie it. The which Pope *Julio* the second did, seeing himselfe prest by the Cardinals, to make a peace with *Lewis* the twelfth, who propounded certaine Articles of an Accord vnto him: whereupon he gaue Commission to the Cardinall of *Final*, and to the Bishop of *Tinolly*, to transport themselves to the French Court, and there to treat; promising to ratifie the sayd Articles which had bene propounded vnto him, if the King consented. But he neyther gaue them Commission, nor power to conclude them, hauing no will but to gaine time, and to frustrate the instance which the Consistory made vnto him for this pacification.

Of the clauses
of treaties.

As for the clauses of treaties, there can be nothing certaine prescribed, this depending of the differences, for the which the treaties are made, the which are infinite, be it for peace or truce, for the restitution of that which they pretend to haue bene vniustly taken from them, or for the Cession of rights, or else for limits and bounds; the which if they cannot regulate, they put them in sequestration or suspence, or they make some Act which may interrupt the prescription of him that holds them; or else for a passage, with consignment of hostages, or of Forts for the assurance; Or else for an offensive or defensive league, or for neutrality, whereof I will treat hereafter.

Principall con-
siderations.

But the principall considerations we must haue, are not to vse, nor to speake for a person which is odious to them with whom we treat; not to yeeld to the first demands though

though iust, but to resist them stoutly : And yet if the danger be eminent, wee must not study so much to Negotiate with aduantage, as to prouide for safety : And especially to haue a care, that the clauses may not be Equiuocall and of a double vnderstanding, or so generall and indefinit, as they may breed a doubt in the interpretation of the treaty. The Spaniards are Masters in such practises. *Isabelle* of *Castille*, and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, circumuented *Charles* the eight when hee restored vnto them the County of *Roussillon*, vpon condition they should not hinder him in the conquest of *Naples*, they adding by another clause, that they meant not to be bound to any thing that might preiudice the Church : Reseruing vnto themselves thereby a liberty to take Armes, if they were required by the Pope ; as Lord of the Fee of the Realme of *Naples*. And in truth after the restitution of the County of *Roussillon*, they began to exhort the King rather to turne his Armes against Infidells, then to make Warre against Christian Princes ; giuing hope vnder hand to the King of *Naples* and to the Pope, to be releiued by them ; and preparing by these exhortations, to breake with King *Charles*, when the occasion should be ready, and the Pope declare himselfe.

They must haue a care that there be no equiuocation in the clauses,

The same Spaniards deceiued the French in the treaty for the diuision of the Realme of *Naples*, betwixt King *Lewis* the twelfth of *France* and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, vpon the equiuocation of the denomination of the Prouinces, made diuersly and in diuers times ; the French thinking the confines should be regulated according to the ancient denomination, and the Spaniards according to the new, which they caused to be exprest in the treaty : They which treated on the French party, neuer considering, that in the diuersitie of Names, they are gouerned according to the present vse. The protection taken by King *Lewis* the twelfth, of *Bentineth*, with *Bolonia*, vpon condition he should not preiudice the rites of the Church,

the

the which was interpreted with no better faith. For whilest the King was an enemy to the Pope, hee interpreted the rites of the Church, for that which the Church enioyed when hee tooke the protection: And afterwards being vnited to the Pope, hee restrained this protection to the person and goods of *Bentineth*.

That generall
clauses are cap-
tions.

Generall clauses are alwayes captions; as those for the defence of Duke *Sforse* in the Dutchy of *Millan*, which did not free him, but that they made his proces, for that he had had a part in the practises of *Morone* with the Marquesse of *Pesquiere*, against the Emperour *Charles* the fift; who in the treaty he desired to make with the Pope against the French, propounded some generall clauses, to the end that vpon the difficulties the Pope should make, he might haue time to prouide for his affaires. These are the most generall considerations, which they may haue in treaties.



CHAP. 51.

Of treaties of Peace and Truce.

Treaties of
Peace.

THe treaties which they make with Neighbours, are either with enemies, or with friends; or with persons which desire to continue Neuters with vs, or we with them. The treaties which are made with our enemies, are eyther for a time or perpetuall. Perpetuall, as the peace which is made to compose all differences, and the Warre that is vndertaken for conquest or for reparation of iniuries, or to restore the Commerce and Hospitality.

Of Truce.

Treaties which are made for a time with our enemies, are called truces, the which are eyther generall for all the Estates

Estates of the one or the other Prince, for all persons, and for all sorts of Commerce : Or else they are particular, for certaine places, for certaine persons, and for the Commerce ; and sometimes they doe not extend it but of a suspencion of Armes. And when any one is bound by alliance, not to make peace or truce without the consent of his Ally, and that they doubt of his consent ; they adde in the treaty, that it shall take place for all those which the contractors shall name, and they set downe no prefixed time, but that it shall continue vntill he shall refuse, and some Moneths after : As that which was made betwixt King *Charles* the eight, and the King of *Spain*, and that betwixt Pope *Clement* the seauenth, and *Don Hugo de Moncada*, Embassadour to the Emperour.

Sometimes a generall truce holds the place of a peace, as that of a hundred yeares, betwixt the *Acaruanes*, and the *Ambracoles*; and that betwixt *Castille* and *Portugall*: And these are commonly made betwixt Princes that are equall in power, and will not quit any thing of their rights by a peace ; and yet desire to liue quietly in the Estate wherein they are, satisfiing by this meanes the point of honour.

Such treaties are many times lesse Subiect to rupture, then a peace which is made perpetuall, for that he which finds himselfe greiued with a treaty that is perpetuall, seemes to haue some reason to leaue it, seeing the greiuanee cannot be otherwise repaired. But if the time bee limited, he hath no cause to complaine, for that he may (the time being expired,) persue that which he thinkes ought to be granted him : And if they haue a will to continue the truce, there is nothing so easie as to renew it. And admit they were well assured of the friendship, yet time causing friendship to grow cold, they haue also need to be renewed by new treaties. Seeing that treaties being grounded vpon the interest of Princes, which change with the time, it is needfull to change them at the end of the time, or to breake

That treaties of trece are lesse Subiect to rupture then these of a peace.

breakethem off wholly, and it would bee a meanes to auoyd the treacheries and periuries, which are committed vsually in the ruptures of treaties.

Diuers intentions for the which they make a truce.

A truce is likewise made to aduance a peace and to treat it. It is in like manner sometimes for the more honest discharge of a league which they haue made with some other Prince, whom they haue accustomed to comprehend therein: so as a peace following it, or the truce being not accepted by him, they take occasion to leaue the league, it being not his fault that leaues it, that the warre was not ended. And although it seemes that a truce cannot by its condition preiudice the pretentions in the principall, yet it is most certaine, that if he which is chased out of a contentious Estate, consents that during the truce, the commerce shall be forbidden to his subjects, hee doth wholly stop that gate; as *Lewis* the twelfth did in the truce which he made with *Gonsaluo* after the conquest of the Realme of *Naples*.



CHAP. 52.

Of treaties of Alliance.

THe treaties which are made with our neighbours as friends, are treaties of Alliance, equall or vnequall: the equall is eyther of simple freindship only, for the entertainement of traffique, or for ayde and succour, that of succours is for the defensue or offensue, and sometimes for both together with or against all men, or against certaine Princes and Estates, and their Alliances are contracted, either from Estate to Estate, and for the preservation of the Estates one of another; in which case by the death of the Prince they may not be interrupted: or else they are contracted betwixt
Prince

Prince and Prince; and then, after the death of one of the Princes, they must enter into a new treaty to continue it, if there be not a certaine time prescribed by the treatie, to the which the alliance must continue after the death of the Prince, or else they are made from an Estate and Prince to an Estate, and from an Estate to a Prince; whereafter the death of the Prince, it is necessary, if not of a new treaty, at the least of some confirmation of the precedents: Sometimes Alliances are contracted for an Enterprize, and for one effect only, in the which the Allies are interested, and it may bee called by the name of a league.

These leagues are commonly defensive; but in effect they tend to attempt against some one; and there are secret Articles for it, as in that of *Cambray* against the *Venetians*, in the which they borrowed the pretext of Religion and the peace of Christendome. In the league which was made before against *Charles the Eight*, betwixt the Pope, the King of *Romans*, the King of *Spaine*, the *Venetians* and the Duke of *Millan*, they borrowed the pretext for the defence of one anothers Estate, reserving a place for such as would enter, and in the secret Articles it was agreed, that the *Spaniards* which were in *Sicily*, should helpe *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* to recouer *Naples*; the *Venetians* by Sea should inuade the Maritime places; the Duke of *Millan* should hinder the succours that came from *France*, and possesse himselfe of *Asti*, where the Duke of *Orleans* was; and that the Kings of *Romans* and *Spaine*, should either of them in their parts inuade *France*, when as *Lewis* the twelfth and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* vnited themselves for the conquest of *Naples*, they likewise tooke a pretext that they would afterwards make warre against the *Turkes*.

Of defensive leagues.

But besides the pretext, there are many things to bee considered in the treaty of a league that is to say, the

Diuers considerations for the treating or making of a league.

cause

cause why they ioyne in league, best for offence or defence: The particular interest of euery one of the Leaguers, and his intention which seekes to vnite himselfe: With what Princes or Estates they make it their courage, constancy, faith, and meanes; the commodities of their Estates to assist the League: and how they shall hinder those which present themselves to enter, which are not fit for our Designe: against whom it is made. If hee be a powerfull Prince of himselfe, assisted by Friends, having facility to inuade the confederates, eyther by himselfe, or by the meanes of his Friends, and his courage, when they are to make the League, and how they may excuse it, and whether the time of the League be precisely limited to a certaine number of yeares, or whilst the Enterprize shall last. The contribution of Allies how it should be ordered, as well in the leuy of Souldiers, as in munitions of Warre and Victuals, who must first ratifie the treaty among the confederates, if there be many heads, or one alone, for the execution and ordinary causes of the Common-weale of the League.

Ordinary causes of leagues.

The ordinary causes for the which they make a league, are eyther to facilitate a conquest; as that which was made betwixt *Lewis* the twelfth, and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* for the Realme of *Naples*: Or to ballance the forces of one that is more mighty, in hindring him that he grow not greater, or diminishing his power. The *Athenians* undertooke to succour the *Egyptians*, not onely to diminish the power of the *Persian*, as *Diodorus* writes, but to encrease their owne by the alliance of the *Egyptians*.

A defensue League which hath no other benefit but a necessary defence, and in the which meane Estates are in a maner equally interested, last vsually longer then an offensive League, which is voluntary, and from the which eyther of the Confederates will easily part when hee hath no more interest. So as in ballancing the interest of the

one

one and the other, he that shall finde himselfe accompanied with distrust, and an opinion to bee irreconcilable to the common Enemy, would proue the most firme in the League.

But with all this we must consider the wisdom, courage, and meanes of him with home we ioyne in League. And as we may not choose him so powerfull, as hauing preuayled ouer our common Enemy, he may make no subiect vnto him: So we must not choose one that is light and inconstant, and of small meanes. They write that inconstancy, irresolution, and the timorousnesse of Pope *Clement* the Senenth, ruined all the affaires of his Colleagues. The *Venetians* would not ioyne in League with Pope *Alexander* the sixt, hauing had ill successie, being ioyned in League with *Sixtus* and *Innocent*, for that Popes comming to dye, they leaue Successors which haue other intentions and designes.

Other considerations for the treatie of a league.

But the commodity or discommodity of Estates neare or farre off, is very considerable, as well in regard of those which vnite themselves, as of those against whom they make the League. And vpon this consideration all the Leagues which they haue propounded in Christendome against the *Turke*, haue gone to smoake: The danger of the *Turke* being held by Christian Princes vncertayne and farre off, and regarding more the Estates of some, then of others: Being vnable but with much time and labour to possesse their minds with this necessary ardor to attempt against him.

By the like reason a League with the *Turke* is of small profit to a Christian Prince, who hath his Estate remote from him, vnlesse it be for the trade of the Subiect; as well for the great distance, as for that the manner of liuing of the one differs so much from that of the other, as there can grow no confidence betwixt them.

But if some one seekes vnto vs to bee receiued into

our league, whom wee hold not fit for our designe; they may propound such hard conditions vnto him, as hee would lose his desire. In like sort, if wee be sought vnto to enter, eyther wee excuse our selues vpon the feare of some Enemy, against whom we must reserve our forces; as the *Venetians* did for feare of the *Turke*, when as they were sought vnto by *Charles* the Eighth, or else wee will demand conditions of such aduantage for our selues, as hee which seekes vnto vs may not yeeld vnto.

Of the time
when wee are
to make a
League.

To say when we are to make a League, it cannot be precisely done. this depending vpon the condition of affaires: But we may well say, that some haue held that we must not make a League, but after that the greatest Prince had imposed hard conditions vpon those with whom they made accompt to ioyne in League, and had by this meanes prepared to vnite themselves for their discharge. This was a Consideration which Pope *Clement* the Senenth had, to deferre the conclusion of the League which was treated against the Gouvernour of *France*, and the Princes of *Italy*, during the Imprisonment of King *Francis* the first; thinking (as it happened) that the Emperour (seeing the vncertainty of this League) was likely to impose harder conditions vpon the King; the which the King would neuer obserue, and so he should be forced to continue in the League of *Italy*, to free himselfe: Whereas if the League had beene made before his Inlargement, it would haue made the Kings Conditions more milde, and more easie for the Emperour, in freeing the King to draw him from the other Confederates. Behold how euery man doth husband the necessity of his Neighbour, the which being wisely examined, may serue to iudge of the time when a League is to be made.

Of the time of
the continuance
to a league.

For the time of its continuance, the League betwixt the *Florentins* and *Luquois*, against the *Pisans* was limited

ted by the treaty at three yeares. And the first Leagues which were treated among the *Swizes*, were also limited to a certayne time. Others haue no other limitation but the end of the Enterprize for the which it was made. But the question is, if the Enemy taking the Countrey, for the defence whereof the League was made, whether the Confederates be bound by the League, to assist him who hath lost it in the recouery. Some haue held that the defensue did not extend so farre. Notwithstanding if there were no treaty which had concerned this conquest, yet it would seeme more reasonable to comprehend the recouery in the defensue, if it be generall. For as it hath for its end to preserve the Allie in his Estate, and that to attaine vnto it, the forces must not onely remaine in the Countrey of the Allie, to attend the Enemy, but after denuntiation of the War, and other acts of hostility done by the Enemy, they must enter into his Countrey, to the end to preuent him or to diuert him, from attempting any thing against the Ally; the offensue being iudged by the agreslion, and not by that which followes: By a stronger reason they ought to enter into the Countrey conquered from the Ally for the recouery thereof. So most commonly these excuses are not pretended, but by such as eyther fayle in their faith, courage, or meanes to make the recouery.

That the Col-
laques are
bound to the
recouery of the
Countrey of
their Allie con-
quered by the
Enemy.

Contribution is one of the points of a League most difficult to regulate. It is made eyther in men or money. The men are entertayned by all; or by him onely that hath need. The defensue League betwixt the Kings of *France* and *England* against the Emperour, contayned a reciprocall Succours of ten thousand men, if the Warre were made by Land; and of sixe thousand if it were made by Sea: And in all other occasions the French King was bound to assist the King of *England* with twelue thousand Launces, and the

Of the contri-
bution of a
league.

the King of *England* him of *France* with ten thousand Foot, at his charge that had the need.

In the League which was made betwixt the Emperour *Charles* the fift, Pope *Clement* the seauenth with the other Princes of *Italy* (except the *Venetians*) for the defence of *Italy* against the French King, the Emperour was to contribute monethly thirty thousand Duckets; the Pope with the Florentins twenty thousand; the Duke of *Millan* fifty thousand; *Ferrara* ten thousand; *Genoua* sixe thousand; *Sienna* two thousand; and *Luques* a thousand; And it was concluded, that besides this, there should be a stocke of the like summe, which might not be imployed vntill they saw the preparatiues made to inuade *Italy*. In the League of the Citties of *Greece* against the *Persians*, the cōtribution whereof *Aristides* made the taxe, mounted to eight hundred thousand Tallents. In the league which some Citties of *Greece* made with the *Lacedemonians* against *Athenians*, the contribution came yearely to a thousand Tallents: And the order for the leuy of souldiers was, that two lightly Armed should passe for a Man Armed at all peeces; and foure Men Armed at all peeces for a Horse-man.

Of the place
or custody for
the contributi-
ons of money.

The contribution concluded in money, there are difficulties sometimes found, for the place of keeping it. The Citties of *Greece* thought that the custody of their contributions was safe in the Temple of *Dele*. But the consideration of Religion could not preuent it, but that vnder the pretext that *Dele* was not strong enough, the *Athenians* found meanes to carry it away, and to imploy it to the particular vse of the Citty. That which may be spoken here-vppon, is not to deliuer the money into the hands of the strongest, for feare they shall not be able to call him to account, nor to lay it in so weake a place, as it may bee exposed to the force and violence of the strongest, or to him that shall first take Armes.

The contribution being settled by the confederates they must

must name a head of the League, if they will not assaile the enemy but of one side: If of diuers, they must name many. And herein they doe many times find themselves troubled for that the most powerfull of the confederates, desires commonly to haue it referred to him, or to some one of his, who gouerns the conduct of the Warre, according to his Maisters affaires, and not those of the other Allies. The other head of the League of the Princes of *Italy*, with King *Francis* the first, would not assaile *Millan* after the taking of *Pavia*, for feare that *Millan* being taken with the Duke, and the *Venetians*, assured from the Imperialists, they should retire from the League, or contribute more negligently: And therefore he tooke a pretext to goe and free the Pope who was a Prisoner. *Antonio De Leua*, in the League which was made by all the Princes of *Italy*, except the *Venetians*, with *Charles* the first against the French, was made generall, with charge to stay in the Dutchy of *Millan*, which depended of the Emperour.

A League concluded by the Deputies of the confederates, there sometimes falls out a difficulty, who shall ratifie and declare himselfe first. In the League which was made betwixt King *Francis* the first, the Pope, and the Princes of *Italy*, the King refused to ratifie, vntill the Pope and the *Venetians* had ratified before him; and wrought so that he droue the Colleagues to declare themselves, and to begin the Warre, whilest that hee treated secretly for himselfe, to the end he might make his conditions with more aduantage: And for feare lest his Colleagues on their side should shew him the like prancke, he preuented them.

That kind of League which is made for an enterprize, succeeds seldome, according to the hope of the Allies, if the enterprize be long. For besides that the preparations be long, the opinions diuers in the pursuit, the resolutions inconstant, the interests of Princes or Estates in League,

Which of the confederates ought to verifie and declare himselfe first.

That an offensive league, and for an Enterprize succeeds seldome according to the hope of the may Allies.

may change with time, or by the practises of him, against who they are in League, in withdrawing some one of the, or making him to suffer more losse then the rest. For seeing himselfe ill defended by his confederates, as hee did hope, and that he was in more danger to loose then his companions, he studies to retire himselfe, and to make his accord apart : As the *Venetians* did with the Turke after the losse of *Cypres*.

Of the
causes of the
rupture of
Leagues.

The most ordinary causes of the rupture of Leagues, are distrust, and ieaiousie ; as if one of the confederates had had conference with the enemy without the consent of the rest ; If that which serueth for the safety of one diminisheth the safety of another ; If they find inconstancy, variety, or cowardize, in any one of the confederates ; If one of the confederates increaseth, and makes some vsurpation, without the consent of the rest ; if he treates with the enemy, not comprehending the other Allies, but as adherents. King *Lewis* the twelfth left the League of the *Venetians*, for that they had made a truce with him, and had presumed to name him onely as their adherent. Sometimes to breake a League, they inuent some occasion, which puts the Leaguers in diuision one against another. In which case as long as he hath hope that this diuision may make them dis-vnite themselves, he must haue a care not to assaile them.

Of Leagues
betwixt meane
Estates, and of
the defects
which are of-
ten found.

I haue sayd that Leagues which are made betwixt meane Estates for their necessary defences, are vsually most durable. Yet they are not without great defects. For they haue not any authority among them, be it Councell or otherwise, which may command them all, and reconcile them in case of diuersity of opinions, or a diuision ; For that holding themselves all to be Soueraignes, they will Establish nothing aboue them : And to fall by degrees to an accord, in all their differences which may happen, it is a difficult thing yea impossible. On the other side leauing their differences to grow old, they may bee of
such

such a condition as they draw after them an irreconcilliable hatred,

Another defect is, that to the greatest part of their Assemblies and Dyettes, they send men new in affaires, fearing to giue authority to any one among them about the rest. So as most part of those which come to these assemblies, hauing little or no knowledge of affaires, their opinions are to make report to their Superiours, and not to resolve any thing; this power being seldome giuen them. Hence grow many delays, which in certaine encounters may bee very preiudiciall to the Estate. There is another ordinary defect among them, that they seldome agree vpon the somme of the contributions necessary for their defence, nor of the keeping of the common Treasure: So as when there happens any need, they find themselves troubled to provide in time.

But behold how Princes allied, doe sometimes finde themselves troubled to gouerne themselves; which is when as three Princes allied, the one makes Warre against another, and demands succours from the third: In this case if the treaties of alliance bee only for friendship, it is certaine he is not bound to giue any succours. But if the treaties carrie an offensive League, hee must succour the most ancient, allied by a precedent alliance. If the precedent alliances haue beene made both at one time, hee must succour him that is allied in an offensive and defensive League. But if the League be offensive and defensive of eyther side, he may not succour any of them: but he may mediate a peace, and cause the difference to be iudged by the common Allies, as it is vsually obserued: And let him know that will not enter into arbitrament, or being entered will not yeild to iudgment, that hee will succour the other. Notwithstanding most commonly in such occasions, they ballance their Estate: And looking more to safety then to iustice, they succour him who being succoured may weaken the powerfull, who is more to be feared.

They

Of the defence
of one that is
not allied a-
gainst an Ally.

They may aide particular Allies, and common Allies, if they be wronged by one of the Allies. But he which is not comprehended in the treaty of alliance, cannot be defended against him that is allied without breach of the alliance: That which they may doe for to suppress it, is to write vnto the Ally: and to entreate him to vse him courteously: which is the offer which the *Romans* made vnto the *Capuans*, who complained and demanded Succours agaynst the oppression of the *Samnites*, allied to the *Romans*. But if the oppressed yeeld himselfe a Subiect, as the *Capuans* did; then the Prince being obliged to the defence of his Subiects against all men, he then may and ought to succour them against his Allies.

Of the vnequal
alliance betwixt
Princes and E-
states: that is
to say of pro-
tection.

An vnequall alliance is that, which is contracted betwixt Princes or Estates, vnequall in honour or in power, and with vnequall conditions; the one acknowledging the other not for Master or Lord, but by honour, as the more powerfull and the better qualified; And some for Protector: And these treaties are made with those Estates which take or giue pension, or which put themselves into protection.

Difference be-
twixt pension
and tribute.

Wee haue formerly sayd, that a pension differs from tribute. For tribute is payd by the Subiect, or by him who to enioy his liberty, payes that which is agreed vpon to him that hath forced him to doe it. A pension is held voluntary, from him that is in our protection, or from him that is in all other things equall to the treaty of alliance, to hinder the pensioner that he ioyne not with the Enemy, or to haue aide and succours from him.

Of protection.

The true protection is that, whereas one takes vpon him the defence of another freely without reward. Yet some haue ballanced honour with profit; and haue receiued a pension from those whom they haue taken into their protection: And these men haue thought that by a pecuniary interest, they did bind the protectors more to succour them, then if he were onely bound by Oath.

By

By the Law of protection, hee that is protected, owes all respect and honour to his protector: Against whom if he attempt, or stayes from his Duty, it is lawfull for the protector to assure himselfe, yea, to make himselfe Maister. They of *Genova* hauing submitted themselues vnder the protection of the French King, vpon certayne conditions; and being afterwards reuolted, the King changed the conditions into priuiledges, to the end it might be in his wil to deprive them when he should think good. But if the Protector for the good of his Estate, finds it conuenient to leaue the protection of him, ouer whom another Estate hath some retentions; he may consent that the difference may be referred to Iustice, and to Iudges to determine it: As *Lewis* the twelfth would doe in the difference which the Pope had with the Duke of *Ferrara*, whom he had taken into his protection, and whereof by this meanes he sought to free himselfe. In like manner the protector ought to defend and succour the protected, and vse him well: Otherwise if he intreate him ill, hee may withdraw himselfe from protection, and seeke another protector.

Of the mutuall duty of the protector and hee that is protected.

CHAP. 53.

Of the differences which happen betwixt Allies and Neighbours: and of the decision thereof.

ANd for that the Alliances not onely of protection, but also those which are equall, made it with more powerfull Estates, draw after them the subiection of the weaker; And that there may betwixt Equals (be it vpon this Subiect or some other) happen many differences, which may breed occasion of breach: they

they must in treating provide for the safety and the decision of differences. Some haue assured themselves of the mutuall faith simply, the which at this day is but weake in many. Others haue demanded hostages: the which ought to be of such consideration, as the Prince or Estate which giues them, may not bee long deprived of them, without preiudice by their absence. King *Francis* the first, being freed from Prison, and after many inhumanities shewed him by *Charles* the fift, who let him goe not through courtesie, but for feare of the League of *Italy*; yeilded to giue his children in hostage, hoping hee might recouer them, either by accord, or by some other meanes, the delay of the recouery being the lesse troublesome vnto him, for that they were in their courage: And so being at his choyce either to giue his children, or twelue of of his principall Men of his Realme, he desired rather to giue his children, whom he might spare, then the others, which were more necessary for his seruice and enterprizes.

Of Hostages.

Sometimes they demand hostages of eyther part, when as eyther of them that treates, promisseth to put something in execution, which they doubt they would not doe without hostages: And this ought to be done according to the distrust they may haue one of another. But if the question be, that the one executes before the other, it is for him that is to execute last to giue hostages. There was a memorable dispute betwixt the Embassadours of the Emperour *Charles* the fift, and those of King *Francis* the first, after his discharge from Prison, whether that the French King should retire his Army out of *Italy*, before that the Emperour had deliuered him his children. They promised on the Kings behalfe to put hostages into the hands of the King of *England*, for the penalty which should be imposed for want of retiring his Army, after he had receiued his children: And the Emperour made the like offers, to restore his children, when the Army should be

be retired ; and to giue Hostages for the sure payment of the penalty, which should be decreed for want of satisfying ; Saying that there was no colour hee should trust the King, who had once deceiued him. Whereunto the French Embassadours replyed, that the more he pretended to haue beene deceiued, the lesse the King ought to trust him, for that this opinion might induce him to faile the King : And besides the offers were not alike ; for that it imported the King more to haue his Children, then for the Emperour to see the retreate of the Kings Army out of *Italy* ; and therefore the assurance were not alike.

It hath happened that without any precedent treaty, then the demand of a passage, they haue willingly giuen hostages to a Prince, which desired to passe through the Estate of another Prince, which was an enemy or suspected vnto him. The Arch-Duke *Phillip*, to passe from *Spaine* into *Flaunders*, the King sent him many of the greatest Men of his Kingdome, for hostages and assurance of his passage through *France*, the which the Arch-Duke caused to be sent backe againe, as soone as he entred into the Realme. Many haue demanded strong places, to assure the victors : And others for the safety of a passage, for a conquest which they meant to make. As *Charles* the Eight did going to *Naples*, to many Princes and Potentates of *Italy*. Others haue ratified the treaties by marriage.

But the greatest security, that the condition inserted in the treaty may be pleasing to both parties, and fitting for the Subiects of the affaires which presents it selfe, ballancing the interest of the one with the interest of the other.

And to preuent that the alliance or protection change not into Subiection, we must be very carefull not to receiue a Garrisson, from the allie or protector stronger then our owne ; and much lesse to make him Maister of our Forts, Forts, &c.

Hostages for the assurance of a Princes passage, through another Estate.

The assurance of a treaty.

It is dangerous for an ally to receiue a

strong Garrisson from his protector, or make him Maister of his Forts, Forts, &c.

Forts, or to make him Guardion and depositary of the Treasure of all the alliance ; as the *Grecians* did the *Athenians*, who consented, the money which should be euery yeare leuied of the Generall, should be put in *Appollos* Temple, and afterwards carried to *Athens*, there to be kept. So as the *Athenians*, being seized of their Allies purse, they made themselves protectors, and of protectors Maiuers ; And so they not onely became Masters of the Treasure, but they caused the appellations of all the other Citties to come before them, at whose charge they trayned vp their Cittizens and made them Souldiers.

Establishment
of Iudges, for
the deciding
of differences
betwixt allies.

As for the dicision of differences, the ordinary course is to constitute by the treatie a certaine number of Iudges, with power of eyther side, in case they should be diuided in opinions, to name an Vmpire, to decide differences, and to cause the contrauentions which they should pretend to be made of eyther side to cease ; Or else to agree vpon some great person, to whom they might referre themselves. A thing which I confesse is very difficult, but yet if it might be done would bee more conuenient. For his authority would mediate an accord more easily betwixt them, who being equalls, cannot directly refuse Warre nor demand peace.

Of compromise
betwixt
Allies, vpon
differences
which may
grow betwixt
them.

They haue likewise vsually had recourse vnto compromise, when as Iudges are not appointed by the treaties, or when as they are suspect to one of the parties. For although the compromise doth seldome succeed, and comes to be effected, yet it workes this effect, to cause all force to cease, and holds the difference in suspence for a time, and most commonly the intention of the party is no other, who sometimes before the compromise drawes a secret promise from the Arbitrator, not to pronounce sentence without their consent : as in the compromise which was made betwixt the Emperour *Maximilian*, and the *Venetians*, in the Popes person

person, who was not limited neither for time nor power, by the publike A& which was drawne; the like secret promise hauing beene formerly made by the Pope to eyther party. Yet in the end the Pope, seeing they could not agree, and that this delay was imputed to him, he gaue sentence, notwithstanding his promise: Yet with this prouiso, that if the parties did not ratifie that which hee had decreed by his sentence should be of no effect.

In this compromise made in the person of the Emperour *Charles* the fifth, for the difference which was betwixt the Pope and the Duke of *Ferrara*, as well for the right as for the fact, the Emperour promised the Pope, not to pronounce vnlesse he were prest by him; and to the Duke of *Ferrara*, that finding that he had right to *Modena* and *Reggium*, he would giue sentence; and that finding otherwise, hee would suffer the time of the compromise to expire. And for assurance it was agreed, that the Duke should deliuer *Modena* into the Emperours hands, as sequestred. Afterwards Iudgment to the benefit of the Duke, whereof the Pope complayned much, for that the Emperour had not proceeded according to his secret promise: But the Emperour excused himselfe vpon the pursuit which his *Nuntio* had made vnto him to pronounce.

They seldome compromis vpon the possessory: For hee that is spoyled ought before all things to be restored. This was the answer which the *Florentins* made to the Emperour *Maximilian*, whom he inuited to compromis to his person the difference they had with the *Pysans*, neyther relying vpon his will, nor vpon his authority. Yet they may compromis vpon the possessory, with charge to pronounce, without adding vnto it the petitory; this being cheifly ruled, by the confidence which they conceiue in the arbitrator, chosen by the compromise, who in a difference of State, is not alwayes found such, as they may wholly rely vpon him.

Of a compromise vpon the possessory.

And

When and
how a Prince
should deale
to reconcile a
difference be-
twixt his
Neighbours,

And as peace is generally to be desired, yet if there be betwixt Neighbours some Subiect which trouble their intelligence, as it would bee a pollicie to shew himselfe displeasing ; so it were wisdom not to grow passionate to reconcile them. They obserue a notable indiscretion in the Cardinall of *Amboise*, and very preiudiciall of *France*, to haue mediated an accord betwixt *Maximillian* and *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, touching the gouernment of *Castille*, this accord hauing beene the cause that afterwards they ioyned together against *Lewis* the twelfth : And nothing but the vanity and ambition which this Cardinall had to attaine vnto the Popedome (in making these two Princes fauourable vnto him) made him to enter into this mediation.

The cause wherein we must labour effectually to reconcile our Neighbours, is, when wee haue need to be succoured by them. So *Lewis* the eleventh treated a peace betwixt *Sigismund* of *Austria*, and the *Suisses*, to vse their seruice against the Duke of *Burgundy* : And *Lewis Sforse* dealt in the accord betwixt *Maximillian* and the same *Suisses*, to bee succoured by them. But let vs returne to treaties.



CHAP. 54.

*Of the breach of Treaties : and of the constancy
and assurance of the word of a Prince,
in the Treaties.*

TO the end we enter not into the rupture for a small businesse, they practise in those which great Men make among them, to draw in all the rest that be lesse to be therein comprehended, as well for the assurance of their Estates, as to entertaine the greatest in an equall ballance, least that the one should rise and oppresse the other. But to make vse in such treaties, the oppression must be speciall and particular: otherwise they may haue iust cause to bee ignorant, that vnder this name of Allies, they which are not named are comprehended:

Meanes to assure a treaty that they may not enter into rupture.

And although that the breach of faith bee too much practised in such affaires, yet there are few Princes found, which haue not sought some pretext before they breake: Some haue pretended to be circumvented by error. Others haue excused themselves by the charge of the Estate of affaires, great wrongs, or ineuitable losse, and apparant danger of the ruine of their Estates. Which are the causes, wherein some say that an oath is not obligatory; the condition by reason of the oath being impossible or vniust. To these limitations they adde, that they must not keepe their faith with an Enemy of the faith, nor with him that hath broken his, nor with a Subject, nor with a Theife. But if it be not lawfull to keepe a mans faith in all these cases, it is not likewise lawfull to giue it. If it be lawfull to capitulate with such men, it is necessary to hold that

Pretext of rupture.

Of the obligation a Prince hath to hold his word.

we promise. The which I vnderstand, when the word is giuen by him that may giue it; and that they relye vpon it. For if they take hostages, he that giues them, is freed from his Faith; for that in receiuing hostages, he that receiues them, hath relinquished the assurance which he had in the faith of him that giues them: And if the promise be made by a Capitaine for his Prince without speciall Warrant, this word giuen bindes not the Prince.

That force nor feare cannot diuence a Prince of his word or promise.

Some Lawyers would iudge of Treaties, as of particular Contracts, and more inlarge the conscience of Princes. For as a priuate man is not bound to that which he hath promised by force or feare, they haue thought (but foolishly and maliciously) that this Maxime should take place in Treaties, which are made betwixt Soueraignes: which is in effect to banish faith from all such publique Negotiations. For there is no Treaty but is vsually made in Armes, by force, or through feare to lose eyther life, or goods, or liberty, or the Estate; which are causes of iust feare, and may shake the most constant.

Other pretexts of ruptures.

Some Princes desirous to shew themselves more religious in these ruptures, haue taken subiect vpon the ambiguity of some clauses in the Treaty, or vpon equiuocation, as *Charles* the fift did vpon these words, *Eunig* and *Enig*, to retaine the Landgraue the *Hesse*: Or they seeke some other occasions, attempting against those whom their Allie is bound to defend: To the end that drawing him to Field, hee may lay the Enuy of the rupture vpon him.

That the constancy and assurance of a Prince in his word is of great advantage.

But the most beneficiall course for a Prince or State is, to make himselfe to be knowne constant and firme in his word. For although such an occasion may happen, as he might get aduantage by the breach of his faith: yet the opinion which they may conceiue of him by this action (which he must not trust vnto) will make him lose many aduantage,

aduantages, which a loyall Prince may haue, finding himselfe discharged of many securities, which they demand vsually and iustly from one of whose faith they doubt.

CHAP. 55.

Of Treaties of Neutrality.

LET vs come to Treaties of Neutrality, the which seemes naturall to Princes, who neither loue nor hate any thing absolutely; but gouerne themselves in their Friendships according to their interests. And in effect Reason of State is no other thing but Reason of interest.

Neutrality may be of two sorts. The one with Alliance of eyther part: The other without Alliance, and without any tye to the one or the other; which is that, that may properly be called Neutrality. The first Rules subscribed by the conditions of the Treaty. The second hath no Rule, but the discretion of the neuter Prince, who must carry himselfe in such sort, as he may not make shew that he inclines more to one side then to another. And for that the Affaires of Princes are not alwayes in one Estate, the Difficulty is to know when the Prince should leaue this Neutrality, and when hee should maintayne it.

Two sorts of Neutrality.

The aduantages of Neutrality are, that he which is Neuter, is honoured and respected of both parties, for the feare that eyther of them hath, should declare himselfe against him: He remaines Arbitrator of others and Master of himselfe: He enioyes the present, and according vnto occasions preuents the future. A Neuter is without any profest Enemy, and offends or wrongs no man openly; so as giuing no aduantage ouer him,

The aduantages of a Neutrality.

they are troubled to finde a pretext to doe him harme,

Disadvantages
of Neutrality.

The disadvantages are, that a Neuter satisfies neither the one nor the other; and so remaines: He doth neyther purchase Friends, nor free himselfe from any Enemies; and in the end is made a prey to the Victor. And many haue held it more aduantage to hazard himselfe to vanquish with a companion, then to remaine in an Estate, where hee is assured to bee ruined by the one or the other.

That a power-
full Prince
should not leaue
a Neutrality
without cau.

To resolve this point, a powerfull Prince hath no neede of Councell. For in what fashion soeuer he remains, he may maintayne himselfe, and prescribe a Law to others. Yet I hold that without great occasion he should not declare himselfe. For that whilest others ruine themselves by Warre, he fortifies himselfe with meanes; he may in the end make himselfe Judge of their differences, and compounding them mildely with honour, hee preserues their Friendship, and maintaynes their Estate.

That a Neutra-
lity is more be-
neficall to a
weake a Prince
then to embrace
a party.

But in a weake Prince, what part soeuer hee takes, it will be hurtfull vnto him; especially if he be in the midst of two more powerfull Estates then himselfe. Yet I will say, that speaking generally, a Neutrality is more beneficiall to a weake Prince; so as they which make Warre one against another, bee not altogether barbarous and inhumane. For although a Neutrality doth not please eyther party; yet in effect it wrongs no man; and as he which is a Neuter, doth not serue, so he doth not hurt. And then the euent of the declaration which he should make, rather for the one then the other, depending vpon the vncertaine issue of the Warre, he should haue no cause to say, that this part is more safe then a Neutrality. And to change his resolution without an assurance to better his affaires, were not to carry himselfe wisely.

But

But if the Neuter be prest by necessity to declare himselfe, he must doe it for the most powerfull of the two parties, following the Councell of that *Romane*; that eyther he must make himselfe the strongest, or bee a friend to the strongest: Vnlesse hee saw that ioyning to the weaker, hee might ballance the power of the stronger, and by this counterpeze reduce them to reason. The safety of Estates consisting cheifly in an equall counterpeze of power in the one and the other, and the greatnesse of a Prince drawing after it the ruine of his Neighbours; it is wisdom to preuent.

Considerations
to leaue a
Neutrallity.

But power is considered in this subiect diuersly: Eyther absolute or conditionall; Absolute power is that which wee measure by the concurrence of the greatnesse of Forces, Treasure: Munitions, and other Military preparations. A conditionall power is that, the which although it be lesse then an absolut, yet it is more fit to succour vs, or to doe vs harme. In this the Neighbourhood is of very great consideration; for that a Neighbour Prince of meane forces, may more easily or sooner hurt or succour vs, then a great Prince which lies farre off. Neere succours are alwayes sooner ready and with lesse charge: For wee may discharge a part when a time and occasions shall serue: If he be remote, he arriues too late after the occasions to defend vs, and too soone to oppresse vs. The greatest part perish by the way; and when he is arriued he hath more need of rest then to bat-taile; and being vnable to send them backe so farre, we must still beare the charge and oppression.

Hieron King of Syracuse, could well obserue these considerations, the *Carthaginians* being Maisters of a part of *Sicily*, he allied himselfe with them against the *Romans*: But the *Romans* being growne the stronger in the Countrey, he fell to their side, and continued the Warre with them against the *Carthaginians*, who were then

more remote from the Iland then the *Romans*. After we haue made consideration of the force, wee must likewise consider of the courage and constancy of the Prince, with whom we are to ioyne. But if hee be light and hath no stay, how powerfull soeuer he be, it is dangerous to engage himselfe with him: But if with these advantages hee knowes how to prosecute his designs with resolution, they may boldly ingage themselves with him.



CHAP. 56.

*Considerations for a Prince that will liue
in good intelligence with his
Neighbours.*

THe Prince that would liue in good termes with his Neighbours, must first consider what Treaty and Capitulation he hath with him, and gouerne himselfe accordingly, alwayes shewing himselfe a Louer of Peace and Concord; desirous to liue in Amity, and a great obseruer of Treaties; not enduring that any breach should be made, how small soeuer; and being done to cause it to be repaired.

If any difficult thing be required of him, he shall neither grant it, nor refuse it, but in ballancing their businesse, he shall labour to haue his goodwill allowed for the effect: And if he which seekes hath sent an expresse Embassadour, they shall send him backe with Presents, and promise to dispatch other Embassadours to make answer, And to the end he may auoyde the discontentment, they shall ballance this delay with some benefit, if may be of more importance then that which they haue demanded: For that the Iniury doth not moue so much as the benefit is pleasing.

How a Prince
ought to carry
himselfe in a
demand made
vnto him by
one of his
Neighbours of
some difficult
thing.

If

If the Prince treating with his Neighbours, hath need to demand or vse any thing from them, hee must haue a care to maintayne his Dignity, and therefore hee may not be too hasty: for that we shew our selues to be too resolute for something; and they seeing the instance which we make, will hold our necessity to be greater then it is: The which will make them more holding, and make them beleue, that we shall be the more bound vnto them, if they grant it, although they reape the like benefit themselves. But if a more powerfull man requires something of vs, which being granted doth not much prejudice vs, and being denied, may draw a warre against vs, which he had prepared against another; We must not deny it. This was an Errour which the *Florentins* committed, seeking in the beginning to oppose the passage of *Charles* the Eighth, hating not therein followed the Counsell which had beene giuen to *Cosmo De Medicis*, not to oppose himselfe agaynst *John* of *Anjou*; notwithstanding that the Pope and Duke of *Millan* were in League with *Ferdinand* King of *Naples*, against whom *John* of *Anjou* made Warre.

To demand something of his Neighbours.

We must not refuse that which is demanded, if it doth not much prejudice.

We must not lightly beleue that which Princes say, and whereof they make shew; but consider, that their owne interest will make them forget it, and to some their faith, if they haue any collour to breake it. The Prince must likewise fauour the traffique and commerce with his Neighbours, for the good and profit which may redowne to the one and the other.

We must not be too credulous in that which Princes say.

He must consider of the meanes how he may with dexterity nourish the distrusts and ieaiousies which are, or may be betwixt them; But he must be warie hee bee not knowne to be the Authour. And contrariwise if they haue a conceit, he must be the first that must seeke to take it away; and in all that which may breed some ieaousie of him, hee must preuent it in time: And he must excuse the fault which is discouered, and deny

Politiquely to nourish distrusts & ieaousies betwixt them.

that, whereof the Neighbours are not, nor cannot bee hereafter assured: Hee must seeke with all diligence to mollifie the most powerfull, by faire deportments and promises, and somtimes to pacifie the one, and somtimes the other, as well to make them the more negligent, as to labour in seeking them seuerally to cast them into some distrust one of another.

To testifie his
good will vnto
them.

The Priuce shall offer vnto his Neighbours that which hee cannot well refuse, before they demand it, to the end they may acknowledge his good will. Especially if there bee neede of succours, hee shall shew himselfe ready; yet without giuing cause of Iealousie to others, in making them knowe the Iustice of these succours, and of his intention, raysing those whom hee succours from the shame, the which doth vsually accompany him that demands. This is the first precept to make them haue confidence in vs.

Of the resentment
hee must
haue of Injuries
received
by his neighbours.

The second, to breed confidence, is not to enter into any resentment of iniuries against those, whom wee desire to make confident of vs, vnlesse it bee a matter of great importance: And wee must suffer courage to sleepe, and awake prudence: But if our honour constraines vs to make some demonstration of an iniury receiued, we must lay the fault vpon the Minister, and complaine of him; so as they may not thinke we hold our selues wronged by the Master. For by the very opinion which a neighbour Prince might haue to haue wronged vs, he would enter into distrust of vs, from distrust into hatred; and hatred it may be, would draw after it another wrong, and an alliance with our Enemies, not onely to assure himselfe, but to annoy vs: The remembrance of an iniury being many times stronger in him that doth it, then in him that receiues it; especially betwixt Princes, whose spirits are very vncapable to take confidence one of another. Aboue all wee must bee wary how wee enter into

into threats. For although our Neighbour be weaker then we are, and that his timorousnesse might giue vs cause to hope for some aduantage by our threats : Yet it might so fall out, that from feare he might passe to despaire, the which doth vsually guide timorous spirits, as well into desperate resolutions, as inconsiderations doth the rash. But Misfortune carrying vs to a rupture, and hauing the Embassadours of our Enemies neare vs, who then may be suspect vnto vs, wee must consider of the meanes to dismisse them. Some haue therein proceeded mildly, and others more roughly. Some to discharge an Enemies Embassadour, haue giuen leaue to all other Embassadours which did reside with him ; and then calling backe those of his friends, suffered his enemies Embassadour to depart.

The Emperour *Charles* the fift, aduertised of the League which was made against him, would not dismisse the Embassadours of *France*, *England*, and *Venice*, vntill his owne were in safety : But hee set Guards vpon them of *France*, *Venice*, and *Florence*, causing them to bee conducted thirty Miles from his Court, with a prohibition not to speake vnto them, nor for them to Write : To him of *Millan* as his Subiect, hee was enioyned not to part from Court ; And as for him of *England*, there was no alteration.

Let vs come to the third point. It is a great aduantage to pierce into the designes of his Neighbours, and to haue gained some confidence with them : For the entire is seldome found. But not able to preuaile by this meanes, he must doe it by Discourse, by Wisedome, and by the Knowledge a Prince ought to haue of the quality of their Estates, of the defects and aduantages which are in them, of the humours, designe, and inclination of the people, of great Men, and of the Prince ; and principally of this last, whose

To pierce into
the designes of
his Neighbors.

to enuallied
enough


whose principall motions and manner of liuing hee must seeke to discouer, to iudge of his wisedome and courage; then the discontentments, diuisions, and the heads of parties which are in the Estate, their pretexts, credit, of whom they depend, and how farre it may extend, the Councell, Treasure, Iustice how it is mannaged, and with what satisfaction of the people or great Men: Moreover what the forces be, and the number of Souldiers and Captaines, with the sufficiency of the cheife among them: The strong Townes and Fortresses; and to know the defects there are to defend them, and the aduantages to assault them: The Munitions of Warre and Victuals: wherein the commerce and traffique doth consist, and how it may be incommodated: The commodity or discommodity of the Entries of the Countrey: The Fertillity Barronneffe, extents or smalnesse of the Estate: and of other Neighbours, his alliances and dependances with other Princes, as well neere as remote: Their actions and deportments past, as well towards vs as others: Their present Estate, and whereunto they seeme most to incline. In which search, we must vse diligence, wisedome, and secrecie, least we giue them cause to distrust vs. All this may be learned from friends, which the Prince may haue in the Estates of his Neighbours; or by spyes, whose intelligences he must duly examine before hee beleue them; And by reason, interest, or apparance, sound if they be true.

Of the introduction of Embassadors or Agents.

But for that all these courses are full of suspicion among Princes, and are dangerous for such as imploy themselves to giue these intelligences; euery Prince hauing the like interest, to know what is done with his Neighbour, and desiring to shew the confidence he hath in him: Princes haue agreed to receiue Embassadors or Agents; who in effect (vnder pretext to entertaine the good intelligence betwixt their Maisters) serue many times to discouer the ground of Estates, and the designs

of

of Princes. Wherefore seeing that by this meanes Prin-
entertaine one another, it is fitting to know the quality,
the charge, and the priuiledges of an Embassadour or A-
gent, the which we will set downe here, as they haue
beene gathered by some of this Age.



CHAP. 57.

*Of the charge of an Embassadour
or Agent.*

AN Embassadour and Agent is the same thing, if we
consider onely the function of their Charges: But
they differ for the honour and respect they beare
more to an Embassadour then to an Agent. An A-
gent hath charge to represent the affaires onely: But an
Embassadour ought to represent the greatnesse of his Mai-
ster, and his affaires. Wherefore for sufficiency, the A-
gent ought to haue as much as the Embassadour: But for
wealth and that which concernes shew, it is not so neces-
sary for him as for the other.

The difference
betwixt an
Embassadour
and Agent.

Neyther the one nor the other, for that which con-
cernes the Body, ought (if it may be) to haue any im-
perfection, as to haue one eye, to be pore-blind, squint-
ey'd, lame, crooked-backt, or extreamely foule and de-
formed: But contrariwise hee must be of a pleasing En-
counter, and not counterfeit, lest hee be ridiculous or
contemned. He must not likewise be sickely nor dainty,
lest the discommodity of the wayes, or the change of the
Ayre make him vnprofitable for his Maisters affaires. His
Countenance must be graue and serious, yet mingled with
mildnesse and a pleasing aspect. For his Age, he must nei-
ther be too young, nor too old, as well for the force and
disposition of the body, as for that of the mind. For the
conditions

Qualities and
perfections re-
quired in an
Embassadour.

conditions of Fortune, he ought to be chosen of an honest condition, and Noble if it may be : Princes holding themselves contemned, when they send Men of little worth vnto them ; as *Lewis* the Bleuenth did, who imployed his Barber to execute this charge.

As for the profession whereon he ought to be chosen, that depends of the quality of the affaires whereon hee is to treat, or of the Prince to whom he is sent. For if they treated of meanes to make Warre, it would be no more proper to send a Church-man or a Lawyer, then if they treated of some right of bounds, or made some conference of Religion, to send a man making profession of Armes. For his goods, an Embassadour ought to haue in a meane proportion. A poore or needy man how sufficient soeuer, is nothing fit for charges of expence and shewe. But of all things they must haue a care not to send a poore Embassadour, after one that was rich, and who had made an excesse of expence ; For the first hauing accustomed those of the Prouince to this expence and charge, the other comming after, and not doing the like, he will bee much lesse honoured and respected ; And by consequence doe his Maister lesse seruice. He must not likewise be distastfull to the Prince to whom he is sent, but rather they must choose one that may be pleasing vnto him : Yet for all this he must not be a subiect, nor dependant, nor tyed by oath, nor any other bond, to him with whom hee is to reside. The example of that which Duke *Sforse* did to the Esquire *Mervelles* teacheth vs, not to choose another mans Subiect for this charge. For the sufficiency, he must haue a quicke apprehension and naturall Iudgment. He must be practised in the affaires of the world, and especially in those of his owne Countrey, and of that where he is Embassadour.

And for that the life of man is too short, to attend a fit experience for the sufficiency which is necessary : hee ought to be conuersant with all sorts of Histories, which
he

hee ought to haue read with iudgment, waighing all the Circumstances of Actions which are there represented : To know the diuersity of the establishment of Estates, and the reasons, if it may bee, of this diuersity ; to vnderstand the right of limits, and reprefailes, the genalogies of Princes, and the pretentions of Kings vpon the Estates of other men. Their forces, means, alliances, and manner of liuing, he must likewise be resolute & couragious in that which he hath wisely deliberated ; but aboue all hee must be secret in affaires of importance, and discrete in his speech. Hee must not detract, nor speake euill, especially of any Master, nor of the Prince where hee remaines : Hee must speake freely of his Masters pretentions, if there bee question to maintaine them.

An Embassadour chofen with these qualities may serue worthily and profitably. Yet I will adde hereunto the manner, how some of our time haue held he should gouerne himselfe, but more succinctly. First hee must furnish his Family with modest and respectiue Men, not insolent, quarrellers, or scandalous : Otherwise he is in danger to receiue an affront, either in abandoning his seruants, or not being able to stay them from punishment. This done, hee must make an ample instruction, least hee bee disauowed, the which shall follow word by word, especially in affaires whereas tearmes strike the stroake ; not promising any more, although he knew he should not be disauowed : But before the promise, he shall hold the businesse in suspence vntill he hath power. Moreouer hee shall instruct himselfe, from the Mouth of him which had gone before him in the said charge, and shall retire from him the Treaties, instructions, and papers of importance : And parting he shall giue to haue some one in the Princes Court, which may Negotiate his businesse, and giue him aduice of all that passeth ; for many times the Secretaries of Estate are so imployed, as they haue not leisure to satisfie all.

Instructions
for an Embas-
sadour, how to
gouerne him-
selfe in a
strange Coun-
trei.

It

If hee goes for some particular affaire, hee must stay as little as may be vpon the way, as well to preuent the aduice, which might be giuen of the particular subiect of his Embassie; the answere whereof hee should find ready, hauing by his stay giuen them leisure, either to illude it, or to crosse it: As for that according to the quallitie of the businesse, hee might arriue so late, as they would mocke at him. As *Tiberius* did of the Embassadors which arriued to condole the death of his Children seauen Moneths after: And hee in mocking lamented the death of *Hector*, who was dead many hundred yeeres before. The same reason requires, that they should demand audience as soone as they can, vnlesse he finds the Court in mourning, or in open Warre, or some other accident of importance which serues for an excuse. He shall from the beginning shew his grauitie, ostentation or pride in his Countenance or traine, his courtesie and affability, accompanied with an honest carriage and modesty; his expence according to the places where hee is. The Northerne people desire a Table well garnished: *Spaine*, and *Italy*, looke more to followers and attendants, and to that which serues for shew; In the Leuant the greatest expence is in presents: But aboue all hee must regulate his expences according to his entertainment, and the meanes hee hath to spend. For it is vnseemely to liue of borrowing in a strange Countrey.

The manner of treating is also diuers. In *Germany* & *Switzerland*, they must haue more money then words, more good cheere there then Art: In other Estates honor, complements, and Orations, are better receiued; and in others the consideration of Religion hath more force. An Embassador ought to be wary, least by too much diligence and affection, he do not augment the suspition, which they may haue of the subiect of his comming, and discouer it by too much Art & talke; all things disguised affected and amplified, naturally breeds suspition. They which demand succours

succours doe many times make their affaires so weake, (thinking to moue pittie ,) as they are so farre from mouing those, from whom they craue succours, as they make them affraid to embarque themselues with miserable persons. In such occasions he must march himselfe discretely, and waigh his words : And the countenance in this doth sometime impart more then the thing it selfe.

Above all things hee must not treat with any other Prince, of that which concernes his Commission, but with him to whom he is sent. This was the answer of the Embassadours of *Florence*, to the Emperour *Maximilian*, to whom they had beene sent, he hauing appointed the to conferre with the Duke of *Millan*, who should giue them an answer for him : But they refused to doe it, as a thing exceeding their Commission. And although his instructions ought to be as ample as may be : Yet affaires being subiect to change, in a shorter time, then there is betwixt his parting & arriual, the Embassadour must, as they say, make Warre by the eye : as if hee had beene commanded to vse mild words, and yet finds it more conuenient to speake boldly or to change, or omitt something mentioned in his Commission, he must gouerne himselfe with great circumspection. But he may not stray from his intention, vnlesse he see that in leauing it, he may preuaile in that which he hath vndertaken. If he be constraind not to doe some things contained in his instructions, and that the businesse is not subiect to delay. hee shall import it to two or three of the most vnderstanding Seruants, that his Maister hath, (if happily there be any in the Countrey where he resides) to the end that the businesse succeeding ill, he may auoyd the reproach, to haue done it alone and without Councill.

There are certaine things that are subiect to disauow; as proud & insolent words, which an Embassadour might haue vsed ; or threats and practises which he attempts in the Estate where he resides, if it be without command:

And

And therefore he must containe himselfe, within the termes of his charge and the modestie that is required. It is fitting he should maintaine the Dignity of his Maister : But it must be without contempt, or offence to him towards whom he is sent, And to the end he may discover all the passages in an Estate, hee must be frequent and daily in Court, but when as the Prince retires himselfe priuately for his pleasures : For then he should make himselfe suspect or importune. And in popular Estates, he must assist all dyets meetings and assemblies : Or if he sees that this may breed some contempt, hee should send some one of his. Besides money, which discovers the secrets of Princes, the entertainment of his Table is of some force. And although that all the intelligences which come from this sort of people which follow Tables, be not alwaies current ; Yet sometimes he shall meete with good ones. Wherefore he must waigh them, and attend the progresse and issue before hee Iudge of them ; and obserue not onely what is sayd, but what is done. He must for this effect write often, and to many parts, to the end he may be the better aduertised ; and neuer respect the charge which cannot be better employed.

He must visit the principall Councillors, the Secretaries of Estate, and amongst others him, who hath the diuision of Forraigne affaires ; he shall doe the like to those which are in credit and fauour with the Prince, although but of meane condition ; applying himselfe in some sort to the custome, and manners of the Countrey, and how others haue done before him. Hee shall informe himselfe discretely of the present Estate of the Court ; and how euery Man stands in authority ; wherein this authority consists, eyther in reputation and honour, or in effect and contention, euery one according to his rancke and degree, winning vnto him if he may, the domestiques and fauorities of those which haue authority. Hauing newes from all parts, he shall still find occasions to discourse and
parley

parley with the Princes, and great men, with pleasing subjects, to be merry with them; or if they be otherwise, and concerne them, to condole, or to aduise them to preuent it. He must visite the Embassadors and Agents of other Princes and Common-weales, which reside in the same Court; but soberly, lest he giue them occasion of iea-
lousie. Hee must be wary not to discouer himselfe wholly vnto them, whatsoeuer they be; but rather seeke to draw from them, then to leaue any thing of his owne, to the end he may alwayes be the first to send the aduice and pleasing newes. And if the affaires which he pursues, inccedes not according to his desire, hee shall make no shew of it, nor seeme to haue any distrust or bad opinion of the Prince and others, with whom hee negoti-
ates. When he shall be intreated to doe them any cour-tesie, he shall study to value it at as high a rate as may be; yet he must doe it speedily and freely, letting them know, that he desires aboue all things to giue them contentment and satisfaction: He shall commend and magnifie the persons, the meanes, the greatnesse, the Coun-
trei, the Lawes, the manner of liuing, and whatsoeuer concernes the Nation; yet with such modesty and discretion, as there may be no shew of flattery. He shall likewise extoll the affaires of his Master with the like modesty and dexterity, to the end they may not grow iea-
lous of him. When he shall finde some stop in that which he desires to doe, hee shall not insist too ea-gerly vpon it, although he had an apparent reason: But he shall with dexterity approue the reasons in part, and by other meanes seeke to attaine his Designe. When it shall be needefull to doe or say any thing contrary to their will or liking, he shall excuse it in such sort, as they shall conceiue that it proceeds not from the Embassador, but from such as command him, and that hee is sorry to doe it, considering it doth not please him; yet iustifi-
ying the businesse by the best reasons he may, and
Q giuing

giuing them some hope of other things which shall be pleasing vnto them. If they charge him to carry bad and distastefull words, he shall doe better to cause them to giue them in writing, rather then to pronounce the words.

And if he findes that by one meanes he cannot obtaine what he desires, hee shall leaue the businesse for a time, and referre it to some other occasion, which he shall finde they desire of him, or shall haue neede of something; and then with dexterity he shall renew his demand, and so perswade them with grace and mildnesse. When he is to obtaine any thing of importance, he shall lose no time to cause it to be dispatcht, but shall sollicite the expedition, yet with mildnesse and modesty: And if it consists in a promise for the future, he shall cause them to set it downe in writing, and contrariwise he shall be carefull not to oblige himselfe nor his Master, but as late as seldome as may be. Intreating and contracting, he must cause the treaty to be set downe in plaine termes, not ambiguous nor captious, according to the termes and clauses of precedent treaties. It is certaine that refusing flatly, or making a busines full of difficulties, they offend him whom they refuse: Therefore an Embassadour not able to grant that which they demand of him, he must eyther giue them other Counsell and direction, to attaine to that which they desire; or he shall testifie his good-will by other gracious effects, and honest speeches which may palliate the deniall. An honest man, (such as he ought to be that executes this charge,) must not be found a Lier, especially in matters of importance; for that there is nothing doth make him lose his credit more. He must therefore be wary not to deliuer doubtfull things for certaine, nor trust wholly to the word and report of others: But hee must alledge his Authour, or else say, that he had learned it from a good place, when he shall not dare to name the person. He shall doe the like for things which concerne
his

his Master, the which he must deliuer on his behalfe. When they are such as there is no great certainty, or else may receiue a change, he must deliuer them with all discretion and stayednesse, lest he be reproached that they are circumuented by this meanes. And if it should happen that he could not well excuse a contrariety, yet he must couer and disguise it with some pretext, in regard of his Master by all meanes possible; and for himselfe likewise, purging and iustifying himselfe, that he had neuer any intent to doe a bad office, nor to make a bad report, nor to be authour and instrument of deceit. The which must take place, when he is constrained either through the necessity of affaires, or by the commandement of his Master, to deliuer one thing for another. The which hee may not doe often, lest he lose all his credit. But it sometimes falls out, an Embassadour lies without thinking of it: For that when one Prince meanes to deceiue another, he first deceiues the Embassadour whom hee sends, to the end that deliuering that which he holds to be his Masters intention, his reasons may be more forcible, assuring that which he speaks more boldly, hauing lesse intention and assurance of that which is dissembled. Wherein the Embassadour is not onely excusable, but worthy of pittie, in that they are distrustfull of him, and meane to make him carry the Bable, and to serue as an instrument of deceit. Moreouer he must not rely too much on those with whom he negotiates, neither yet wholly despaire for those things which happen; for that affaires change easily, and affections likewise according to occurrents: And many times that which seemed impossible at one time, growes easie afterwards; and so the contrary.

But one of the principall points whereof an Embassadour takes care, is to maintaine the ranke and dignitie of his Master, especially with the Embassadours of other Princes. For Princes doe not subsist, but by the greatnes and opinion they haue of them: It argues a contempt

if their ranke be contested, and an Embassadour must must rather loose himselfe, then quit any thing: And if the Prince with whom he remaines, fauours him that makes the attempt, after that he hath made instance to be maintayned in his ranke, he ought to retire. And for this point, it is vsually obserued in many places among Embassadours, that they which come first, goe to visite those which came last, although that the first commer goe before them in ranke.

Of the priu-
ledges of Em-
balladours.

Let vs come to the priuiledges which the Embassadours haue in a strange Countrey. The principall is, that by the Law of Nations, they are inuiolable, that is to say, in all freedome and safety: But it is in their Countrey to whom they are sent. For that if they passe through the Countrey of one that is Enemy to their Master, although allied to the Prince to whom they are sent, yet it would be necessary to take this passport, being not in that regard respected as an Embassadour, if he praetiseth any thing against the Estate, or the Princes person with whom he resides: For hee cannot defend himselfe by the Law of Nations. And wee must not doubt but hauing violated his Faith first, wherein the Law of Nations doth chiefly consist, but the Prince neare whom he remaines, and against whom he hath attempted, may cause him to be punished. Yet for that it may be that the commandement to attempt, proceedes from the Master, and that punishing the Embassadour, it were to fall vpon the stone, and not on the Arme that cast it. Some Princes haue vsed it more discreetly, contenting themselues to seaze vpon these vndertakers expecting the avow or disavow of the Master: And being vnable to draw eyther of them from him, to pre-suppose a confession, and then send them to their Master. Moreouer, if the Embassadour commits any priuate outrage against one of the Princes Subiects with whom he resides, vnlesse it be to defend the dignity of his charge,

or

or of his Master, many haue held him iustificable before the Prince where he liues. For there is a great difference betwixt the Dignity and Authority of a Prince, in the Countrey of another Soueraigne. Hee may well retaine his Dignity, but not his Authority. But the most safe and the more seemely were before he doe reason to the party, to demand it from his Master, who in that case would not deny it him so soone as in matters of Estate, and it is a meanes to free the Prince from slander of Iniustice towards the Ministers of another Prince.

As for his Domestickes, there is no doubt but they may be punished if they doe ill. And if they or any other hauing fayled, retire into the Embassadors house, he may be summoned to yeeld them, and to suffer Iustice to search his house: Otherwise after this deniall the Iustice may doe it, for that the house of an Embassadour ought not to serue for a retreat and Sanctuary to the wicked. Yet this search may not be done by simple Sergeants, no more then the Summons: But it must be executed by the Iudge of greatest Authority in the place, accompanied with men of honour, with excuses, intreaties, and courteous words, as well to testifie the respect which they beare to the Dignity of the Embassadors Master, as to preuent the insolency and indiscretion which doe vsually accompany Archers, Sergeants, and such other sorts of Ministers. But in stead of punishing the Domestickes of an Embassadour, after they haue made their processe vnto condemnation, and caused the Ciuill party to be satisfied, some haue pardoned them in his fauour whose Subiects they are, sending them backe with the processe. Or if there be no such intelligence betwixt the two Princes, as the one will not be beholding to his cōpanion, they may procure some common Ally vnder-hand, to make the demand: To whom the Prisoners being deliuered, he may send them to the Prince whose Subiects they are.

Some Embassadours haue perswaded themselves, that they had all iurisdiction ouer their Domestickes, euen to put some to death. But this is not grounded vpon a reason, if the Prince with whom he resides doth not giue him leaue; as they say the *Turke* tollerates it with the Embassadours of Christian Princes. Yet they may detaine those Prisoners in their house, which practise against the seruice of their Master, vntill they haue aduertised him, and receiue an answer; provided that they whom they detaine, be not admitted as Embassadours by the Prince, or Estate where they are: For in that case they are in freedome and safety. Behold how Embassadors ought to gouern themselves with strangers in a strang Coutry. We must now see being in those charges, how they ought to carry themselves to their Masters, to whom they serue as eyes and eares.

How Embassadours ought to carry themselves toward their Master.

Some haue held that an Embassador ought to giue aduice to his Master, of all that is spoken indiscreetly against him, for that the aduertisement may come from some other, then from his Embassador, who in such things ought to be carefull not to be preuented, wherein we cannot giue any certaine Rules. Yet if the word hath escaped either in choller, or from a passionate spirit, were it the Prince himselfe; being not spoken publicuely, it were more discreetly done to conceale it from his Master, then to deliuer it. For the Master that neither would nor could breake, would seeme offended at such a report, if the Estate of his affaires will not suffer him to demand satisfaction: And on the other side sometimes, in taking exception at an injury, he seemes to confesse it. But if the Embassador findes it more expedient to conceale the words spoken by the Prince with whom he resides; he shall let him know, how much his Master would hold himselfe wronged, if they were related vnto him: But that knowing the good which growes to both the Estates, by the Friendship in which the two Princes haue liued, he had rather therein fayle of his duty, in not making this report, then to be the occasion

sion of trouble, and breach for a word spoken in choller.

It is to no purpose to say, that in doing this, it were to shew himselfe wiser then his Master; or that he must deliuer all, and conceale nothing. For that which offends Princes, and inuites them to resentment, is not so much the offence in it selfe, as the opinion they haue, that the world knowes they haue bene wronged; and if they doe not seeke some reuenge, they should make a breach in their reputations, and inuite others to affront and contemne them. So as the wrong being not published and knowne to all Men, and the Embassadour making it knowne that for the good of peace, he would conceale it from his Master, it doth no way touch the reputation of the Prince, who otherwise being held to be couragious, they would alwayes beleene, that if the report had bene made vnto him, he would not haue endured it without reuenge: There are many things which Princes are glad to haue concealed; but those principally, for the which they cannot provide, without greatly incommadating their affaires, these ought to be dissembled and concealed from them.

As for dispatches, it is certaine that they seldome know what an Embassadour doth in his charge, but by that which he writes. He must therefore shew himselfe by his dispatches, which must be graue, short, close couched, and mingled sometimes according to the Subiects, with passages of Sentences, yet seldome: And to be the more intelligible, some hold it fit that he should articulate euery priuate action apart, not troubling himselfe with a continuance, and bond of clauses in diuers affaires, and he must acknowledge in all his letters, the reception of those to the which he makes answer. If he enforced to write many letters vpon the same subiect, and to the same place, as it happens vsually, he shall doe well to diuersifie the terms and stile as much as may be, to the end they may not bee like vnto a Notaries Indenture, and that they which haue receiued the like letters, comming to conferre them together,

Of their dispatches.

ther, may not thinke that he hath intreated them equally; euery man esteeming of himselfe not onely better then he is, but also more then his companion.

He must haue a care not to write any thing to his Master for true, concerning those with whom hee negotiates, if he hath no testimony by Letters, or that he knoweth it from those in whom his master hath confidence, the which he ought to name: For that the change which may happen in a businesse, might cause a reproach and bad conceit of the minister, with his Master, either of lightnesse, or of little fore-sight. He shall be alwayes esteemed to doe more then to write, and to giue them good hope when he shall see day, before he giue them assurance and certainty of the businesse. As for the particular of the Embassador, as we haue said before, besides the Secretary of Estate, who is to receiue his Dispatches, he must haue some one which may giue him aduice of that which passeth. He with some other friends, must doe him all sorts of good offices, in comending and praising his Seruices and dexterity. And the Embassadour on the other side, shall labour to haue others write; especially men vnknowne to commend his industry and labour, absence causing a decay of opinion, and makes them sometimes forget the worth of a man, if by these practises they be not re-
uined.



THE
COVNSELLOR
OF ESTATE. OR,
A COLLECTION OF
the greatest and most Remarkable
Considerations serving for the Man-
aging of Publicke Affaires.

PART. II.
CONTAYNING THE MEANES
how to preserve an ESTATE.

CHAPTER I.
*Of the parts and conditions in generall, necessary
for a Prince and Soueraigne.*



Having treated of that which is necessary for the setting of an Estate, we must consider of the meanes how to preserve it. It is not sufficient to build a strong ship to make a long and tedious Voyage; but we must withall provide a good Pilot to governe it, and to seeke meanes to calke it, and trim it when it takes water, and to be able

to

to resist the waues of the Sea, and the violence of the Winds and stormes without shipwracke.

The preservati-
on of the Estate
consists in the
authority of a
Prince,


That which serues for the Establishment, doth likewise serue for the preservation of an Estate; but wee must likewise haue other meanes to preserve this order, the which consists eyther in the authority of him that commands or in the remedy which they must find, against that which might ruine the Estate. The Authority of him which commands, proceeds eyther from the loue of the people, or from his owne reputation.

The Loue of
the people
cause the au-
thority of the
Soueraigne.

Loue alone would suffice him that hath once gotten it, were it not that hee cannot promise any thing to himselfe from the inconstancy of Men, who loue to day and hate to morrow, without any subiect or occasion. Wherefore hee which commands, must assure himselfe of Men long before, and not attend vntill he be reduced to the poynt of necessity. For then the danger being eminent, it is no more time, for that their faith is then shaken, and by this search hee giues a testimony that hee feares: the which many times doth hasten the Princes ruine, and makes them fly from all reconcilment with him.

Diuers meanes
to gaine his
good-will.

This Loue is gotten by many meanes. The Beauty, Behaviour, Carriage, pleasing Countenance, and Courtesie, are sometimes of great force. With others Nobility, and reputation of their predecessors hath beene of great vse, although that they had not any other part that was commendable. Among the Inhabitants of a Citty or Towne, riches may likewise doe something, if they vse it as they ought.



CHAP. 2.

*Of the parts necessary for a Prince to
purchase the Love of the
People.*

BVt to treat in generall of the parts necessary for a Prince to purchase this good-will, wee will reduce them to three, Mildnesse, Bounty, and Iustice.

From Mildnesse growes the peace of the Estate, the fidelity of the Subiects, and the Establishment of affaires, there being nothing that doth more force the people to honour their Lord, then the naturall mildnesse which he shewes, and practiseth to their good. Rygour makes him to be feared, and consequently not beloued, and this feare and cold Friendship lasts no longer, then the occasion of feare continues. But mildnesse governed with discretion, remaines in the heart, and produceth its effect, whilst that Men which haue receiued pleasure and profit liue. This mildnesse is practised by the Prince principally, in three points. The first, is to pardon offences, but not those of the Estate; and to pardon those, who being discovered can hurt no more, and by vsing clemency vnto them, may get some reputation; but not to those who may mutine, and who by no meanes cannot be perswaded to submit themselves to reason: Mildnesse to such is cruelty to all others. It is cruelty I say to pardon a wicked Man, if by the impunity which doth follow, we bee forced afterwards to dipp our hands deeper in blood.

*Effects of mild-
nesse in a
Prince.*

It is a stupid bounty, and a simplicity without discretion, to pardon all, and to suffer all. The excesse of clemency, conuerts it selfe into a soft and effeminate nature: And if this bounty be not mingled with rigour, and facility
with

with authority ; it is meere carelesnesse blamable in a Prince, for that in suffering one fault, it soone drawes after it another. Clemency is comendable towards an Enemy dejected and humbled : But whilst hee wauers and stands in tearmes against vs ; it is weakenesse, amazement and feare, not to dare to resent it, hee must therefore vse mildnesse with discretion, yet in such sort, as they may alwayes find the Prince more inclined to mildnesse then seuerity.

To cherrish
great Men.

The second point, when they discover mildnesse, is cheifly to cherrish great Men, and the cheife of the Estate, and according to occasions, others : For that euery Man esteeming himselfe of more worth then he is, they grow easily discontented if they make no reckoning of them. The third point, by the which he which commands may testifie his mildnesse, is in shewing himselfe indulgent in things, wherein the people take delight ; Prouided alwayes that they fly excesse and disorder. For by this meanes they mollifie the sauagenesse of the Subiect, they diuert him from vndertaking ; and make euery one more ioyfull in his vocation. Yet hee must not suffer himselfe to be carried away with this indulgence, as through negligence, and the little care hee had to prouide for his Estate ; but with a designe and discretion restratiue in his time. For this effect he must also prouide, (as we will shewe hereafter) for the abundance of Victualls and commodities, to the end that he may thereby testifie the care he hath of his people, and by this care the affection he beares them. For if the people should fall into necessity, or into a dearth of Victualls, this mildnesse and indulgence would proue vnprofitable ; and the Prince would loose much of the Loue of his Subiects : there being nothing that doth so much discontent them, as such discommodities ; especially when it growes eyther through the Monopoles of the Prince, or the excesse of custome.

C H A P.

CHAP. 3.

Of the liberality of the Prince.

Liberality is of two sorts, the one practised to the benefit of priuate persons ; and the other to the profit and aduantage of the Publique. The one and the other well husbanded , serues to purchase Loue to the Prince. For although hee cannot extend his bounty to all in particular, for that it would bee impossible his reuenues should suffice : Yet a liberall Prince is beloued of euery man ; For that euery man hopes to taste of his bounty according to his degree, making him his Friend ; although that the facility of giuing ruines the Estate sooner, then too great sparing. But no Man enters into consideration, how much sparing is necessary for a Prince, for the generall good of his Estate : For that the number of those is small which doth in particular to hinder that which belongs in generall to all. And yet as excesse is blameable in all actions, so it is most preiudiciall to the Estate in this : And we haue seene in our time, that moderate giuing hath bene a weake meanes to purchase the Subiects loue to the Prince : For it reiects more then it gaines ; and if it be employed without respect of merit, it proues a shame to him that receiues it, and is receiued without grace.

Two sorts of liberality.

The excesse of liberality in a Prince most hurtfull to the Estate.

The Subiects of a Prince excessiue in gifts, makes them excessiue in expences, and importune in demands. They gouerne themselves not according vnto reason but to custome : That which is receiued is no more accounted of. They loue not liberality but for the future. Wherefore the more a Prince doth exhaust himselfe in giuing, the poorer he growes in Friends ; and from excessiue prodigality, doth vsually grow the pouerty of a Prince: From
pouer-

pouerty exactions and hatred in like manner. For the number of those from whom he takes by exaction, being greater then the Friendship of those to whom he giues; the Prince is in danger not to command long. If then he be reduced to one of these extremities, it were more expedient for the Prince to bee poore and not hated of his Subiects, then to be hated and rich. For although that for a time he may force obedience, yet it cannot be durable: And although that he which spares, seemes in outward shewe to doe good to few, yet not exacting from the Subiect hee doth good to all, whereas a prodigall Prince doth vsually good but to few.

Considerations necessary
in liberality.

We must therefore be carefull to vse this vertue well, thereby to purchase loue. For although that the gifts and benefits, be in some sort in the liberty and free-will of him that giues: yet it hath certaine distinctions and lawes which restraints it, and especially in that which concerns the Prince; who being but a simple dispencer of the Publique Treasure, he ought not to imploy it without hope of some profit to the Publique. Wherefore hee must consider what he giues, to whom, and when. For it is not needfull to giue to all that demands; as if the demander and deseruer were one and the same thing: Likewise betwixt those which haue deserued, he may not giue to all that begg, for it would be found that they which haue least deserued, haue tasted of his liberality, and not the rest.

And as the payment of a Bond ought to goe before liberality; otherwise it would be iniustice to giue, at the charges of those to whom we are indebted: So Merit must be recompenced, before we doe good to him that hath not deserued: And before Merits, seruices ought to march; and before seruices, debts and Bonds ought to be discharged. It is the Law of Iustice, not to doe wrong to one, to gratifie another, The which is very ill obserued by the most part of Princes, who therein follow the nature

nature of other Princes, which is, rather to doe that which proceeds from their owne will, then what is commanded them by Iustice, or that whereunto they are bound: For that in the first they acknowledged themselves Superiours, and in the second Inferiours; the recompence shewing the merit and valour of him to whom it is giuen.

Wherefore the benefit or liberality of the Prince, proceeds eyther from the acknowledgment of service, or of merit, or of his owne free-will; or to inuite and draw some one to loue him, or to corrupt him, or to purchase the reputation to bee liberall. Concerning the first two sorts of bounty, they are necessary, as well for the satisfaction of those which receiue them, as for the contentment of the Generall, who by the example would bee inuited to conforme their actions to the good of the Estate. For the acknowledgment of a benefit is no lesse esteemed, then if the liberality proceeded from a free will: For that the good and pleasure which they doe, proceeds many times from the abundance of wealth, and the great power which hee hath that giues, as well as from good-will: But acknowledgement cannot come but from the desire hee had to doe good, so as although to giue and doe good, be more to be desired, yet the content which they feele, is peradventure more commendable, as proceeding only from a francke & free courage.

And it is that whereof among priuate persons wee haue experience, that the benefit which comes from a bond or debt, is more pleasing then that which comes vnto vs from the free-will of another: For that in this consists the content of the giuer, who chargeth vs with a bond which binds vs; and which in some doth rather ingender hatred then Friendship; especially if the benefit exceeds all Satisfaction. In the other, besides the pleasure to receiue the benefit, we receiue content to see that we acknowledge the former good which we haue done them.

Diuerse kinds
of liberality.

Of the liberality
which is
used for the ac-
knowledgment
of service and
merit.

and

And although that they which loue vs, deserue to be requited for their good-will towards vs, as being the principall part of the benefit: Yet it deserues rather to be recompenced by a Prince, with kind vsage and good words, then by effects; the which hee must keepe to recompence effects, otherwise his Reuenues would not suffice. Yet if he finds that some for want of this, withdraw themselves from him, although vniustly and without cause, it shall be necessary that hee retaine them by the mildest meanes he can, and rather in doing them good, then in imploying threats, who according to their naturall disposition, might be the more incensed.

That a Prince
must shewe
himselfe liberal
to those which
may serue him
against his
Enemy, be
they of a con-
trary party.

The Prince may also bestow gifts and benefits of those, which may serue him against his Enemy; I say to those which are of a contrary party, to draw them vnto him. For as it is a vice in them to suffer themselves to be corrupted, so it is a vertue and wildome in the Prince to corrupt and gaine them. And as some haue not allowed of this expence, for that the aduantage which we expect is doubtfull, hauing to deale with traytors, who may as well betray the Prince which giues them, as him they serue: Yet the general experience is contrary; being most certaine that the Minister which takes, sells himselfe, bee it that the money binds him, or that the shame to haue receiued, stayes him from failing of his promise; Or that the feare to be discovered makes him to be suspected of him hee serues, and to him that giues him, which were a meanes to ruine him with the one and the other, forcing him of necessity to keepe his word with him that hath corrupted him; being in his heart growne irreconciliable to him whom he hath resolu'd to betray. Besides few men of quality suffer themselves to be corrupted, vnlesse they bee transported, by some hatred, contempt, or desire of Reuenge, which they haue conceiued against him whom they serue: Or they are not disposed in heart and affection, to loue him which corrupts them, there being none but

but base spirits, or needy persons, which suffer themselves to be corrupted for meere avarice.

The liberality which is vsed to particular persons, to purchase reputation, extends commonly either to strangers, or to Subjects, which doe not know nor frequent the Princes Court, who ought to haue in no lesse recommendation those which are remote from his Court, then others which are dayly in his eye: For that the greatness and maiesty of the Prince doth not take its foundation and increate to know, but to be knowne of many: And the honour and renowne to aide and doe good to another, should be too much restrained, if his succours and benefits should proceede no farther, then to such persons whom they see and know. Behold wherein vsually the bounty of Princes to priuate persons is employed,

Of the liberality of the Prince to purchase reputation.

In their manner of giuing they must obserue three things. The first, not to giue at the request of a third person, to the end that he which receiues may be bound vnto him, and not to the other, by whose importunity hee giues. The manner of giuing must be in such sort, that although it be for an acknowledgment or recompence, yet they to whom it is giuen, receiue the benefit with an obligation; otherwise the gift were fruitlesse, and is held for a payment, and not a liberality; so as they encourage him that receiues, to demand againe, rather then to acknowledge that which they haue giuen him.

The manner of giuing.

The third is, to giue in the view of all men, to purchase reputation. For although that in a priuate liberality this were not commendable; yet this manner is necessary in the Estate, where the Actions of Princes must be apparent and visible, neyther must they be vnfruitfull; And it sufficeth not to doe a pleasure; but you must make him that receiues it, acknowledge that it is done to such an intention. As for the measure of benefits, they must be proportionable to the time, and to the persons, as well of him that receiues, as of him that giues. And for the time,

Benefits must be proportionable to the time.

R

sometime

sometimes a small succour giuen in necessity, obligeth not onely more then a great gift would doe at another time; but sometimes causeth an Enemy to forget all the wrongs he had receiued, there being two things in concurrence in this benefit, either of which may doe much for a reconcilliation, and by consequence for loue. The one is, for the benefit and pleasure he doth him, in the best time that could be; I meane at need. The other is the assurance that he which receiues the benefit, takes of his good will that succours him so opportunely. Thus he must obserue the time to giue esteeme to his benefits, to the end the Debt may be the greater. As for persons, the humours being diuers, the Prince must obserue the humours of his Ministers, not onely as I haue sayd, to impart their Offices vnto them, but also for his recompences: For that some demand honours, others riches, according to the which hee must gouerne himselfe.

Recompences
of Honour
must bee well
husbanded,

And for that there are more men found which affect Riches, then honour; and that being willing to satisfie euery mans desire, he should be forced to exhaust his treasure: He must (as much as may be) encourage his Subjects to seeke for Honours, as recompences which can not impouerish him; and yet vse it in such sort, as it may seeme that he doth not giue them without discretion and election. For when as Honour is imparted to vnworthy men, it begins to be contemned, and to lose this Title of Honour, as likewise he may not mingle it with profit, for that many would make more esteeme of profit, then of Honour.

Liberality of
the Prince to-
wards the Pub-
lique.

If the liberalities of Princes towards private persons, doth get them good-will, not onely from those which taste the fruite, but also from all others which participate in hope: That which the Soueraigne practiseth towards the Publique, as being more profitable, and extending to more persons, should purchase vnto him more generally

generally the affection of the people : As the Succours which the Prince giues in publique calamities, in famine, plague, dearth, burning of Townes, Warre, inuasion of Enemies, Earth-quakes, inundations, and such accidents. For that the Prince alone may giue this releife, being necessary to haue meanes which exceede the ordinary : The reason of Estate will not allow that any priuate person, although he were able to doe it, should enter into this kind of liberality, which it may be would aduance him in the loue of the people before the Prince. And in Common-weales and popular Estates, some priuate person hauing attempted to shew their bounty, haue bene punished, as men which sought by this meanes to seduce the people, and to vsurpe the Estate.

The Liberality of a priuate person towards the Publique is not to be allowed.

Seeing then that this liberality is fitting onely for the Prince, he must practise it as much as may be, and not suffer occasion to be lost. There is another sort of liberality, which the Prince may practise to the benefit of the Publique, no lesse importing then the other : which is to aduance to vertue, by the establishment and foundation of Seminaries of Piety and Religion, of Schooles and Colledges for all sorts of Sciences which may serue the Publique : Of Houses of Honour and Vertue, for the practises and exercises which may serue in Warre ; and of other places for all sorts of Worke-men and Artizans, for the bringing in of Manufactures, whereof I haue formerly treated.

Liberality of the Prince towards the Publique, which consists in aduancing vertue



CHAP. 4.

Of the Princes Justice.

Justice divided
into two parts.

wherein the
prince ought to
shew himselfe a
lover of Justice
in regard of
private men,

Justice is generally beloved and desired : But when they will practise it against private persons, the commiseration they have of a condemned man, or the colour of some contrary reasons, ioyned to interest and obstinacy, make the rigour and severity odious to many. Wherefore in a manner in all Estates, the exercise of Justice hath beene divided into two parts. That which concerns the punishment of crimes, and the deciding of controuersies betwixt man & man, hath beene left to the Magistrates and inferiour Officers to the Prince, to free him from the enuy and hatred which condemnations draw after them : And that which concerns the distribution of Dignities; honours, charges, recompences, pardons, and rewards, hath beene retained by the Prince, to gaine the loue of the Subjects. Yet the Prince, euen in that which concerns private men, may shew himselfe a lover of Justice, and by this meanes winne the affection of his people, not incurring any enuy by the establishment he shall make of Lawes, necessary to suppress the fraud and violence of his Age, by the choise he shall make of good men to administer Justice: And by the care he shall take to keepe them in awe, in prescribing the forme of the administration of Justice. The frauds most vsually practised in an Estate by private persons, are disloyalty, vsury, falshood, frauds, and Monopolies; by the which some grow suddainly rich, & some extremly poore; whence many times grow the despaire of those who they thrust into innovations; & the insolency of the others which makes the insupportable:

And

and from the one and the other growes trouble, and in the end theruine of the Estate followes. Against this kind of disorder and abuse, the Prince must shew himselfe affectionate for Iustice, by the ordaining of rigorous punishments against such as shall be surpris'd; as also in blaming them in his discourses, according to the occasions which shall be offered, and by admonitions and exhortations to Iudges in generall, not touching any one in particular, and of persons otherwise odious.

And particularly vsury or interest, (which cannot be defended) ought to be regulated at much lesse then the ordinary gaine of those which borrow, (be they Marchants or Laborers) may mount vnto; to the end that the poore in borrowing of the rich, may lay, and pay that which they are forced to borrow; and thereby auoyd the ruine of the poore by vsury, and that of the rich by banquerupts whereof they are the cause. As for violence which is committed in an Estate, it is of two sorts, the one is of Theeves and Robbers, who by open force and Armes, trouble the safety of priuate persons: against the which the Prince hath a double reason to oppose himselfe, as well for that all force ought to be in his hands, as for that he is Established to maintaine the peace and safety of his subiects, not onely against strangers, but also among themselves, and the Prince which comes and doth not giue order, looseth the loue of his Subiects, and exposeth his reputation to contempt, which makes him in the end loose all his authority; and is in danger that these Theeves seeing themselves strong, will trouble him in his Estate: But this is easily preuented in lending a strong hand to Iustice, and causing those to assist, which are appointed for the apprehension of such persons.

Against vsury.

Two sorts of violence in an Estate which the Prince ought to suppress.

The other sort of violence contrary to Iustice, is the oppression of the poore by great Men, be it that it is made by the vnlawfull exactions of money, or of day workes, beating, or other ryotts, to preuent the which,

Of the oppression of the poore.

Of the Princes
pardon to o
fensors, and
the miseries
which ensue.

the Prince must not onely in his ordinary discourses con-
demne this manner of proceeding, threatening them to be
punished, without taking notice of any person in particu-
lar; but also that which shall concerne the punishment of
private men, he must leaue free to the ordinary Justice,
to dispose according to the Lawes, without assisting the
delinquents with any fauour or pardon; as many Princes
vsually doe, who trouble the order of Justice by such
impunities, and ruine their Estates by maintayning such
people. And we haue often seene, that a Prince hath sa-
ued the life of some such man, who in a combustion hath
beene the first to raise the Subjects, and to draw his sword
against him. This is the recompence which such Prin-
ces deserue. They come by degrees to pride and disobe-
dience, as to all other vices. He that hath dared this
day to condemne the Law and the Magistrates, to morrow
will condemne the Prince who hath made the Law, and
hath established the Magistrate; and if occasion be offered
will attempt against him.

Cases wherein
a Prince may
give pardon.

I meane not for all this to tye the Princes hands, so as
he may not give a pardon: There are cases in which Iu-
stice doth allow it: But besides when as some great
and publique profit requires it; as if it bee for a man,
from whom the Publique hath drawne great and famous
Services; or if by the punishment there will follow some
trouble in the Estate: The Prince in this case for a
greater good, or to auoyde a great mischiese, may dis-
pence and pardon him. But before he resolue, he must
examine duely what he intends to doe, and he must not
flatter himselfe in his considerations, to fauour some one
against Justice, which considerations he shall keepe se-
cret, lest they draw vnto a consequence: And moreover,
before he comes to that, if there be any particular interest,
it must be satisfied with such contentment, as there may
be nothing to be desired, neither from him which hath of-
fended, nor from the Princes Justice.

Among

Among all the violences and oppressions which great Men commit, the most dangerous to an Estate, and which ought to be lesse supported by the Prince, is that which is done against the Magistrate, eyther in executing his charge, or in hatred thereof. For this is to attempt directly against the Publique, and to ouerthrow the order of Iustice, making (by the impunity of such violences) the Magistrate fearefull in the execution of the Princes will. He that endures these violences, not onely seemes to loue Iustice and the publique good but little, but also makes them thinke that he feares to punish them by the ordinary course of Iustice; and in such conuiniences he loseth both the loue of his people and his reputation.

That the grace and fauour of the Prince not extend to haue violence done against the Magistrate.

The second point wherein a Prince may shew his affectio towards Iustice, is the choise which he shall make of those which shall administer it for him: As coe arwise, the indifferency which he shall shew, to make vse of the first comers, will discouer his carelesnesse. I meane to speake here not onely of those which are destinated to iudge the controuerfies of priuate persons, but also of all such as vnder the Princes Authority, haue any power or command, according vnto which they may doe something iustly or vniustly. For Iustice is mingled and practised in all actions, be they priuate or publique. E- uery man is a Iudge in his charge. And wee must not say, that there being good Iustice, we may not punish those who vnder the Princes Authority shall offend in other Offices. For besides the Difficulty which is sometimes found, the same may they say of Iudges. But the Princes fore-sight may passe farther, and hinder the mischiefe and iniustice as much as may be. It is the last remedy to punish; and wee must doe what possibly wee may not to come vnto it. To preuent all this, wee must vse choyce; whereof few Princes dreame, and the contempt of this choyce in some

Of the choise a Prince ought to make of Iudges & Magistrates.

Estates is proceeded so farre as Offices are giuen to them that will offer most. An apparent signe that these Estates are neare vnto their ruine.

Diuers meanes
to make choise
of those which
are to be esta-
blished in the
administration
of iustice.

Some Princes haue had this care, to propound in publique the names of those whom they meant to send into Prouinces, to see what might be objected before they sent them. Others haue made Rolles, of those that were to be imployed in Offices, causing themselves to be informed secretly by good men: And others haue chosen them according to the opinion of the people. But the safest meanes is that whereof we haue spoken, to cause them to execute the meanest Offices from degree to degree, before they were aduanced to others of great importance. For then more men are able to testifie of their Experience and Discretion; and their Actions being as it were publique, and apparent to all the World, it is more easie to iudge in petty charges they will accustome themselves to doe well, for the desire they haue to be aduanced to greater: And admit they would transgresse, besides that the euill cannot be great, it may be easily corrected.

That the
Prince must
haue a care to
preserue the in-
tegrity of those
that are to doe
Iudice.

But this is not all, to haue chosen such as must attend Iustice (although that it would bee more then halfe the worke, to haue chosen them good and capable men) but man changeth; and many times amidst the malice of men which are reported vnto him to iudge, he learns to be malicious. Wherefore the Prince must alwayes haue an open eye to maintaine them in Integrity: And this demonstration which he shall make, in reproaching them for some fault which they haue committed, will in a manner suffice in an Age that is not too much corrupted: But in another, hee must according to occurrents adde to his helping hand, to prevent the mischief.

Diuers meanes
to preserue the
integrity of
Iudges.

One of the meanes to auoyde the euill, and to preserue the integrity of Iudges, is, after that hee hath made

made choise of honest men, to giue them meanes to entertaine themselves in seruing the Publique : To the end he may draw them from the thought, which necessity might force them to, to gather goods by vnlawfull meanes. Others haue held Officers in awe by inquiries made from time to time. But the Commissioners of these searches being as well subiect to corruption as the rest, this course hath not bene long obserued.

Moreouer, Princes thrust on by the harpies of the Court, haue many times made vse of these meanes, rather to gather together money, then to reforme disorders : There hauing bene (vnder the like pretext) a publique concussion drawne into many Estates, the which hath equalled (by the meanes of generall and particular compositions which haue bene made) good men with the wicked ; No man how good soeuer, being desirous after a long vexation of imprisonment, and proceeding to run the hazard of a Iudgement of Commissioners ; whereof some are many times partizans, or depending of partizans for such compositions, or rewarded by the Fines and Confiscations which they make ; and for a small matter would hang a man to haue his clothes.

Another mischief which is committed in such compositions, is, that by the meanes thereof the wicked remayning still in his Office, vnder hope to be freed another time at the same rate, doe worse then they did before : And hee which is an honest man, seeing himselfe compell'd and forced to pay a Fine for an offence which hee hath not committed, resolues to doe it, as well to re-embource himselfe, as to haue meanes another time to satisfie the auarice of the Authours of such searches.

Wherefore they must eyther make no enquieries, or else they must finish them by the course of Iustice. But if in such things the Prince will shew fauour, and pardon some one mans life : At the least after hee is reprehended,

Of the compositions with officers, misbehauing themselves in their charges, and of the inconueniences which follow.

That a Prince hauing pardoned an Officer, may not suffer him in his charge.

Of Spyes in
euery Prouince
to inquire of
the carriage of
Officers.

heded, he may not suffer him to continue in his place, as wel to take from him the meanes of ill doing, as not to make the charge contemptible, and himselfe odious, in maintayning a person therein, who hath beene held of a bad life. There are Princes which haue made vse of spyes, whom they sent throughout the Prouinces, to inquire of the actions of officers: And these for that they were vnknowne, might easily enter into all places, and obserue the actions of one and another, and sometimes doe bad offices vnseasonable for the honestest men, yet the Prince being wise and not relying vpon the report, but tying them to a secret prooffe, and without any brute, may make vse of it, and ought not to neglect this meanes.

Secret delari-
ons practised
by King Lewis
the twelfth to
containe his
Officers in
their duty.

Lewis the twelfth who was called the Father of the People, for that he held a strict hand ouer Iustice, making his ordinary abode in *Blois*, examining himselfe secretly, those which come to Court from all parts of his Realme, and sometimes passengers of that which was done, as they had heard spoken in the place from whence they came, and especially of great Men, and of his Officers; and finding by report of many, some aduises conformable, against some one, he caused him to bee put into the hands of Iustice, to informe of his life, and to punish him: And in this manner he contained euery man in his duty. Secret delations haue beene brought into *Scotland*, by an ancient Edict of *Conan* King of *Scotland*, the which they say is yet practised at this day, and is called *Indict*: But better by the ordinance of *Millan*, by the which in all their Townes there must bee a hollow Trunke in the cheife Church, whereof the Gouvernour hath the Key, into the which it is Lawfull for any man, to cast the lybell of accusation secretly, containing the crime committed, the time, the place, the offenders, & the witnesses; and this ordinance giues a moiety of the confiscation to the litor: which is a great meâes to facilitate the punishment of crimes.



CHAP. 5.

Of the administration of Iustice.

IN the forme of the administration of Iustice, among priuate persons, the Prince ought to haue an eye of the order, to the speedy expedition, and to the putting off of charges, and ordinary expences, which they consume in pleading, the which many times exceed the principall. Order is as it were an essentiall part of Iustice: For where there is confusion, there can be no Iustice; and to auoyd this confusion, they must provide that no iurisdiction attempt not against another. For the which they must haue a care, not onely among those which are of equall power, distinguished by places, or by certaine kinds of causes: But also betwixt inferiours and superiours. Contrarywise they must strictly bind the parties vpon great penalties, to follow their suits by those degrees, and in that place which is appointed for them by the Law: And the Prince must hinder, that by Euocations eyther to himselfe, or to some other of his Subjects, there may be no contrauention without great cause.

In the speedy expedition, the Prince shall testifie his affection to the good of Iustice, in taking away the power of Iudges, to prolong delayes, and fauour those that fly from tryall, in shortning as much as hee may, by the aduice of the most iudicious of his Estate, the stile, and forme of their ordinary proceeding, as well in Establishing Fines and Amercements against those that faile and delay, as in diminishing the degrees of Iurisdiction, and other tediousnesse in pleading. As for the expence, the pleader suffers in three or foure sorts. The one, when he is forced to goe farre from his house and family: For be-

Considerations necessary for a Prince, for the administration of Iustice.

The expence of pleaders.

sides

sides that he is not able to attend his domestique affaires during his absence, they perish most commonly in regard thereof; the charges as well of his voyage as of his returne, are much greater then in his house. The remedy hereof is, to settle in a great Estate Iudges in euery Province, and if it may be, in the midst, to the end that the extremities may not be too remote. I meane not only of Iudges, which may iudge in the first instance, but also of those to who they will giue power to iudge definitiue, for ordinary causes, and which deserue not the charge of a iourney of a hundred, or sixe score leagues.

Of the vocations of Iudges

Another expence is for the vocations of Iudges, who as we haue sayd, ought to bee honestly entertained by the publique, and priuate men freed of that charge. But if they feare that their vocations being reduced to ordinary wages, many amongst them would neglect to labour: They may conclude that the summe appointed by the publique for the payment of their vocation, shall bee diuided amongst them according to their labour, which shall bee taxed by the whole company. There being nothing so vnseemely for a seate of Iustice, then to take money from the hands of one of the parties, yea his iust Fee; and yet there is nothing so ordinary in this age, in a manner in all Estates.

Of tax of Registers, Vshers, and such other Ministers of Iustice.

Another expence is of Registers, Vshers, and such other ministers of Iustice, whose taxes they must not onely Regulate, but also limit the time, in the which they ought to deliuer the expeditions to the parties, and that vpon great penalties. For a party which sees that he may spend much, will be willing to giue vnto a Register halfe that which it would cost him, besides his tax, then to grow obstinate, to pay nothing but the tax, set downe by the orders, and to be contrayned to consume twice as much in slaying to attend his expedition.

Of the expence of Solicitors, Proctors, and Aduocates.

But the greatest and most excessiue expence, is that of Solicitors, Proctors, and Aduocates, which is a very diffi-

difficult thing to order : And some haue held, that we must leaue this meanes to those of this quality, to enrich themselues in seruing others, there being Groomes as they say of all prizes. Yet if they could set downe an order, which might be easily executed, it would be a great benefit for Iustice : But hauing not bin hitherto found, at the least it would require the fore-sight and Iustice of the Prince, to prouide in such sort, as poore Men desiring to recouer their owne, might bee freed from this charge.


For this effect it hath bin sometimes propounded, to oblige those, which desire to come in time to great offices of this profession, before they should attaine vnto any, they should vndertake the pursuit of causes freely, and that it should not bee lawfull for them to take any Fee ; vpon paine of concussion, and to be made vncapable euer to enter into any office for the future. These being commonly Men of meanes, desirous to winne honor. and in an Age when desire is most ardent : will striue in Enuy one of another to protect the poore, when as for their recompence they should propound vnto them, some place being voyd of those whereunto they aspired, to preferre him which had defended the greatest number. Besides the benefit which the poore should reape, the Publique should haue aduantage ; in that they which should enter into these charges, had giuen some testimony of their integrity and sufficiency : Whereas the custome is at this day, to place Schollers comming from Schoole, in the companies of Iudges, with little Learning and lesse experience, and hauing giuen no prooves of their discretion.

There is another poynt wherein the Prince may likewise testifie his affection to the good of Iustice, when he submits his Lawes and Edicts to the iudgment of those, to whom he hath referred the last appeales of his Iustice, before hee causeth him to bee executed. The Kings of

Of the verification of Edicts by the course of Parliament.

France

France, aboue all others, haue bin curious to bee held Iusticers : And although that otherwise, they haue made profession of Armes and Warre, more then any other Princes, yet they would bee in all places, in their Seale, and in their throne of Iustice. But aboue all others they of the last race, haue affected this Name to be great Iusticers ; hauing brought in the verification of their Edicts, by their Courts of Parliament, before they wil cause them to bee executed ; stopping the mouthes of such by this formality, as would impugne their commandements with iniustice, in giuing more authority to the execution, and preserving themselves from surprize and importunity.



CHAP. 6.

Of the Reputation of the Prince.

Of the meanes
how a Prince
may purchase
reputation.

Of Prudence
and Vallour in
a Prince,

That a Prince
must haue a
general know-
ledge of all
Sciences.

THe reputation of a Prince, is the other part which giues him authority. It is gotten by many meanes. But we will begin with the principall, which are Prudence, and Vallour. Prudence serues him as an eye to see, and to consider all things. Vallour serues him as a hand. Without the one he should be like a blind Man, and without the other weake and vnable. Prudence giues him Counsell, and Vallour force. The one commands and the other executes. The one discovers the difficulties of enterprizes ; and Vallour breakes them. The one designs affaires ; and this finisheth them. The one sharpens the Iudgment ; and this fortifies the courage.

Prudence to be such as it ought to be in a Prince must be accompanied, with a generall knowledge of all sorts of Sciences, not exactly, as to make a trade and profession ;

buc

but he must know as much as is necessary for him, to distinguish truth from falsehood, and to vnderstand those which discourse according to occurrents. His profession is not to bee an Engineere, to build houses, to make a Bridge, or to be a good Canonneere: But to know those that are most fit; and iudiciously to make vse of Men of all sorts of professions. Neyther must the Prince bee amazed at this knowledge, which is required in him as of a thing impossible, amidst the variety of affaires and occupations, which they of this quality haue vsually; nor to distrust his vnderstanding and capacity: For there is nothing therein but is most easie.

And among other meanes to get this generall knowledge, the principall is to haue about him a good number of Men, great in all sorts of Sciences, as Diuines, Philosophers, Mathematicians, and Captaines, for whom (be it at table or else where,) he may in few words learne that which cannot be apprehended in many moneths at schoole: To giue them a subiect of discourse, in walking, bee it on foot or horse-backe, going a hunting, and in all other occasions; to keepe them prepared, so as presenting themselves before him, they may be ready to deliuer something that is rare and excellent. Yet he must remember, if he meanes to haue them discourse before the world in his presence, to aduertise them secretly sometime before, of that which he meanes to propound, to the end they may be prepared; for the most sufficient may bee surprized: And not to reprehend him before the world; the which would doe wrong to his reputation, and that of the Prince would likewise suffer, for that they would conceiue he had made a bad choyce. Thus the Prince imploying the time onely, which others spend in the encounters of iesters, he will in a short time be as learned as shall bee necessary for him.

Alexander, Iulius Caesar, Charlemaigne, Charles the wise King of France, and Alphonso the tenth King of Castille,

The practise of
many great
Princes.

Castille, had not want of affaires and imployments : And yet they found leisure to read , and some to write. *Alphonso* the first King of *Naples*, who in his time had as many affaires and crosses as any other of his quality , sayd , that a Prince without Learning was an Ass crowned.

Of experience.

Two sorts of experience.

Experience is the Mother of Prudence , for that many things seeme grounded vpon reason , and easie in familiar discourse ; the which being put in execution, succeed not, as they conceiue : but contrariwise they haue found some impossible. Experience is of two sorts. For eyther we get it of our selues , by that which we obserue, and whereof we are eye witnesses : Or by the report of others. The report of others , is eyther of the liuing, or such as are dead. In regard of the first , although it extends not farre , by reason of time ; Yet it may imbrace many places , for that Embassadours, Spyes, Marchants, Souldiers, and such like persons, who (eyther for pleasure, or for affaires, or for some other subiect,) haue beene in many places , and haue found themselves in diuers Encounters, may teach vs many things for our conduct.

The knowledge of history necessary for a Prince.

But History passeth much farther, and with much more profit : For there is seene the life of the world, the manners and fashions of Nations ; the diuers Establishment of Estates ; the beginning, progresse, middest, and end, and the causes of the encrease, and ruine of Empires. There may bee learned the causes , for the which some Princes raigue peaceably , and others in troubles and combustion ; Some in making war, and others in being prodigall ; And some stayed in their expences with dignity. But to relate here all that is necessary to Prudence, we must make a repetition of all that is formerly spoken, this treaty tending onely to this point, wee will content our selues to propound some rules, which concerne onely the Prudence of the Prince.

CHAP. 7.

*Rules and necessary instructions for a
Prince to be held wise.*

A Prince may easily iudge by himselfe what may be the deliberations of all others of his condition. Interest is the part and reason which preuailes, and makes the resolutions bend to that side where it shewes it selfe : And therefore he must neither trust to Friendship, alliance, league, nor any other Bond, if there be no interest.

A Prince must oppose himselfe against a mischief in its breeding, and resolutely : For that disorders grow, and fortifie themselves in such manner with time, as they surpasse our forces. But when the mischief exceeds the forces of the Prince, then he shall doe wel to deferre it, for that with time matters may change : & he that hath time, as they say hath life. Hee may not consent that they put any thing in deliberation, which may cause charge or innouation in the Estate : For that the propositions which are made in the Princes Councell, giue him credit, how strange and pernicious soeuer they be. It is a signe that there is some difficulty to discover the good and euill that is in this subiect, seeing they bring it into consultation.

He must not thinke in his resolutions to be able to auoide all inconueniences : For that cannot bee. There is no generation of things in this world, how good soeuer, but a corruption hath gone before it. But he must weigh the inconueniences, and choose the party wherein there are least, and most easie to preuent. He may not imbrace many Enterprizes at once : For hee that

S

imbraces

embraces too much, gripes not fast : But hee must assure his Estate before hee attempts a Warre of a long continuance.

Hee may not quarrell with one more powerfull then himselfe, but dissemble the iniuries of the mighty, and the offences which cannot be punished. To yeeld sometimes to time, and rough encounters is Wisdome : And in a strong storme to strike saile, and to accommodate himselfe with the strongest, yea with disadvantage, to preuaile over the weaker. And thus the Princee shall increase the courage of his Men, and make himselfe fearefull to his Enemies : It being not Wisdome to commit himselfe to hazard and Fortune, for a light matter.

The Prince may not make any suddaine change, for that it cannot be done without violence; and violence doth seldome produce an effect that is durable. Being ready for the execution of an Enterprize, he may not deferre it, vnlesse hee finds an apparrant danger in the execution : Fortime may breede more harme then good. Hee must likewise preferre old things before new, rest before trouble, the certaine before the vncertaine, and safety before hazard.

Hee may not breake nor attempt against powerfull common-weales, vnlesse it bee with great aduantage, and in a manner a certaine hope to preuaile. For the loue of libertie to such as haue it, is so strong; as it is a difficult thing, yea impossible to roote it out : And moreouer the Enterprizes and designs of Princes, die with them ; but the resolutions of such free Estates are immortall. Hee may not likewise breake with the Church for a small matter. For that many other Princes, who would bee glad to worke their owne ends, vnder pretext of Religion, and of succouring the Church, will be glad to ioyne with it : And the Warres of Princes against Popes, are of great expences and little profit.

Wee

We haue spoken formerly of the election of Ministers; we will adde here, that he must haue a care they may be equall to the affaires, not superiours, nor inferiours. For that they which esteeme themselues capable of a greater matter, then that which is committed vnto them, neglect it, and contemne it; and they which are vncapable, and cannot discharge the place, disgrace and are preiudiciall to those that imploy them.

If his Estate be great, to discharge himselfe of some humors, hee may entertaine a Warre with some of his Neighbours: Yet hee may not continue it so long, as hee shall make his Enemy too Warrelike: But shall make a peace with him, although he himselfe were the stronger. For by this meanes hee shall giue a Law to the treaty, and may preserve his aduantages, and then begin Warre with another: He shall make himselfe powerfull and fearefull to all, being still Armed, and hauing Men inured to Warre. This is the *Turkes* vse with his Neighbours, who hath settled himselfe in his conquests by this meanes: It being a great indiscretion in a Prince, to forbear to make a peace, vntill hee can make no more resistance. For then all the conditions are to his disadvantage: And admit hee would not continue the Warre against some one of his Neighbours; Yet hee may not wholly relinquish Armes; for that a disarmed peace is weake.

But he must haue a speciall care not to attempt a War against his subiects; and if he be prest to it, let it bee with great aduantage, and end it speedily: For the more the Warre continues, the more his subiects are incensed and estranged from him; so as they can neither obey him, nor afterwards trust in their Prince. Wherefore he must not oppose himselfe directly against a multitude: For admit hee should preuaile (the which notwithstanding would bee difficult) it cannot be without losse of the loue which they beare him. But like

vnto good Marriners, hee shall take aside wind, when as that in the Pope is contrary; and shall make shew to giue that, which hee cannot hinder nor take from them. But aboue all hee must bee warie in diuisions of his Estate, not to remaine partiall; and in the place of Prince to make himselte head of a partie. The Enterprizes wherein courage is necessary, must be performed with Celeritie, the which will giue vs the aduantage which wee want, and which wee cannot haue by our owne forces. Celeritie strikes suddainely; and against force if wee haue time, wee may fortifie our selues with that which is necessary to resist.

The one puts an Enemy in disorder, and the other breaks him: And it is more easy to disorder him and then breake him; then to breake those at the first charge, that are in order. Yet there are certaine enterprizes, in the which wee must vse time and patience, not rash violence; for that delay weakens with time and occasion; and it is more easie to weaken then quite ouerthrow a businesse, then to force it suddenly.

Aboue all things the Princee must study to know the oportunity of occasions, For his enterprizes and affayres; which is no other thing but an encounter of many circumstances, which makes that easy which before seemed difficult. Hee may not commit the execution of an Enterprize to him, which is not of aduice, it should bee attempted; For that the will cannot bee followed by the effect, if the vnderstanding doth not incline thereunto, and serue him for a guide: And hee which hath not held a businesse easy before the Execution will find more difficulty in the Execution. Hee must consult naturally of Enterprizes: But, as I haue said elsewhere, hee must leaue the meanes of the Execution, to the discretion of him to whom hee commits it. For the Execution depending for the most part, vpon oportunity and present occasions which


which vary continually, to limit it is no other thing, then to intangle the Minister, and to spoile the businesse.

A Prince must not thinke in flying to preserve himselfe in mischief and danger ; but he must oppose against it : For that in flying, he not onely followes, and falls vpon vs ; but withall many other dangers grow : Whereas in making head wee stay him, and then we repulse him in time ; and the danger most commonly dissolues to nothing. In consulting of an Enterprize, hee must auoid sharpe Councell and full of subtilty ; for they seldome succeed, and a few crosses make them vnprofitable : As also those which haue more shew and vanitie then a good foundation. In the Estate hee must build vpon that which is solid and firme : As likewise hee must fly those which are full of expences, and aboue his forces and meanes. But hee must follow Councell grounded in reason vpon safety, and little subiect to be crost by accidents. Yet he that assailes, must hazard sometimes : But when the question is to preserve, he must commit nothing to Fortune. Wherefore slow Councels are more fitting for great Princes, which haue more neede to preserve, then to get, and those which are suddaine will bee more proper for conquerours.

But in doubtfull occasions which are vrgent and precipitate, there is nothing worse then slow and middle Councels. Courage will be alwayes more profitable, and lesse preiudiciall, vnlesse they be resolved wholly to yeeld. In affaires where the reasons are strong on all parts, and where it is in a manner impossible to see and choose that which is most commodious and profitable, (the which breeds in vs doubts and perplexities) the best is to incline to that party, where there is more honesty and Justice. For although it miscarries ; yet we shall alwayes haue a satisfaction remaining in vs, and a glory outwardly, and to haue chosen the best: Besides, no man

knowes what might haue happened, if wee had chosen the contrary party. Finally if wee doubt which is the best, or shortest way: Wee must hold the straightest.

We must not in difficult affaires, diue into all sorts of inconueniences, nor in accords and treaties, trouble our selues with nice poynts, which grow vsually in treating: But wee must looke to the maine, and to assurances. I might adde herenno an infinite number of other rules, the which might eue a Prince to make him to be held Prudent in practising them. Yet I doe not hold that in matter of State, hee should so tye himselfe to rules and maximes, as he should not peaze and waigh the circumstances, and particularities of affaires: For hee may encounter with such a circumstance, as he shall be forced to take a resolution contrary to maximes. But the greatest signe of prudence in a Prince, is to be secret: Otherwise he should betray himselfe; and none of his resolutions would succeed.



CHAP. 8.

Of Cunning or Policy.

ANd for that they make two sorts of prudence; the one which is guided by the ordinary maximes of honesty and Iustice, and the other which consists more in surprizes and deceit, which they call cunning: Many haue doubted, whether it were expedient for a Princes reputation, to make vse of this last. Wherein I will speake my opinion here; but I will deliver that of one of our time, who hath written vpon this subiect: Who holds that Fraud, Cunning and Deceit, if they be without vice or wickednesse, may bee allowed

lowed vnto a Prince. for the Publique good, and for his defence and preservation; but not to offend any man. It is his duty, to procure the Publique good, and the health of the people. This is the soueraigne Law, by the which the Prince ought to gouerne all his actions.

Wicked men should haue too much advantage, if by cunning they might not repell their cunning. It is lawfull to defend an Estate with the same Armes, with the which they assaile it. It is not tollerable to turne the backe to honesty and iustice, but sometimes to goe about it and coast it. But the more distinctly to explicate this, we will borrow the distinction which he makes, of diuers sorts of cunning and deceits: Some are light; others great; and some meane and indifferent. The light he not only allowes to Princes but commands them. The meane he tollerates. The greater he forbids.

Diuers sorts of cunning.

Among the light, he puts distrust and dissimulation. Distrust is as necessary in a Prince, as credulity is hurtfull. So it hath bene called the strength of prudence; that is to say, to warch, to beleue nothing lightly, and to haue an eye to all things. He must therefore trust few Men, and those long knowne and often tryed. And yet hee may not to flipp the line in such sort, as hee doth not alwayes hold it by one end, and haue an eye to it: But hee must couer and disguise his distrust, yea, in distrustting he must make a shew to haue some confidence. For open distrust offends, and inuites another as well to deceiue vs, as too much indiscreet confidence. They haue many times had a desire to deceiue him, whom they haue found fearefull to bee deceiued: And on the other side, an open confidence bindes some to guard loyalty. From distrust they come to dissimulation, which smotheres the fore-head, and couers the thoughts, no lesse necessary for a Prince then the first. But he

must learne how to play this part cunningly, without ex-
 cesse or foolery, making open profession of simplicity,
 cherishing those that are free and open, as enemies to dis-
 simulation; and that in small matters the Prince proceede
 openly, to the end they may hold him for such in greater.

Of the practi-
 ses and intelli-
 gences of Prin-
 ces in the E-
 states one of a-
 nother.

Another sort of deceipt, and ordinary among Princes,
 are the practices and intelligences which they haue in the
 Estates one of another; drawing cunningly the hearts of
 their Neighbours, officers, seruants, and confidants, to
 discouer their secrets, and to crosse the designs of their
 Masters, and sometimes to lead a hand to some Enter-
 prize against their Masters person. This hath proceeded
 so farre, as it hath sometimes corrupted euen the Wiues of
 Princes. This is done by two meanes: Either by perswa-
 sion, making vse of the discontentments which great men
 haue of their Masters: Or by money which is the most v-
 suall course. And many haue held this manner of procee-
 ding allowed against an Enemy, a rebellious, or suspec-
 ted Subiect, yea, against any stranger with whom they
 haue no alliance: But against his Friends; Allies and
 Confederates, it is treachery, which ought not to be prac-
 tised as they doe at this day.

Of Equiuocati-
 on, faire
 words, promi-
 ses, letters, Em-
 bassies, & lies,
 to obtaine some
 advantage.


The procee-
 ding of Prin-
 ces to defend
 themselves and
 their Estates
 from their Ene-
 mies, vniust in
 themselves, but
 excusable by
 necessity.

There are Princes to whom all sorts of meanes are iust
 to gaine some advantage, and to attaine to their designe:
 who haue made vse to deceiue by Equiuocations, faire
 words, promises, Letters, Embassies, yea, and by lies,
 to obtaine that which they could not otherwise doe, by
 reason of the difficulty of time and affaires. *Plato* allowes
 this deceipt, so as it be for the good of the Subiects. Yet
 to make this proceeding iust, there must be a necessity;
 and it must be in a troublefome and confused time; and
 not onely to aduance the good, but to diuert some great
 mischiefe, and against the wicked.

There are other kinds of proceeding, frequent enough
 in Princes, to preferue themselves and their Estate from
 their Enemies; the which cannot be excused but by ne-
 cessity:

necessity : And the Prince which is reduced to this point, must know that it is a misery for him to see himselfe forced to leaue the ordinary course of Iustice, for the safety of his Estate, and he may not proceed but with some feeling of griefe; but he must carry himselfe therein like a Father, when he is forced to cauterize, or cut off a member of his Child to saue his life. I will set downe here some examples : As to put those secretly to death, and without forme of Iustice, which cannot be punished without trouble and danger to the Estate. If they deserue death, the Prince who may dispence with the other formes, may likewise dispence for the safety of his Estate. To clip the wings, and shorten the meanes of some one which mutines and fortifies too much in the Estate, and makes himselfe fearefull before he hath a commodity to attempt. To diue by authority into the purses of his rich Subiects, in some necessity and pouerty of the Estate. To reuoke the priuiledges giuen to some one, or to some Comminalties, or particular men, to the preiudice of the Soueraigne and the Estate. To seaze vpon some neighbour place, for feare that another holding it, he should make Warre against vs and ruine vs.

All these things are in themselves vniust; but this iniustice is ballanced by necessity and publique profit. Necessity as they say, hath no Law : And the Prince reduced to these termes, must know not onely how to command according to the Lawes, but also how to command the Lawes themselves. All is, that the Prince doth not forge this necessity and constraint himselfe, for to satisfie his covetousnesse or ambition : For in stead of purchasing the reputation to be wise, he will cause himselfe to bee esteemed an vniust and inhumane Tyrant.



CHAP. 9.

*Of the reputation of a Prince ; and the meanes
how to get it.*

Valour the
cause of a
Princes repu-
tation.

How impor-
tant and need-
fary it is in a
Prince.

Meanes to get
and entertaine
this courage
and valour.

Vallour is another part which serues to reputation, and it is of such importance, as power is much inferiour vnto it. Vallour procures power ; and without vallour power is lost. This is seene in many Estates, the which with small forces haue beene conquered by valour ; and others for want of valour haue lost themselves with their power.

And although that valour consists chiefly in the interior and courage : Yet to maintaine this courage, he must haue care of the exterior. A Prince may well be couragious, if hee be sickly and incommoded of his health, and that as they say, his legges faile him ; his courage may be commendable, but very vnprofitable for him and his Estate. Wherefore he must haue a care of two things. The one to entertaine this vigour of spirit, and to keepe it in action, by a desire of honour and glory, be it by the reading of valiant exploits of Warre, performed by great Princes and Captaines, or by the conuersation of couragious and wise men, putting them often vpon the Discourse of great Enterprizes, which they or others haue done ; or be it by the consideration of that which concernes the Duty of a Prince, and the shame and contempt which they of his quality run into, which haue beene base and Cowards.

The other care which a Prince ought to haue, is to entertaine himselfe in health, and to get an able and strong complexion. Sobriety and moderation in Meats, serue greatly to preserue health, as gluttony and drunkenness altereth much. And from thence proceed indigestions, crudities,

ties, gouts, and all other diseases. Continency is likewise of great force; there being nothing that doth more weaken chaste men, nor that debilitates the spirit and body more, then an excessive lasciuiousnesse. The forces likewise increase with exercise, as that of Hunting, or others which consume the humours of the body. And to frame a strong and able complexion, he must in good time accustom himselfe to cold, heate, watching, hunger, to water, wine, and to all courses of life: The encounters being so diuers, to the which a Prince must accommodate himselfe, that one failing, sometimes this defect makes many things impossible vnto him.

There are yet many things to be done, which may serue a Prince to get reputation: As to couer his defects and weaknesse cunningly, is a great meanes to to preserve his credit: To make shew (yet without ostentation) of his forces to those that are more weake: To flye, and shew himselfe an Enemy to vanity and much talking, but to doe more then hee speakes. To talke grauely, and with a solid Iudgement: to maintayne his word, the testimony of courage and a firme Iudgement: To be constant in aduersity, and moderate in prosperity. Not to hazard himselfe in enterprises, vnlesse he be assured to preuaile; and hauing attempted one, not to giue it ouer, lest he shew himselfe to haue had little iudgement in the beginning, and of as little courage to end it. Not to busie himselfe in petty Enterprises, but to seeke occasions of great ones, especially in the beginning of his Reigne: For that thereby they settle a iudgement of that which will follow. He must not seeme to depend on the counsell and will of another; for that were to establish a Superiour and companion, and to make his insufficiency knowne.

Diuers other
meanes for a
Prince to get
reputation.

He may not imploy himselfe in things which are vnder the dignity of a Prince; as Nero busied himselfe in Singing, to make Verses, and to be a good Coach-man;

Domitian

Domitian spent his time in Shooting and in taking of Flyes; and *Aropas* King of the *Macedonians*, imployed himselfe in making of Lanthornes; *Valentinian* to make Images of Waxe; *Rene* Duke of *Anion*, and Earle of *Pronence* to paint, *Chilperic* King of *France*, and *Thibaut* King of *Nauarre*, to rime; and *Alphonso* King of *Castille* in Astrologie: But he shall imploy himselfe to know his Estate, and that which may serue for the good gouernment. The vniformity of life in a Prince, and the constancy in his commands doth also breede him reputation.

He must likewise treat his affaires with dignity, and not by men which are of a base and vild condition. The basenesse of Ministers doth vilefie his affaires, and the weakenesse ruins them; and both the one and the other makes the world beleue that the Prince distrusts great men, or that he feares to be discovered, inferior in affaires, by those which shall haue more vnderstanding, or that he hath no iudgement in making such a choice. But he may not suffer great talkers to approach neere vnto him, nor admit them to his secret affaires, for feare least they should discouer his actions and designs, by an itching desire which such Monckies haue commonly to babble.

He must not grow familiar with all sorts of persons, nor shew himselfe to often but vpon great occasions, and with a countenance and behaviour full of Majesty: And in his extraordinary ioy heauinesse or choller, hee shall not shew himselfe at all; but shall passe his first motion in his Cabinet, and out of the sight of his followers: His habite must be graue and modest without extravagancy, he shall auoyd extremities in all his courses, shewing himselfe neither slow nor rash, but he shall rather incline to the first then to the last; for the first hath a dependance of Prudence and Crauity, and the other of lightnesse and rashnesse; he must make more accompt
of

of truth then opinion, and haue a care that all that proceeds from him may be great, accomplished, excellent and admirable, finally that he doe lesse and doe it well, that he suffer not any disobedience which may be drawne into example.

That the affaires of importance may depend vpon him alone, without imparting it to any man what fauour soeuer he beare him, as the authority to make Lawes, to giue priuiledges, to make peace or warre, to giue pardons, to make choice of his principall Ministers, to impose Taxes, Subsidies, and other leuies of Money, to fortifie places, to cast Ordnance, to recompence others out of his Treasure, to aduance to Dignities or such other things as he ought to reserue.

By Magnificence he may likewise get reputation, as by the structure of publique Buildings, Pallaces, Churches, Fountaines, Fortifications of Townes and such like places, which redowne to the benefit of the publique. Religion likewise knowne to be in a Prince, imports him much for his reputation, for shewing himselfe to be full of Piety, the people will conceiue that he will be likewise iust, and that he will not vndertake any thing but with the assistance of God: Wherefore it imports him much to make esteeme of Church-men, which are knowne to haue probity and sufficiency in them, to retaine some about him, to procure a good reformation in the Church by mild and lawfull meanes, without Trouble, Schisme, or Deuision, to dispose of Benefices to capable men, to haue care of the poore, and finally to imploy himselfe in all workes of Piety.

By these last meanes a Prince may in time of Peace maintayne his reputation, hauing no neede in time of Warre to seeke for other particularities then his owne valour: The which shewing it selfe in occasions which shall present themselves, will maintaine them alwayes in credit and reputation. But if in the time of Peace they
desire

desire something more of him, there being people to whom he must give a subiect of discourse, and busie them in the consideration of their Princes actions, otherwise they contemne them: The Prince must imploy himselfe sometimes to reforme Iustice, sometimes the Treasurie, sometimes the discipline of Warre, and alwaies to make some new Establishment which may serue the Estate. *Augustus* hauing brought all his affaires to an end, and finding no more subiects to entertaine the people of *Rome* with his actions, he imployed himselfe to reforme the Callander.

So in the like encounters, the Prince must seeke all meanes to quicken his reputation in the spirits of the subiects, and to make them beleue that he is not idle, giuing them occasions to speake well of him, and hinder them from detracting and speaking ill.

Hauing discoursed of the meanes, by the which a Prince might get or maintaine his authority; Let vs see the meanes and remedies, which may bee found for that which may cause the ruine of the Estate. To know if the remedies bee proper, wee must likewise know the disease.



CHAP. 10.

Of the causes of the ruines of Estates: and of the remedies which may be found.

The cause of
the ruine of
Estates.

THe workes of nature faile by two kinds of causes: whereof some are exterior, and others interior. The exterior are Fire, Sword, and such other violences. The interior are the excesse and corruptions of the first qualities. In like manner States are ruined eyther

eyther by forraigne force and violence, or by the corruption and disorder that is with it ; but more rarely by the first alone then by the last : And we haue seldeme seene any Estate ruined by forraigne force, which was not first corrupted within it.

Yet let vs speake something of the ordinary meanes, by the which wee may preuent a forraigne force. Byther the Prince that is assailed by this force, is equall in power to him that assailes him, and in all meanes and necessary advantages for his defence : Or else he is weaker either in meanes or for that hee hath not his forces ready to oppose. If hee be equall, he may fore-see his enemies designe : And if hee hath any iust and tollerable pretext to make an offensive Warre, he must not stand vpon his defence. Among Princes which make Warre, he that layes the cloth (as the prouerbe sayes) payes the reckoning. For, besides that his countrey is ruined as wel by his owne Army, as by that of his Enemies, the amazement is greater among his Subjects ; And hee will not dare to hazard a Battaille, which would endanger his whole Fortune, for that loosing it, he shall not onely loose his men but also his Countrey : Whereas his Enemy may aduenure it with farre more advantage, his Estate being secure, and whatsoever happens he can loose but men.

A remedy against the violence of strangers.

But if the Prince be weaker then his Enemy which inuades him, he must procure him some greater Enemy, or many which may effect that which he cannot doe alone. He must likewise practise factions and diuisions with his Enemy, and get intelligence with some one of his prime Councillors or great Men, and with those that haue most authority and credit with his Enemy ; to the end they may diswade him from this Warre, or diuert it, or make it vnprofitable, in slackning the executions, or giuing aduice of his designs, to the end hee may oppose himselfe in time.

But if the practises be such, as they may breed a feare
in

in his Enemy of a reuolt, Treason, Sedition, or a ciuill war; they will be much better and of greater force. Defensiu^e Leagues with his Neighbours, or with the Neighbours of his Enemy, may be of great vse, who may grow ialous of his power. For the feare which his Enemy might haue, that inuading one, all the rest may goe to Armes, would retaine him.

Besides this, the Prince must keepe good guards vpon all the principall passages of his Estate, and place strong Garrisons in his Forts, who may stay the Enemy, and by a long siege cause him to loose much time, and many men; and by this meanes consume his prouisions, and waste his Army; whereby he may bee the better able to encounter him; And if he be able to raise an Army, he must choose a strong place at the entry of his Countrey, and lodge it in such sort, as he may bee neither forced to fight nor to dislodge, to the end he may hinder his Enemy from passing on. But hauing neither forces nor forts vpon the passage of this quality; or the Enemies forces being such, as they are not to bee stayed by this meanes: Some in this case haue themselues wasted their owne Countrey, on that side where the Enemy was to enter, causing all to retire into the heart of the Estate, depriving him not onely of all prouision of Victualls, but also of other commodities, Mills, Ouens, Lodgings, and other imployments, whereof an Army is seldome wholly furnished. The first aginst the *Polonians*, and the second aginst the *Turkes* forces, haue assured their Countreyes for a time, in laying a great part of the confines waste. And the *Muscovite* being in a Countrey which doth abound in Wood, shut himsele vp in a short time; So as *Stehen* King of *Poland*, meaning to passe into *Muscovie*, was forced to spend much time in cutting downe the Woods to make a passage for his Army.

And although that he which is assailed be the weaker, yet there hath beene some, which haue carried the Warre
into

into their Enemies Countrey, to make a diuersion as *Agathocles* did, who being besieged by the *Carthaginians* in *Siracusa*, resolved to leaue a sufficient troupe to maintaine the Siege, and to imbarke with the rest, to transport the Warre into *Affricke*. *Bonifacio*, Earle of *Corsega*, did the like, in the yeare 822. to retire the *Saracens* out of *Sicily*. The which succeeded the more happily, for that the *Carthaginians*, the *Affricans*, who were the inuaders, hauing not fore-seene this policy, had not provided for their Countries. And it is a generall rule, that we must assaile an Enemy where he least suspects.

But if the Enemy be so powerfull, and hath such an aduantage ouer vs, as there is no meanes to resist him, rather then to lose all, it were better to yeeld something: And if he may be freed for ready money, in making as they say a Bridge of Gold to his Enemy, he shall escape good cheape. The which hath beene happily practised by the *Florentins*, *Venetians*, and *Genois*, or else he must seeke the protection of some Prince that is neare or farre off, yet so as he may be relieued in time, or the Enemies Estate annoy'd. So the *Capouans* finding themselves prest by the *Samnites*, put themselves vnder the protection of the *Romans*. The *Genois* were sometimes protected by the *French*, and sometimes by the Dukes of *Millan*. Pope *Iulio* the second, made vse of another policy, to diuert the *French* from the Siege of *Ferrara*, selling it to the Emperour, with hope after the Warre to redeeme it againe for money: So as the *French* hauing no will to breake with the Emperour, gaue ouer their Enterprize.

There haue beene some Princes, who finding no meanes to resist, haue made choicerather to yeeld to Fortune, and to abandon their Countrey, then to see it ruined; hoping that the affaires changing, their Subiects not wholly ruined, would cal them back more willing'y then if they had bin chained away by an open rebellion, or that growing

T

obstinate

obstinate to maintaine themselves, they had bin punished by the Enemy: This succeeded happily to *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, chased from *Naples* by *Charles* the Eighth: To the *Venetians* when they abandoned their Townes vpon the firmeland, to the league of *Cambray*: To the Duke of *Urbino*, who seeing himselfe vnable to make head against *Cesar Borgia*, abandoned his Countrey, hauing first ruined all the Forts of his Estate; hoping that being well beloued of his Subiects, vpon the first alteration they will call him backe, as they did.

But for that they seeke to surprize him whō they meane to assaile by force, and to attaine vnto it, they deuise other pretexts to arme, to the end they may circumuent their Neighbour: And in like manner, when as two powerfull Neighbours make Warre together, and afterwards come to conclude a Peace, eyther of them seekes to free himselfe of his Souldiers, at the cost of some one of his Neighbours: The Prince which shall finde himselfe to haue such bad Neighbours, must presently arme, and stand continually vpon his guard whilest his Neighbours are in Armes.

These are the most generall and ordinary Remedies against forraigne force, the exterior cause of the ruine of Estates.



CHAP. II.

Of the interior Causes of the ruine of Estates.

The neare causes of the ruine of an Estate.

THe interior Causes from whence the ruine of an Estate may grow, are of two kinds: Some are neare, others are remote. The nearest are conspiracies against the Prince, or against the chiefe Magistrate, vnder whose authority the Estate is gouerned: The

The treason of Townes, strong places, or Armies: The Rebellion of Subjects against the Prince; and the Division into factions and parties. But for that these causes grow from a precedent corruption in the Estate, being but the effects of remote causes; we must seeke the mischief farther off to provide a Remedy. The causes which produce these effects, proceede either from the defect of the Soueraigne, or of the Magistrates, and others which haue the chiefe charges in the gouernment of the Estate; or through the defect of other Subjects, which are considered either in generall vnder the name of people, or relatively by the reason of their subiection; Some being borne subjects to the Prince to whom they obey; others are subjects by conquest, that is to say, borne vnder another Prince, but haue beene since conquered by him to whom they obey, or else they are considered according to their condition, quality, and power, which they haue to trouble the Estate.

Of the remote causes which ruine Estates.

Among the defects which may be found in the Soueraigne Person, those which may breed the Subjects hatred and contempt against him, are most preiudiciall. Those which ingender hatred, are cruelty and couetousnesse. Cruelty shews it selfe in the executions of such which he causeth to be punished. Auarice in the leuying of money and exactions vpon his Subjects. To remedy the first, he must deale as little as may be with the punishments of his Subjects: but referre the Iudgement of such things to the ordinary course of Iustice. But if for the good of the Estate, and for the little assurance there is in Iudges, he be forced to interpose himselfe, he must doe it seldome, and make it knowne that he doth it vnwillingly, and onely in consideration of the publique good, to the end he may retaine good men in their duties, and diuert the wicked from their bad intentions: Neither must he shew any choller, and aboue all things he must forbear to be present at Executions; That the punishments must be ordinary, and not

Of the Soueraigne defects which ingender the Subjects hatred.

A remedy against the Princes cruelty.

vnusuall, and that in punishing diuers for one fact, there must be an equality of punishments obserued. But if by the death of one alone he may preserue the rest, he ought to doe it. And if there be many that be put to death, he shall cause them to suffer altogether, to the end that by the continuance of execution it may not renew the hatred.

A remedy a-
gainst the Prin-
ces auarice.

Some haue held it fit to sweeten the hatred of an Execution, to punish the Minister which hath done it, if he be of that quality that he hath deserued it. Yet I hold this manner of proceeding vniust and tyrannous; especially if it tends to death, whereof they ought not to make so slight an accompt. Yet a Prince may in necessity, hauing no other meanes to free himselfe from Enuy, chase him away, laying the fault vpon him, and making shew that he hates him for the same Subiect, for the which he is odious vnto the people: But wholly to abandon him were basenesse. Moreouer he must sweeten rigorous Executions by benefits, yea, by gifts out of the confiscation of the parties goods which is executed, to such as be discontented with the Execution, to the end it may appeare that not couetousnesse but only Iustice hath brought the Prince vnto it. To remedy the second, he must make it appeare, that the leuies which he raieth, are grounded vpon the necessity of the Estate, there being no Estates without tributs, customs or Subsidies, the which are necessary to satisfie the expences, without the which the Estate cannot subsist and be maintayned. Impositions must be made with equality, according to euery mans goods and faculties, without hatred or fauour, and with moderation; not insupportable nor sordid; not too frequent nor new, nor vnder vnusuall names; They must be leuied with modesty, without couetousnesse, cruelty, or violence, and by honest men; and he must punish those seuerely that mis-behaue themselves.

Finally, he must make it appeare by the expences, that the money is employed for the necessity, good, and preservation

uation of the Estate, and not for the Princes ryot or prodigality, to aduance men of no worth, and to satisfie their pleasures.

As for the defects which ingender the Subjects contempt of their Prince, there are diuers sorts. Some grow from weaknesse of age; as Minority or a decrepit age. Others from nature; as deformity, or a bad aspect, the naturall dulnesse of the mind, deafnesse, and other indispositions of the body. Others proceed from Fortune; as to be vnfortunate and without support; with such other defects, which can be hardly remedied.

Of the Princes defects which cause contempt.

The principall remedy is, not to shewe himselfe vpon all occasions, whereas these defects may bee more visible. *Tyberius* finding himselfe not so affable as *Augustus*, would neuer come among the people to Playes and Theaters, as *Augustus* did: but kept himselfe close and retired, and neuer shewed himselfe but in great actions, for the which he had prepared himselfe long before. So the Prince must as much as may bee hide his imperfections; and not shewe himselfe in publique, but well prepared according to his dignity, and if it may be, recompence the defect of nature by some aduantage of the mind.

There are other defects, which breed a contempt of the Prince in the Subjects minds, the which proceeds onely by his owne fault, and may be easily auoyded: As irresolution in his Councells; lightnesse, inconstancy, and iniustice in his commands, negligence in his affaires, and seeming to depend of another, or tying himselfe so strictly to some priuate person, as he trusts him with all the affaires of the Estate; an ordinary indiscretion in many Princes. The onely remedy to preuent all this, is to doe the contrary, and to follow that which wee say must bee done to purchase reputation.

Other defects of a Prince which breed contempt.

These are the defects which ingender hatred: whereof they which procure contempt are most dangerous. For contempt giues courage to those that desire to vndertake

The Princes defects which breed contempt are more dangerous then those which cause hatred.

whereas cruelty and avarice, although they breed hatred; yet such as are fearefull: And moreover by cruelty you diminish the number of your Enemies, and amaze the rest; and by avarice and exactions you make them vnable. But the most preiudiciall defects are those which breede hatred and contempt both together: As lasciuiousnesse and drunkennesse; the one for its beastlinesse, and the other for the scandall and trouble of Families, which it doth vsually draw after it. Wherefore the Prince must not onely fly from them, but auoide the suspicion.



CHAP. 12.

Of the defects of Magistrates, Officers, and Ministers to the Prince.

THe defects, abuses, and disorders of those which haue any charge and gouernment in the Estate, the which may further its ruine, are of two sorts.

For either these abuses proceede from corruption which is found in particular persons, of whom they haue made a bad choice, or haue beene corrupted with time; or else it proceeds from some bad custome, the which vnder pretext of good, and by a bad interpretation of the Law, or of an order made in the establishment, hath beene brought in.

To remedy the first, the best course will be, that seeing the choice was bad, to make another. But therein he must vse his discretion: For that all changes are dangerous, and that sometimes seeking to preuent a mischiefe, the remedy is found worse then the disease. *Lewis* the Eleuenth meaning to reforme *France*, changed all his predecessors Officers, whom in the end he was forced to restore, to auoide a generall reuolte.

A change in an Estate is dangerous.

If

If this corruption may be easily punished without trouble in some of the principall, and that the example of punishment may reduce the rest vnto their duties; he must doe it with seuerity. But if he cannot effect it, he must draw those which nourish these abuses from their acquaintance and familiars; And imploy them in some other places with honest men, who may serue as comptrolers and examples to doe well, and to keepe them in awe.

No man is willingly bad for nothing, eyther it is to doe pleasure to some one, from whom he hopes for support; or to reuenge his owne iniuries, or those of his Friends; or for couetousnesse, the which he cannot well practise without confident mediators. Take him therefore from his acquaintance, and out of the hands of his Enemies; maintaine him against the greatest, to the end hee may not feare any future wrong: There is no doubt that there being no man to whom he may intrust his corruptions, nor whom hee may distrust, hee will bee indifferent in that regard, and will haue no thought but to doe well: But retire him before he may enter into strict familiarity with any man. And so of a man how corrupt soeuer, you may make good vse of him for your seruice; if he be not altogether impudent and depraued: In which case being easie to discouer his practises, it will be as easie for the Prince to cause him to be punished.

But if the abuse be in the bad administration of Lawes, or of the establishment which hath beene made of some order; he must eyther by interpretation, or by change, or by abrogation of the Law or order, prouide for it. But for that it would be a difficult thing, that they which made their profit by the abuse, should willingly yeeld vnto it, if they be many in number, he must make himselfe the stronger, as *Licurgus* did. For in such affaires they are commonly ill assisted; the partizans of the reformation being cold, and they which profit in the abuse,

A remedy against the abuse of Lawes.

(who haue the pretext of Custome and the Lawes for them) are more violent to preferue that which brings them profit.

Considerations
necessary for a
reformation.

But the Prince must first consider duly, if that which he meanes to establish, will hold: For that abuses which haue taken a deepe roote, are hardly pulled vp; and sometime it is more fit to liue with these abuses quietly in an Estate, then seeking to take them away, to put all into confusion. It is a body which hath an infirmity, the which you must strue to cure, yet in such sort, as you put not the patient in danger of death. It is a Philme in the eye; yet the eye hath not wholly lost its sight: If you cannot cleare it without losse of the sight, it were better to leaue it there.

Above all in a reformation you may not make a Law that looks too farre backward, and makes vs enter into the search of that which is past long since; Neither must they establish an order altogether new: But you must gently and by little and little reduce them to their first institution, and not pull vp the Tree to plant another in its place; but set it by. The string which makes an Instrument out of tune, must be gently straind, vntill it be in tune, and not broken. We know the defects and inconueniences of an ancient establishment; but we are ignorant of the inconueniences of a new.


But if the order were so peruered, as it were impossible to make vse of it; yet in the establishment of a new, you must retaine the same termes, names, and qualities of the ancient: For that the people feeding themselves more with the shew of truth, the face of antiquity in such establishments hath more authority with them; and nouelties are suspected vnto them, and lesse esteemed. But if you cannot retaine the ground of this antiquity, you must colour the innouation with the names of the ancient establishments, to giue it credit, and to make the people thinke that there is little alteration. An aduice which hath bin practi-
fed

sed by all such as vnder pretext of reformation haue sought to vsurpe an Estate : But this may be more iustly put in vse by a lawfull Prince, for the good of his Subiects, and to facilitate the reformatiō which he intends to make: In the which he hath great reason not to ingage himselfe, if he doe not confidently belecue to bring it to effect. Besides the disgrace which he shall receiue, he should by his weaknesse countenance the mischief, and despaire of the remedy: Whereof I say that he ought to make himselfe the stronger. The which I meane not onely of an armed force, but also of the inclination of the greatest part of his Subiects. And if it may be he must so worke vnderhand, as he may be required and solicited to provide for it; besides that it will make his designe easie, all the honour will be due to him. And if there be any enuy, he may easily discharge himselfe vpon those which haue required him. But if the Prince doubting the euent of a necessary reformation, desires to make it rather by some one of his Ministers, then to ingage himselfe: In this case some haue aduised rather to take but one, to whom he may giue all authority, then many. For although it seemes more conuenient, that this reformation should be countenanced by many, to the end it might carry the greater waight, and be the better receiued: yet the diuersity of opinions that is in many heads diuersly interessed, be it for themselves, or for their Friends and Kinstolkes, in this reformation; the length there will bee in making them resolute; the difficulty in this plurality to make them keepe secret, many small surprises, policies, and cunning, which they must sometimes vse, to attaine vnto this good; and in case the businesse doth not succeed, being more difficult to dismisse many, for to free himselfe of the enuy and shame to haue attempted this reformation without successe, then they may doe in one person: Wherefore it seemes more safe for the Prince to imploy but one. But the preservation of the order established, must be left to the

the care of many ; For that many hauing once found the benefit, will not willingly yeild to leaue it : And a multitude being irresolute among themselues, tend rather to leaue affaires in the Estate they are in, then to change them, vlesse they bee thrust on by some apparant profit, or by some Man of credit and authority. Hence it comes, that the companies of greatest authority in an Estate, oppose themselues more willingly to all innouations, how good soeuer ; And consent not to the change of the ancient ordinances, although they be accompanied with abuses.

But for that the same men, which made their profit of the abuse before the reformation, continuing still in those places where the abuse was committed, will finde meanes sufficient to frustrate it : Some haue beene of aduice to change them, and to imploy them else where : and others to attribute the knowledge of the contrauentions which haue beene committed to the preiudice of this reformation, to other Iudges, then those of that body which they meane to reforme. Yet therein they must gouerne themselues, according to the facility or difficulties which are found in such Establishments,

These are the principall considerations, which ought to bee obserued in a reformation ; besides those which priuate occasions, and the quality of disorders may breed in our minds. Let vs now come to the disorders which proceed from the Subjects, and may aduance the ruine of an Estate, if they be imbraced by the Enemy.



CHAP. 13.

*Of the Subiects defects in generall, which
cause the ruine of an Estates*

Although that naturall Subiects owe all obedience to their Prince, and it is their good so to maintaine themselves: Yet the nature of a multitude is so inconstant, as it cannot long subsist in one Estate. Having no employment, they invent some themselves, and forge a thousand designs to their owne disadvantage.

The most generall defects and peccant humours of a multitude.

Peace and abundance, are the things which should giue a people the greatest subiect of content, and containe them, for that they cannot change this condition without impayring. But the one in the end makes them idle; and idlenesse being tedious vnto them, they imploy their spirits to thinke ill; and which is worse, to doe mischief. The other makes them stately, proud, and vntractable; who like vnto pampered Iades, kicke many times at their Masters that haue fed them. But in danger and feare, they are tractable and easie to mannage, louing after their owne pleasure, and fearing at the discretion of another, and neuer iudging but by passion. For although that some one haue done euill, yet if the people loue him, they perswade themselves that the action had some good ground: And if they hate him, although he hath done well and vertuously, yet they interpret all to a bad sence, and attribute a good action to a sinister intention, and a bad designe.

In all that which they affect, they looke rather to an apparant profit, then to that which is iust and honourable; And if in shewe there be any thing to hazard, or to loose, although the end may bee happy and successfull, yet they will

will alwayes be of opinion to abandon that party. They neuer imbrace affaires but by the shewe, without examining the importance, if it be any thing remote; They hate the present affaires, as those wherof they are most sensible; they forget a mischeife past, although it bee farre greater then the present; They loue those which are turbulent in their actions and of suddaine execution. They vsually slander the actions of the Prince and his Gouvernours, and complaine; Yet they are easie to reduce, when they see themselves forced to obey, and that they haue no head nor any seeds of diuision. They hope more then they ought, and indure lesse then they should. They attribute to want of will and iudgment, that which proceeds from the want of power and meanes.

They are desirous of innouations, and easie to moue vpon the first wind; Credulous, increasing reports and newes, and publishing vsually that which is most forbidden; they follow the multitude, not knowing why; full of Enuy, Suspicion, and distrust: ingratfull for the benefits they haue receiued, and reuengfull of injuries, yea of another mans; little carefull of the Estate, and louing nothing but an vnrestrayned liberty, wherof they are soone weary: finally doing nothing by election, but all by hazard.

Behold a part of the blemishes and defects of a people considered in generall: Whereon most part of those which haue attempted against another mans Estate, haue grounded their designs, making vse of them by many practises, according to occasion and the condition of affaires. And although there be many among a multitude free from these imperfections: yet being drawne together with the rest, the greatest number carries it, and most commonly they houle (as they say) with the Wolves. One foole or rash man is sufficient to stopp the mouthes of many wise, and to make them all loose the course of reason. And most commonly that which they condemne
in

in particular, being in a throng, and with the rest they like of, and allow ; bee it that wee are restrayned through feare to oppose our selues to the common way, which is vsually the worst, and sometimes composed of the most fooles, the most impudent, and the most mutinous ; or be it that by this contagion, wee feele the like passions which transport the rest, and with the like heate wee suffer our selues to be carried to the same resolutions.

The Ancients finding all these pecant humours in the peoples minds, to entertaine and busie them, and by this meanes to diuert them from doing euill, haue sought out diuers meanes. The *Grecians* entertayned them with sports, Comedies, Tragedies, Wrestlings, and Olimpique Games. The *Romans* added thereunto Sword-players, representation of Nauell Battailles, and the combats of wild Beasts. The Kings of *Egypt* busied their Subjects in the construction of Pyramides and buildings, although for the most part vnprofitable. The Christians in some places, when as they feare the peoples disposition to mutine, haue imployed them in Processions, Prayers, in the visitation of Oratories and Churches, with other extraordinary deuotions, as Cardinall *Borromeo* did often at *Mellan*, and others in other places. But when as all these meanes haue not beene forcible enough to retaine them, they haue stirred vp a forraigne Warre, not only to diuert the peoples minds by this obiect ; but also to entertayne them a little with the feare of a common Enemy, and to free the Estate from those pecant humours, which being still retained might ruine it.

Remedies to cure the Estate of these defects and bad humours.

But sometimes the Estate is so composed as it would bee dangerous to entertaine a continuall Warre, eyther for that they are weake of Men and meanes, or for feare that giuing the commandement to some one, he should get vnto himselfe the authority of Armes. The which cannot be but prejudiciall in all Estates : The Prince being vnable to bee still conductor of his Armies, without hazar-

hazarding of his person too much, and leauing a great part of his Countrey ill provided for. In a Commonweale this would be of more dangerous consequence; if they doe not gouerne themselves in that respect like vnto the *Swisses*, who desiring rather to make Warre for another, then for themselves, send forth their most busie and turbulent Men to serue Princes, to purge the Countrey.

Behold the most ordinary remedies which are practised, to preserve themselves from these bad humours of the people, considered in generall. But there are others which are particular, according to the diuers conditions of persons, whereof the people consists; and others which must bee practised with a people Conquered.

XX

CHAP. 14.

*Of diuers sorts of humours among the Subjects,
according to the diuersity of their
Conditions.*

Three sorts of
persons in all
Estates.

IN all Estates there are three sorts of persons: Great Men who haue power, credit, and wealth: The poore and miserable who want all, and the meaner sort. These last are usually more quiet and easie to gouerne: The rest are more difficult, for that great Men by the commodity which riches brings with it, doe hardly abstaine from doing Euill. The miserable for the necessities wherein they find themselves, are commonly vicious and capable of all parties.

The Credit, alliances, and wealth of great Men, makes them vntactable, little obedient, and sometimes insupportable; and pride and presumption giues them courage to vndertake: Contrariwise the miserable, are easily moued to any insolencie. The actions of great Men
are

are accompanied with violence : Those of the poore and needy with fraud and malice. But the meaner sort, hauing neyther so great meanes which might make them grow proud, nor power to attempt ; Neither being in such necessity, as they should be thrust into extraordinary actions, they desire rather to preserve the certaine, then to runne after the vncertaine : and so they are neither transported with ambition, nor oppressed with necessity. Presupposing then that this sort of Men continue in their duties, let vs examine the two others.

There are severall sorts of great Men : Some are so neere vnto the Prince by alliance or kindred, as they may in time pretend vnto the Estate. Others, who being Lords of great possessions, enioy in the Princes Estate, Lordships, and Reuenues of great consequence. The third kind is of those, who by their valour or wisdom in the gouernment of important affaires of the Estate, haue purchased credit and reputation with the people, or among the Men of Warre. The fourth are they, to whom the Prince hath committed his forces, his gouernments, and his cheife places.

Meanes to
containe great
Men in their
duties.

Many Princes before they had any subiect of suspicion of an Enterprize, haue growne iealous of their neere kinsmen. *Alexander* meaning to passe into *Asia*, put all his neere kinsmen to death, except one of his base brethren, whom hee had no cause to feare. This villainous and barbarous course hath past for a rule of State among the *Turkes*. The Kings of *Ormus*, before they were expelled by the *Portugalls*, put out the eyes of all their neere kinsmen. The which it may be they learned from some Emperours of *Constantinople*. The Kings of *China*, & those of *Ethiopia*, shut them all vp into one place, from whence not any one comes forth, but he that is to succeed in the Estate.

Of great Men
allied to the
Prince.

Christendome is more happy : For although wee haue scene that *Phillip* the second King of *Spaine* hath bin forced

forced to put his Sonne to death, for some ieaiousie hee had conceiued of him ; yet this is not ordinary. And the Kings entertainethemselues with their kinsmen, making much of them, and intreating them courteously, yet not trusting them with all their forces, which may giue them meanes to attempt, nor yet crushing nor disgracing them, to the end they may not dispaire : And by this honest and courteous course, they take from them both the meanes and desire to doe euill.

They which are great in meanes and Reuenues, are the sinewes and strength of an Estate, whom they may not in any case ruine, as some Ministers of Tyranny haue conceiued, but they must bee preserved to maintaine the Estate. And those Estates where there bee not any, are exposed in Prey to the first losse of a Battaile : For that hauing no Man that hath credit to draw them againe together, being vnfurnished of support and counsell, they presently resolue to yeild vpon the first amazement. The which hath beene often seene in *Egypt*. Contrariwise those Estates which haue beene powerfull in Nobility, although they haue beene often ouerthrowne, yet they haue easily recovered themselues. *France* and *Persia*, the *English* and *Spaniards*, with those of *Tartary* and the *Turkes*, haue sometimes beene oppressed and brought low : But by the meanes of the Nobility, who haue more courage and conduct to maintaine the Estate then the people, they haue alwayes recovered themselues.

And to say that such kind of people may trouble the Prince, this may sometimes happen, if the Prince bee a Tyrant, which seekes to oppress them, or wants counsell & courag : As they whom the *Carliens*, and *Capets*, caused to retire from the gouernment of the Estate. But neuer an able and sufficient Prince, who knew how to make vse of Men of this condition, ran any bad fortune with them. The meanes to make profitable vse of them, is to countenance them with Maiestie, to doe for them in

occasions which may be offered; to imploy them neare his person with honour and magnificence, rather then to commit his forces and all his authority into their hands: And they which shall be suspected of lightnesse and inconstancy, to cause them to be accompanied by men which may watch and obserue their actions. This is the Councell (as they write) which the Emperour *Charles* the fift gaue vnto the deceased *Philip* King of *Spaine*, to imploy great men, and to retaine them neare vnto his person in the most honourable places, and giue those of Command to men of a meaner condition: But his Sonne neglecting this aduice, in the person of *Don John* of *Austria*, drew himselfe into danger of an inconuenience.

As for the two other sorts of great men, they cannot be such but by the Princes meanes. Wherefore it is easie for him to preuent the inconueniences which this greatnesse may cause; and the fault must be imputed to himselfe, seeing it was in his power to hinder it. The meanes which may be vsed herein, are common to eyther. For some haue beene made great, and haue gotten credit, for that they had the force and authority in their hands; And the others are great by reason of their birth. The principall meanes then to preuent the inconueniences which may grow, is in the choice, wherein the Prince must obserue foure considerations.

Of great men which haue force and credit with the people by reason of his imployments in great affaires.

The first is, that he commit not his forces and authority to any that are borne great; as they of whom we haue formerly spoken: For that he cannot adde so little to the greatnesse of such men, but he shall equall them vnto himselfe. The other considerations are, that he make not choice for a great command, or to lead a great Army, of a man that is audacious and vndertaking, or of one that is too cunning and subtil: Much lesse of a person that is inconstant and light, inclined to feare and hope, and subiect to follow the En-

Considerations to aduance some one in authority.

terprizes of another, or to bee surpris'd by some one.

Inconueni-
ences proceede
from the con-
tinuation of
great places in
one person.

The second meanes is, not to continue great Charges, as the governments of Prouinces, of strong places, and of a great troupe of Souldiers long in one and the same person, to the end hee may auoyde three inconueniences. The first, lest that governments by little and little be not made hereditary and patrimoniall, as they haue done in all places of Fees; and in *France* of the ancient Earle domes, Dutches, and Marquesats. The other inconuenience is, that the Prince depriues himselfe vnaduisedly of the meanes to make vse of a better subiect, who may in time discouer himselfe vnto him. The third is, that it may be he to whom he hath giuen this charge, may through indisposition grow vnable, or by Age vnfit, or through passion or some particular designe, be preiudiciall to the Estate. The fourth meanes is, neuer to giue the great command of a Prouince to any one that is borne there; lest that by the meanes of his Kindred, Aliances, and Friends, with the fauour he may haue from the Prince, which will purchase him many seruants, he findes not meanes to perpetuate himselfe.

But if eyther by a bad establishment, or some bad custome, the Prince findes his Estate otherwise disposed, he may gently provide for it, in suppressing and drawing to himselfe this great authority and power; or dismembring it into diuers charges, which may depend immediately of himselfe. And if he cannot reduce the Gouvernours to such termes as he holds it fit for his safety, some haue held opinion, that he should strip them by little and little of his forces, in providing for his places of strength, and causing the Garrisons to be changed euery three yeares; and in like manner to haue the Gouvernor assisted by one or two of his chiefe Councillors, without whose aduice he might not resolue any thing: Thinking that by this meanes they should not onely preuent the Gouvernours

Gouernours Enterprizes, but also make them more careful to doe that which concerne the Princes service, seeing their actions obserued.

The poore and needy are no lesse dangerous to the quiet of the Estate then great men, and great men which haue had a will to mutine, haue made vse of them: For that the present Estate being contrary vnto them, they desire a change, hoping to change their condition; and amidst the disorder and violence to free themselves from the necessity wherein they liue. The meanes to shelter himselfe on that side, is to hinder this necessity in an Estate; but principally excesse and vsury; for that excesse begins pouerty, and vsury brings it to extremity. Necessity may likewise be preuented, bringing in abundance; And especially by imploying the common people in all sorts of Manufactures, as *Vopiscus* writes they did in *Alexandria*, where the gouty and blind found meanes to get their liuing.

Of the poore and needy,

Meanes to containe the common people in their duties.

Excesse and Vsury the chiefe causes of pouerty.

Solon in *Athens* bound the Fathers to teach their Children a Trade, vpon a penalty to be deprived of all succours and respect which the Children owe vnto their Fathers. In *China* the Children are bound to follow their Fathers Trade, and for such as had not any, they imployed them about their publique buildings; as *Augustus* and the Kings of *Egypt* did. To conclude, they must imploy such men, and not leaue the Estate in the hands of the needy, and of men which haue nothing to loose. And thus much concerning the restraint of naturall Subjects.



CHAP. 15.

*Meanes to containe conquered Subiects
in their duty.*

To giue con-
quered subiects
in interest an
the govern-
ment.

THe Subiects which haue bin conquered eyther by force, or by treaty, are vsually more difficult to gouerne then the naturall. Wherefore besides that which we haue spoken concerning the Naturall, we must obserue with these more discretion and precaution. The principall and most generall meanes to containe the Subiects by conquest, in the obedience of the Prince which hath conquered them, is to giue them such interest in his gouernment, as they may haue a feare to change, lest they should impaire their condition: Otherwise the peoples inclination being contrary to the Conquerour, the Principality will be like vnto a Tree without roots, which owes his fall to the first winde.

Mildnesse and
clemency.

He must fauor
religious men
and learned.

Hee must ob-
serue the con-
tracts made
with the coun-
try conquered.

He must breed
vp youth like
vnto his natu-
ral subiects.

The meanes which we haue sayd are necessary for a Prince to purchase loue and reputation, will much import him with this kind of Subiects: And amongst others mildnesse and clemency. Hee must likewise fauour Religious men, and such as be learned and vertuous, which shall be found in the Countrey, for that the people doe commonly gouerne themselues to good or euil, according to the consciences of such kind of men. He must in like manner make much of great men, and imploy them in honorable charges; Yet out of the Countrey of conquest: And in like manner to giue them Estates and Seignouries else-where: He must obserue the contracts, conuentions, & priuiledges vnder which the Countrey was yeelded; for that one breach made by the Prince, makes them to feare the lesse of the rest. Hee must breed vp many Young men of their conquered Countrey, after the manner of his naturall Subiects: As *Alexander* did thirty thousand

thou and young *Persians*, of whom he made choice, to be instructed after the *Macedonian* manner.

The *Romans* erected Colledges and Seminaries, vpon pretext to ciuillize the Nations which they conquered; but in effect it wasto imploy them otherwise then in the Warre, and to traine them vp after the *Romans* manner. And they which were best conceipted of their intentions, sayd, that it made a part of the Seruitude, vnder which they reduced the Prouinces which they conquered. The *Turke* holds another course in the breeding vp of his *Ianizaries*, the which although it seems violent, yet it is grounded vpon reason and iudgement. For choosing them among the Christians Children, he fortifies his power, in weakning his Subjects which are most suspected vnto him. Marriages and Alliances helpe much to ioyne and vnite a conquered Prouince with the naturall Subjects. *Alexander* purchased much loue of the *Persians*, hauing married a *Persian* Lady. And as *Titus Livius* sayth, there was nothing did so much hinder the *Capouans* from accommodating themselues with *Hannibal*, then the priuate alliances they had contracted with the *Romans*.

The *Romans* also made vse of another meanes, hauing interessed in the preservation of their Estate, the greatest part of the neighbour Prouinces conquered by them, receiuing them into their Citty, giuing sometimes to priuate persons, and sometimes to a whole Prouince the right of Burgeoisie, and making them sharers in the honours of the Citty. But to reduce them wholly to the forme of naturall Subjects, by little and little they brought in their owne Language; as since the *Arabians* haue done in all their conquest. And *William* the Conquerour, and before him the *Saxons* in the greatest part of *England*, not suffering the Lawes to be written or published but in their languages, nor the audiences for the dispatch of affaires and Comissions for Letters patents; The contracts of priuate men were past in the same language,

You must make Marriages betwixt them and his naturall Subjects.

The Conqueror must bring his owne Language into the conquered Country.

to the end they might force them mildly to learne it.

Hee may not
change the
Lawes and Re-
ligion of the
conquered coun-
trei but with
great Iudge-
ment.

As for the Customes and ancient Lawes of the Coun-
trei, which concerne onely the ordning of priuate mens
goods, and not the Estate, nor the obedience due vnto
the Prince, he may not change them: Or if he doth,
it must be done by degrees. For what Iustice soeuer there
be in a new Law, the people being not accustomed vnto
it, will suspect it. But if the change of Lawes be pre-
judiciall to a Conquerour, the change of Religion is
much more, there being nothing wherein the people
grow more obstinate, then to retaine their ancient Re-
ligion. Yet this will be no hinderance, but by the e-
recting of Colledges and Seminaries of Piety, the Con-
querour may bring in Learning and Knowledge, by
meanes whereof gaining dayly someone, he may by lit-
tle roote out that of the Countrey without force. And if
he cannot speedily attaine to his designe, at the least he
shall haue this aduantage, that those of the conquered
Subjects which adhere to his Religion, will be confident
vnto him, and making shew to fauour them, the rest
will be soone reclaimed.

But whatsoeuer the Conquerour be to bring in newly
among a conquered people, be it Religion, Customes,
Tributes, or Lawes: the establishments must bee made
whilest the amazement of the conquest last; and that the
people are in feare of worse. For if you suffer them to
know themselues, and to grow assured; besides the dif-
ficulty you shall finde to make them taste these Innouati-
ons, it is to be feared they will make vse of it for a pre-
text of reuolt.

Force is a po-
werfull meanes
to containe
conquered sub-
iects in their
duty.

But if all these meanes proue too weake, (as they
will be with an vntamed multitude) to keepe such peo-
ple in awe and obedience, there is no other meanes to con-
taine them, then to make vse of the same force which con-
quered them. The *Romans* haue imployed whole Ar-
mies: yet mutinies being too ordinary, and of a dangerous
consequence

consequence in these great Bodies, this example hath not beene followed by the wisest Conquerours : But in stead thereof they haue made vse of strong Forts and good Garrisons, well commanded and gouerned. And some haue therein imitated the *Romans* in planting of Collonies, the which are of lesse expence, and seeme more milde ; but in effect they are more vniust in their establishments : For that you must ruine many people to settle them with commodity ; and moreover, they are difficult to settle, as well for the choice of men which you are to send, as for the planting of any good order amongst them, to make them liue in peace. If you send of the chiefe men of your Estate, you vnfurnish it, if they be many in number ; if few, they will make themselves Masters of the rest. If you take them all poore, as the *Romans* did, disorders will easly grow amongst them ; and to liue at their owne pleasures, they will at neede ioyne with them of the Countrey against you ; as many Roman Collonies haue done against the *Romans*. But if you gather them out of diuers parts of your Estate, they will hardly agree.

The planting of Collonies more vniust & difficult.

Yet if the conquest were of so great an extent, as the expence would proue excessiue, to maintaine them in their duties by force, you may make vse of this meanes with these considerations ; First your Estate must be such, as sending a good number of your Subiects to that end, you may not vnfurnish your selfe : That the Warre had so vnpeopled the conquered Countrey, as after the conquest you should not be forced to commit so open an iniustice, as to ruine part of the Inhabitants for the planting of Collonies. These spoyles and vnpeoplings are excusable during the time you are in Armes : But afterwards they can admit no excuse, what considerations soeuer are brought to the contrary, and this vnpeopling made during the Warre, giues place and excuse to a Collony.

Considerations for the settling of Collonie.

The third consideration is, that you must send Soldiers which haue beene accustomed to liue in discipline and order : The which must not be so old, as they cannot accustome themselves to the place where they shall be planted ; nor yet so young, as they shall be incapable of Discipline ; but being mingled one with another, they may liue together with some good order and equality.

Other meanes
to containe co-
quered subjects
in their duties.

To mollifie the
courage of a
conquered peo-
ple.

Besides this meanes they haue added three others to containe vntamed Subjects. The first is, to abate and mollifie their courages : The second to weaken them of forces, and to take from them all meanes to doe euill, when you cannot make them loose the desire. And the third to keepe them from assembling together, or from ioyning with their Neighbours. To attaine vnto the first, some as the *Turke* hath ruined the Nobility and the Princes, to take from the people all meanes to assemble, and make a head vnder some Commander of courage. Others haue suffered them to abandon themselves to drunkenesse, and to all sorts of incontinency and pleasure. But these meanes are tyrannicall and filthy. *Numa* who was wiser and more moderate, to mollifie this barbarousnesse, which *Romulus* had entertained among the people of *Rome*, made vse of Religion, to the end he might retaine by the feare of the Gods, those whom the feare of men could not containe ; and for this effect he caused Statues and Altars to be erected at the Corners of Streets, to the end that the people might generally be retained by the presence of Religion which they had before their eyes. In the Christian Religion diuers sorts of Orders and Rules haue bin instituted, the which besides the good which concernes Religion, purge the World of many sauage humours, which happily wou'd doe much mischief. Others haue inuited people to giue themselves to all Mechanicke Arts. For besides that the mind is diuerted from euill by this imployment, most commonly they which are bred vp in shops, haue no desire of troubles,

troubles, nor Warre: And admit they should affect it, they should find themselves vnfit, neither would it be successful. there being more losse for them then gaine. Others vnder pretext of priuiledges, exempt a conquered people from going to the Warre, and by little and little make them vnprofitable by this exemption.

Some haue held that imbarcking them in the study of Sciences and Learning, it was a good meanes to make them desire rest. Yet in bringing in the study of Sciences, you must distinguish them: For those which may serue for the Warre, must in no sort be imparted to the people, nor those which teach to command: But onely such as are fitting studies, as Diuinity, Phisicke, Astrology, or such like, the which so entertaine their minds, as they ioy in no other thing when they know them, and make their spirits melancholly, depriuing them of that viuacity which is necessary for military actions. Some others haue held that busying, a riotous and contentious people in suits, was necessary, not onely to imploy their minds, but also to giue them meanes to vomit out this bitterness and bad humour, whereof euery one hath a part, without troubling the Publique: And in regard thereof they haue fill'd Estates with diuers Offices, in some sort to content the most ambitious; and by the iealousie of the maintaining of their authority, to binde them to the preservation of the Publique. But in the practice of all these meanes, they must first obserue the humour of the people with whom you are to deale; and make vse of that wherunto you shall see them inclined, and accomodate your selfe accordingly, as occasion and time wil giue you leaue. As for the disarming of a conquered people of their forces and meanes, they proceed after diuers manners. The first is, to take from them all sorts of Armes: And not onely the vse, but also the matter and making of them; for in a mutiny and combustion, they may make vse of it: As also the vse of Horses and of Ships of War.

To weaken a conquered people.

Warre. To keepe their commanders about you, eyther for Councillor vnder collour of some charge : To imploy the Youth which haue beene already trayned vp to Armes, out of the Countrey : as *Cesar* did, meaning to passe into *England*, who carried with him all the Young Men, assuring himselfe by this meanes of the *Gaules*, and making vse of them against those of great Brittain. He likewise vnder the collour of hostages, vnfurnished the Townes of their principall Men, and of such as might either serue for conduct or Councill. The Emperour *Heraclius* to weaken the *Saracins*, entertained foure thousand *Arabians*, which were their principall force. We haue sayd that the Turke weakened the Christians, in taking their Children to be instructed in his Religion, and by this meanes fortifies himselfe. The *Desmaneling* of Townes and strong places, which a Prince will not or cannot keepe, is also necessary ; For fortresses in Townes haue many times encouraged the Inhabitants to a reuolt, as *Tacitus* writes of *Ierusalem*.

To hinder the
vnion of a con-
quered people.

There remaines the third meanes, which is to hinder these people from vniting themselves, and making a head; for their vnion will hold the place of force. Some Kings, or rather Tyrants of *Egypt*, haue made vse of the diuersity of Religions, to keepe their Subiects in diuision ; Others haue entertained iealousies and distrusts among them, and sometimes hatred betwixt Neighbour Prouinces. Others haue kept their Subiects in feare : by certaine secrets and hidden searches, causing him to bee punished speedily, which was found to haue any will to Mutine : And some haue written that the inquisition in *Spaine*, although in shewe it were Established for Religion, yet they haue sometimes made it serue for an instrument of Estate.

Some haue of a Conquered Prouince made three or foure ; as the *Romans* did of *Macedony*, which they deu-
 uided into foure, that is to say, *Amphipolis*, *Salonica*, *Pel-*
la,


la, and *Pellagonia*. And beſides this *Paulus Amillius*, commanded the great Men to paſſe into *Italy* with their Children, and after this diuiſion, the Prouinces were forbidden to contract any alliances one with another. Others haue forbidden a conquered people all ſorts of aſſemblies, allowing them neyther publique Councell, nor Comminalty, nor Brotherhood; as the *Romans* did at *Carona*, leauing them no forme of publique command. The *Turkes* in like manner hath forbidden Bells, not onely to the Chriſtians, but through his whole Empire, fearing (as ſome hold) that at the ſound thereof, the people ſhould gather together for ſome deſigne then for deuotion. The *Souldans* of *Egypt* fearing the multitude of the Inhabitants at *Caire*, croſt the City in many places with trenches, and broad and deepe ditches, to take all meanes from the people in a Mutinie to aſſemble ſuddenly together.

But to hinder a new conquered people, from vniting themſelues with others, beſides theſe meanes they haue reſtrayned them from all commerce with ſtrangers, forbidding them to goe out of the Countrey without leaue, as ſome write of *England*, *Muſcouie*, and *China*, and not ſuffering any ſtrangers to enter without paſſport, keeping guards and ſecret ſpies vpon the Ports and paſſages. But if you cannot preuaile by theſe meanes, ſome haue bin of opinion to transport them to other places, as they of the mountaines of *Genoua*, were drawne into the plaine by the *Romans*. *Aurelian* tranſplanted the *Daces* on this ſide the *Danowe*; *Charlemaigne* the *Saxons* into *Flanders*, and the *Turke* many people of *Aſia* into *Greece*.

Theſe are the meanes, whereof they haue made uſe to preuent a future miſcheife, that is to ſay, the effects of theſe firſt cauſes of the ruine of an Eſtate. But if they haue beene forgotten, or proue too weake to ſtay the Subiects minds, and to keepe them from running to neerer courſes to ruine the Eſtate: then

you

you must of necessity, vse remedies fit for euery one of these causes, to preferue it.



CHAP. 16.

Of the neereſt cauſes of the ruine of an Eſtate.

Of a Conſpiracie againſt the Princes

perſon : Of the Cauſes thereof :

Of the meanes to auoyd it :

Of the diſcovery and

Puniſhment.

Conſpiracy
againſt the
Princes perſon.

Meanes to pre-
uent.

Cauſes of a con-
ſpiracy.

The iniury
which they
feare to receiue
from the Prince

As the Prince is the Axeltree whereon the Eſtate turnes ; ſo a conſpiracy againſt his perſon ſucceeds according to the deſire of the conſpirators , or drawes after it many times the ruine of the Eſtate, to preuent the which they make vſe of foure meanes ; the firſt is , not to doe any thing that doth vſually inuite the Subjects to ſuch conſpiracies , the ſecond to cauſe himſelfe to be guarded , and not to ſuffer any vnkowne perſon to aproach neere vnto him , the third is to obſerue the actions of his guards and of his familiars and great men , the fourth to cauſe ſuch as ſhalbee ſurprized , to bee duly punniſhed.

In regard of the firſt , the cauſes which draw men vſually to ſuch wicked deſignes are theſe : an iniury receiued from the Prince or a feare to receiue one ; the ambition of great men and of fauourites , the deſire of liberty, and the zeale of Religion.

An Iniury is of three ſorts , for either it concerns life, honour or goodes ; and they which haue beene thruſt on through feare of their liues , haue moſt commonly preuailed in their enterprize : for the deſpaire wherein they are, makes them to hazard their liues more freely, to ſaue it by the loſſe of the Princes, who ſeekes to take away theirs,

theirs, running no worse fortune in this hazard then to loose that which could not otherwise preserve: and therefore a Prince should not reduce any man, be he great or small in that extremity. And iniury done to the honour is great in a person of courage, and *Bodille* testified it, who slew *Childeric* which had caused him to be whipt: But of all iniuries, that which concerns the honour of Woemen and the Bed, is one of the most powerfull in such enterprises, whereof there are many examples; An iniury which concerns mens Estates is not so violent, and few men to recover their goods, or in revenge of that which hath beene taken from him, will hazard their liues: and yet in a great courage, the revenge of any iniury whatsoever is much to be feared.

As for the ambition of great men and fauourites, it doth produce more conspiracies then iniuries, for that the weake although they haue receiued an iniury from the Prince, they cannot hurt him for want of comodity and support; But great men who haue both the one and the other, and ambition withall, which is sometimes no lesse violent then revenge, giues them more meanes to preuaile in such designs: yet there are seldome such enterprises, but when as the Prince hath suffered some one to grow to that power, that hee wants nothing but the Crowne.

Wherefore the first meanes to auoyd this danger, is to humble such men by degrees; as if he cannot suffer them to liue without hazard to make them away speedily: As *Tiberius* did of *Sciannus*, the Second is to appoint successors after him, if he hath no Childeren: be it by Adoption or Election; provided alwayes that the Lawes of State allow it: But these successors must not be so great and powerfull, as they may haue a will to make the like enterprises, desiring rather to make themselves Maisters of the Estate, then attend the succession; For the which *Augustus* knew well how to provide
by

by the Adoption of successors in many degrees, supporting and strengthening his Gouverment euen by this meanes.

The desire of
liberty.

The desire of Liberty doth likewise produce a powerfull and strong effect in the minds of Men, who are otherwise ill affected to the Prince, and he must haue a very strong bridle to restraine them, when it is once entered into the minds of a multitude, who haue the more courage, when they constantly beleue that all meanes are lawfull to dispossesse an vsurper, or a Prince whom they hold vnlawfull: This it is which hath produced in former time, so many Murtherers of Tyrants, and with the like desire they were thrust on, which conspired against the Dukes of Florence.

The inconsiderate
zeale of
Religion.

I am ashamed to put Religion in this number, and to make it the cause of so many wicked enterprises, as hath beene practised against Princes; there being nothing so impious, nor so contrary to Religion, as such Murthers. Yet the *Jewes* Bookes are full of such examples: And in truth it is contrary to Religion, to beleue that God would punish wicked Princes, and free his people by this meanes, and that the Diuine iustice make vse of such instruments, as Men doe of Hangmen, to execute his decrees: But if for this reason the end haue beene sometimes good, and the euent to the honour of God; yet the action in it selfe is bad: They be Rods, which after the punishment are good for nothing but the fire, so the *Jewes* to hinder the consequence of such actions, haue represented them as done by the expresse commandement of God: And yet certaine Diuines, fuller of malice then Piety, haue sought to draw consequences from thence: and of a Religion full of Piety and mildnesse, haue made an Altar of impiety, pouring for the bloud of Kings and Princes, vpon pretext of a contrary Religion, wherein they haue followed the proceeding of the old man of the Mountaine, who bred vp many yong men

Men to such enterprizes, promising them another life full of vnspeakeable pleasures and ioyes: who being transported with the hope thereof, exposed themselues freely to death: And without any other Army, his Estate (although of a small extent) kept all other Monarches and Potentates in feare to be murdered, forcing them to seeke his Friendship, and some to pay him a Tribute to liue in safety: So as in the end the Kings of Armenia were forced to roote out this Race of Assassins.

To preserve himselfe from all these sorts of vnder-
takers, you must vnderstand, that all conspiracies doe
not alwayes succeed, by reason of some defects, where-
of some one doth vsually fall out in such attempts.
The first is, for that hauing resolved to obserue a
certaine order in the execution, most commonly the
particularities which they haue foreseene, doe not
impe, and will doe lesse, if the Prince doth not impart
to any man, whether he meanes to goe, or what hee in-
tends to doe long before; but doth so vary in his actions,
as none but himselfe is able to deuine of the time when
he meanes to part, nor of the place whither he intends to
goe, nor where he meanes to stay, nor how he will bee
accompanied. The second defect is, that many times the
Executioners heart failes him, either by an amazement
which seizeth on him, seeing the Prince to looke on him,
and to obserue his countenance; or his courage failes him
and grows milde by the good countenance he shews him.

Wherefore many Princes suffering all men to approach
neare vnto them, doe not forbear to obserue such as are
vnknowne vnto them: So as he which hath a will to at-
tempt, is easily discovered in lifting vp his Armes, or in
approaching too neare vnto him; and his constant looke
would be sufficient to make him grow into distrust that
hee was discovered, and diuert him from his En-
terprize.

Other

Other Princes hauing suspition of some, haue purposely cast forth words of distrust, which notwithstanding might be interpreted in a double sence, and speaking them they haue obserued the countenance of those whom they distrusted, to the end they might discouer their hearts. The third error is the little discretion of him that attempts, as he that meant to kill *Commodus*, entering into the Ampitheater; before he gaue the blow began to cry out, behold what the Senate sends thee: For these words aduertized *Commodus*, and gaue his guard meanes to preuent him, wherefore Guards are necessary for a Prince, not onely for a signe of his greatnesse, or that being accompanied with force he may haue the more authority: But likewise to preferue him, and to obserue the countenance of such as approach neere vnto him.

The manner of passing before Princes, although it seemes to be practised onely for honour, yet it was beneficiall to *Pandolpho* Tyrant of *Syenna*, against whom *Iulio Belanty*, his Sonne in-lawe, had laid an ambush in his house, by the which *Pandolpho* was accustomed to passe, to goe and visite a Friend of his which lay sicke; But *Pandolpho* staying in his lodging, to speake to some one, it gaue time to them of his traine to goe before; who by this meanes without thinking of it, discouered the Enterprize: Whereas if after his accustomed manner, hee had gone first, he had beene in danger to haue beene surprized.

The fourth Errour is a false imagination, or an accident not foreseene. They which had resolued to kill *Cesar*, seeing *Popilius* one of their companions to discourse long with him, they had a conceipt that he spake of the Enterprize; which made them resolue to aduance their designe, feareing that in staying longer they should bee discouered. A word may sometimes diuert such Men. An accident not foreseene discouered the Treason intended against *James* King of great Brittain; and a letter sent by
one

one to a friend of his, not to be present at the assembly of the Estates, not giving him any other reason, made them carefull to visite all places about the House at *Westminster*, where the Prince and Peeres were to assemble: Where in a Cellor vnder the great Hall, in the which the Peeres were to sit, (where the King with the Queene and their Children, were to assist in person) they found a great quantity of Gun-powder, and Fagots, to blow vp the Chamber and the whole assembly.

Some Princes haue gone priuily armed when they went in publique; as they say, *Cosmo de Medici* did. The *Turkish* Princes after that *Baiazet* had beene in danger to be slaine by a *Dernis*, haue not suffered any vnknowne person to approach neare vnto them, which is not accompanied by two *Capigies*, or Vihers, who hold those that goe vnto him by the Armes: And this custome is practised with the Embassadours of Princes. There are many other meanes which are diuersly practised, according to the persons, time, and place. Yet the most generall is, to haue a good eye to the Enterprises which may be attempted openly. But that which is most to be feared in Princes, is poisoning: the essay which is taken of his Meate and Drinke, cannot warrant a Prince. Some haue accustomed themselves to take Counter-poison, as *Mitridates* did. But the safest way is to haue faithfull and vigilant persons about him, to haue a care of it, besides the ordinary Officers, which are appointed to prepare the Princes Meate and Drinke: And these must not be knowne if it may be, lest they should corrupt them, as they may doe the ordinary Officers. He must likewise haue confident persons, to watch and obserue the actions of such as they may distrust, (which is the third remedy to frustrate the effect of a conspiracy) And if they be such as they ought to be, it will be a difficult thing but they will discover what is practised.

Conspiracies are discovered by two meanes; either by the discovery of Treasures.
X the

the report of another, or by coniecture. Report proceeds either from the little fidelity, or from the little discretion of those to whom the Treason is imparted. This little faith is vsually found among men: For such a businesse cannot be communicated but to him that is a deare friend to the vndertaker, or to one that is discontented with the Prince, against whom they conspire. To find such a Friend that will willingly expose his life to an apparant danger, it is very difficult: And admit you finde him, yet you cannot be assured of his Courage, although you haue tryed him in other affaires. Moreouer to measure a mans fidelity in this subiect, by the discontentment he hath of the Prince, were great indiscretion. For the vndertaker hauing discovered his intentions to this discontented person, he giues him meanes to recouer the Princes fauour. Wherefore the hatred hee beares vnto the Prince, must be exceeding great, or the vndertakers must haue much authority and credit with him, to make him to keepe his Faith: For the malecontent desiring nothing more then the Princes grace and fauour, he shall haue a good occasion to hope for it by the discovery of the enterprize.

By the little indiscretion which is likewise in such men, conspiracies are commonly discovered, either in speaking too much, or before such as he ought not: like vnto *Brutus* Sonnes, who hauing conferrd with the *Tarquins* Embassadours before one of their Seruants, they were discovered by him, to haue conspired against their Countrey. *Cataline* acquainted *Fuluia* with his designe, who discovered it to *Cicero*; *Dionis* discovered the Treason which he had plotted against *Alexander*, to a yong youth named *Nichomachus*, who reuealed it to *Cibalinus*, and he to *Alexander*.

The Treason of *Scenius* against *Nero*, was discovered by coniecture; *Scenius* hauing the day before the Execution of the Enterprize, made his will and
comman-

commanded *Milichus* his freed man to sharpen his Dagger; he enfranchised all his Bond-men, and caused many Rowlers to be made for the binding vp of wounds: So as this freed man doubting that these preparations were for some such Enterprize, aduertised *Nero*, who by his meanes discovered the other conspirators. In like manner Spies prying vp and downe, may by the indiscretion, lightnesse, or malice of another, or by coniecture, haue some light of that which passeth; and they must especially obserue the actions of discontented persons, and of such as may better their condition by the Princes death.


It remaines now to know, (after the discouery of such Enterprizes) how to punish them fitly and seasonably. For many times it may be done vnfitly: And instead of amazing the confederates which are not yet discovered, you shall thrust them on to effect their designe. Sometimes they shall incense and inuite others to make attempts, in stead of diuerting them by the punishment of the first. The Prince being aduertised of some Enterprize against his person, before he publish it or seeke to punish it, he must seeke to discover it with all the particularities and circumstances, if it be possible, measuring the condition of the conspirators with his owne. If the Conspirators be strong, he must resolute vpon some other pretext to make himselfe the stronger; and in the meane time he must dissemble, bestowing fauours and gifts vpon the Conspirators, lest that finding themselves discovered, they attempt not openly.

In the conspiracy of the two Legions (which the *Romans* had left for the guard of *Capua* against the *Samnites*) who had resolved to sacke the *Capuans*, the Senate hauing giuen charge to *Rutilius* the new Consull to preuent it; to kill them asleepe, he caused and commaunded it to bee proclaimed, that the Senate had decreed they should continue there still in Garrison:

Of the punishment of conspiracies,

So as hoping they should alwayes haue time to execute their designes, they deferr'd it. But when they saw that they separated them, sending some one way, some another, they resolved to put it in execution as they did: The which they would not haue done, if after this first policy they had taken order to haue beene the stronger before they had diuided them. Wherefore a Prince that wil haue time to discouer or punish a Treason, hee must cause the conspirators to haue an opinion to finde a more fit occasion to execute their designes: And he must not be rash in such things, if the danger be not apparant in staying. For the punishment is made for two principall ends. The first is to free himselfe of such dangerous persons; and the second to terrifie others by the example of punishment, from attempting the like. Whereas by haste the Prince not onely looses the fruits of the punishment; but also he hazards his person.

And although that punishments seeme necessary; yet if the subiect or the condition of the businesse be such, as mildnesse and clemency may bring more reputation and safety to the Prince, then the impunity of the danger, he shall doe well to shew it in such an action. *Augustus* pardoned *Cunia* three times, and by the last assured his life more then he had done by the punishment of all others, whom he had caused to be executed for the like attempts. The vnexpected Clemency of a Prince to some one, the which proceeds not from feare and cowardize, doth not onely binde him to be faithfull, but doth mollifie the bitterness of his Enemy, who grow the more incensed by punishments; the which being held vnjust, by such as hold the same opinion of the Prince with the vndertakers, they thinke it lawfull to be reuenged, as they would be of an iniury or some violence done to the Publique, or to some priuate person.



CHAP. 17.

*Of the treason of Places, Townes, and Armies,
and other forces of the Estate : and of the
remedies to prevent the effect.*

BY the Treasons which are practised vpon strong places, or vpon Townes of importance, or vpon Armies or principall forces, Estates are brought to their ruine. The onely remedy is in the fore-sight, by meanes of the choice which they shall make of those to whom they shall giue the command : And he must haue a speciall care to choose men that are not couetous, ambitious, cunning, or dissemblers, light, or inconstant; or easily subiect to discontentments; or men that haue great support and credit, and are vndertakers.

Hauiug thus provided for the Election you must not so ioyne the authority of command with the forces in one man, as when you would you shall not be able to separate them : And not onely he which hath the Authority, but also they which command the particular forces, must depend immediately of the Prince, with charge notwithstanding to obey him, to whom the Prince hath giuen the authority of command, vnlesse hee receiue a Counter command. And it is of no force to say, that if they which are to depend not wholly vpon him that is to command them, he cannot answere for that which they giue him in charge. For if the Prince trusts him, hee must likewise trust; and watching ouer the forces, aduertize him if they doe not as they ought, and doe not obey that which is commanded them according to the duty of his charge.

Some in like manner (as I haue formerly sayd) haue

held it fit, not to continue great commands in owne man, especially in one place, whereby the custome of obeying him, the Subjects may tie themselves too strictly to him, and giue him meanes to dispose of the Prouince where he commands. These are the remedies to preuent the greatest treasons: For the rest which are made by intelligences with petty companions, as in corrupting a Centinell or a Corporall that shall be in guard to seaze vpon a Port, they may easily auoide it, in drawing the guards by lot, and by the care and dilligence of the Captaines. And if they be aduertized of some practice which the Enemy makes with the Souldiers and Inhabitants of a Towne, they may cause some to make shew to be of the intelligence, who addressing themselves to those whom they haue reason to distrust, they may easily discover the truth.



CHAP. 18.

Of Rebellions, and of the meanes to preuent them.

Conspiracies and Treasons are most commonly secret and hidden, and are plotted by few men, the which makes them more difficult to discouer, and more easie to punish. Contrariwise Rebellions and Factions are made more openly; but as they cannot be attempted without great numbers, so they are with more difficulty pacified and punished; and doe more usually draw after them the ruine of the Estate then the former. But to know how a Prince ought to gouerne himselfe in a Rebellion, he must consider whether he be stronger or weaker then the Rebels; and he must hold himselfe the weaker, although they were equall in forces; for that he may not hazard his authority vpon a doubtfull euent, as it is
ordinary

ordinary among equals. If hee bee the stronger, hee must preuent it in the beginning speedily and secretly; cutting off the Heads and chiefe Commanders, before they know they are taken; and then present himselfe with courage to suppress it, to the end he may amaze the Rebels. And if he be farre from the place where the Rebellion is made, he must approach; as the Emperour *Charles* the fift did, who passed from *Spaine* into *Flanders*, to suppress the rebellion of the *Gantois*, the which succeeded happily. For to abandon the place where the Rebellion begins, or to retire farre from it is held a feare, the which blemish and impaire the credit & authority of the Prince, and encourage the heads of the party, and makes the People more bold and insolent. But if he findes not himselfe the stronger, and to haue some great aduantage; without retiring himselfe too farre from the place where the Rebellion is made, he must make shew to haue a will to yeeld to that which the people desire of him, to giue them time to grow cold; especially if they haue no Commanders of credit and authority.

Sometime a small matter may be able to reduce a people to their duty: And in such Encounters subtile and inuentive spirits are fit, as likewise those which are popular and eloquent, to entertaine and to draw a mutinous multitude to their duty, by feare, distrust, and hope. That familiar and popular course which *Menenius Agrippa* obserued with the people of *Rome*, by a Comparison of the diuision of the members from a humane body, succeeded better to pacifie them, then if hee had false vpon more serious reasons. The inuention which *Calatinus* the *Capuan* made vse of, to saue the Senators of *Capoua* from the hands of the people, was no lesse witty: For ioyning himselfe to their party, and applauding them in all things, seeing them resolute to put their Senators to death, hee propounded vnto them that they should begin first with him that was most odious

vnto them, but withall he let them know that the Estate must not remaine without gouernment, & that before they put him to death, they must make choice of some other in his place. So not able to agree, and passing from one to another, they found that they whom they meant to put to death, were much better then the others whom they intended to choose in their places : And so the people were pacified.

Sometimes in such mutinies and combustions, they haue made vse of the occasion of an Eclipse, or of some extraordinary signe from Heauen, or of some vnexpected misfortune ; wherewith the people being toucht and amazed, suffer themselues to be perswaded to returne to their duties. A Man of authority and credit with the people, may preuaile much in such occasions. *Soderin* Arch-Bishop of *Florence*, coming forth in publique with his Pontificall Robes and his Clergie pacified the *Florentins*, who were in combustion one against another. And as in some places Preachers haue beene the Firebrands of sedition, and the trumpets of Warre, in others they haue serued to pacifie them, and they haue made good vse of them. But if the people cannot be suddenly reclaimed, and that the popular mutinie passeth into Rebellion and a settled reuolte : you must then seeke to reduce them by degrees, disuniting theih, and gayning some of the commanders vnderhand, by promises and benefits ; or putting them in distrust of the people, and in ieaousie one of another.

If neither of these remedies will preuaile, hee must yeild to that which the people demand, either in all, or in part : For that loue and reputation being the foundation of the Princes Authority, if the Prince in yeilding seemes to diminish his reputation in some sort, yet thereby hee shall preserue the affection of the people, who being pacified, he may by other meanes recouer his reputation. And yet in such occurrents he may so carry himselfe, and vse such dexterity, that accommodating him-

himselfe mildly to the peoples inclination, he shall seeme to grant that willingly which they extort from him by force; being necessary that the Prince to maintaine his authority, make shewe to will and desire that which hee cannot hinder, and so to apply his will to his power. And to the end he may make it knowne that it is a thing which he desires, he must seeke to draw some apparant advantage for his greatnesse: There being few actions in the Estate, from which the Prince either in effect or in shew may not draw some advantage; although in another thing he be damnified: And it shall be a part of Wisedome to shew himselfe more ioyfull of the advantage which he receiues, then discontented for the disadvantage which his Enemies sought to procure him.

The *Turkish* Emperours although they be powerfull, haue beene many times constrayned to yeeld some of their Ministers to the *Janizaries* to be put to death: The which a well aduised Prince should neuer doe, if his Ministers had not otherwise highly offended; but seeing himselfe reduced to this extremity, he should giue them meanes to escape, yet dissembling that it is with his consent. For besides that it were a cruell Iniustice, to deliuer an innocent man into the hands of a furious multitude, the shame will redowne vpon him, with a disdain, and a distrust of all others, whom hee should call to serue him, who will rather gouerne themselves, according to the will of those which had credit with the people, then to his desire. But if the Ministers are found to haue carried themselves ill, the Prince may take this occasion to cause them to be punished by Iustice, to pacifie a popular mutinie: Although it were more discreetly done to preuent it, then to stay vntill hee were vrged to doe that by force, which for his owne good he should haue formerly done.



CHAP. 19.

*Of Factions and of the meanes to hinder
the effects.*

THere remaineth now to speake of Factions, for the last and most ordinary causes for the ruine of Estates. They are seldome framed among the people, vnlesse great men be of the party : For they grow eyther from the priuate quarrells of great men, who imbarque the people on their sides ; or from the subiect of some reformation ; or for the gouernment of publique affaires. If they grow from particular quarells, the Prince must speedily force them to referre the cause to his Iudges, or to Arbitrators, without making shewe to fauour the one more then the other. This was that which King *Francis* the first did, in the suit depending betwixt Madame *Lonyse* his Mother and *Charles* Duke of *Bourbon*, who reuolted vpon this subiect.

But if the controuersie cannot be reconciled, for that the proofes faile on the one side, although that by strong presumptions, the fact be in some sort apparent ; or if it concernes the honour of one of the parties in the decision of the businesse : the Prince must separate them, imploying them out of his Estate in some honourable charges, the one farre from the other ; And hee must Entertayne them thus diuided, vntill that eyther their credit bee diminished with the people, or that time hath made them forget, or at the least temper their hatred. If (as it happens often) to the priuate quarrells of great Men, they adde some publique pretext, as of reformation, Liberty or Religion : The Prince not able to hinder the course of these factions, hee must ioyne with the stronger to
ruine

Ruine the weaker : Whercin hauing once preuailed, he must free himselfe by diuers meanes (yet lawfull) of the cheife Commanders with whom hee had ioyned, eyther imploying them out of the Estate, or causing them to bee punished for their priuate offences.

But if the Prince comes not in time to ruine the one nor the other, for that they are equall, and that his Counterpease cannot waigh downe the ballance; hee must attend, that by the Euent of some misfortune to the one, they may find the weaknesse of that side, to ruine him wholly. Yet if in this case the heads of the Factions, and not the Prince, bee to reape the Honour and fruits of the Victory of one of the two partyes; the Prince shall doe more wisely to ballance the one with the other, and to make himselfe rather an Arbitrator or a Iudge of their pretentions, then a party : For that hee should make himselfe to those, against whom hee should declare himselfe : and should not thereby gayne any Authority or credit amongst those, whose party hee should imbrace, into the which hee should not be receiued by the partizans, but to countenance their designs, and not for any affection they beare him, hauing already ingaged themselues to him, who had first aduanced his standard, and had presented himselfe vnto them to bee their Leader, and to assist them in their designs; And they will attribute to the credit of their Commander, that which the Prince should afterwards doe for them.

The principall Remedy must bee vsed in the beginning : For that when as the parties are once framed, the Prince must rather study how hee may liue in this corruption of State, then to thinke of the meanes how to take it away. For if eyther of the parties haue an aduantage, hee will not abandon his Armes, vntill
he

he haue ruined his opposite : wherein the Prince shall haue a double losse ; the one is he shall lose a great part of his Subiects ; the other is, that the head of the faction being fortified with credit, he may cause him to lose the rest, and vsurpe his Estate. But if both parties be equal, they will containe themselves through the feare they haue one of another. And the Prince hath no other remedy, then to breed a ieaousie and distrust among the Commanders of one and the same party, making many equall in in honour and dignity, to the end they may not agree to obey any other Head then the Prince ; or aduancing some of those which obey the Heads of parties, to greater dignities then their Generals, to the end they may disdain to obey them. This must be practised with such as haue many followers.

THE



THE
COVNSELLOR
OF ESTATE. OR,
A COLLECTION OF
the greatest and most Remarkable
Considerations serving for the Man-
aging of Publicke Affaires.

PART. III.
CONTAYNING THE MEANES
to increase an ESTATE.

CHAPTER I.
*Of the increasing of an Estate by the en-
larging of Townes.*



N Estate is increased either by multiplying
or husbanding that which is our owne, or
by adding vnto it, and drawing vnto vs To increase
that which is another mans, by lawfull our owne by
meanes. Our owne is multiplied either by our owne.
manuring the land; or by enlarging of Townes, especi-
ally those which may serue for defence, and to make head
against

against an enemy; or in taking care of the procreation, breeding vp, and education of Children: In regard of the manuring of the Land and that which depends thereon, it hath beene recommended formerly, in treating of the wealth and the reuenues of the Estate.

Diuers meanes
to enlarge
and ampie
Townes.

As for the enlarging and amplifying of Townes, it is done after diuers manners, either in drawing together people dispersed here and there in the Fields, in many scattered Houses and Villages, and reducing them into one place, as *Thescus* did at *Athens*, and as they say it is practized at *Brazeels*, as well to Ciuillize that people, as to haue the better meanes to instruct them in the Christian Faith: Or else people fearing the inuasion of some strange Nation, haue reduced themselves into some place that was strong of Scituation. By this meanes *Venice* was amplyfied and built. The ancient *Spaniards* retired themselves to the Mountaines of *Biscay* and *Aragon*, when as the *Moors* held *Spaine*. The *Persians* flying before *Tamberlaine*, some retired themselves to Mount *Taurus*: others to *Anti-Taurus*, and some to the Ilands of the *Caspian* Sea, where they peopled many Townes. *Pisa* was enlarged by the Ruines of *Genona*, when it was sacked by the *Sarrasins*. The coming of *Atilla* was the cause of the beginning and foundation of *Venice*, the greatest part of the best families of *Italy* being retired into the Townes of the *Adriatique* Sea, to auoyd the fury of so powerfull an Enemy. *London* and many Townes in *England* haue beene peopled by *French* and *Flemmings*, being chased out of their Countries in regard of their Religion.

The pleasant-
nesse of townes.

The pleasantnesse and beauty of some Townes, for their Scituation or their buildings, haue drawne many to frequent them. The structure of the *Pyramides* in *Alexandria*, the bounty of the Aire of *Mitilene*, *Smirna*, and *Rhodes*, made many *Romans* resolute to leaue
Rome,

Rome, and to make their abode there : The which hath beene the cause of the increase and amplyfying of those places. But profit is that which drawes most Men to live in a place : The which although it bee of diuers sorts, yet it proceeds from three principall causes, the which must concur for the enlarging of a Towne; The commodity of the scituation, the fertility of the Countrey; and the facility of commerce.

Profit drawes Men wonderfully to live in townes.

Principall causes of profit in a towne.

The commodity of the Scituation consists in two things ; the one to send forth that whereof wee haue aboundance ; and the other to receiue that from others which wee want, which two must concur together in one place, to people it and make it great. Otherwise if it were but a simple passage, it would not be enlarged no more then the Ilands of the *Terceres*, the which although they serue the *Portugalls* for a passage to the *Indies*, yet are they nothing the better peopled : And *Flushing*, although it bee a great Hauens, where many Ships arriue ; Yet it is but a very small Towne. Whereas *Venice*, *Lisbone*, *Genova*, and *Antwerpe*, hauing both Commodities ioyned together, haue made themselves great.

The commodity of the Scituation.

The fertility of the Neighbour Countrie, makes not a Towne to bee the better peopled, but helpes to maintaine it being peopled from other places : For wee haue seene and see daily, many Townes Scituated in a barren soile, as *Genova*, who haue made and maintained themselves great : Necessity sharpening and quickening the Inhabitants spirits to labour and industrie.

The fertility of the Countrey.

The facility of commerce proceeds from the easie transportation of Marchandize, be it by water or by land, in a plaine Countrey or a hilly, they hauing the commodity of carriages : Yet the conduct by water is more easie & of lesse charge. A nauigable water is either by Sea, or riuers, or lakes, or chānels, made with mens hands with some stops;

Of the facility of commerce.

or

or Pooles, as that of *Niree* in *Egypt*, which they write, had fifty Miles in compasse. But of al the transportation by water, that by Sea is much more commodious and profitable : And the Towne which hath it, and is accompanied with a good Port, whereas Ships may ride safely from winds and the violence of stormes, may make it selfe great with little industrie.

Religion a
meanes to en-
large a Towne.

Religion hath sometimes serued to inlarge the City of *Ierusalem* : For the *Iewes* sacrifice being Celebrated onely there, euery Man ranne thither, and many made choice of it for their abode : And many Villages haue of late beene made Townes, in regard of the Religion which they haue tyed vnto them by Pilgrimages.

The Establish-
ment of
Schools and
Vniuersities.

The erecting of Schooles and Vniuersities, of all sorts of Sciences, haue serued others to amplyfie them, being a meanes which Princes haue practised, not onely to stay their Subjects, who going to study out of their Estate, carry forth the money, and bring home strong manners, most commonly pernicious to their Countrey ; but also to people those places where their Elections were made, by the succours of their Subjects and strangers.

The Erection
of Seats of
Justice.

The Election in like manner of some Seats of Iustice, whose Iurisdiction hath a great extent, and is well peopled, may also serue : Especially in that sort as it is vled in most of the Estates of Christendome, where they must spend much time, and disburse much money to recouer their owne. For the frequentation of those which come from abroad, with their long stay, cannot but bring great meanes which remains there. The Erecting also of Manufactures, if there bee any, or of stufes, which are particular to a Towne, and sought for by others, may also increase it. Some Townes haue beene peopled by the exemptions and priuiledges of Princes, who haue drawne Inhabitants from all parts : They vfed this meanes to people New-Hauen ; and the

Erecting of
Manufactures.

Duke

Duke of *Tuscany* doth the like for *Linorne*. The residence and the abode of the Nobility & Gentry in Townes, ^{Residence of the Nobility.} serves likewise to enlarge and amplify them. For besides that such Townes are commonly better built; the Nobility are more curious to have policy entertained, then when it is composed onely of Merchants, who dreaming onely of their gaine, and to doe their businesse, have most commonly little care of the Publique, vntlesse there bee many rich men which haue the gouernment: For then the wealth and commodity which they enioy, giues them the same courage with the gentry, and they gouerne themselves after the same manner. But besides this, the Prince must assist them with some publique Reuenues to that effect. The comparison of the Townes of *Italy* with those of *France*, shews what difference there is betwixt Townes inhabited by Gentlemen, and those which are not. And the Townes of *Flanders* and *Germany*, which are in the hands of rich Merchants, yeeld nothing in beauty to those of *Italy*.

The residence and abode of the Prince for a long time ^{The residence of the Prince.} in one Towne, doth much encrease and amplify it; whereof the example is but too familiar in all Estates: And the reason is for that the affaires and the treasure are brought thither as to its Center; the which doth not onely draw those which are necessary for the Princes seruice, but also Merchants and Artizans, who goe where there is commodity and gaine.



CHAP. 3.

Of the increase of an Estate by the Procreation of Children.

BUt they strive in vaine to increase an Estate by the manuring of the Land, and peopling of Townes, if they doe not provide to husband it, and to fauour the generation, breeding vp, and education of Children; being the onely meanes we haue of our owne, to people both Countries and Townes. *Augustus* after the Ciuill warre, found this care not onely worthy of himselfe, but necessary for the Estate, propounding great priuiledges to such as had three Children, and yet to fauour a single life as much as might be.

Of Poligamy.

Some people haue thought they had provided well by *Poligamy*, allowing one man to haue many Wiues; as well not to tye the fruitfulnessse of a man, to the barrennessse of one Wife, as to multiply generation: Yet experience hath taught vs, that whether that a man being employed in many places, cannot commonly get Children which liue long; or not able to extend the care of a Father to so many Children through necessity, or otherwise they cannot a taine to ripe age; the Countrey which make vse of Poligamie, finde not themselues better peopled then others. The *Turkes* raise greater Armies then the *Christians*, but this growes from the extent of the Countrey which they possesse, for that they make no other profession but Armes. For he that shall compare the people which is now in *Greece*, with that which it was before the *Turke* entred, shall finde it much lesse peoled then it hath beene.


Of Celibate.

It is true that Celibate or a single life indifferently allowed

ed to all sorts of men, is many times the cause of the decay of people in an Estate. *Charlemaigne* being borne in an Age full of deuotion, in the which the greatest Men made themselves Monckes or Clergie Men, although that otherwise hee was much respectiue to that which concernes Religion, hee held it not fit to suffer any one that would, to make himselfe a Moncke. For besides that you may not allow good Men to abandon the Estate, it is a meanes in making profession of a single life to loose the race. Good Men come from good, and the valliant as they say produce their like; and therefore they must make vse of them for the good of the Estate. But as a single life is seemely for men of the Church, and that there must bee some: it seemes necessary to cut off, or at the least to hinder heereafter this infinite number, which vnfurnish the State of Men which would be very conuenient and fit for other places, and who for the most part become a scandall and reproach to the Church; Experience shewing sufficiently, that such an excessive multitude, is not capable to bee reduced to its first order and institution: And whereas a small number well entertayned may edifie by their example, this great number incapable of discipline ruines all, and are a shame to their Mother which hath brought them forth and entertayned them.

But for that many times they make vse of their retreates, rather to discharge Families which are poore, then for any deuotion, for the which they were cheifly instituted; and likewise that an infinite company of poore are kept from marrying, least they should leaue their children miserable: It seemes that the erecting of Seminaries in all professions, (which we haue formerly mentioned) should preuent this feare & the incōueniēces which it breeds; letting them in such sort, as no one should want a retreat

nor entertaynment in serving the Publike: whence would grow its encrease, and the peace of Families. These are the meanes to encrease and multiply our owne; by our owne.



CHAP. 3.

Of the encrease of an Estate by the Union of another Mans to ours.

Divers meanes
to vnite ano-
ther mans to
ours.

Protection of
the weaker.

THe lawfull meanes to draw another mans, and to vnite it to our owne, are of many sorts: The *Romans* knew how to manauge them with great wisedome and dexterity. The first whereof they made vse, was to draw and vnite vnto them the people whom they had conquered; as they did them of *Alba* and the *Sabins*. The second was to ruine the Neighbour Citties, and by this meanes force the Inhabitants to retire to *Rome*. The third, to grant the right of *Romane* Burgeses, to the greatest and most powerfull of their Neighbours, vniting them by this meanes to their Estate, and binding them to the defence thereof. The fourth to treat equall alliances vnder the name of Society, as with the *Latins*; or vnder the name of Friendship; as with the Kings of *Egypt* and *Asia*. They haue also made vse to increase their Estate by the protection of the weaker; as they did taking that of *Capoua* against the *Samnites*, and of *Messina* against *Hieron* and the *Carthaginians*.

Some Princes of our time haue made good vse of this meanes, hauing changed the protection into an absolute Seignoury, some vnder colour of the disloyalty of the *Anones*; others by the consent of the *Anories* themselues; Some vppon pretext, that they had not beene satisfi- ed, certaine summes of money which they had imployed for the Defence thereof: And some for the onely con-

consideration of conueniencie, and to serue for a defence to their Estate.

The *Romans* haue also made vse for their encrease, of the benefite of Kings, their Friends, and Allies, who haue made them heires of their Kingdome by Testament, as *Attalus* King of *Asia* did; and *Anichomede* King of *Bythinia*. The *Genois* had *Pera* in gift from *Michael Paleologue* Emperour of *Constantinople*. *Cabo Ioanin*, likewise Emperour of *Constantinople*, gaue *Metillin* to *Francis Cataguse*, a *Genois*. The *Venetians* had *Veggia* from *John Phano*; *Francis Forse* had *Sauonne* from *Lewis* the Eleuenth. The Emperour *Fredericke* the third, gaue *Modena* and *Rhegium* to *Borso* Duke of *Ferrara*: The *French* Kings haue had *Dauphinie* by the Donation of *Humber* the last *Dauphin*; and *Prouence* by the Testament of *Charles* of *Aniou* the last Earle of *Prouence*.

Other Princes haue enlarged their Estate in purchasing from their Neighbours that which lay conuenient for them, there being no Traffique more beneficiall, nor more honourable to a Prince, then to purchase that which cannot bee valued. Pope *Clement* the sixt, tooke *Anignon* and the County of *Venice*, in payment of the arrerages due by *Ioane* the first, Queene of *Naples*, and Countesse of *Prouence*, in regard of the pension which shee ought for *Sicily*; Others haue written for the Realme of *Tunis*. *Sforse Attendulo* had *Catigola* from Pope *John* the thirteenth. The *Florentins* had *Arrezo* from the Seignour of *Cesse*, for forty thousand *Florens* of Gold; and *Liurne* from *Thomas Fregose* for one hundred and twenty thousand Duckets. They haue also purchased *Cortona* for *Ladislaus* King of *Naples*, and *Pisa* from *Gabriel Visconte*.

Some haue taken their Neighbours Estate in Mort-Engagements.

gage, the which lying conveniently for them, they haue not restored, the ingagement being past into a meere alienation. The Electors of the Empire, sold their voyces to the Emperour *Charles* the fourth, to choose his Sonne *Venceslaus* King of the *Romans*, for one hundred thousand Crownes a peece, the which the Emperour being vnable to pay, hee ingaged vnto them sixteene imperiall Townes, the which they haue euer since enjoyed with the Title of Soueraignty. *Lewes* the Eleuenth of *France*, held in Mortgage the County of *Ronsillon*, from *John* King of *Aragon* for foure hundred thousand Crownes, the which King *Charles* the Eight yeelded vp afterwards for nothing: whereby hee lost an occasion to enlarge his Territories: But hee had a better conscience then the *Florentins*, who retained *Borgo Di San Sepulchro*, which Pope *Eugenius* the Fourth had pawned vnto them for five and twenty thousand Crownes. The *Polonians* retaine *Liuonia* by engagement, for sixe hundred thousand Crownes, which they disbursed in the Warre made for the *Tenton* Order, against the Duke of *Muscovie*, in the Yeare 1558. But since the Warre was ended, they neyther speake of re-emburment nor restitution.

By Marriages and Alliances the Prince may likewise enlarge his Estate, the house of *Austria*, which comes from the Earles of *Asburge* in *Switzerland*, who were about foure hundred yeares since of little accompt, haue by this meanes encreased in Estate, as wee see at this day: That is to say, by the Marriage of *Itha*, Heire to *Raoul* of *Pulendorfe*; of *Bergantia*, with *Albert* of *Asburge* Surnamed the Rich; of *Hettingis* Heire to *Vlrich* *Liburg*, Landgraue of *Alsacie*, with *Albert* called the Wise, Sonne to *Albert* the Rich; of *Elizabeth* Heire of *Aufrea*, *Carnithia*, *Tirol*, and *Corieya* with the Emperour *Albert* the First; of *Mary* the Heire of *Burgondy*, *Flanders*, *Brabant*,

Brabant, and other Prouinces of the *Netherlands*, with the Emperour *Maximillion* the first; Of *Ioane* the Heire of *Castille*, *Aragon*, *Sicily*, and *Naples*, with *Philip* Arch-duke of *Austria*; Of *Anne*, the Heire of *Hungary* and *Bohemia*, with the Emperour *Ferdinand*, Brother to *Charles* the Fift; And of *Isabel* of *Portugal*, Mother to *Philip* the Second, King of *Spaine*, with *Charles* the Fift. This example shall suffice to verifie the increase of Estates in a Prince by this meanes. Adoption is another kinde of portion, by meanes whereof they of *Anjou*, and afterwards they of *Aragon* haue beene made Kings of *Naples* and *Sicily*, hauing beene adopted by *Ioane*. A doption.


The *Polonians* haue enlarged their Estate by the election of their Kings, choosing them among the neighbour Princes who had their Estate neere vnto them: and so they of the house of *Iagellon* being called to gouerne their Estate, they haue wrought so as they haue ioyned *Lithuania* vnto it, whereof they of *Iagellon* were Dukes, and in making the Nobility of *Prussia*, and *Podolia*, equall to that of *Polonia*, they haue increased and assured their Estate with these two Prouinces; But to returne to the Election, if it be a Prince which seekes by this meanes to increase himselfe, hee must not so much relye vpon the inclination of the people, and the considerations which they may haue for their priuate advantage; but hee must bring that which may assist and helpe him in this pursuite, as Money, Force, and Intelligences: Especially if there be Competitors, who are to make vse of the like meanes, and that the affaires and persons are thereunto disposed. Election.

The ordinary course in the Election of Popes, is to giue their voice to that Cardinall which is most in credit, ioyning thereunto the consideration of priuate Interest, of Friendship, and the remembrance of Bonds

for benefits received, with hope to be fauoured for the same election by him to whom he giues his voice, if he happens to faile of it. But as they which run a Race, many times hinder one another, and whilst they strue, a third man gets to the Marke before them; so commonly we see, that they whom they thinke should be preferred before the rest, sticke fast by the way: Wherefore they must not onely relye vpon credit. *Charles of Austrea*, who after was chosen Emperour, to attaine vnto this Dignity, he not onely distributed two hundred thousand Crownes among the Electors, (as King *Francis* had done for his part) but hee caused Leuies of Souldiers to bee made in *Germany*, and his Army being ready, he made it approach to *Frankford*, vnder colour to keepe the Election from being forced; whereby hee encouraged his owne party, and caused them to yeeld vnto him which wauered, and he terrified *Brandeburge*, who held the party of *France*, so as hee durst not discouer his intentions. As for practizes, *Charles* carried himselfe more cunningly then *Francis* the first, for hauing first of all laboured for the exclusion of *Francis*, he had thereby assured himselfe of the Electors, who he knew would neuer agree to choose one amongst themselves, by reason of their emulations and dissentions; and that opposing one against another, they which should be excluded, would more willingly giue their voices to a third man, then to him that had opposed against them. Contrariwise the *French* Embassadors labouring not for the exclusion of *Charles*, but feeding themselves with the hope which the Arch-bishop of *Mentz*, and the Marquesse of *Brandeburge* gaue them, that this election would succeed to the benefit of King *Francis*, remained abused, wherein Pope *Leo* did in some sort helpe, yet contrary to his intention: For although he desired not that King *Francis* should be made Emperour, no more then the King of *Spaine*, but some third person, he entertained the first with hope, to the end that when
he

he should see himselfe wholly excluded, despite should make him imploy his practizes against the King of *Spaine* in fauour of some *Germans*, and that hauing purchased no credit with him, he might not grow distasted, but might then fauour this designe openly.

We will therefore conclude, that in euery Election the first consideration must be, to labour for the exclusion of Competitors; being certaine that many will sooner agree for the exclusion of one, then they will for the Election of another; and yet ingaging them by this meanes to offend the Competitors, you bind them to thinke no more of them. But if many agree to reiect you, you must haue recourse to time, and delay the Election as much as may be, to the end they may grow weary and separate themselves.



CHAP. 4.

Of the encrease of an Estate by Conquest.

BVt the most ordinary meanes to enlarge an Estate, is by Conquest: And to attaine vnto it you must know how to attempt it, to make warre and to auoide it.

Of the enterprize of Warre.

For the Enterprize of warre, you must fly two things: Injustice and rashnesse. To the end the Warre may bee iust, he that vndertakes it must be a Soueraigne, and the cause and end must be iust. The iust causes to make War are our owne defence, and that of our Friends: the reuenge of our iniuries and theirs: The iust pretentions we may haue to an Estate, and our Diuines adde not only the defence of our Religion, but its aduancement and propagation by the way of Armes, and some the extirpation and rooting out of a contrary: But others hold that Warre is a bad meanes to plant piety.

The iust causes of a Warre.

As

A Warre must
be vndertaken
with discretion,
and not rashly.

As for rashnesse he must likewise auoide it: and for this effect before he resolue to warre, he must see eyther some apparent profit, or that he is forced by some great necessity, but aboue all things before he vndertakes it, he must assure his Estate both within and without. Within, in giuing contentment to his subiects, iustifying his taking Armes, and making them to allow of it, to the end that if neede be, they may assist him: without in renewing the Leagues with such as may assist vs, or annoy our Enemies, or with those that may succour them, diuerting them from their Friendship. They must also resolue, whether is most profitable, either to make warre by Sea, or by Land, or by both, and in what place. Wherein although there be no generall Rule, yet it would be of great aduantage to strike rather at the head, then at the armes or legges; and at the place where the Head of the State remaines, then at any part more remote. As likewise he must consider the place where the Enemy feares most to be inuaded. The which the *French* vnto this day, (in the Warres which they haue had with the *Spaniards*) haue little obserued. For by many examples it may be verified, that the thing which the *Spaniards* haue feared most, was lest the *French* should inuade him by *Spaine*. King *Ferdinand* of *Aragon*, although he were inuaded by the County of *Roussillon*, and was then stronger then the *French*, yet he would not entertayne the Warre vpon this frontier, as *Guichardin* sayth. And the same Author writes, that the said King hauing taken *Nauarre*, more by the amazement which the *English* forces gaue, then by his owne, he would proceede no farther; holding it no discretion to begin a Warre on the other side of the Mountaines with the *French* King, lest hee should remaine in the subiection of the people and great men of *Spaine*, who being armed within the Countrey, might haue sought to aduance their owne Estate: And therefore seeing

seeing the forces of *France* turne towards *Italy*, hee dismist his Army which was vpon the frontier of *Nauarre*, without inuading *France* as hee had promised to his Colleagues, being vnited for the defence of *Italy* against King *Francis* the first.

It serues for no purpose to pretend to the contrary, the bad successe of the voyages of *Perpigneau* and *Nauarre* by the *French*: For in effect there is no History which doth not attribute that misfortune to the want of fore-sight and negligence of our Kings, and to the bad conduct of their Ministers: For admit they should not finde victuals sufficient in *Spaine* to entertaine their Army, yet *France* which ioynes to this Frontier, is not so needy, nor so farre off, but by Sea or Land they might be easily relieued, and *Spaine* on that side being more barren, it is certaine that the want will be greater for the *Spaniard* then for the *French*.

But to returne to generall considerations, they must fore-see and prouide for all the inconueniences which may happen in such an Enterprize, waighing exactly, and comparing our forces with those of the Enemy. And for that a Prince doth seldome conquer by force onely, hee must obserue if there be in the Estate which he meanes to inuade, any of those defects which is sayd might serue for the ruine of Estates, to the end he may make vse of them.

To make Warre, hee must haue recourse to Military wisdom and iudgement, which deserues a more ample discourse, and therefore I will now leaue it. But to auoide Warre, one of the principall considerations is, to embrace a fit time to treat a Peace to his aduantage: And therefore hee must not haue an obstinate desire wholly to conquer a Prouince, what hope soeuer good Fortune hath giuen him, but hee must study how to make profit of his aduantages, and to assure

assure that by peace which he hath conquered : In imitation of the *Turke* who holding this Maxime hath neuer restored any thing of Importance which hee hath gotten ; but all remaining in his possession , in lesse then three hundred yeares hee hath built an Empire fearefull to all his Neighbours.

But the consideration a Prince ought to haue in his encrease , is that hee make his profit of it ; it many times falling out , that if an Estate newly conquered , be not gouerned with great discretion and Iudgment, it doth rather weaken , then make the new conquerour more powerfull, especially if this encrease, ministers matter of iealousie to the Neighbour Princes : For thence grew many designs and Leagues against him. Thus drawing into consideration the aduantages of a conquest, he must likewise haue a care of the meanes to maintaine and preserue it, whereof we haue formerly spoken.

FINIS.

